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The purpose of this study is to document and analyse the 
transformation of UK fisheries policy between 1967 and 1983. This 
transformation encompassed changes in the administrative arrangements 
made for the conduct of fisheries policy, and to some extent in the 
tools used in fisheries management, but centred principally around 
the shift from narrow limits to UK fisheries jurisdiction (twelve 
miles - see page 81) to wide ones (two hundred miles). In the 
process the fishery regime over the principal grounds fished by UK 
vessels moved from a High Seas regime to an appropriated one. A 
regime is defined in the sense that it is used by Mason, as "a set of 
rules together with the administrative arrangements for their 
implementation and enforcement which, it is hoped and intended, will 
have an important, if not a determining, effect on the allocation of 
resources" ■*-. Such a definition seems more appropriate to fisheries 
issues than that of Keohane and Nye , since the nature of the 
administrative arrangements adopted seems largely to be a direct 
consequence of the exclusivity of state authority over a fishery. 
This determines entry to a fishery (the number of vessels attracted), 
the success and nature of the regulation of fishing capacity and 
effort, and the identity of the authority making and enforcing 
conservation regulations.
Since fisheries is a resource, one might expect the central 
assumptions of fisheries policy to be concerned with the allocation
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of that resource. In practice that is not so. The natural habitat 
of human beings is terrestial, and the state system has developed 
with reference to authority over land territory. Hence, marine 
fisheries, except close to shores, exist in an area which is 
potentially international in that it is not so open to seizure and to 
human settlement as the land. Inter-state relations on fisheries 
policy have not centred on the nature of the resource, but upon the 
rights and duties of states, and as such upon their rights in 
relation to a wide variety of marine activities, rights largely 
defined in relation to areas of ocean rather than in relation to an 
individual resource or activity.
A High Seas regime is predicated upon a theoretical freedom of 
fishing enjoyed by all states (and thus incidentally by their 
citizens). An appropriated regime, on the other hand, confers the 
right of fishing only upon citizens of particular states, specified 
by intergovernmental or international arrangements entered into by 
the state to which the law of the sea, by custom or convention, 
accords jurisdiction over the fishery. Under such a regime, rights 
may be conferred upon individuals or firms rather than upon states.
In the case of the UK, the move to an appropriated fishery has been 
complicated by membership of the EEC. The arrangements for the 
continuation of the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Economic 
Community, agreed by the Council of Ministers in January 1983, 
accorded the right of fishing within the UK fisheries zone to 
citizens of all state members of that Community, and entrusted the 
European Commission with the task of monitoring stock levels and
making recommendations about catches. It is possible that the 
Commission might in the future strengthen its authority, and extend 
its dealings with individual fishermen through the issue of licences, 
and that the intermediate role of states might decline: but this is 
probably a function more of the general level of success of the 
Community in harmonising the policies and aspirations of its member 
states than of anything specific to fisheries.
Since the emphasis of this study is upon the move from narrow to wide 
limits of fisheries jurisdiction, it addresses the factors underlying 
and contributing to that move. Regimes are the product of power 
relationships between states, and of the relative costs and benefits, 
for the powerful states within a system, of regime stability and of 
regime change. Therefore, in attempting to ascertain the reasons 
for the UK's moving from enthusiastic support of narrow limits to 
coastal state fisheries jurisdiction to strong advocacy, at least 
within the EEC, of the treatment of fishery resources as part of the 
natural endowment of the coastal state, this study examines the 
increasing costs imposed upon the UK by the narrow limits regime.
It is perhaps self-evident that states' support for or opposition to 
a regime is primarily determined by strategic factors, but there can 
be few issue areas where this tautology is better illustrated than 
that of fisheries, since it was Britain's traditional concern for 
"the freedom of the seas", primarily for the freedom of navigation of 
merchant and naval vessels, which determined HMG's support for the 
narrow limits policy. Lowi  ^distinguishes between high, low and 
sectoral policy, whereby the fundamental strategic concerns of a 
state (high policy) take precedence over other areas of policy. 
These other areas are either general but less crucial to the survival
of the state (low policy) or of a technical nature and of interest 
primarily to a specialist sector of society (sectoral policy). The 
technical rationale of sectoral issues may be ignored in the creation 
of a regime because of the apparent requirements of high policy. 
Thus the specific needs of the fisheries resource were ignored by the 
narrow limits regime, because it was thought that extended coastal 
state competences were interlinked and could not be distinguished 
from one another.
To the outsider, the assessment and identification of policy can 
prevent some problems. Firstly, for short periods at least, two 
government Departments may advocate differing solutions to a problem. 
Within UK government this is not such a problem, as it is in a state 
without a career civil service, such as the United States of America, 
where there may be prolonged disagreement between various government 
departments. Within the UK there is no discontinuity of 
administrative personnel associated with a change of government, and 
some movement of civil servants takes place between Departments. 
Therefore while there may be temporary divergence of views between 
two government Departments, the caste ethos of higher civil servants 
and a network of methods, formal and informal, for the exchange of 
views between Departments ensure that consistency is quickly 
restored. Secondly the various government Departments do not carry 
equal weight in relation to each other. The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office ^ enjoys the position of lead Department on 
foreign policy. It identifies the policy linkages, and thus had 
long been obsessed with the ideas that any extensions of state 
jurisdiction at sea constituted a step towards restrictions on 
navigation and a threat to all High Seas freedoms, and that extended 
jurisdiction over fisheries could not occur without implications of
territoriality. Otherwise there is no formal hierarchy of 
Departments, but their relative influence in determining policy 
outcomes is determined by the degree of alignment between their 
concerns and those of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In 
practice, therefore, during most of the period studied the government 
Department concerned with the administration of the UK merchant fleet 
(the Board of Trade and that concerned with North Sea oil (the 
Department of Trade and Industry from 1970, Department of Energy from
1974) have been more successful than the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food in influencing policy outcomes. Several hundred 
years of maritime history had diffused widely through Whitehall the 
feeling that the maintenance of a strong, healthy and mobile merchant 
navy was fundamental to the UK national interest. The relative 
cheapness and convenience of oil had led the UK economy to become 
dependent upon imports of that commodity, and the OPEC price rises 
from 1973 raised the strategic importance of the UK's continental 
shelf oil reserves.
A third problem lies in the nature of negotiation. Even if one 
assumes that a state involved in international negotiations has a 
clearly unified and well-thought out set of objectives, which is by 
no means always so, it will have an optimal position and a fail-back 
position. I have tried where outcomes are concerned to equate 
"policy" to a fail-back position, as this represents HMG's required 
outcome. In practice most international negotiations bearing on 
fisheries either possess terms of reference which permit only a 
limited range of outcomes, like the Fisheries Commissions, or concern 
a wider range of policy issues than merely those concerned with 
fisheries, such as the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, and the negotiations for the accession of the UK to the EEC.
These provisos apart, it is fairly simple to identify clear policy 
positions for each of the date parameters of this study, 1967 and the 
end of January, 1963- In a sense any chronological boundaries are a 
little artificial. The fishing industry has long suffered from 
recurrent crises requiring government action (witness the 'fish days' 
or 'Political Lent' of 15^7 onwards, by which people were forbidden 
to eat meat on certain days in order to encourage maritime 
pursuits)^. In addition there are time-lags between a 
policy-decision and the appearance of change in the fishing industry 
or in the characteristics of fish stocks which can confidently be 
ascribed to that policy decision- This means that the overwhelming 
majority of new policy decisions are incremental, emerge rather than 
being made, and can have few clearly discernible results. The 
international dimension further reduces the efficacy of ascribing 
motivation and results to government decisions, since it increases 
the range of issues and concerns bearing upon fisheries policy.
Nevertheless, a study of policy change has to identify a starting 
point where policy was relatively stable. 1967 has been chosen as a 
starting-point, not because it marks the clear beginning of a new era 
in fisheries policy, but because it was the year of some significant 
milestones in the relationship between the UK and its international 
environment. Several developments in that year symbolise the 
decline of the UK's global interests and the rise of her regional 
concerns- The later shift of policy from a maritime to a coastal 
state orientation can in retrospect be regarded as heralded- The UK 
had always been primarily concerned to maintain global freedoms of 
navigation in order to protect the movement of trade by sea, but was 
in succeeding years gradually to acquire a policy equally concerned 
with resources close to her own shores- 1967 saw a Cabinet decision
to withdraw UK military forces from East of Suez, while in the same 
year a renewed application was made to join the European Economic 
Community. These two moves constituted part of a gradual change of 
posture from that of a global power to that of a regional one. For 
the first time in over two centuries the UK was overtaken as the 
state with the largest registered merchant tonnage, while that year 
also saw a rapid unfolding of knowledge about the probable extent of 
oil and gas reserves beneath the North Sea. The 'Torrey Canyon' 
disaster occurred off Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly in March 1967, 
the first of a series of 'supertanker' accidents causing damage to 
coastal environments. Gradually, therefore, the traditional UK view 
of the sea as a medium for free and unrestricted navigation was, over 
a period of years, to be augmented by a realisation of its importance 
as a source of raw materials and as a fragile ecosystem. These 
latter considerations would argue for some limitations on navigation.
The most compelling reason for the choice of 1967, however, is that 
in that year Arvid Pardo, Malta's Ambassador to the United Nations, 
introduced into the General Assembly, predominantly on his own 
initiative, a resolution proclaiming the seabed beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction to be the 'Common Heritage of Mankind' . The 
gradual repercussions of this resolution were to lead to a fresh 
re-opening of international negotiations on the law of the sea, and 
ultimately to a major change in maritime regimes, including those 
concerned with fisheries.
The choice of the beginning of 1983 lies in the fact that by that 
time the UK's international fisheries relationships were moving to a 
new position of relative stability, a process culminating in the 
establishment of a new agreement on the Common Fisheries Policy of
the European Economic Community, among whose members the UK was now 
to be counted. The overwhelming concern for freedoms of navigation 
had given way to a desire for adequate safeguards against the 
possibly harmful consequences of navigation, and the obsession with 
long supply lines had vanished as Western Europe replaced the British 
Commonwealth as the UK's major trading partner. In addition, the 
North Sea oil and gas fields had become so productive that the 
country now had a diminished, though not negligible, reliance upon 
imported oil. The UK's merchant fleet had shrunk, and its position 
in the world league table had fallen to eighth. The Pardo 
initiative had finally, in December 1982 after the lengthiest 
international conference in history, borne fruit in a new Law of the 
Sea Convention, although the UK had not signed it.
These broad shifts of the UK position were reflected in a number of 
concomitant changes in fisheries policy. There are four main 
international aspects to fisheries policy; these being (i) limits to 
coastal state jurisdiction over fisheries, (ii) vesting of authority 
on the High Seas beyond the limits of coastal state fisheries 
jurisdiction, (iii) the type of regulations introduced in order to 
conserve fish stocks, and (iv) the approach adopted for the 
enforcement of these regulations.
(i) On the issue of fisheries limits, the UK in 1967 strongly 
favoured narrow limits to coastal state jurisdiction, and endorsed a 
six-mile limit exclusive to UK fishermen and an additional six miles 
under UK jurisdiction where fishing was reserved to states whose 
nationals had habitually fished there (historic rights). By 1983 
the UK claimed fisheries jurisdiction over all waters out to 200 
miles from baselines, although it had vested some of its competences
over this area in the European Economic Community
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(ii) On the vesting of authority on the High Seas, the UK in 1967 
favoured flag state jurisdiction tempered by consultative 
arrangements between the states fishing a geographical area. By 
1983 the position was much the same, although the only consultative 
arrangements of importance to the UK operated within the EEC system. 
The demand for free access to distant waters had been replaced by one 
for quotas negotiated by the European Commission.
(iii) As for the issue of conservation regulations, in 1967 the UK 
placed great faith in the establishment of minimum mesh sizes for 
nets directed at particular species, with certain areas closed to 
particular types of fishing or in particular seasons. By 1983 a 
whole battery of methods had been added: the banning of particular 
methods of fishing, national quotas within Total Allowable Catches 
determined within the EEC framework, and the restriction of effort 
(catching capacity times days spent fishing) by a number of means 
including licensing, closed seasons and closed areas. The relative 
implications of the alternative conservation methods for the economic 
viability of the fishing industry was now better understood by 
government, and there was general confidence that by means of 
licensing and scientifically-determined Total Allowable Catches the 
constant cycle of economic and stock crises could now be combatted. 
Although the full implications of the appropriated fishery had not 
yet been carried through, fisheries issues had become the concern of 
a much larger public than in 1967, which raised the political cost to 
the governing party of enforced reductions in capacity. However, I 
hold that the beginning of 1983 is significant, despite the fact that 
rational licensing systems for most stocks were still to be
developed, since the philosophy of licensing was now universally 
accepted within fisheries administration, and given that national 
proportions of the total catch in most of the areas fished by UK 
citizens had been clearly established.
(iv) In relation to the enforcement of conservation regulations, the 
UK approach over these fifteen years had shifted from one appropriate 
to a High Seas regime, with vessels of the Royal Navy deployed 
largely in order to enforce the "right" to fish, to one appropriate 
to a regime of wide coastal state jurisdiction. The latter involved 
the deployment of vessels specifically designed to carry out 'police' 
functions and intended to prevent illegal fishing. An integrated 
protective policing system, also involving the use of aircraft 
patrols and special arrangements for the protection of offshore 
oilfields, emphasised the growth of the UK's interests as a coastal 
state. The system of 1967 emphasised flag state enforcement of 
intergovernmentally-formulated regulations, while that prevailing in 
1983 included a joint enforcement scheme between EEC member states. 
However, in addition to this joint enforcement scheme there was the 
certainty that the UK would and could take national action against 
anyone fishing within the UK 200-mile limit in contravention of 
international or national regulations.
It is therefore the purpose of this study to document the process of 
so complete a policy shift. This process was long-winded, tortuous 
and disjointed. Although a bald comparison of the UK's positions on 
international fisheries questions in 1967 and 1983 quite properly 
yields the contrasts revealed above, the actual processes by which 
the policy shift occurred were often indirect and piecemeal. Most 
key decisions were made on grounds unrelated to fisheries, while the
division of responsibility between government departments, and the 
power relationships between them, contributed to the raggedness of 
policy change. Change in policy on one issue gradually permeated 
other areas of policy through the search for consistency so beloved 
by civil servants. Since there was no unified mechanism to impose a 
discipline upon fisheries policy, change resulted incrementally. 
This phenomenon of minimal change has been cited by Vital, and by
g
Wallace . This incremental nature of change and the determination 
of bureaucratic organisations to survive , has meant that change has 
been largely accomodated within existing institutions.
The Study
This thesis is divided into four parts. Part I gives the 
background, with the scope of the study laid out in this Chapter 
while Chapter 2 contends that fisheries possess specific biological 
and hence economic attributes which determine the elements of a 
successful conservation and management regime. In the absence of a 
system of authoritative control of effort in response to fluctuations 
in stock levels, a fishery will decline. Part II of the thesis 
attempts to document fisheries policy in 1967, and specifically to 
explain the UK's strong devotion to narrow limits to fisheries 
jurisdiction. To this end Chapter 3 demonstrates the relative 
weakness of fisheries compared to the UK's other marine interests 
(specifically her maritime pursuits), and Chapter 4 shows how this 
weakness was woven into inter-departmental consultations on the 
fisheries regime. The organisational fragmentation of the fishing 
industry, the greater influence with MAFF enjoyed by the deep sea 
section of the fleet, and the paucity of political interest in or 
concern about fisheries issues are also considered. Chapter 5
emphasises the UK's role as the principal architect of the 
narrow-limits regime, examines the impetus towards wider coastal 
state limits provided by the Truman Proclamation (see page 104), 
identifies the law of the sea as defined by the Geneva Conventions of 
1958, and considers the arrangements for consultations between states 
fishing the North Atlantic.
Against this background, a number of factors from 1967 created 
challenges for existing policy: Part III examines the ways in which 
these challenges were dealt with by means of attempts to maintain the 
regime but to adjust the administrative arrangements. In this vein 
Chapter 6 documents the rise in the relative importance to the UK of 
coastal state factors, while Chapter 7 looks at the long-term 
implications for fishery limits policy of the re-opening of the law 
of the sea consequent upon the Pardo initiative, together with the 
strategy adopted by the UK to prevent massive extensions of coastal 
state jurisdiction. Chapter 8 describes the overall effect on 
fisheries policy of UK entry to the EEC. Chapter 9 deals with a 
number of systemic problems which occurred within the fisheries, and 
examines the way in which the free-for-all nature of the high seas 
regime, together with the high incidence of industrial fishing and 
the weakness of the NEAFC, led to the collapse of certain fisheries. 
These problems led certain states with a high relative dependence on 
fisheries to attempt to extend their fisheries limits, a problem 
examined in Chapter 10. Chapter 11 examines the crisis in 
anadromous fisheries occasioned partly by the reluctance of 
successive governments to create an appropriate legislative climate 
for increased investment in stocking and partly by High Seas salmon 
fishing; while Chapter 12 documents the rise in the political 
profile and effectiveness of the inshore industry relative to the
distant-water industry, as the former found a new level of 
organisation and new allies at the same time as the latter lost the 
support of the Labour Party and its Trade Unions.
In the face of the number and variety of these challenges, it was 
inevitable that UK policy towards the fisheries regime should change 
from a maritime to a coastal state orientation. Part IV of this 
thesis looks at the stages in which these changes took place and 
identifies four principal milestones in this reorientation. The 
first was HMG's offer, conveyed by Minister of State David Ennals to 
the Caracas Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, that the UK would accept the concept of an Exclusive 
Economic Zone for coastal states, an offer explored in Chapter 13. 
The second was the decision, taken in conjunction with the other EEC 
member states, not to wait for the outcome of the conference but to 
extend fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles (see Chapter 14), while 
the third was HMG's decision vigorously to pursue, within 
negotiations on the CFP, preferential arrangements for the UK and to 
back up demands with the unilateral application of conservation 
regulations. The fourth milestone was the acceptance of the new CFP 
in January 1983. These last two decisions are dealt with in Chapter
15. From being perhaps the state most strongly supportive of the 
"freedom of fishing", within a loose framework of international 
consultation, the UK had moved to a vigorous advocacy of coastal 
state rights over fisheries and tight intergovernmental arrangements 
for the extremely detailed monitoring and control of fishing 
activities.
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It is the contention of this study that the nature of fisheries 
imposes specific biological and economic imperatives on any system of 
fisheries management, and that unless these imperatives are heeded in 
formulating such a system fisheries will decline and fishing 
industries collapse. Throughout the period under review the 
rationale behind UK policy on limits lay outside the fisheries 
sector, and a structurally-imposed subordination to policy 
considerations external to fisheries resulted in somewhat 
inappropriate arrangements in fisheries management. The principal 
determinant of the UK position on limits policy was the preoccupation 
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with the view that extensions 
of coastal state, jurisdiction threatened navigational rights.
This inappropriateness resulted from the weakness of the fisheries 
constituency, both absolutely and relative to other lobbies with 
conflicting interests and needs. In addition, on many issues, 
opinion within the fishing industry was divided, and the signals 
conveyed to government were conflicting or misleading. Moreover, 
political debate on fisheries questions was inappropriate and 
ill-informed. Positions adopted, whether by political parties or 
individual MPs, were largely defined by considerations external to 
fisheries: these were generally either related to maintenance of 
employment, or were the direct consequences of MPs' attitudes to NATO 
or to the European Economic Community (EEC).
The inappropriateness of the fisheries regime led to the decline and 
collapse of many fish stocks and to recurrent economic crises within 
the fishing industries of many states. These fisheries crises
combined with other factors to make the seaward extension of their
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jurisdiction appear more attractive to many governments. This 
process took place in the United Kingdom also, since during the 
period the nature of UK government interests in relation to marine 
policy changed: the merchant navy declined, marine pollution aroused 
public concern and the offshore oil-fields were developed. The 
Royal Navy retreated to a regional posture, and so freedoms of 
navigation declined in importance. The actions of OPEC and OAPEC 
over oil supplies raised the importance to the government of 
maximising the extent of the continental shelf under UK control.
In addition, major changes took place in the nature of the fisheries 
constituency. It rose from operating at a low level, and fairly 
ineffectively to operating at a high level and effectively. There 
are two main reasons for this. The first is that the fishing 
industry was able to gain a unity of purpose on fisheries limits 
(though on little else) because its principal actor, the "deep sea" 
fleet, declined in importance, and its remnant was forced to seek 
fishing grounds nearer home. Fluctuations in the market for fish 
and a quadrupling of oil prices led to severe financial losses, and 
in addition the "deep sea" fleet's habitual grounds disappeared as 
other states extended their fisheries jurisdiction to include them. 
A second and much more telling reason for the rise in the industry's 
effectiveness, was that two high policy issues arose on which the 
interests of the fishing industry accorded neatly with that of two 
powerful political coalitions: those who wished at all costs to 
prevent the SNP's capturing more than half of the Scottish 
parliamentary seats, and those who opposed either the principle of or 
the arrangements for UK membership of the EEC.
Whitehall's initial reaction to such changes was to make adjustments 
within the framework of existing high policy, and where possible with 
a minimum of institutional innovation, with the result that new 
fisheries policies, although more appropriate to the specific 
imperatives of fisheries than were the old policies, were maintained 
and contained within administrative arrangements which had been 
formulated for reasons other than fisheries. Several years of 
instability and decline resulted, until finally at the beginning of 
1983 the rudiments of a new equilibrium were established, one which 
attempted at least to take cognizance of fisheries biology and 
economics.
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CHAPTER 2 1 8
BIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EFFELTIVE MAHAGEMEMT OF
FISHERIES
In order to understand vhy the period under review has seen such 
changes in UK fisheries policy it is necessary to examine the 
biological and economic aspects of fisheries. Fisheries possess 
particular biological attributes which distinguish than from the 
exploitation of many other resources. Seme of fisheries' peculiar 
attributes cure the inability of fishermen effectively to target what 
species they are catching, the extremely variable recruitment and the 
problan that there is a negative marginal rate of return (in biomass 
terms) to extra inputs beyond a certain catch level. Fishing is a 
hunting activity, and, as such, data on stock levels are incomplete, 
being largely deduced frem catch levels rather than escapement. In 
addition, most marine and all anadremous fish stocks partly depend 
upon an international or a transnational environment, whereby 
co-operation between more than one state is necessary for their 
survival. These factors present national policy makers with irttnense 
problems: to be effective in conserving stocks any system of 
fisheries management must provide for repeated and imnediate 
adjustments of aggregate fishing effort - fishing capacity (a 
combination of vessel size, net size and fish-finding technology) 
multiplied by time spent fishing -, in response to the opinions of 
scientists involved in the constant monitoring of stock levels. 
Fisheries biology has clear and destabilising economic consequences. 
Sane species shoal seasonally and disperse for the rest of the year, 
so that the catch is not even throughout the year. Since fresh fish 
is perishable, and must be sold quickly, the months of relative
abundance can see very low quayside prices.
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These problems emanating frcm the nature of the resource are 
compounded by such economic factors as cost and price changes and 
exchange rate shifts. Relative prices of various species change 
with fashion and scarcity. Fishermen's costs shift with new 
regulations, technological developments and changes in energy prices. 
Cost structure, exchange rates and proximity to fish stocks vary 
between states, resulting in differences in the costs (in pounds) of 
fish production between the UK and other states producing fish for 
the UK market. For species where demand is very firm, overfishing 
can induce scarcity: raising the price and encouraging still further 
overfishing.
The policy implications for government are considerable. Fisheries 
has its own rationale of which government action should take note if 
it is to be successful. A  fishery cannot remain productive without 
authoritative intervention to regulate catches and to steady the 
market. Governments also need to take action to support the 
collection of scientific data on fisheries, which is unlikely bo be 
pursued if left to the individual fishermen. These problems, acute 
even in a national fishery, are increased in a High Seas fishery, 
where management requires voluntary co-operation between a number of 
states if fishing effort or catch levels are to be optimised. In 
addition, the goals of biologists and econcmists as to the optimal 
yield are not entirely congruent, a fact which moves fisheries issues 
frcm the technical to the political arena in times of crisis.
Biological aspects
The very nature of fish and their environment tends to divisions 
between groups of fishermen and to the eventual decline of an 
insufficiently-controlled fishery. Marine species of ccmmercial 
value to the United Kingdom are divided by virtue of their habits 
into four categories. Demersal fish feed at or near the sea floor, 
and can be taken by nets dragged close to the sea-bottom. Demersal 
fish include 'gadoid' fish, such as ccxd and whiting, as well as 
flatfish such as plaice, sole and flounder. Pelagic fish shoal 
mainly in midwater or near the surface of the sea, and are taken by a 
net dragged or suspended well clear of the bottom. The principal 
food fish in this category are herring and mackerel ^ .
In practice the distinction between pelagic and demersal fish is not 
always useful, for at certain times of day cod and haddock may be 
taken with midwater trawls and mackerel may be taken in a bottom 
trawl. Similarly, blue whiting, related to demersal species, shoal 
between demersal and pelagic levels. Partly as a result, any net 
catch will include a by-catch of species other then the target 
species. A  third category, anadranous fish, spawn in fresh water 
but spend part of their lives in the sea. They can be taken in the 
rivers by rod or net, by coastal nets or traps, or in the ocean by 
midwater drifting. Those of ccmnercial interest to the UK are the 
Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar) and the Sea Trout (Salmo trutta). The 
fourth category, shellfish, embraces all molluscs and crustaceans, 
sane of which spend their lives in contact with the sea-floor and 
sane of which swim or float in midwater. They are taken by a wide 
variety of methods, ranging fran baited traps to lines, as well as 
midwater and bottom-nets.
This diversity of the resource has had a number of implications for 
policy. Firstly it has resulted in a divided fishing industry, 
whose conflicting demands make it difficult for government to 
articulate clear policy options, with the result that a principal 
role of the UK fisheries administration has been that of adjudicating 
between conflicting interests. The interests of demersal fishermen 
and shell fishermen, for instance, are often mutually opposed, because 
of the damage which bottcm trawls can do to shellfish beds. 
Similarly by-catches of juveniles of species larger than the target 
fish can be so sizeable as to threaten the livelihood of those 
fishing for the larger species. While in general government might 
wish to ranain neutral, damage to stocks can be so severe as to 
require government to intervene in order to ensure that so far as 
possible returns should be available bo those making investments in 
increasing fish stocks. This is principally important in relation 
to anadrcmous fish and to shellfish, where the location of breeding 
grounds is well known. The government responsibility in this matter 
extends to ensuring an adequate supply of clear water, and to 
ensuring that the owners of breeding grounds obtain a good proportion 
of the catch.
The prizes to be won are considerable. Since the United Kingdom is 
situated on the broad shallow continental shelf of North-West Europe, 
it is well-placed to exploit seme of the densest fish stocks in the 
world. The waters above Temperate Zone continental shelves are the 
marine areas most favourable for the production of the phytoplankton 
which forms the basis of marine food chains. Although the surface 
layers of the entire ocean are penetrated to a similar extent by 
sunlight, the quantity of nitrates and phosphates in the
light-suffused surface waters largely determines phytoplankton 22
production, and this varies considerably. Under normal 
circumstances these salts are concentrated near the sea-floor, where 
the amount of light decreases with depth. Those areas richest in
phytoplankton are those where upwelling of water brings these
2materials to the surface
A number of its attributes carbine to make the North-Eastern Atlantic 
shelf ideal for vertical water-mixing. Shallow water, the 
prevalence of storms, the Gulf Stream, and the lew thermocline 
(temperature gradient) because of the low surface temperature, all 
help bo bring the necessary salts to the surface. The high 
production of primary food has resulted in dense concentrations of 
fish above the shelf. Furthermore the rigours of Arctic and 
sub-Arctic life mean that those relatively few fish species which 
have adapted to life in cold seas usually occur in large numbers, 
because of the lack of intense competition for primary food frem 
other species. Further North, where the water is colder, there are 
even fewer species, and so for many years British fishermen have 
travelled to the Icelandic continental shelf and the Norwegian coasts 
to take cod. The concentrations of relatively few species, together 
with the tendency for many species to shoal for at least part of the 
year, and with the development of freezing techniques to preserve the 
catch, have made it possible for directed fishing for a particular 
species to provide the raw material for continuous-flow processing 
industries on shore or aboard. Fishing a stock can, however, 
endanger its future productivity, and for a variety of reasons the 
fishing itself cannot always be operated as a continuous-flew 
process. One species of fish may occur in several geographically 
close but biologically distinct stocks, with little interchange of
manbers between them. At least ten biologically distinct stocks of 
herring have been identified as spending at least part of their lives 
within fifty miles of UK shores. Overfishing of any one stock can 
cause its collapse, as has happened to several of the stocks of 
herring. Many species migrate each year, occurring seasonally in 
different areas. Large numbers of mackerel, for instance, which 
overwinter off the UK's South-Western coasts, spend the sunrner widely 
dispersed throughout the Northern North Sea and the North-Eastern 
Atlantic. Such a stock can thus be the basis for an intense 
seasonal fishery but cannot support a sustained year-round processing 
or catching industry. Similarly there is a Spring concentration of 
blue whiting in the waters between Rockall and the Faroes, which, 
after spawning, disperses to a low density over a wide area. To 
prevent overfishing of the mackerel and blue whiting stocks is 
primarily a question of controlling the number and size of fish taken 
at the points of seasonal concentration. When a migratory stock 
shoals throughout its adult life, as does the herring, it is even 
more difficult to prevent overfishing, and in sane cases such a stock 
can be profitably exploited within the fisheries limits of more than 
one state, as well as cso the High Seas. The North Sea herring 
stock, for instance, spawns off Shetland, and adults usually spend 
the winter near the Western edge of the Norwegian trench, while 
larvae concentrate at a number of nurseries, seme of them close to 
the Danish coast. Excessive fishing pressure in any one of these 
three locations can threaten the stock. To make matters worse such 
a constantly shoaling species makes an ideal target to act as the 
basis of a continuous-flow processing industry, which makes it still 
more vulnerable to overfishing.
If fisheries biology requires constant and authoritative monitoring
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of stocks and fishing effort, it is legitimate to ask the goal of 
this activity. The preference of fishery biologists is to view the 
purpose behind the conservation of marine fisheries as the 
maximisation of the long-term catch, and thus to extract frcm each 
stock its Optimum Sustainable Yield (OSY) (Y2,E2 on Figure 2.1). 
This is approximately the largest average catch a stock can bear over 
a period of years without causing a reduction in the bicmass (the 
total weight of the entire stock). The bianass is a function of 
recruitment (the number of new young fish joining the adult stock) 
and of growth and mortality, both natural and as a result of fishing. 
Below the level of OSY any fish left uncaught may not necessarily be 
harvestable in the future, and represent a permanent loss.
While OSY sounds a biologically-appropriate goal, it is impossible to 
identify until it has been passed, because the characteristics of an 
individual stock cannot be known with certainty. When a stock of 
fish is being exploited by a growing number of fishermen, the weight 
of the catch will at first increase. This will result in a fall in 
the total number and weight of fish in the stock and in the average 
age of its members. These trends will continue until OSY has been 
exceeded, and the yield of the fishery is declining.
Although OSY is impossible to locate precisely, the relationship 
between fishery mortality (the percentage of a stock killed by 
fishing) and stock size has been the subject of increasingly 
sophisticated study by fishery biologists since the end of the 
nineteenth century. Scientists distinguish (after Peterson, 1894 ^) 
between 'growth overfishing1 and 'recruitment overfishing'. 
Peterson formulated growth overfishing as occurring when fish are 
caught while still juveniles, depressing the total catch weight.
Figure 2.1; Hie relationship between optima susi-^inahle and maximmi
economic yields 5
Y, .E, -  M EY 
Y2. E2 -  M SY  = OSY 
Y3. E3 -  TC = TR
The diagram shows a typical yield curve. It is assumed that costs are proportional to effort 
ITC is a linear function) and that revenue is proportional to yield (TR is identical to 
the yield curve).
Recruitment overfishing is a reduction in overall stock caused by the 
failure of sufficient numbers of new young fish to recruit, due to 
the intensity of fishing of adults before spawning. The composition 
of catches forms the principal source of information on stock levels 
and there is a time lag of one to three years (depending on the 
duration of the larval stage of the species) between the appearance 
of evidence of growth overfishing and of recruitment overfishing. 
This stems fran the fact that most fish larvae have different 
locational and feeding habits frcm adults of the same species, and 
are also too stall to fall prey to nets. By the time there is 
evidence that recruitment overfishing is occurring, up to three years 
of damage may have been done
Even vhen recruitment falls it may not mean that recruitment 
overfishing is taking place. Fisheries management must also take 
into account the extreme variability in survival rates of fish larvae 
fran year to year, owing to the effect of climatic conditions on 
phytoplankton production. The rate of larval survival in a 
particular year is traditionally ascertained by 'cohort analysis', 
which entails examining catches of adult fish two or three years 
later and classifying the fish of which they are composed, according 
to year of hatching. This method has shown that recruitment to the 
North Sea sole stock varies frcm year to year by a factor as large as 
sixty, while the 1962 Year Class of North Sea haddock was twenty-five
times as large as any recorded predecessor ^ . Figure 2.2
illustrates over a period of time the fluctuations of year-class 
strengths in the Irish Sea for four species of white fish. Heavy 
fishing increases the instability of recruitment which is more
Q
variable at lew stock levels . This variability in recruitment
makes the problem of maintaining catch levels at OSY almost
Recruitment overfishing is a reduction in overall stock caused by the 
failure of sufficient numbers of new young fish to recruit, due to 
the intensity of fishing of adults before spawning. The composition 
of catches forms the principal source of information on stock levels 
and there is a time lag of one to three years (depending on the 
duration of the larval stage of the species) between the appearance 
of evidence of growth overfishing and of recruitment overfishing. 
This steins frcm the fact that most fish larvae have different 
locational and feeding habits frcm adults of the same species, and 
are also too snail to fall prey to nets. By the time there is 
evidence that recruitment overfishing is occurring, up to three years 
of damage may have been done
Even when recruitment falls it may not mean that recruitment 
overfishing is taking place. Fisheries management must also take 
into account the extreme variability in survival rates of fish larvae 
frcm year to year, owing to the effect of climatic conditions on 
phytoplankton production. The rate of larval survival in a 
particular year is traditionally ascertained by 1 cohort analysis' , 
which entails examining catches of adult fish two or three years 
later and classifying the fish of which they are composed, according 
to year of hatching. This method has shown that recruitment to the 
North Sea sole stock varies frcm year to year by a factor as large as 
sixty, while the 1962 Year Class of North Sea haddock was twenty-five
times as large as any recorded predecessor ^ . Figure 2.2
illustrates over a period of time the fluctuations of year-class 
strengths in the Irish Sea for four species of white fish. Heavy 
fishing increases the instability of recruitment which is more
Q
variable at low stock levels . This variability in recruitment





























Figure 2.2: Variation of year-class strength In the Iri^h Sea of: 
(A) cod, 1967-77 and vfoitinq, 1971-77,
(B) plaice, 1963-74 arai sole. 1968-76. 9
Relative year-class strength is shown by means of an exponential 
scale. The difference between two consecutive integers jjrplies the 
doubling or halving of the numbers of fish in a cohort. -1 thus 
represents half the mean stock, while +1 represents double the mean 
stock.
28insurmountable. A catch which may be acceptable for one year may 
seriously deplete the stock if it is repeated in the following year. 
Growth overfishing is much easier to ccrribat. Beverton and Holt 
(1957) ^  advocated maximising the yield per recruit by reducing the 
mortality of young fish with prescribed minimum mesh sizes.
In general these aspects of fisheries biology are the subject of 
broad agreement between the fishery scientists of states fishing the 
North Atlantic. The transnational consensus has, since 1902, been 
created and maintained within the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES), a forum of European fisheries 
scientists. Fisheries research is usually government-funded, 
because of the individualistic nature of the fishing industry and the 
prevalence of small proprietors. Such a long history of 
international co-operation in the collection and interpretation of 
data might be expected to form an effective bulwark against 
politicisation of international fisheries questions, but there are 
areas of uncertainty, and in these areas states can harness the 
opinions of scientists as mere anmunition in their struggle with 
other states for scarce resources. Little is known, for instance, 
about the effect of fishing directed at one species upon other 
ccmnercially-valuable species. It is possible that the removal by 
fishing of the adults of a species high up the food chain may 
stimulate the survival, both of its prey species and of juveniles of 
the target species, v»hose bicmass conversion rate will be greater 
than the older adult fish taken. On the other hand, fishing 
directed at prey species will yield a greater weight of snaller and 
therefore less easily-processed fish, but will depress the stocks of 
predator species. It is difficult to understand the precise 
relationship between species, since sane change their target food as
they grow, and seine are cannibalistic. Moreover, directed fishing 
for one species can yield a by-catch of other species, and where the 
adult of a target fish is snail, like sandeels or Norway pout, the 
mesh size necessary to ensnare its adult will catch undersized 
specimens of most of the other species of carmercial value.
Eooncmic aspects
There are special attributes of fishery economics which stem partly 
frcm these biological factors. Classical economics assumes that the 
application of additional resources to the production of a good will 
necessarily increase aggregate production. In a fishery increased 
effort does not add to the size of the resource. Thus new entrants 
to the market will raise costs for all producers, because of the 
decline in catch per unit of fishing effort. In a High Seas fishery 
the fact that most fisheries are appropriated neither by states nor 
by individuals means that while there still appear to be profits to 
be made further entry will occur. In addition differences in 
fishermen's costs between states and the fact that seme governments 
subsidise their fishing industries mean that sane entry may occur 
even when sane fishermen are making losses. Successful vessel 
owners may invest in better catching technology, vhich by increasing 
fishing capacity has the same effect as new entry. Thus economic 
rent will disappear from an uncontrolled fishery.
Classical econanics also assumes that, in the event of a rise in 
costs, inefficient producers will drop out of the market. In 
practice, even if sustained losses are being made, it is difficult to 
persuade fishermen to leave a fishery, since the adjustment costs 
involved in leaving the industry may be still higher, owing to the
need to amortise a sophisticated vessel and/or processing plant and 
to find alternative anployment. This constitutes a problem in the 
model shown in Figure 2.1, which assumes that costs are proportionate 
to effort, whereas there are high fixed costs such as debt servicing 
which bear no relation to effort. Regions where fishing is
important are often areas with few other employment opportunities. 
The vagaries of year-class recruitment, as well as hope for a change 
in the political regime governing the fishery, may also deter 
fishermen frcm leaving the industry. The number of boats primarily 
directed at fishing a particular stock is thus much less variable 
than recruitment to that stock. When a fishery has been built up 
over a succession of above-average recruitment years, returns per 
unit wall fall dramatically as poorer cohorts recruit, and yet 
individual fishermen may be reluctant to leave the fishery ^ .
If fishermen's costs cure unrelated to the biological yield curve, so 
are fish prices, which are determined partly by supply and partly by 
consumer preferences. Scarcity induces high prices which further 
exacerbate biological overfishing. As an example, the UK landed 
price par tonne of sole in 1967 was sixteen times as high as that for 
herring, with the result that sole were highly prized and heavily 
fished. Fish prices vary between states, partly as a function of 
distance frcm fishing grounds, but also because of differences in 
national taste. According to a papier prepared for the White Fish 
Authority, "the Germans generally prefer redfish and saithe, the
Dutch plaice, the French whiting, the Scottish haddock whilst the
12English would choose cod" . Whilst this is obviously a 
simplification, these general preferences mean that price ratios 
between species vary considerably between states, and fishermen of 
all North-West European littoral states indulge in exporting seme
fish, sometimes morely by landing wet (unfrozen and unprocessed) fish 
directly at a foreign port. In a situation where domestic fishermen 
are suffering losses, such clearly visible imports can be the cause 
of deep resentment, with the accusation of "dumping" on the 
assumption that the foreigners are also making operational losses.
Some fish of low commercial value may be found in sufficient 
concentrations to allow their economic exploitation for "industrial 
purposes", usually processing into fishmeal for cattle food. The 
costs of this industrial fishing are lower per unit weight than those 
of fishing for human consumption, due to part-processing at sea and 
the absence of need for sorting, gutting, or handling. The British 
industrial fishery has been small, but causes of unrest among UK 
fishermen have been losses to the food fishery from the success of 
the Danes and the Norwegians in industrial fishing, taking large 
numbers of undersized individuals of "protected” species (see pages 
237-240).
Unlike the biologists, fisheries economists favour Maximum Economic 
Yield (MEY) (Y1,E1 on Figure 2.1) rather than OSY as the goal of 
fisheries management. This occurs at the point where the difference 
between total revenue and total cost is greatest. As Figure 2.1 
illustrates, Maximum Economic Yield occurs at a lower catch level 
than does Optimum Sustainable Yield. In practice, fishermen cannot 
hold catch at that level, because the number of producers is too 
large for one or two to control the market. Where there is no 
regulation, additional entrants to a fishery can be expected until 
total costs equal total revenue (Y5.E3)« In addition, states will 
often subsidise fish production or export, in order to maintain 
employment, to gain foreign exchange or to maximise food supplies.
These subsidies encourage a continuation of overfishing even beyond 
Y3,E3, tending towards the economic and ultimately the biological
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collapse of the fishery. The profitability of fishing can be 
increased by raising the catch per unit of fishing capacity, thus 
reducing unit costs.
Although MEY is a perfectly legitimate goal of fisheries management, 
even had the political obstacles been surmountable it would have been 
difficult to achieve MEY in practice. A number of problems appear 
in the application of the model presented in Figure 2.1 in the 
operational conext of fishing activity. For one thing. Maximan 
Economic Yield is difficult to determine in an international fishery 
across the exchanges. More seriously, given the differing goals of 
econanists and biologists, fisheries management becomes more 
susceptible to political manipulation. This is worsened by the fact 
that, as De Meza has pointed out, even for the economist MEY is the 
correct management objective only if the social discount rate is zero 
^ . Figure 2.1 deals with sustained yields, and does not address a 
dynamic situation so well. A cut in effort will cause the bicmass 
to regenerate, and is therefore an investment strategy, with current 
income being foregone in exchange for future income. The higher the 
social discount rate (i.e. the less value society places on future 
income rather than current income) the higher is the optimal level of 
effort and the lower the bicmass. If the discount rate is 
sufficiently high effort could even be in excess of the OSY level.
In addition the price-taking assumptions of Figure 2.1 are wrong. 
Fish is an extremely perishable caxmodity, and landed prices for wet 
fish, at least, react violently to the changes in supply caused by 
weather conditions and seasonal changes in fish stock location and
concentration. It is therefore cannon for governments to raise the 
econanic return to fisheries by intervening in the market for 
newly-landed fish. Fishing is an industry in which a large number 
of carpeting undertakings, with an imperfect knowledge of each 
others' activities, attempt to sell a highly perishable resource to a 
smaller number of fish merchants, although freezing facilities, where 
possessed by fishermen, can prevent same fish fran reaching the 
market at a disadvantageous time. The largest firms in 1967 were 
expanding their fleets of freezer trawlers, capable of freezing the 
catch at sea, but the vast majority of fishermen were dependent on 
the wet fish market. In such a situation the fish merchants possess 
advantages over the fishermen because of the latter's greater 
numbers, and the 'landed price' (that received by the fishermen) can 
plunmet violently in reaction to a slight oversupply. Seasonal 
factors like weather conditions and piscine breeding habits mean that 
there cure great underlying fluctuations in the fish market. State 
or intergovernmental agencies can intervene by imposing a minimum 
price on fish sold for human consumption, and fish which cannot 
ccmnand this may be dumped or reduced to fishmeal. Such minimum 
(withdrawal) price schemes reduce the cost to fishermen of 
oversupply, working against the interests of stock conservation by 
increasing yield and effort beyond where they would otherwise be.
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The management of a fishery
Whether the regime operating over a fishing ground is a territorial 
or a High Seas one, most sizeable fisheries, other than shellfish, 
cure essentially transnational. The lifecycle of most fish includes 
migration, which with the dispersal of pollutants means that even a 
fishing ground wholly within a state's Territorial or Internal Waters
is not inmune from the activities of the nationals of other states. 34
Viewed in this light, regional fishery organisations are essential 
for a sustainable fishery, and the distinction between the areas 
landward and seaward of a state' s fisheries limits should only be 
whether regionally-agreed regulations are enforced by coastal states 
or flag states. In practice, of course, flag states vary in the 
zeal with which they ensure that their fishermen comply with such 
regulations.
The tools available for fisheries management fall broadly into two 
types. Firstly there are tools which are aimed at eliminating 
growth overfishing, in other words those which attempt to maximise 
the yield per recruit by preventing the taking of undersized fish. 
Secondly there are tools intended to prevent recruitment overfishing, 
authoritative actions constantly to adjust fishing effort to a level 
appropriate to yield either OSY or MEY, whichever fishery managers 
are aiming at. The choice of goal depends on whether a state' s 
principal concern about fisheries is their role in regional economic 
development, in which case MEY, which aims at maximising producer's 
surplus, is appropriate, or whether strategic issues like food supply 
or the creation of the largest possible pool of trained mariners and 
of vessels are central to state strategy, in which case OSY is 
appropriate. Either way, since a fish stock fluctuates, fisheries 
management tools are aiming at a moving target.
The first category of management tools is generally easier to 
implement than the second, since such tools are necessarily 
non-discriminatory, and involve an equality of treatment between 
vessels of all states. In addition the prevention of growth 
overfishing tends to increase aggregate catches, and thus involves no
individual sacrifices. The principal tool in this category is the 
prescription, after Beverton-Holt, of minimum mesh sizes for
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"protected" species, e.g. those of ccumercial value. There is a 
much greater variety of tools for depressing fishing effort, but they 
are harder to introduce since they usually impose restraints on 
fishing, and therefore require close intergovernmental co-operation.
There are a number of alternative means of increasing yield per unit 
effort, of which the significance was well understood in 1967, but in 
spite of their availabilty to the Atlantic Fisheries Carmissions (see 
pages 1 25 — 131), they had not been used. One is to reduce the number 
of vessels as catching technology, and hence fishing capacity, 
improves and to limit entrants to a fishery by the use of licences. 
Such a method had been used by the International Halibut Ccnmission 
in the Pacific during the 1930s, and had successfully rehabilitated a 
declining fishery, guaranteed the earnings of those engaged in it, 
prevented overcapitalisation and provided a rent for management. 
Although this would have had adverse effects upon employment numbers, 
it would have secured the livelihood of those remaining in the 
fishery. Since it could be interpreted as a limitation of High Seas 
freedoms, however, the states constituting the Ccmnissions did not 
see this as an option. A more politically acceptable yet 
econcmically wasteful means of increasing yield per unit effort is to 
reduce the number of days available for fishing. Closed seasons, 
and the limitation of fishing to certain days of the week, have been 
used by a number of fisheries authorities. Econcmically these 
limitations are wasteful, and their only saving is in operating 
costs. By curtailing available fishing time, they reward vessels 
which can take a large catch speedily end can therefore cause 
overcapacity, leaving vessels and men idle vhen not permitted to
fish. The resultant overcapitalisation makes it hard for the 36
industry to cover costs. Moreover if closed seasons fail to 
coincide with an open season for the same species elsewhere, they can 
prevent the steady flow of fish required by processing operations. 
A system untried on a large scale was that of limiting catches by 
imposing national quotas within a scientifically-determined Total 
Allowable Catch. This approach presented both legal and political 
difficulties. Firstly it would amount to a limitation of state 
freedoms on the High Seas. Secondly, a political consensus would be 
required sufficient for agreement on unevenly distributed sacrifices 
based upon estimated stock sizes, with further disagreement on the 
optimum size of TACs.
Notes
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PART II - THE NATURE AND DETERMINANTS OF UNITED KINGDCM FISHERIES POLICY
IN 1967
United Kingdom fisheries policy in 1967 was to a considerable extent 
determined by HMG's devotion, for strategic and economic reasons, to 
narrow limits to national jurisdiction. Fisheries was dwarfed by 
other marine-related industries in its economic and strategic 
importance to the UK (see Chapter 3), a subordination which was 
reflected in the institutional arrangements for the government of 
fisheries (see Chapter 4). HMG's conviction that the UK's national 
interest lay in narrow limits to national jurisdiction was reflected 
in the attention successive UK governments in the past had paid to 
the creation of such a regime (see Chapter 5).
CHAPTER 3
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO UK POLICY IN 1967 OF THE PRINCIPAL 
MARINE-RELATED INDUSTRIES
However pressing the biological and economic rationale of fisheries 
may appear, in the formulation of UK marine policy fisheries 
interests have to share influence with a variety of other maritime 
interests. There are two main types of interaction between pairs of 
marine interests with a significant bearing upon the formulation or 
maintenance of government policy. Firstly, the activities of one 
marine interest can directly affect the activities of another. Frcm 
Figure 3.1, for example, it can clearly be seen that most polluting 
activities can be damaging to fisheries. Other pairs of interests 
may have little direct effect upon each other, but mutually reinforce 
or challenge HMG's preference for a particular regime or element in
1Figure 3.1; Potential Interactions of Marine Activities in Close Proximity
the law of the sea.
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It is among the tasks of government to resolve conflicts of interest 
by encouraging an appropriate legal regime. These conflicts may 
involve persons of the same nationality, or they may involve citizens 
of more than one state. In the former case successive UK 
governments have seen their role as the encouragement of 
accomodation between diverse interests, rather than the imposition 
of centrally-determined policy. This is the realm of Vital's "line
2of least intellectual resistance" . Where citizens of more than 
one state sire concerned HMG may have to negotiate with other 
governments, and to assess UK marine interests in terms of its cwn 
high policy concerns. Where possible Whitehall attempts to extend 
its functional, accomodating approach to such contacts, by the 
institution of permanent intergovernmental arrangements reflecting 
HMG's priorities. The attempts to resolve potential conflicts 
between users of ocean space and to create an integrated marine 
policy have often led to fisheries being accorded a fairly low 
priority by UK policy-makers, and the interests of the inshore fleet 
(for an explanation of the divisions within the UK fishing industry 
see page 59) particularly so. The principal reason for this has 
been the low economic and strategic importance of the fishing 
industry relative to other UK marine activities.
Where a government department is forced to choose between the 
interests of two marine-related activities it makes its decisions 
upon a combination of economic, strategic and political factors. 
While it is difficult for the outsider bo evaluate with certainty the 
relative importance in determining policy of these different typies of 
factor it is fairly clear that in 1967 fisheries was significantly
outstripped by other marine-related industries in both economic and 
strategic importance to HMG. Domestic political importance is 
harder to gauge, because the potential electoral unfavourable impact 
of an action generally perceived as unhelpful to a particular 
interest depends not only upon that interest but also upon the extent 
to which that interest is able to co-opt other national or regional 
interests which will perceive the concerns of the former interest as 
vital to the national interest or to the economic and social health 
of their region. Other issues complicate the question still 
further, such as the balance of support between political parties in 
the regions most reliant upon the interest under consideration.
With these caveats, it is clear that in 1967 not only were other 
industries of greater economic and strategic importance to KMG than 
fisheries, but in relation to the law of the sea the balance of 
industrial interests, especially in the light of these economic and 
strategic factors, was heavily behind narrow limits to coastal state 
jurisdiction and maximisation of High Seas freedoms.
The well-being of the shipping industry was generally regarded as 
being Britain's fundamental marine concern. For perhaps 250 years 
the UK had been pre-eminent in world shipping, with the largest 
registered tonnage 3, This concern was both economic and strategic. 
The shipping industry made a larger contribution to GNP than did 
fisheries, around £150Cm in 1967 **. In addition the UK shipping 
industry was an important prop for a sizeable shipbuilding industry, 
which contributed £69m to the balance of payments (£1t7m net) in 
1967^. The shipping industry made a contribution to the balance of 
payments of £792m in 1967 When purchases by UK shipowners of new 
vessels from foreign yards are taken Into account, this contribution
43shrinks to £770m ?. To these figures probably needs to be added at 
least part of the several hundred million pounds per annum earned 
from the insurance of vessels and cargoes through Lloyd's. It is 
important, however, not to exaggerate the importance to the insurance 
business of the maintenance of a strong UK-based shipping industry, 
since Lloyd's has largely maintained its global pre-eminence 
throughout a very long period of decline in the proportion of the 
world's shipping flying the British flag. There are also important 
policy implications for government stemming from the threat to 
Lloyd's contribution to the balance of payments from large insurance 
payouts to foreign shipowners. Since most successful insurance 
claims result in payouts by the City, it was important that the Board 
of Trade encourage, through IMCO, the development of 
internationally-agreed ceilings for the financial liability of 
shipowners.
Strategically the UK was heavily dependent upon overseas trade, and 
upon imports of raw materials and foodstuffs. In two world wars the 
destruction of British merchant vessels by enemy action had brought 
the UK close to defeat, and HMG was anxious to ensure the continued 
prosperity of UK shipowners in preparation for future national 
emergencies. In addition the industry was well-organised to 
influence government- The shipping companies were organised as the 
General Chamber of Shipping (GCS). Consultation under the auspices 
of the Chamber meant that the Board of Trade, the government 
department mainly responsible for shipping policy, was presented with 
clear and unambiguous statements of the interests and policy of the 
UK shipping industry. This was in marked contrast to the 
conflicting signals emanating from the fishing industry (see Chapter 
it). Consultation across state boundaries, both between shipowners
and between shipping states, produced the same unanimity of purpose. 
The larger shipowners were organised in the International Chamber of 
Shipping (ICS), and in addition many tanker-owners belonged to the 
Oil Companies' International Marine Forum (OCIMF). Shipowning 
states discussed their mutual interests within the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO). IMCO was based in 
London, staffed entirely by Board of Trade civil servants, and voting 
in its Council was on the basis of registered tonnage, rather than by 
sovereign equality. This made it a very suitable body as far as the 
shipowners and the Board of Trade were concerned, since up until 1967 
the UK had the largest vote of any state. IMCG helped to maintain 
common international standards for the construction, use and 
navigation of vessels, thus simplifying seaborne trade.
The Board of Trade's traditional international duty as a sponsoring 
department was simple: it was to resist attempts by states, other 
than flag states, to erode freedoms of navigation or to appropriate 
parts of the High Seas. Such a role was not obstructionist; the 
Board's counterparts in other shipowning states had long been in 
agreement. They were willing to tighten and to refine construction 
and use regulations, provided that the new rules were global and that 
sufficient time was allowed for their implementation, in order to 
avoid imposing undue hardship on owners of existing vessels. In 
this vein IMCO had met with considerable success in combatting 
pollution, principally in reducing the incidence of the intentional 
discharge of oily water at sea IMCO was thus in no way a bar to 
the constructive development of international maritime law, even at 
the expense of derogations from the absolute freedom of navigation. 
However, it was not an authority vested with executive power but a 
consultative body which could formulate Conventions for ratifying
states to implement- The latter role was the prerogative of states, 
and the implementation of IMCO Conventions was slow. Policing was 
dependent upon flag states, many of which showed little willingness 
to enforce regulations against their own citizens. Theoretically a 
signatory state could denounce an IMCO Convention in the same way as 
any other international Convention. Despite these faults, the UK 
was strongly committed to IMCO, with its headquarters in London, its 
empnasis on technical rather than diplomatic consultation, and its 
built-in majority for important shipowning states 9.
Also ranged behind narrow limits to coastal state jurisdiction was a 
variety of public and private authorities engaged in the disposal of 
wastes at sea. Marine waste disposal was not a unified industry 
with a sponsoring department convinced of its value; it stemmed 
largely from piecemeal neglect and cost-cutting by local authorities, 
firms and consumers. There was thus no strong, unified waste 
disposal lobby pressing government for the maintenance of High Seas 
freedoms, but the philosophy underlying waste disposal at sea was a 
laissez-faire one, with a High Seas flavour, associated with the 
medieval idea of the common, the inexhaustible resource. 
Essentially, waste disposal at sea fell into three broad categories: 
the dumping of noxious wastes, dredgings and sludge; the runoff and 
direct discharge of chemicals and sewage from the land; and the 
jettisoning of routine waste from vessels in transit. It may seem 
improper to think of marine waste disposal as an industry with an 
economic value, but by preventing expenditure on more expensive forms 
of waste disposal it reduced costs for government, industry and 
consumers alike. Some indication of the value for the year 1967 of 
this function to the UK can be gauged from the cost later incurred by 
private companies and public authorities in making alternative
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arrangements. This figure can be regarded, especially under the 
system of fixed exchange rates, as equivalent to the amount by which 
the costs of UK industry were lowered by the disposal of wastes at 
sea. A substantial effort to reduce the quantity of pollutants 
entering the sea later took place during the years 1970-75, but no 
comprehensive work has been done on the costs or benefits of this 
effort.
The contribution of marine waste disposal to both GNP and the balance 
of payments is impossible to quantify. Although presumably it had 
an effect in producing lower comparative costs for UK products than 
would have been the case had more sophisticated methods of effluent 
treatment been adopted, low water quality and dirty beaches probably 
drove away tourist revenue. Measures to combat pollution, although 
expensive, might well have increased GNP. In addition to the 
philosophical underpinning which the use of the sea as a means of 
waste disposal provided to the High Seas view, it also dramatically 
illustrates the weakness of fisheries interests within policy-making. 
As Figure 3.1 shows, the use of the sea as a means of waste disposal, 
encompasses the marine activities most inimical to fisheries. 
Polluted water inhibits the growth of many species of fish, while 
waste objects on the seabed can damage fishing gear. IXimping of 
noxious waste and sludge took place outside the territorial sea and 
largely in either 'deeps’ (small hollows in the seabed), or on the 
edge of the continental shelf. Provided that the waste was securely 
packaged, it was rarely a hazard to fishermen for a few years after 
deposit. There was, hovever, an ever-present possibility of 
accident, either en route to the dumping ground or by leakage 
resulting from deterioration over time of the containers in which 
waste was stored. Moreover, in North-Eastern Ehgland, colliery
dumping introduced loose mineral debris into the sea, which clouded 
the water and reduced the growth rate of fish. Sewage was 
discharged directly into the sea from more than 200 pipes, and in 
addition many rivers were badly polluted by sewage, industrial and 
household effluent. Tne waste discharged by vessels in transit was 
of varied types, some of which could be dangerous to fisheries. The 
gravest problem, that of oil discharge, was in decline thanks to the 
IMCO Conventions, but a considerable variety of substances, solid and 
liquid, were thrown into the sea from the many ships passing through 
the Straits of Dover. Despite these problems, there was no national 
lobby of fishermen to reduce water pollution.
In addition to these industries arguing for the maintenance of the 
High Seas regime HMG had to consider a small but promising 
continental shelf mining industry. It appeared to be neutral on the 
issue of High Seas or coastal state limits, since its basic needs 
were ensured by the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. In 
1256 a gas field had been located between layers of Rotliegendes 
sandstone near Groningen in the Netherlands. The knowledge that 
this rock underlaid much of the Southern North Sea had led to a rush 
by littoral states to delineate their shares of the continental 
shelf. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) had been asked to 
identify relevant principles for this division, while the UK and 
Norway had agreed to ignore a mid-shelf trench and to abide by the 
principle of equidistance Had the trench formed the boundary 
the UK share of the shelf between the UK and Norway would have been 
substantially larger, but the desire for the swift onset of 
exploration led the Foreign Office to make this concession. It was 
not thought at the time that the UK was conceding any mineral wealth, 
as the sandstone did not extend sufficiently far North for the
48Anglo-tJorwegian shelf to be thought to contain gasfields. 
Exploitation followed rapidly on delineation. The Continental Shelf 
Act 1964 ^  had divided the UK shelf into blocks, each measuring 250 
square kilometres, which could be leased for a period of up to six 
years with an option to renew for a further forty-six years- By
October 1966 twenty-six wells had been sunk, and seven of these, only 
one of which lay outside the Rotliegendes sandstone, had located gas. 
In that month Burmah Oil had announced a find of indeterminate size, 
of oil similar to the light Libyan crude variety Whether or not
oil was present in considerable quantities was thus a very 
tantalising question, but a Shell/Esso gas field at Leman Bank was 
thought to contain recoverable reserves of pure methane equivalent to 
fifteen times UK annual consumption of gas 13.
The evidence of the quantity of gas did not make the continental 
shelf a vital UK interest. There was already a worrying possibility 
of over-capacity in the government-owned energy industries because of 
ambitious forward programmes for new plants to produce gas and 
electricity 1^ . There was also a danger that a sudden flood of 
cheap North Sea gas might cause many consumers to undertake a costly 
conversion of facilities to burn gas rather than coal, electricity or
oil. This would threaten many coal-pits and power stations with 
closure, while in perhaps fifteen years thence the gas would be 
exhausted, leaving the UK with a serious undercapacity in coal and 
electricity. The ruling Labour Party, for reasons of history, 
mythology, and structure, relied heavily upon coal miners, a group to 
whom declining demand for coal gas would be economically damaging 
On the other hand a market had to be found for the newly-discovered 
gas, because the government wanted the continuation of exploration 
for oil, and so drilling companies had to be seen to secure an early
return on their efforts - 49
Some of the gas could be absorbed as a feedstock for the production 
of chemicals. The substantial price advantages which North Sea gas 
would enjoy over coal gas could provide the UK chemical industry with 
substantial cost advantages over its competitors. The potential 
demand of the chemical industry for North Sea gas was, however, 
limited by its chemical composition. Methane, though excellent as a 
fuel, is inferior to coal gas as a chemical feedstock. Nnile some 
basic chemicals, including ammonia, alcohol and acetylene, can be 
extracted from it, the olefines necessary for the production of 
plastics and heavy organics are absent. Over the winter of 1966-7 
it rapidly became apparent that there would be too high an annual gas 
production from existing wells for the chemical industry to absorb, 
especially when in February 1967 Philips Petroleum made a huge find 
of methane The state monopoly in gas supply required that if
the gas were to be used as fuel the government would have to buy it 
at a price low enough to prevent lessees from gaining excessive 
profits, but high enough to make continued exploration an attractive 
proposition. This option had a drawback; the combustive properties 
of methane differ considerably from those of coal gas, and its use 
would require extensive modifications to much capital equipment.
After a delay of several months the gas industry agreed to buy
17methane at a low price, two and one half old pence per therm
By mid-1967, therefore, the potential wealth which the UK could 
derive from beneath the continental shelf had imprinted itself upon 
the public mind as a vital UK interest, although estimates of the 
contribution which it could make to the UK economy varied widely 
This uncertainty was exacerbated by the vagueness of the outer limit
of the state-managed continental shelf as defined by the 1956 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf (see pages 117-118). Although 
the first major oilfield was not to be discovered until 1970, the gas 
industry was committed to buying large quantities of North Sea gas, 
and had staked extensive investment plans on this commitment. The 
competitive price implied that coal gas production would decline, and 
that UK energy users would be heavily dependent upon a favourable 
regime on the continental shelf. While the contribution to GNP, the 
balance of payments and employment of continental shelf exploitation 
was meagre in 1967, it was the object of extensive hopes among UK 
citizens.
If other UK marine interests largely favoured HMG's maximising the 
High Seas, such a policy did not necessarily appear to be against the 
interests of the fishing industry- The well-being of that industry 
in 1967 did not obviously cry out for either the maintenance or the 
revision of the High Seas regime, since the specific biological and 
economic rationale of fisheries appeared to be identical whatever the 
regime. Moreover, the UK fishing industry embraced vessels designed 
to fish close to the shores of other states as well as vessels 
suitable for fishing in UK coastal waters (see page 76), and so the 
fishing industry had no decisive and united objective interest in 
relation to the regime. Compared with shipping, fisheries could 
wield very little political or economic influence. In terms of its 
contribution to Gross National Product, the fishing industry was 
dwarfed by shipping. The total first sale price of fish landed by 
UK vessels contributed O-lSi of GDP in 1967 Fish processing and 
distribution trebled this contribution, but it must be remembered 
tnat these latter industries might well have been almost as big even 
if totally dependent on imported fish.
The balance of payments savings attributable to fishing by UK vessels 
cannot be precisely quantified. Firstly it is difficult to 
calculate what UK price and demand levels would be if there were no 
domestic production, and also any fisheries regime is subject to 
possible alteration which may affect the likelihood of future 
savings. In addition, the very nature of fisheries creates wide 
fluctuations in imports and exports. Apart from the seasonal nature 
of some fisheries, many fishermen will choose where to land their 
catches by looking for advantageous price levels, taking exchange 
rates into account. Foreign landings of fresh fish at UK ports 
count as imports, while landings by British fishermen at foreign 
ports count as exports. It is possible to make an estimate, 
however. Consumption of fish and fish products in the UK 
consistently exceeded domestic production. A rough estimate of the 
adverse effect on the balance of payments of a cessation of fishing 
by UK residents can be made by subtracting net imports from the total 
value of UK consumption and adjusting for the fact that part of the 
value added even to imported processed fish occurs within the United 
Kingdom.
On this basis fishing contributed around £70m at current prices to a 
favourable balance of payments in 1967 ^°. Such low figures for the 
relative economic contribution of the fishing industry mask, however, 
its true strength. It had a most significant economic role in its 
contribution to employment. As can be deduced from Figure 3-2, 
fishing constitutes a very small proportion of total national 
employment, a miniscule 0.1‘4 in 1967 . By that year total 
employment in fishing was less than half of what it had been 
following the re-establishment of peacetime fishing after the Second
World War. Where fisheries did score was in their contribution to 52
regional employment, and thus their importance to regional policy. 
Despite the low number of fishermen, fishing is locally a very 
important source of employment. Many towns and villages around the 
coast are heavily dependent upon it, and certain regions, such as the 
North of Scotland and South-West England, offer few alternative 
opportunities for work.
Figure 3-2: Number of fishermen as at 31st December of each year
YEAR ENGLAND & WALES SCOTLAND NORTHERN IRELAND UNITED KINGDOM
Reg. Part. Reg- Part. Reg. Part. Reg. Part.
Employed Employed Employed Employed Employed Employed Employed Employed
1938 26,062 2,949+ 12,976* 4,939» 342 556 39,380 8,444
1948 25,946 3,373+ 12,080« 5,148« 800 300 38,826 8,821
1960 12,712 3,646+ 8,795« 2,451* 500 150 22,007 6,247
1967 10,110 3,076 8,057 1,847 508 184 18,675 5,107
1970 9,424 2,382 7,656 1,441 548 200 17,628 4,023
1973 10,199 2,830 8,311 1,336 600 200 19,110 4,366
1974 9,799 3,636 3,172 1,399 600 200 18,571 5,235
1975 9,016 3,917 7,507 1,341 538 285 17,061 5,543
1976 8,730 4,149 7,560 1,306 540 285 16,830 5,740
1977 8,172 4,498 7,625 1,360 540 285 16,337 6,143
1978 8,064 4,755 7,843 1,378 540 285 16,467 6,418
1979 8,377 4,558 7,613 1,211 600 300 16,590 6,069
1980 8,455 5,135 7,561 1,138 700 300 16,716 6,573
1981 8,450 5,992 7,376 1,085 783 241 16,609 7,318
1982 8,258 5,465 7,247 937 841 263 16,346 6,665
♦Includes ’hobby' fishermen. 
•As at 30 November
A decline in direct employment in fishing can therefore be extremely 
serious for these regions. The Scottish economy is relatively more 
dependent on the fishing industry than the UK as a whole; 0.43? of 
those at work in Scotland in 1967 were directly engaged in fishing^. 
For many years the Scottish unemployment rate had rarely fallen below 
1255 of the rate for the UK as a whole ^  and so the maintenance of 
employment in fishing and its ancillary industries was of paramount 
importance to government regional policy-
In addition to the number directly employed in fishing, a 
considerable number of people worked in processing or transporting 
the catch. Fishing, like all primary industries, has a multiplier 
effect on employment, partly due to the spending power of the 
fishermen and partly because of ancillary jobs in processing, 
handling and transportation. The proportion of fishermen to 
ancillary workers in Scotland has been calculated at 1:1.79 for 
196725, which means that approximately 25000 jobs there were 
dependent on fishing, over half of them concentrated in what is now 
the Grampian Region. Tne aggregate income and employment multiplier 
effect of fishing was thus substantial, but the effect was felt, not 
at the port of landing, but at the towns where processing plants were 
located. They were concentrated in only a few locations, and fish 
were extensively transported long distances in order to be processed. 
For instance, for every £10,000 worth of fish landed in Fraserburgh
there were 6.7 process workers whilst in flallaig there was but 0.1
26'J- For this reason, landings in some less-favoured localities 
generated very little ancillary local employment, and the political 
importance of fisheries was concentrated upon a few towns where a 
large number of votes night be swayed by fisheries-related issues. 
Since the processors were much more numerous in these towns than the 
producers, the fundamental political concern became access to fish 
stocks rather than any issue concerned with the well-being of 
fishermen. Moreover, although partisans of the fishing industry 
generally imply otherwise, a decline in landings by UK fishing 
vessels by no means implies a proportional dwindling of the 
processing industry. Ancillary jobs can be safeguarded by increased 
imports of unprocessed or part-processed fish, although this will 
tend to concentrate processing activities at still fewer locations.
Imports can also serve to provide a smooth flow of raw material when 
the indigenous fishery is seasonal. Thus the Iceatlantic factory in 
Scalloway, Shetland was to be kept open by supplies of Canadian 
herring in the face of stringent catch limitations and closed seasons 
in the local herring fishery during the lean years of the late 1970s-
For these and other reasons, the precise employment multiplier of 
fishing is uncertain. That of the "deep sea" fleet was probably 
greater than that of the inshore fleet, because the former achieved a 
greater catch per man. In addition the popularity and 
diversification of convenience foods based on white fish caught by 
the larger trawlers allowed a greater value to be added by 
processing. The Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Board 
claimed an employment multiplier of 5-04 for Hull ^7. The true 
multiplier of the distant-water fleet was probably considerably less 
than this, because Hull was the principal port of entry for fish 
imports and also processed some fish landed by UK fishermen at other 
ports. Whatever the true contribution of UK fisheries to 
employment, it was this issue, rather than substantial added value, 
which gave fisheries political significance. At least for England 
and Wales, however, the concentration of these processing jobs in the 
distant-water ports tended to exaggerate the political importance of 
the distant-water catch. For Northern Scotland fisheries was an 
extremely significant source of employment.
This combination of the relative unimportance of fisheries to overall 
UK policy, with the result that the marine regime was unlikely to be 
tailored to its biological and economic rationale, and a 
determination to maintain employment levels for regional purposes 
meant that HMG was happy to provide subsidies to the industry, where
necessary, rather than contemplate regime change. 55
It can thus be expected that the interests of the fishing industry 
were of little importance in the determination of policy outcomes 
both in 1967 and for much of the period under review. Fisheries 
were of little economic or strategic value compared with other marine 
industries, and had a smaller constituency than shipping or 
continental shelf mining. Marine waste disposal was of greater 
value, but had no great constituency. However, this does not imply 
that policy was invariably opposed to the interests of fisheries- 
Policy made for reasons external to fisheries may favour certain 
sections of the fishing industry and act to the detriment of others. 
The best example of this is the question of the extent of state 
jurisdiction. Narrow limits to state jurisdiction increase the 
mobility of snipping, and make it harder for a state to control the 
damping of waste materials at sea. Therefore while the UK shipping 
industry and the Royal Navy were pre-eminent and while the problem of 
the dumping of materials from passing vessels was not great the UK 
could be expected to favour narrow limits to state jurisdiction. 
Such a policy incidentally favoured the interests of British 
distant-water fishermen operating close to the shores of other 
states. The economic and strategic importance of the various marine 
interests is reflected in the inter-departmental relationships 
between their sponsoring departments upon which policy-making 
depends, relationships which are dealt with in Chapter 4.
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BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE ORGANISATION AND GOVERmENT OF THE FISHING
INDUSTRY, 1967
Ttie position of fisheries within the UK administrative structure
If fisheries were of lesser importance to the UK economy than other 
marine-based industries with which they had to compete, this 
subordination was reinforced by the manner in which fisheries 
administration related to the overall structure of government 
decision-making. Fisheries was essentially a sectoral policy area, 
with its own semi-autonomous branches of government, an arrangement 
vAiich allowed great flexibility within the confines of existing high 
policy but which prevented fisheries having any meaningful input to 
that high policy. Fisheries administration represented a minor part 
of the work of ministries devoted primarily to agriculture and to 
food supply: in England and Wales the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF), and in Scotland the Scottish Office's 
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland (DAFS). In 
relations with other governments these departments were unable to 
operate independently, since the Foreign and Ccnmonwealth Office 
(FCO) was the lead department on international questions . The 
international role of MAFF and DAFS was confined to operating 
inter-governmental arrangements previously approved by the PCD. 
Questions of exclusive limits to fisheries jurisdiction, and of which 
states' vessels should enjoy a right to fish in which waters, were 
therefore settled in terms of FCD concerns. These concerns, because 
of an PCD perception of the UK's long-term economic and military 
survival as attributable to the health and mobility of the Royal Navy
(RN) and the shipping industry, were for narrow limits to state 
jurisdiction over the water column, and for the maximisation of 
navigational freedoms, that is flag-state rather than coastal-state 
regimes. For this reason the FCO enjoyed close and routine 
co-operation with the Board of Trade (the ' sponsoring department' of 
the shipping industry) and with the Ministry of Defence.
The overall subordination of fisheries to other interests was 
canplemented by a number of factors which strengthened the political 
power of those sections of the fishing industry sharing the PCO1 s 
narrow-limit views, and weakening those sections of the industry 
which might have fared better under a more rigorously coastal-state 
policy. The cwners of trawlers working close to the shores of other 
states were richer and more effectively organised to affect policy 
outcomes than the owners of vessels working close to UK coasts. The 
ccnmonly-styled "deep sea" (more properly distant-, middle-, and 
near-water) fleet had effective campaigning organisations, could 
call on the support of sizeable trades unions for its opposition to 
extensions of coastal state jurisdiction, and because of its 
concentration on a few ports represented a vital constituency 
interest for MPs of both Conservative and Labour Parties. On the 
other hand, the so-called 'inshore' fleet had no effective 
campaigning organisation, had little connection with the trades 
unions, and was distributed across a large number of ports, forming 
an important interest in only a few constituencies, mainly in
Scotland.
The sectoral operation of fisheries policy 60
The classic sectoral process of policy formation as delineated by 
such writers as Wallace ^ and Barber ^ involves the negotiation or 
exchange of views between Government Departments and between a 
variety of actors, inside and outside the government. The task of 
government is not to achieve an objective "ccrrmon good" but to find a 
ccmprcmise among diverse and conflicting interests and views. Any 
groups and individuals outside the Executive with relevant interests 
or knowledge of a matter under review may be consulted. Pressure 
groups, especially established "protective" ones and MPs with special 
concerns, are involved, but political parties do not participate as 
such. The task of co-ordination is carried out by a small 
specialist division of a Government Department or Ministry which acts 
as the sector's sponsoring department, and which has a degree of 
autonomy in representing the perceived interests of the sector in 
relation to other institutions of the civil service and to other 
governments.
Fisheries administration fits the classic sectoral model well, 
involving issues of great technicality vital to those economically 
dependent on fisheries but of only marginal interest to the bulk of 
the UK population. The need for rapid and sympathetic responses to 
economic and biological fluctuations, combined with a requirement for 
inter-state co-operation in fisheries management, had to a 
considerable extent detached day-to-day government relations with the 
fishing industry from the wider political concerns of the party in 
power. The position of the responsible Civil Service divisions was 
that of "sponsoring departments": maintaining good relations with 
all sections of the industry and issuing regulations according to
their perception of its best interests.
For England and Wales the principal sponsoring department for 
fisheries was MAFF1s "Fisheries department", and for Scotland, DAFS' 
"Fisheries department" (the "Fisheries departments") . The leading 
civil servants in the two Fisheries departments of MAFF and DAFS were 
styled "Fisheries Secretaries". Formed Ministerial responsibility 
lay with the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, but they usually delegated 
responsibility for most aspects of fisheries to Junior Ministers (see 
Figure 4.2).
The sectoral approach to fisheries administration gave the 
departments considerable autonomy in relation to their statutory 
functions. In order to permit swift responses to Fisheries 
Cormissions and to fluctuations in the level of fish stocks, the 
Minister for AFF and the Secretary of State for Scotland were 
empowered to ban landings of, or to prescribe minimum landed sizes 
for, certain 'protected' species. Political confidence in this use 
of Statutory Instruments was strong in 1967, and the pcwer of 
ministers to make them was to be extended under the Sea Fisheries Act 
1968 6 .
This sectoral approach to fisheries was very successful in the 
absence of systemic crises or pressure frcm the international 
environment, both of which could result in the needs of fisheries 
being subordinated bo high policy considerations. The fisheries 
departments provided a number of financial, technical and economic 
services to the industry. They maintained laboratories devoted bo 
fisheries research ab Lcwesbofb, Porb Erin, Conway and
Burnham-on-Crouch, and made regulations and provided information to 
fishermen on the basis of their findings. The success of the North 
East Atlantic Fisheries Ccrmission (NEAFC) in increasing total yield 
by the progressive application of minimum mesh sizes, and the wide 
dissemination of the findings of the research laboratories had welded 
fishing industry opinion solidly behind the scientific approach. 
While fishermen often complained that nationals of other states were 
contravening the regulations, and sometimes broke these thanselves,
7they generally approved of such regulations
In addition to research, the Fisheries departments provided financial 
and market control assistance. The two principal channels of 
government aid to the industry were the Herring Industry Board and 
the White Fish Authority (1 The Statutory Bodies' ) ® . They were 
semi-independent of the fisheries departments, but their part-time 
maribership was appointed by the minister and the Secretary of State. 
Financed primarily by a levy on the point of first sale, the Herring 
Industry Board had been extremely active in market intervention 
throughout its life. It had introduced a register of herring
fishermen, pioneered quick freezing of the catch, and operated a 
number of fish-meal factories whose raw material was herring which 
had failed to carmand the Board1 s minimum prices for fish for human 
consumption. It also licensed all involved in all aspects of the 
herring trade, and regulated their activities. The White Fish 
Authority (WFA) had not made such extensive use of its powers, 
generally confining its activities to financial and scientific 
assistance. It had been fairly active in modernising the processing 
industry by example, but otherwise had kept out of downstream 
operations. The powers accorded the Authority by legislation were 
as vd.de as those possessed by the Board, and the infrequency of their
use was due to the fact that white-fishermen were cushioned against 
the biologically-induced supply fluctuations which affected the 
herring industry since a number of different target species can be 
taken with the same gear. Herring fishermen, on the other hand, had 
no other pelagic species close to their main ports which could be 
exploited with the same equipment. Like the Board, the Authority 
was financed frctu a levy on firsthand sales of white fish, and from 
grant aid frcm the Treasury for research and development.
Both Statutory Bodies provided grants and loans for the construction 
and improvement of vessels, financed directly by the Exchequer. The 
construction of inshore vessels had first been subsidised as a spur 
to domestic food production during the Second World War, and the Sea
QFish Industry Act 1962 had extended construction and improvement 
grants to the "deep sea" fleet. A  complicated system of operating 
subsidies also existed, with their progressive withdrawal as 
profitability increased.
While fisheries administration fits the sectoral model well, there 
were a few functions of importance to fisheries which were exercised 
by other government departments. The Board of Trade1s Marine 
Division was responsible for all matters concerned with the 
construction and seaworthiness of fishing vessels, safety 
regulations, weather forecasts and navigational services, and its 
Registrar-General of Shipping and Seamen maintained a register of 
vessels ard seafarers and supervised training and certification. 
Since the fishing fleet comprised caily a small proportion of the 
ccrrmercial tonnage, the Board's positions and procedures tended to 
reflect the interests of the merchant navy.
The Board also maintained a laboratory at Torry in Aberdeenshire to 
study the food applications of fish, and a number of other government 
departments exercised sane functions relevant to the fleet. The 
Ministry of Social Security was responsible for the welfare of those 
employed in the industry and for relevant transfer payments, playing 
an important role in view of the casual nature of much fisheries 
employment. A large number of fishermen were either se 1 f-employed 
or remunerated by a share in either net proceeds (officers) or gross 
earnings (crew) and special conditions attached to transfer payments, 
sind liaison between MAFF and Social Security officials took place at 
port level. The Department of Health maintained regular contact 
with the fisheries departments over matters of food fish hygiene, 
while the Department of Education and Science provided, through the 
Natursil Environnent Research Council, facilities for hydrographic and 
oceanographic research. It also substsintially financed the Marine 
Biological Association and the Scottish Marine Biological 
Association. More than two hundred harbours, docks and piers were 
used for the lsinding of fish at sane time of the year, and these were 
the responsibility of a bewildering variety of institutions of local 
and national government, although MAFF and DAFS operated the most 
important ('scheduled') fishery harbours. The Treasury was 
concerned in budgetary questions and in the regulation of fish 
imports. The Ministry of Defence provided a search and rescue 
service and, through the Hydrographer of the Navy, charts and tables.
Although the sectoral approach to fisheries policy meant that 
government was responsive to fishermen's needs within the boundaries 
of overall government policy, the Fisheries departments were poorly 
positioned to make effective representations as to major policy or 
regime change. They were very weak within their cwn departments,
MAFF and the Scottish Office. 65
The operation of the Fisheries departments
Among the lower administrative grades, civil servants moved fairly 
frequently between posts, so that they tended to develop a 
Departmental view (one related to the wider concerns of MAFF and the 
Scottish Office), in addition to a "departmental" view (one related 
to the specific concerns of the Fisheries departments). These rapid 
changes of post among lcwer grades contrasted with great longevity of 
tenure in higher posts, because of the pyramidal structure of 
Government Departments. By 1967, Sir John Winnifrith had been 
Permanent Secretary at MAFF for eight years, while Sir Anthony Aglen 
had been Scottish Fisheries Secretary for an astonishing twenty-one 
years. The vertical structure of MAFF and the Scottish Office meant 
that on the rare occasions when fisheries policy obtruded into the 
higher levels of government structures it had to compete with other 
policy concerns of its parent Departments. Taking MAFF as an 
example, the problem was not usually that the concerns of other 
divisions of the Ministry conflicted with those of the Fisheries 
department, but that they crowded them out. MAFF was overwhelmingly 
concerned with agriculture. Two Royal Ccmissions on the 
organisation of the Ministry, reporting in 1951 and 1956, had ignored 
fisheries altogether as only a minor part of the Ministry's work ^ . 
Within MAFF's internal structure, the Fisheries department was 
extremely ineffectual (see Figure 4.1).
The Fisheries Secretary had to compete for the Ministerial ear with 
twenty-seven other civil servants of his grade (Under-Secretary), 
most of whan were concerned with agriculture. Under routine
Figure 4.1; The position of fisheries within the organisational 
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circumstances he was subject to a Deputy Secretary in charge of 
'Fisheries and Food', one of six Deputy Secretaries in the Ministry. 
The bracketing together of fisheries and food was partly the product 
of administrative convenience at the time of the amalgamation of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the supply-orientated 
Ministry of Food in 1955- The arrangement also demonstrates that 
fisheries was seen by the bulk of the Ministry as largely a source of 
'free' protein for a food-importing country. In this way, food 
supply and price considerations might at times have overridden the 
interests of fishermen. The 'Food' concern with strategic food 
imports reinforced the Fisheries department's suspicion of coastal 
states' extensions of jurisdiction in creating a MAFF Departmental 
view- The bulk of the Ministry's higher civil servants regarded 
fisheries as a very minor part of its work This institutional
subordination of fisheries sometimes yielded criticism from fisheries 
interests angered by a lack of decisive action. As one MP put it:
"Having had ten years' experience of trying to help the 
fishing industry in my constituency I know of no more 
feeble department in Whitehall than the fisheries side of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. However 
hard one tries, one experiences difficulty in getting
positive and constructive action out of that department."
13
The weakness of fisheries was also demonstrated by the Ministers 
appointed to oversee the sector. Few Ministers appointed during the 
period under review represented fisheries constituencies (see Figure 
4-2), and even fewer knew anything about fishing-
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This combination of autonomy in policy execution and powerlessness in 63
policy-making was repeated on international questions. MAFF's 
Fisheries Division III provided UK representation to all the major 
inter-governmental organisations concerned with fisheries, including 
the FAQ and the OECD Fisheries CCmnittees as well as the two 
Fisheries Comissions despite the fact that MAFF had a specialist 
External Relations Division. This autonomy, however, did not extend 
to issues of regime change. The Foreign and Catmonwealth Office 
(FCD) occupied the position of 'lead Department' in foreign policy, 
with formal overall control. Although day-to-day conduct of many 
aspects of foreign economic policy had been relinquished to sectoral 
control, the FCO maintained routine observation of sectoral 
developments. Its Marine and Transport department maintained a 
watching brief over international fisheries, largely because of their 
implications for the freedom of navigation. Relations with Canada, 
Norway and Iceland, off whose coasts most of the UK distant-water 
catch was taken, were also of concern to the FCD's Western 
Organisations department because of these states' membership of NATO. 
A number of the FCD's geographical departments were also marginally 
involved, receiving regular reports from British embassies in states 
near to whose shores UK vessels engaged in fishing.
All departments of the POO were prodigious information-gatherers, and
often the FCO spoke directly to concerned organisations and
individuals within the fisheries sector, undermining the departments'
16position as sectoral coordinators . The FCO also possessed a 
number of specialist divisions to provide legal, economic, historical 
or information retrieval services to its geographical and functional 
departments ^ . The services of these departments and of the PCO ' s 
prestigious libraries provided an impressive consistency and
continuity to PCO policy. This emphasis on continuity lent a 
historical bias to FOO strategy, leading the PCS) to pursue 
established goals without any procedure for evaluation. The 
tremendous flows of information into the Foreign Office were sifted 
and organised according to existing policy assumptions. Similarly, 
new recruits to the higher echelons of the PCO were socialised into 
prevailing views. As Lamer lias put it:
"There is too much work for there to be time to question
the value of the work."
This historical bias included an obsession with maximising the extent 
of the High Seas. During three centuries of British naval 
superiority and a shorter period of British industrial supremacy 
British foreign policy interests had lain in the "freedcm of the 
seas". It was therefore an article of faith for the Foreign and
Ccmnonwealth Office that such arrangements were still in the UK1 s 
interests.
The PCO' s concern for high seas freedoms and the safeguarding of 
navigation was reinforced by its links with other government bodies 
vhich thought likewise. There was a close relationship between the 
FOO ard the Ministry of Defence, partly through formal bodies such as 
the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy Ccmittee, but largely of 
an informal nature, through long usage and constant mutual 
consultation. If 'high' policy is that vhich concerns the security 
of the state this consultation is to be expected. The habitual 
association among politicians of defence and foreign policy is well 
illustrated by an extract frcm the memoirs of Lord Avon, who had 
served both as Prime Minister and as Foreign Secretary:
"Defence and foreign policy had to be considered together
and they formed the chief topic of conversation between Sir
• i gWinston Churchill and myself in sixteen years."
The FOO's narrow limit views were also shared by the Board of Trade, 
which included a predictable political and legal environment for 
merchant vessels, with flag state discipline applied for breaches of 
regulations and a clear right of passage through straits, even those 
wholly encompassed by territorial seas.
The power of the FCO in relation to the fisheries regime was 
demonstrated in two ways. The Foreign Office had in the past shewn 
a consistent determination to intervene in fisheries questions when 
narrow limits to coastal state jurisdiction were threatened. 
Disputes with Norway in the 1940s and with Iceland frem 1958-61 had 
provided evidence of this determination.
Up until 1962 the distant-water fleet had routinely been accompanied 
by frigates of the Royal Navy's Arctic Squadron. Although this was 
no longer the case, fisheries protection duties, except within the
Scottish twelve-mile limit where DAFS operated its own six ' fishery
20cruisers', were carried out by the Royal Navy . The PCD view was 
that to carry out policing functions on the High Seas with civilian 
vessels would imply a civil claim beyond fisheries limits, and an 
inevitable result of this policy was inappropriate vessels. The 
Royal Navy ensured that their fishery protection vessels also 
possessed a military capability, and the eight-vessel Fisheries 
Protection Squadron doubled as the Mine Countermeasures Squadron.
The second area in which the FCO's power clearly impinged upon 
fisheries was in the monopolisation of British representation at 
discussions on the Law of the Sea and the creation of the kind of 
intergovernmental fishery arrangements that posed no threat to the 
High Sea regime. The Fisheries Commissions owed their existence in 
large part to deliberate FCO activity in producing a workable 
institution for functional cooperation in the management of a common 
property resource, one which reconciled the biological imperatives of 
fisheries with the FCO's own preferences for maximal High Seas 
regimes. These Commissions were only two examples of a number of 
international economic organisations in whose establishment the 
Foreign Office had cooperated with foreign governments because it 
considered them appropriate to the conduct of the UK's foreign 
economic policy. . That the structure of apparently purely 
functional intergovernmental organisations may be more determined by 
state diplomacy rather than by functional requirements has been 
claimed out by R.E. Jones:
"By definition, intergovernmental transnational 
organisations can only be established by governments. In 
embarking on such enterprises governments may be moved far 
more by traditional diplomatic interests than by notions of 
systemic control." ^2
If FCO diplomacy in pursuit of 'high policy' goals supplanted 
functional fisheries goals, the relationship between the FCO and the 
fisheries departments was not overtly one of power. Regular 
low-level exchanges of views took place between officials, so that 
inter-Departmental decision-making was not a process of negotiation 
between prepared positions in which the FCO could use its position of
'lead' Department to impose its views on other Departments- By the 
time that formal inter-Departmental consultations took place, many of 
the potential disagreements had already been settled between 
officials at a low level- Consensus views emerged, rather than 
being negotiated- In the words of a Scottish Fisheries Secretary:
"The build-up of advice is constant and continuous. Some 
of it is written, some of it is not written...In my view 
the excnange of views between it [the Foreign Office] and 
the Fisheries Departments are [sic] complete and 
effective." ^2
Often, as Wallace has pointed out, the relevant officials in 
different departments share each others' views and a common outlook, 
so formal consultation is often superfluous ^. This was largely 
the case in relation to international fisheries in 1967. The FCO 
usually deferred to the fisheries departments in the setting of 
policy, except during periods of direct intergovernmental disputes in 
matters related to fisheries limits Even on this issue there 
had been no real conflict. The FCO and the fisheries departments in 
1967 both strongly supported, for their own reasons, the negotiation 
of High Seas fisheries questions within Fisheries Commissions (see 
pages 125-6), and generally opposed coastal state extensions of 
fisheries jurisdiction. The significant aspect of the relationship 
was not that the FCO overtly exercised permanent dominance, but that 
in rare cases of disagreement on international questions the FCO was 
able to establish UK policy. An example was the decision to 
establish a European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as a counterweight 
to the European Economic Community in 1960. All sections of the 
fishing industry and the Fisheries departments were opposed to EFTA
74because of fears of competition frcm Norwegian fish exports, but the 
Foreign Office had insisted because the institution was important to 
its high policy concerns
The willingness of MAFF officials to acquiesce so readily in the 
FOO's narrcw-limit desires stenmed frcm the fact that the Fisheries 
departments in 1967 were certain that the High Seas regime was in the 
interests of the fishing industry. Over half the UK catch by value 
was taken frcm areas classified by MAFF as "distant-water" or 
"middle-water", (see Figure 4.3), and a regime of narrow limits 
served to protect seme of these areas frcm expropriation. There was 
sustantial foreign fishing effort close to UK coasts, but the 
fisheries departments had by 1967 made little attempt systematically 
to evaluate it. Figures 4.4 and 12.2, although based upon later 
data, may give an approximation.
In addition to its greater apparent importance in catch terms, the 
"deep sea" industry was far better organised to influence MAFF than 
was its inshore counterpart. The owners of most of the larger 
trawlers were members of either the British Trawlers Federation (BTF) 
or the Scottish Trawlers Federation (STF). Although the larger 
trawler firms did not hold a monopoly of membership, they wielded a 
disproportionate influence within the Federations. A requirement 
that any fisherman wishing to obtain White Fish Authority assistance 
for the purchase of a new vessel must provide a substantial deposit 
had led to deposits being advanced by large firms on behalf of the 
smaller operators. In tliis way these firms had become share-owners 
of a number of near-water and middle-water trawlers operated by small 
or family firms. By including as members the owners of many smaller 
trawlers the Federations blurred any division of interest among
75Figure 4.3; British wet fish landings in 1967 by region of capture, 
excluding shellfish. ICES and ICMAF areas appear in brackets.









(NEAPC) Barents Sea (I) 50282 3582 6.3
East coast of Greenland (XIV) 1180 84 0.1
Bear Island and iH! 527 0.9
Tornas 213270 15788 27.9
Distant water West coast of Greenland (1B-F) 16826 1007 1.8
(ICNAF) Gulf of St. Lawrence (4S-V) 4428 295 0.5
Labrador (2G-J) 7380 498 0.9
Gulf of Main and Georges Bank 49 2 —
Grand Banks of Newfoundland 37392 2561 4.5
(3L-P)
TOTALS 66075 4363 7.7
TOTAL DIOTAOT WATER 279345 20151 35.6
Middle water Faroes (Vb) 29421 2562 4.5
(NEAPC) West of Scotland (Via) 127702 6553 11.5
Rockall (VIb) 295 27 —
Norwegian Coast (Ila) 43935 3289 5.8
Skagerrak (Ilia) 98 8 —
TOTALS 201451 12439 21.9
Near water West of Ireland and Porcupine Bank296 26 ___
and inshore (Vllb-c) 
Irish Sea (Vila) 21497 1413 2.5
North Sea (IV) 298840 21402 37.7
South of Ireland and Sole Banks 738 55 0.1
(VIIg-k)
English Channel (VIId-e) 10332 794 1.4
Bristol Channel (Vllf) 4379 420 0.7
TOTALS 336082 24110 42.5
TOTAL CATCH 816888 56700 100.0
Figures for "near water and inshore” are not further subdivided because 
MAFF fishery statistics are not presented in a form which identifies the 
size of vessel used or distance taken iron shore.
Figure 4.4: Location of fish stocks and the main areas of foreign
fishing effort.
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trawlermen about fisheries limits. Distant water activities did not
canpete with the inshore fishermen of the UK, and so the Federations 
were able to present a clear and unequivocal view to MAFF. These 
Federations had been able to adjust the market to increase the return 
to their members: a BTF minimum landing price was found to be legal 
by the Restrictive Practices Court in 1966. Owing to objections, 
the WFA had found itself unable to implement a minimum landed price 
of its own. The wealth, small numbers and geographical 
concentration of the Federations' membership enabled them to employ 
specialised and permanent officials, skilled in public relations. 
Hie Federations thus enjoyed a close relationship with the Fisheries 
departments which the inshore men could not match; for instance, 
regular weekly meetings were held between the BTF1s Director General 
and MAFF's Fisheries Secretary.
The deep sea industry had other political advantages. The 
concentration of its activities on a few ports and the size and 
processibility of cod had created local concentrations of persons 
whose employment depended upon the health of the distant-water 
industry . In addition its views were shared by organised groups 
of retailers, such as the National Federation of Fish Friers, whose
members depended most heavily on cod, which comprised 70.9% of the
30middle and distant water catch in 1967
The influence of the Trawlers Federations in relation to limits was 
bolstered by the power of trade unions with members dependent upon 
the "deep sea" industry. The Transport and General Workers' Union 
(TGWU) aspired to represent trawler crews and the dockers, lumpers, 
bobbers and truck drivers upon whan the distribution of all fish, 
whether imported or caught by UK-registered boats, depended. This
union sponsored approximately twenty MPs in each of the Parliaments 
during the period 1967-79. The Secretary of the TGWJ Parliamentary 
Group was a Hull MP, McNamara (Lab - Kingston-upon-Hull N). The 
General and Municipal Workers' Union (GM"iU), the principal union 
among fish processors, sponsored about twelve, including Johnson (Lab 
- Kingston-upon-Hull W). USDAW, the normal Trade Union for fish 
processing workers in North-Eastern Scotland, did not sponsor any 
MPs.
The TGWU and GMWU MPs were, in fact, better organised to represent 
the interests of fish processors then of trawler crews. The TGWU 
was a large union representing a range of trades and each local 
official could spend only a small proportion of his time in dealing 
with fishermen. ■ Very few of the Union's full-time officials had any 
fishing experience, and the post of "National Fishing Officer”, which 
had only been established in 1966, was merely an additional 
responsibility for the Regional Secretary of the Hull Branch. 
Moreover, union membership was much more general among processors 
than among crewmen. Trawler crews were sharply divided in their 
conceptions of their interests, both between different ranks and 
between different ports. Three of the biggest ports - Aberdeen, 
Hull and Grimsby - had separate and mutually independent Trawler 
Officers' Guilds, whereas in Fleetwood the officers were usually 
members of the TGWU. Nor was there a clear unity of interest among 
the non-officers on board a trawler. All save freezer trawlers 
operated a system of bonus payments for crew members, based upon the 
landed price of catches, a system borrowed frem the share-fishing 
system cannon among inshore vessels. The proportion accorded to 
each member of the crew varied according to rank and duty, so that 
there was little solidarity on issues of pay. In addition, there
was no clear common interest between fishermen based in different 79
ports. In ports such as Aberdeen, with a high flat wage rate and a 
low bonus, TGWU membership was more normal than in ports like 
Lowestoft where the bonus constituted a large proportion of
•3 1earnings-* . Aboard the freezer trawlers the bonus was more 
predictable, consisting of a flat rate per tonne of the catch rather 
than being open to the vagaries of the market, but the strength of 
TGWU membership was reduced because about forty per cent of crewmen 
were process-workers and if unionised they tended to be members of 
the GMWU.
As distance from markets, average value of species taken and 
modernity of equipment varied considerably between ports, the concept 
of a national basic wage did not appear very practicable, and 
fishermen commonly negotiated with the local Fishing Vessel Owners' 
Association on a port-to-port basis. The casual nature of 
employment as a deckhand also contributed to the fact that union 
membership was the exception rather than the rule. In the main 
trawler ports men would sign on ("take articles") for one voyage, 
sailing at twenty-four hours' notice. Tnere was no register of 
fishermen and the trawler owners could employ men as and when they 
wished. On completion of a voyage the deckhand would be discharged 
and would register as unemployed.
The low proportion of crews and the high proportion of processors who 
were unionised led trade unions and their sponsored MPs to 
concentrate on the issue of access to distant waters rather than the 
improvement in shipboard working conditions. The concentration of 
the "deep sea" industry upon a few ports (see Figure 4.5) and the 
number of jobs involved in processing made their interests of
tremendous importance to the MPs representing a few ports.
Figure 4-5: The concentration of the distant- and middle-water fleet 32 
at 31st December 1967: Home ports of trawlers over 110'.
Figures in brackets represent 31st December 1982-
110’-139.9' 140'+ Total
Aberdeen 61 (4) 2 (0) 63 (4)
Fleetwood 36 (3) 10 (0) 46 (3)
Grimsby 57 (13) 60 (4) 117 (17)
Hull 0 (7) 104 (21) 104 (28)
Leith 8 (0) 8 (0)
Lowestoft 15 (16) 1 (3) 16 (19)
Milford Haven 0 (5) 0 (5)
North Shields 4 (1) 3 (0) 7 (1)
Other England 0 (18) 1 (1) 1 (24)
and Wales
Other Scotland
TOTAL 181 (57) 181 (29) 362 (86)
England and 112 (53) 179 (29) 291 (82)
Wales
Scotland 69 (4) 2 (0) 71 (4)
Parliamentary inputs
Parliamentary inputs in 1967 were provided by a small number of very 
active MPs representing the home ports of the distant- and 
middle-water fleets and a much larger number of MPs less active on 
fisheries questions with some near-water and inshore interest 33, 
Many of the latter were to become more active during the mid-1970s, 
providing significant strength for one or other aspect of an inshore 
view which was not articulated in 1967.
A remarkable degree of bi-partisan agreement reigned among the 
distant-water cognoscenti. It was accepted by both Labour and 
Conservative MPs among them that the common interest of owners, 
trawler crews and processors lay in maximising British access to
fishing grounds and in trying to restrict fish imports: such 
divisive issues as trawlermen1 s working conditions had not yet 
reached the Parliamentary arena. Distant- and middle-water 
fisheries appeared to be predominantly the constituency interest of a 
few backbench Labour MPs. As Figure 4.6 demonstrates, of the ten 
Parliamentary seats covering the trawler ports of Aberdeen, 
Fleetwood, Grimsby, Hull, Leith, Lowestoft and North Shields, six had 
returned Labour MPs at every post-War General Election, while two, 
pylde North and Tynemouth, had consistently returned a Conservative. 
Only two, Aberdeen South and Lewes to ft, had changed hands at any 
time. The fact that most deep sea ports were in safe seats had 
probably prevented the development of differing partisan views wdthin 
each constituency, because all sections of the industry knew that 
they had to deal wdth their MP.
Figure 4.6: Parliamentary representation of the deep sea fishing ports: 
General Elections 1945-1979.
1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979
Aberdeen N Lab Tah Tab Lab Lab Tab Tab Lab Lab Lab Tab
Aberdeen S C c C C C C Lab C C C C
Edinburc^i, Leith Tah Tab Tab Tab T ah Lab Tab Tab Lab Tab Tab
Fylde N c C C c c C C C C C C
Grimsby Tab Tab T ab Lab Lab Tab Lab Lab Tab Tab Tab
Kingston-u-Hull C Tah Lab Lab T Ah Tah T ab Tab Tab Tab T ab Tab
Kingston-u-Hull N Lab Tab T jab Lab Tab Tab Tab Tab Lab Lab Tab
Kingstan-u-Hull S T ah Tab Lab Tab T ah Lab Tab Lab Lab Tab Tab
Lcwestoft T ah Tab Lab Tr*h C C C C C C C
Tynemouth c C C C C c C C C C C
Key: C Conservative
Tah T jh n ir
In practice. Conservative MPs for the rural Humberside constituencies 
of Haltemprice and Louth were usually also active in the interest of 
the trawler fleet, so backbench support for the distant- and 
middle-water fleet was fairly well-balanced between the two main 
parties. There were semi-regular meetings between middle- and
distant-water MPs, especially Clegg (C - Fylde N), H. Hughes (Lab - 
Aberdeen N), Johnson (Lab - Kingston-upon-Hull W), McNamara (Lab - 
Kingston-upon-Hull N), and Wall (C - Haltemprice). They referred to 
themselves as the "All-Party Fisheries CcnTnittee" and Johnson acted 
as their chairman. On many occasions both Johnson and Wall would 
ask a similar question of a MAFF Minister demonstrating both 
non-partisanship and co-ordination. In 1967, activity in support of 
the fishermen consisted primarily in taking constituents' problems to 
the Fisheries departments, or of questioning Fisheries Ministers 
about their duties. Prime areas of concern were safety, equipment 
and manning regulations, and the levels of subsidy to the industry. 
There was also a variety of complaints about the White Fish 
Authority, either on the grounds that it did too much or that it did 
not do enough.
In contrast to the political strength of the distant-water fleet the 
inshore fleet was unable to articulate to MAFF any distinctive policy 
of its own. Several factors contributed to the lack of a single 
representative organisation for inshore fishermen. Firstly, the 
boundaries between different categories of fishermen are blurred. 
There is no statutory definitial of an inshore fisherman, although 
two components of such a definition would include single-vessel 
firms, often based on families or friends, and fishing close to UK 
shores. Obviously these two components are associated with small 
vessels, and MAFF defined inshore vessels as being under eighty feet 
in length. There was no inshore equivalent of the Trawlers 
Federations; when MAFF wanted a specifically inshore view, it 
consulted the Fisheries Organisation Society, established in 1915 in 
response to reccrmendations from government that there should be a 
united voice for inshore fishermen. During the late 1960s and early
1970s two-thirds (about 6,000) of all inshore fishermen were members 
of one or more of the over 100 societies affiliated to the Society, 
but direct membership numbered less than a thousand. The Society 
was very strong in South West England and fairly strong in most of 
England and Wales, becoming progressively weaker to the North. It 
was almost non-existent in Scotland For most indirect members
their local representative body was of prime importance, vhile the 
Fisheries Organisation Society was regarded as a distant body. The 
Society enjoyed a close relationship with MAFF; the Chief Inspector 
of Fisheries served on its Board of Governors, while much of its 
financial support came frcm government. Although MAFF's Fisheries 
department found the Society extremely convenient to deal with, most 
small self-employed and share-fishermen owed their principal 
allegiance to one of a considerable number of local bodies (see 
Figure 4.7).
35Figure 4.7: Seme of the organisations representing the inshore
fishing fleet in 1967.
Scottish Inshore White Fish Producers' Association Ltd.
Scottish Herring Producers' Association Ltd.
Clyde Fishermen's Association.
Firth of Forth Fishermen's Association Ltd.
Shetland Fishermen's Association Ltd.
Orkney Fishermen's Association Ltd.
Mallaig and North West Fishermen's Association Ltd.
North Scottish Light Trawl Fishermen's Association Ltd.
Ulster Sea Fishermen's Association.
Derry and Antrim Sea Coastal Fishermen's Association.
Fisheries Organisation Society.
Secondly, there was a conflict of interest between inshore fishermen 
as individuals and as persons sharing a port or a fishing ground. 
New entrants to a fishery, however localised, could raise the costs 
for all, but once established in that fishery they could provide 
additional political strength for the local fishermen. Different 
methods of fishing could also interfere with each other.
Crustaceans and molluscs are usually caught from small boats, as are 
the high value flatfish, such as plaice and sole. It has been 
claimed that the gear and stocks on which these fishermen depend can 
be damaged by seme types of bottom-trawling. Foremost among the 
types of trawling accused of damage to bottem-living fish was the 
recently-developed practice of beam-trawling, whereby a heavy beam on 
the leading edge of the trawl served both to keep the net open and to 
keep it close to the sea-floor. This system had developed in the 
Netherlands for flat-fishing, and had begun to spread to the UK. 
Brixham, in particular, had by the late 1960s built up a considerable 
fleet of near-water beam trawlers, vhiich were accused by other 
South-coast flat-fishermen of causing damage to their livelihoods. 
Similarly the traditional herring drifting industry, most of whose 
catch was taken within thirty miles of UK shores, had been hard hit 
by competition frem the more efficient purse-seiners, operating frem 
Grimsby and frem ports in North-East Scotland. They were fast, 
radar-equipped, and capable of capturing an entire shoal of herring 
at one cast of a bag-shaped net. The Herring Industry Board's 
system of minimum prices guaranteed herring fishermen a market and 
therefore encouraged investment in such sophisticated vessels and 
hence overfishing. Seme of these purse-seiners were operated by 
large firms and seme of them were family-ewned boats.
Thirdly, the local government of the area within the UK fisheries 
limits contributed to the organisational fragnentation of the inshore 
industry. Fishermen had to relate to local Sea Fisheries Ccmnittees 
in England and Wales, and to District Offices in Scotland, making it 
advantageous bo maintain fishermen1 s organisations with boundaries 
corresponding to the governmental ones. There were also 
organisations based upon particular ports, to enable fishermen to
negotiate with local merchants and with harbour authorities, such as 
the Mallaig and North-West Fishermen's Association and seme based 
upon the use of a particular fishing method, such as the Grimsby 
Seiners' Association, or fishing ground, for example the Clyde 
Fishermen's Association. There were interlocking relationships 
between many of these associations, with many fishermen belonging to 
more than one, but in general the fragmentation prevented the 
expression to the fisheries departments of a strong and unified 
inshore view.
There are other considerations which contributed to the relative 
political insignificance of the inshore industry. Small fishermen 
tend to be individualists and their hours of work and their
geographical dispersal militate against their developing an 
esprit-de-corps. Political lobbying can be expensive because of the 
loss of earnings which it entails, especially for fishermen frem 
peripheral areas such as the Scillies or the Shetlands.
Since there was no strong representative body for the inshore 
industry, MAFF was thrown back upon its own system of information 
gathering to deduce the industry's needs. MAFF's fishery department 
maintained "District Inspectors" and "Fishery Officers" at all 
principal fishing ports, in order to enforce the national regulations 
and the local by-laws made by Sea Fisheries Ccmnittees. Sea 
Fisheries Ccrrmittees had been established by the Sea Fisheries 
Regulation Act 1966, and they consisted of representatives of one or 
more coastal County Councils. They were empowered to prescribe 
by-laws relating to types of fishing gear and their stowage,
penalities for the contravention of these regulations, and area 
• . 37restrictions . They could also set local limits to mesh sizes and
landed fish. The Carmittees held sway out to three miles and MAFF 86
was responsible for the three- to twelve-mile zone. The boundaries 
of MAFF districts and those of Sea Fisheries Committees did not 
coincide (see Figure 4.8), which further hampered the organisation of 
inshore fishermen. Moreover, the location of MAFF inspectors in 
ports tended to concentrate their attention on issues of resource 
management dependent upon a camcn property regime, such as size 
limits for landed fish, rather than upon the condition of stocks and 
the fundamental questions of whether regime change was necessary.
The inshore industry's lack of a distinct and powerful representative 
organisation was compounded by its lack of a voice within any 
sizeable trade union. Very few inshore fishermen belonged to trade 
unions, because npst vessels were either family-owned or operated by 
partnerships. Employees on these were usually paid a share of the 
value of the catch after appropriations had been made for the upkeep 
of the vessel.
The processors of the inshore catch were similarly weak. Within 
England and Wales most of the inshore catch was processed away from 
its port of landing, and only in North East Scotland were there large 
processing industries dependent on fish caught inshore. Labour here 
was unionised, although the principal union, USDAW, lacked political 
muscle and had no sponsored MPs. The dispersed, of the inshore 
industry meant that its votes were nowhere very important except in 
North East Scotland, but even here most parliamentary seats seemed 
impregnably safe: Banff, Moray and Naim, Aberdeenshire East and 
West all seemed very safe Conservative seats, with only Caithness and 
Sutherland in any sense marginal. The net effect was that no MPs 
worked steadily for the inshore interest. There had been no
8?Figure 4.8: Tîie overlapping areas of jurisdiction of the Fisheries ^  
Districts of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the 
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland, and of Sea Fisheries
Districts.
boundaries of Sea Fisheries Districts 
boundaries of Fisheries Districts
There is no significance in the size of the area apparently enclosed by 
each set of boundaries, which merely indicate the length of coast under 
each jurisdiction.
detailed Parliamentary consideration of the relationship between 
inshore and deep-sea needs and few, if any, MPs would have seen their 
interests as diametrically opposed. MPs lacked easy access to much 
of the necessary information. Parliamentary Select Committees were 
but in their infancy, and although English and Welsh fisheries lay 
technically within the purview of the House Select Committee on 
Agriculture which had been established the previous year, the 
Committee was never in its three-year life to find time to discuss 
fisheries.
The net political effect of all this was that MAFF viewed the needs 
and wants of the "deep sea" industry as being those of the active 
fishing industry. Had the inshore seats been political marginals, 
or had there been a specialist select Committee on Fisheries, more 
parliamentary expertise could have been built up as to the 
complexities of the issue, and a more distinct inshore view might 
have been articulated at a national level. In practice, there was 
little antagonism between the "deep sea" and the inshore industry in 
1967, largely because the latter was doing well: catches were high 
and increasing. The inshore industry's comparative prosperity was 
due partly to better-than-average meteorological conditions for fish 
recruitment in the mid-1960s, but largely to the fact that by the 
Fishery Limits Act 1964 39, UK fisheries limits had been extended 
from six miles to twelve miles- This step had been taken 
reluctantly by the FCC following a three-year confrontation on the 
Icelandic continental shelf between RN frigates and the Icelandic 
coastguard, 1958-1961 ^0.
The Act did not phase out the historic rights of other states between 
six and twelve miles, and so the principal beneficiaries had been
Scottish inshore fishermen, since the Act made extensive use of 
fisheries closing lines to seal off the Minches and some of the 
Firths as internal waters. Scottish fishing capacity was steadily 
increasing, and had not yet reached a level of overcapacity. A 
united stance in favour of an extension of Scottish fisheries limits 
which had existed among Scottish inshore proprietors in 1962-3 was 
being eroded as many fishermen in North East Scotland used finance 
provided by government and larger firms to replace a drifter with a 
purse seiner or mid-water trawler. Thus political conflict between 
fishermen plying different grounds was replaced by conflict based 
upon fishing methods. The Scottish industry, being with the 
exception of Aberdeen overwhelmingly an inshore one and therefore a 
possible source of threat to the regime, was also kept quiet by a 
number of advantages which it enjoyed over the English and Welsh 
inshore industry. For a century trawling and seining had been 
banned from within three miles of the Scottish coast, with a few 
areas excepted. This advantage to the Scottish inshore industry had 
resulted from the need to protect salmon stocks and to avoid damage 
to 'fixed engines' set on the seabed by small coastal fishermen.
In addition DAFS was better placed than MAFF to receive the views of 
inshore fishermen. Neither Sea Fisheries Committees nor by-laws 
existed, and DAFS "Inspectors in charge of Areas" enforced the 
department's own regulations. These officers also served to 
transmit the views of the fishermen to the department. Moreover, 
the White Fish Authority had a separate Committee for Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, and the Herring Industry Board was principally 
concerned with Scotland, so the Scottish inshore industry obtained a 
reasonable service from government within the confines of overall 
government policy. So long as that policy did not appear to be a
barrier to the prosperity of the Scottish inshore industry the system 
worked well, but the autonomy of Scottish fisheries administration 
and Scotland' s unbalanced interest in inshore fisheries held 
potential for a future challenge to the narrow-limits policy.
Since the inshore industry was doing well thanks to the twelve-mile 
limit, the danger that another extension of UK limits might invite 
retaliation from other states, displacing large British trawlers frcm 
their traditional grounds into UK waters, seemed greater than the 
benefits of such an extension. This further moderated any potential 
conflict between the sections of the industry. The distant-water 
fleet did not appear at that time to be in conflict with the inshore 
industry in relation to the market. The fact that UK demand for 
fish had steadily exceeded UK landings meant that in no way could 
distant-water competition be said to be depressing the market, even 
for white fish, and the target species of the distant-water fleet, 
cod and haddock, did not form a very substantial proportion of the 
inshore catch.
Furthermore, this difference between the target species of the two 
sections of the industry made the distant-water industry look more 
vulnerable and more in need of specific government assistance. The 
market for cod and haddock caught off Norway or Iceland by UK 
trawlers could be filled equally well by similar fish caught on the 
same grounds by Norwegians and Icelanders, whereas the markets for 
the inshore industry's plaice, sole, herring and shellfish were not 
threatened to the same extent by potential imports. Potential 
conflict between the two sections of the industry was also defused by 
the fact that many deckhands worked sometimes on deep sea vessels and 
sometimes on inshore boats.
These unifying factors were reinforced by the fact that the 
statistical data necessary to examine the relative costs and benefits 
to the UK fishing industry of the common property regime or a wider 
coastal state regime did not exist. MAFF and DAFS catch statistics 
were reported by ICES region rather than by distance taken from 
shore, while the departments' system of classifying vessels was based 
on vessel length rather than type of proprietorship, capacity, or 
fishing ground. Uor did the Statutory Bodies, close as they were to 
the fishermen, provide any forum for the evaluation of policy. 
Statutory Advisory Councils existed to give them advice on the 
exercise of their functions. The Councils' membership consisted of 
persons considered to be representative of all interests affected by 
the operations of tne Herring Industry Board and the White Fish 
Authority. These Advisory Councils had proved rather too large and 
met too infrequently to have a significant effect on policy. In the 
words of the Fleck Committee of 1961:
"The representation of the various sections and Trade 
Unions and of consumers, with some weight given to 
different parts of the United Kingdom and to port 
interests, has resulted inevitably in the creation of two 
rather unwieldy organisations. While they provide a forum 
for general discussion of principles and policy, they are 
less useful for obtaining constructive advice and guidance 
on particular matters than smaller meetings with 
representatives of individual associations. The Advisory 
Councils meet only once a year." ^
If the Councils were too unwieldy to give coherent advice to their
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Authority had also impeded the formation of a coherent policy 
relevant to the resource. The Fleck Report had recommended that the 
Statutory Bodies be merged to form a "Sea Fisheries Authority", with 
Ministers taking more power 42. Fleck argued that in order that a 
realistic national policy could emerge, all the diverse interests in 
fish-catching and distribution had to be considered in relation to 
each other. This recommendation had not been implemented, and the 
division of functions between the two bodies had survived, to be a 
significant factor in the tardiness of policy-change in the 1970s. 
The one body which could have extracted these data from MAFF was 
Parliament, and there were no MPs articulating a specifically inshore 
perspective.
In effect, therefore, the organisation of government and industry 
alike combined to maintain a strong commitment to a narrow limits 
policy. The role of the FCO as lead department in foreign affairs, 
the influence of the Board of Trade an(j Ministry of Defence, 
combined with the effectiveness of the deep sea industry in 
influencing MAFF and the lack of political organisation and relative 
prosperity of the inshore industry to maintain this commitment. In 
1967 the sectoral approach to fisheries was operating well. The 
Scottish industry had a more distinctly inshore flavour than the 
English and Welsh industry, a difference which was to lead to a split 
in the face of the systemic crises and coastal state threats to the 
High Seas regime which were to accelerate over the next few years.
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Anadrcmous fisheries constituted an autonomous issue area on which a 
derogation from the High Seas regime had already proved necessary. 
Like inshore fisheries, anadrcmous fisheries were of greater relative 
importance to Scotland than to the UK as a whole.
The term ' anadrcmous' is used for migratory species of fish which, 
while spending most of their life-cycle in the sea, spawn in fresh 
water. Of the U K 1 s two significant species the Atlantic Salmon was 
far more important, both economically and politically, than the Sea 
Trout because of its greater size, and consequently its greater 
attraction as a sporting fish. The problem of applying the sectoral 
policy-making approach to anadrcmous fisheries lay in the great 
variety of interests competing for a share of the catch, and the 
difficulty of finding a mutually acceptable compromise. Freed of 
the implications of territoriality so implicit in activity on 
questions of fisheries limits, UK external policy on the matter was
t
relatively straightforward, namely to maximise the number of fish 
returning to UK rivers. While the coordination of government policy 
on fisheries limits involved the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade 
and the Ministry of Defence as well as MAFF, anadrcmous fish had by 
1967 been the concern only of MAFF's Fisheries I Division. They had 
never been an issue in international negotiations, since there had 
been no serious attempts to harvest Atlantic salmon in their areas of 
adult concentration off the Greenland coast.
A number of public and semi-public bodies had an interest in salmon 
fishing. By 1967 MAFF and DAFS, in their capacity as overseers of 
UK marine fishermen, had prevented all but the Northumbrian drifters
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fishing for anadromous fish beyond the UK territorial sea had been 
asserted in the Sea Fish Industry Act 1962 and reasserted (with 
'fishery limits' replacing 'territorial sea') in the Sea Fish 
(Conservation) Act, 1967 A bewildering variety of River Boards 
and District Fishery Boards, all of which exercised some statutory 
powers in relation to freshwater fisheries, had been reduced in 
number by 1967- The Water (Scotland) Act 1967 45 had consolidated a 
large number of water authorities into thirteen regional water boards 
and the Central Scotland Water Development Board. The Water 
Resources Act 1963 ** , the first stage of a rationalisation of inland 
water administration in England and Wales, had established 
twenty-nine river boards.
Although a few coastal drifters had an interest in both marine and 
anadromous fish, in general the conservation and exploitation of the 
latter attracted a distinct set of domestic actors, many of whom, 
unlike marine fishermen, did not need to involve the general public 
in order to influence government policy. Among the comparatively 
small number of UK residents who took an active interest in salmon 
and trout, many occupied positions of considerable authority within 
UK society, which raised the political status of the issue above its 
expected relative economic value.
Although all interested domestic actors were united in their desire 
to prevent foreign harvesting of the fish at sea, there was a 
considerable conflict of interests stemming from the competition for 
adult fish returning from the High Seas to UK coastal and inland 
waters. Some branches of the concerned public wanted anadromous 
fish only to be taken within rivers and lakes and for fishing
opportunities to be rationed by applying high licence fees. These 
groups included the owners of fishing rights (the riparian owners), 
the hoteliers and shopkeepers who depended upon the spending power of 
wealthy visiting fishermen, and the latter themselves, many of whan 
occupied key posts in UK political, economic and cultural structures, 
and thus had considerable potential to influence policy outcanes. 
They were keen to preserve the image of the salmon as a near-magical 
fish which fights honourably and cleverly against its would-be 
captors. In 1967, riparian owners could cctimand fees of several 
hundred pounds per rod per week frcrn wealthy salmon fishermen, and so 
consequently colluded with the Scottish Office to keep secret the 
precise disposition of salmon catches. Those groups were also 
opposed to salmon-netting, which both diminishes the stock available 
for angling and degrades the image of the fish, but were in favour of 
legislation designed to improve water quality, and to prevent 
obstructions to the fishes' progress upriver. Riparian owners were 
organised as the Salmon and Trout Association, which had a Scottish 
Camiittee to deed. writh purely Scottish affairs.
Ranged wholly or partly against these interests were the interests of 
all who, while wishing to harvest the stock, were unwilling to pay 
large rentals. Apart frem those of diverse nationalities who might 
have washed to take salmon on the High Seas or within the fishery 
limits of other states, the bulk of the UK 'sports' angling ccrmunity 
and seme cernercial marine fishermen fell into this category. The 
situation in Scotland was seme what different fran the rest of the UK, 
because of the greater prevalence of herring drifting north of the 
border (drift nets are suitable for taking salmon at sea), and also 
because much of the Highland area consisted of a small number of 
large estates, limiting public access to the salmon waters. Many
keen anglers, especially in the urban areas of the Central Lowlands, 
regarded cheaper access to the salmon rivers as a right, resenting 
the concept of salmon-fishing as a preserve of the rich* The 
principal body representing their interests in 1967 was the Scottish 
Salmon Angling Federation. In the Highlands, many crofters enjoyed 
the right to take salmon from their landlords' waters, and were 
concerned to prevent legislation encouraging investment in salmon 
stocking by extinguishing these rights. Particularly active during 
the 1960s had been the Shetland Crofters' Fishing Rights Protection 
Society.
There were also in 1967 a number of fishermen either engaged in, or 
wishing to commence, the taking of salmon at sea- The Salmon Acts 
(Scotland) of 1862-8 had legalised the estuarine and coastal netting 
of salmon in order to alleviate coastal poverty, and by 1962 the 
industry provided employment for about 1,700 men in Scotland alone^. 
Coastal fishermen used "fixed engine" traps, set from the shore, or a 
small boat and a long net (a system called "net and coble" fishing), 
to catch salmon entering the river mouths 240- To further their 
interests .coastal netsmen were organised as the National Council of 
Salmon Netsmen of England and wales and the Salmon Net Fishery 
Association of Scotland. The maintenance of Scottish coastal 
netting was important to the Scottish Office. Apart from the 
employment provided, many of the fisheries were owned by the Crown. 
To the chagrin of the Scots drifters, salmon drifting was practised 
off Northumberland where it was a long-established industry. From 
I960 onwards a new and highly efficient method of salmon drifting had 
been developed and by 1962 a fleet of 139 boats, mostly under fifty 
feet in length, was operating from a number of Berwickshire and 
Northumbrian ports and drifting for salmon between three and twelve
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stocks that salmon drifting in Scottish waters had been prohibited by 
Statutory Instrument a deep resentment therefore existed, 
especially in the ports of Lossiemouth, Buckie, Peterhead and 
Fraserburgh, where the highly lucrative salmon catches raignt have 
more than offset the decline in the profitability of herring 
drifting. Northumbrian drifters now took salmon bound largely for 
the Tweed, since North-Eastern England's own two great salmon rivers, 
the Tees and Tyne, had become too polluted to support fish, and this 
fact further embittered the Scottish fishermen.
Within this context, the fisheries departments were in a difficult 
position. They were broadly sympathetic to the views of the 
riparian owners, but mindful of the importance of coastal netting in 
augmenting crofters' incomes. Two Royal Commissions, the Bledisloe 
Commission, dealing with England and Wales, and the Hunter Commission 
for Scotland , had recommended the cessation of salmon fishing 
seaward of river mouths. There were three reasons for this. Tne 
first was that the maximum economic rent could be obtained from the 
resource by high rod fees. The North of Scotland was relatively 
poor, and the multiplier effect of these fees could be extremely 
valuable. In 1967 the Highlands and Islands Development board was 
established, and the maximisation of economic rent from local 
resources was one of its aims 50. Secondly, since all parties 
wanted to maximise the UK catch, there was a need to ensure returns 
to riparian owners for any investments made to increase or improve 
stocks. This could only be done by keeping firm control over the 
number of salmon harvested without any return to the owners. The 
third reason was that catch figures were the only means of judging 
stock size, so that there was no way to set catch quotas or to decide
upon how many licences to issue, and to aim at OSY, unless some 
method was developed of measuring escapement as well as catch. 
While this was becoming technically feasible with the use of 
underwater sonar, it could only be done in a narrow passage, i.e. 
inside a river mouth. Such accurate counts would be useless in the 
event of large scale poaching, less easy to prevent at sea than in 
inland waters.
The Bledisloe Commission submitted its report in 1961 51. it 
identified twenty-eight rivers with a significant salmon run and 
recommended a co-ordinated approach to an increase in anadromous 
stocks by increasing returns to investment in stocking. Fishing 
seasons out to the three-mile limit, for both rods and nets, should 
be set by the River Boards, whose membership should include 
representation from Sea Fisheries Committees. One-third of licence 
revenues should go to a National Fishery Improvement Fund. 
Pollution and obstructions should be reduced. No legislation had 
resulted pending the report of the Hunter Commission, working with a 
similar brief on Scottish anadromous fisneries-
The Hunter Commission submitted two reports. The first, published 
in 1963 52, haci defined the state of the industry and recommended an 
immediate ban on drifting in Scottish waters, a ban which HMG had 
already imposed during the previous year in response to the 
Commission's emphasis upon the urgency of the situation (see page 
96). The second Report 53^ published in 1965, recommended a policy 
of managing anadromous stocks so that maximum revenue could be 
obtained therefrom. This policy was in part influenced by the 
Committee on Land Use in the Highlands and Islands, which submitted 
evidence to the Commission- The Commission had recommended an
expansion of trout fishing in lochs, and maintained that, in order to 
encourage stocking, the statutory protection enjoyed by salmon owners 
should be extended to the owners of trout waters. The Hunter 
Commission also argued that the maximisation of the marginal return 
to investment in stocking, together with the need for accurate counts 
for individual rivers, called for stronger penalties for poaching and 
for the prohibition of sea-fishing for salmon. Coastal netters 
could be compensated by being given the right to buy licences to set 
fixed traps in the rivers:
"The full implementation of the management policy 
recommended would require that salmon fishing in the sea 
should be prohibited. This would entail the running down 
of all coastal netting and its eventual replacement by new 
methods of fishing."
However, the Commission recognised the unfairness of a situation in 
which only English and not Scottish fishermen were able to drift for 
the Tweed-bound salmon. It recommended that pending the prohibition 
of marine netting in Northumberland, Scottish drifting be permitted 
in the area immediately South of the Tweed. The Hunter Commission 
also applauded the conclusions of the Committee on Land Use in the 
Highlands and Islands that tourism could be encouraged by the 
compulsory public acquisition of fishing rights where deemed 
necessary, and that Forestry Commission fishing rights could also be 
commercially exploited 55 m
Unfortunately, the delicate balance of Scottish interests did not 
make such a clear policy easy for any government to implement. To 
make disagreements between interested parties more bitter, very
little was known about salmon numbers, the only evidence of stock 1 0 0
size being catch figures, as the report noted. An increase in 
effort or an improvement in efficiency would result in a higher 
catch, yet this obviously would not imply that stocks were 
increasing. Hunter recommended the development of methods of 
counting escapement as well as catch.
In addition to the possible effect on Scottish political opinion of 
the government's apparently favouring the wealthy riparian owners, 
tax concessions to them implied a substantial loss to the Exchequer, 
and the recommendations of Hunter and Bledisloe had still not been 
implemented by 1967-
These recommendations which had been implemented were those which did 
not clearly oppose the interests of any of the long-established 
groups competing for the catch. The banning of drifting in Scottish 
waters (see pages 96 to 93) had been possible because the drifters 
threatened both netsmen and riparian owners. Similarly the 
rationalisation of the water industry (see page 9*0 had been possible 
because cleaner water, and a reduction in the number of physical and 
administrative obstructions, were in the interests of everyone 
involved. Similarly, certain rationalisations proposed by 31edisloe 
had been instituted for England and Wales, such as introducing 
overlapping membership of river authorities and sea fisheries 
authorities and establishing seasons out to the three-mile limit.
Unfortunately these improvements could not secure an increased salmon 
run without reference to the salmon's life on the High Seas. 
Claiming jurisdiction over an extended area of the High Seas was not 
only anathema to the most central tenets of HMG's marine policy, it
was also useless, since the salmon's area of High Seas concentration 
was close to the Greenland Coast- However, it had been decided to 
adopt a 'species' approach, asserting UK jurisdiction over the fish 
rather than over the water column. Accordingly, at the same time as 
drifting had been banned in Scottish waters, legislation (the Sea 
Fish Industry Act 1962) had been introduced giving the fisheries 
departments the right to regulate fishing anywhere for migratory 
salmon and trout spawned in the UK. That this represented a long 
term commitment was demonstrated by the incorporation of the 
principle into overall fisheries legislation in the Sea Fisheries 
(Conservation) Act 1967-
On a number of issues, mostly in relation to Scotland, the government 
had taken no action by 1967, paralysed by the fear of offending one 
or more of the plethora of interests involved. As a result policy 
on anadromous fisheries was in a state of crisis, with constant catch 
levels but extreme disagreement between concerned actors. The 
Hunter Report had recommended extending statutory protection to the 
owners of loch fisheries, and a tax regime to encourage them to stock 
with trout, with the intention of giving the Central Lowland angling 
clubs the opportunity to take non-coarse fish without any threat to 
the exclusivity of salmon. Similarly the Bledisloe Report had 
recommended a National Fisheries Improvement Fund to improve inland 
waters for a similar reason. By 1967 no action had been taken, 
perhaps because of Treasury opposition to the £90 million in 
necessary expenditure (1967 prices) 56.
Nor had action been taken on Hunter's recommendation that coastal 
netting be banned seaward of river mouths, and that those with a 
historic right to coastal netting be empowered to swap this right for
the opportunity to put fixed traps in the rivers. Given the 
resentment of crofters towards the riparian owners, to have given the 
latter jurisdiction over the actions of the former would have caused 
a political furore. Nor could it be done without a similar 
development in England and Wales, including removing the ancient 
Northumberland right of salmon drifting.
A substantial proportion of Scottish opinion in 1967 was therefore 
aroused in relation to anadrcnous fisheries, and no clear policy on 
the distribution of the catch had emerged. Coastal MPs like 
Wolridge-Gordon (C - Aberdeenshire E) and Campbell (C - Moray and 
Nairn) argued the netsmen's case in Parliament, since all were aware 
that Fisheries department opinion favoured the introduction of the 
Hunter recarmendations.
Conclusion
The detailed administration of fisheries policy in 1967 was carried 
out by the fisheries departments of MAFF and DAFS, and involved 
extensive use of delegated legislation in order to react to seasonal 
and other changes in fish stocks or types of gear employed. This 
worked very well within the context of overall government policy on 
law of the sea, but the Fisheries departments were extremely weak 
relative both to their own parent bodies, MAFF and the Scottish 
Office, where they were subordinated to considerations of food 
supply, and to other government Departments which worked to uphold 
the narrow limits policy, the Foreign and Ccrrmonwealth Office and the 
Beard of Trade. The Fisheries departments were themselves organised 
in such a way as to represent distant-water interests most 
effectively, since they held weekly consultations with the British
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co-opt the support for a distant-water position, by membership and by 
part ownership, of the owners of the near- and middle-water fleet, 
and could also count upon the support of a number of MPs of both 
Conservative and Labour Parties and of two powerful trade unions, the 
TGWU and the GMWU.
In contrast, the inshore fleet had no strong representative body, and 
was divided both according to interests and according to ports. 
Shellfishermen and flatfishermen, for instance, probably felt no 
great ccnmunity of interest with the trawlermen who scraped their 
seabed, while drifters resented seiners. Their MPs took little 
action in support of their interests, and indeed the inshore men did 
little lobbying. They were generally happy with their position, 
since the government had only adopted twelve-mile limits three years 
previously, together with straight baselines to enclose seme Scottish 
waters, gains which had not yet been digested. On anadremous 
fisheries there were disagreements between conflicting interests, and 
indeed HMG was seeking international sanction for its control over 
salmon and trout spawned in the UK anywhere in their range, but it 
was not an urgent policy matter, merely a logical result of a wash to 
use anadremous fisheries in the development of the Highlands and
Islands.
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UNITED KINGDOM POLICY ON FISHERIES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1967
The UK role in the historical development of the law of the sea
The domination of the narrow-limit view in British policy had a long 
history, and while this study treats 1967 as a milestone, the Marine 
and Transport department of the FCO saw the year as a point on a 
continuum in the clarification of a well-established law of the sea. 
In this narrow limit view the bulk of the ocean consisted of High 
Seas, an area of free movement and free activity not open to seizure. 
Two elements in this simplified FCO view stand out. The first is 
that fisheries cannot easily be separated from other uses of the sea 
for the purposes of international law. Freedom of fishing was 
inextricably linked with freedom of navigation. The second is that 
maritime law was the object of clarification, of successive 
unfolding, in which the UK had played the leading part, rather than a 
set of political arrangements open to extensive changes.
In reality the international fisheries regime in 1967, like all 
international legal arrangements, was a reflection of historical 
power relationships between states within a fragmented state system. 
Viewed in this light, the development of maritime law over the 
previous three hundred years had basically consisted of a struggle 
between "maritime" states, that is states with the technology and 
wherewithal to exploit marine resources far from their own shores, 
and states lacking such long-distance potential, especially those 
with valuable coastal resources which they wished to protect, by 
expanding their internal and territorial waters.
During medieval times states had often tried to lay claim to large 
tracts of sea off their coasts, but with the expansion of trade and 
the development of larger and more mobile navies maritime states had 
begun to challenge "closed seas". During the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries the galley-owning states of the Mediterranean 
littoral had argued that, since a coastal state could only impose its 
sovereignty over the strip of sea lying within cannon-shot of the 
shore, the logical extent of the territorial sea was the range of 
cannon. The maritime lead had passed to North-Western Europe during 
the seventeenth century, and such maritime powers as France and 
Holland adopted the cannon-shot rule. Such an ill-defined width 
proved inadequate for the narrow entrance to the Baltic, and the 
Danes adopted a distance definition of four miles. The work of the 
Italian jurist Galiani in the 1780s led to the widespread adoption of 
three miles, a Southern European league and approximately the range 
of the larger shore-mounted guns then in use ■*-.
By the mid nineteenth century this standard was almost universally 
recognised, but it was pressure from maritime powers, rather than 
conviction, which ensured that few states claimed more. A number of 
economically-disadvantaged European states such as Italy, Russia, 
Portugal and Spain opposed the general rule of three miles because 
they wished to reserve the coastal living resources to their own 
nationals, in the face of fishing and hunting by better-equipped 
foreigners , and some Scandinavian countries clung to four miles. 
They were, however, unable effectively to extend their control beyond 
three miles because of the power of the maritime states, notably 
Britain. In 1900, for instance, Britain had forced Denmark to 
accept a treaty reducing Iceland's territorial waters from four to
three miles, a source of long-term resentment among Icelanders 1 1 1
With no possibility of an increase in the width of territorial waters 
above three miles, the coastal states had increasingly resorted to 
subterfuges to maximise their internal waters, that is the waters 
landward of the territorial sea. This was done by pushing out to 
sea the baselines from which the latter was measured. Offshore 
islands, coastal standing ice, estuaries, bays and low tide 
elevations combined with shifting coastlines, meandering rivers and 
seasonal variations in tides to compound the problem. Many states 
laid claim to estuaries and bays as historic waters, holding that 
their control of them had never been successfully challenged. In 
1869, Norway began to measure its territorial sea from a series of 
straight baselines linking points on the outer line of the 
skaergaard, the line of about 120,000 islands fringing the Norwegian 
coast, and thus enclosed as internal waters areas of sea more than 
twelve miles from land. In 1911 the Russian government claimed that 
the territorial waters were measured from "the lowest ebb-tide, or 
from the extremity of the coastal standing ice"
The possibility that such nibbling at the High Seas might continue 
had led Britain to co-sponsor conventions on the law of the sea. It 
was willing to concede a little to coastal states in return for 
consistent delimitations of baselines. Thus a convention of 1882 
provided that a state could incorporate as internal waters any bay 
with a distance between headlands of less than ten miles.
In the same vein the UK co-sponsored in 1930 a League of Nations 
Conference on the Progressive Codification of International Law at 
The Hague. This made considerable progress on baselines. On
coasts with a simple plan and profile the baseline should be measured 
from the low-water mark shown on official charts used or issued by 
the coastal state, with the proviso that the baseline should not 
'depart appreciably from the line of the main low-water spring tide'
a . Outermost permanent harbour structures should be considered as 
land for the purpose of drawing baselines, and where rivers, whatever 
their width, flowed directly into the sea, the baseline should be 
drawn across the mouth of the river. Where, however, a river flowed 
into an estuary, the latter should be treated according to the rules 
for bays. Similarly offshore islands and low-tide elevations 
generated territorial waters.
The Hague Conference also made some progress in delimiting the 
territorial sea within narrow straits. Nevertheless, it left a 
number of important issues unresolved. It failed adequately to 
define a bay, formulated no definition of estuaries, and developed no 
principles to govern the delimitation of territorial seas between 
adjacent states. The most serious omission of the Conference was, 
however, its failure to formulate a standard breadth for the 
territorial sea. It proved impossible to obtain sufficient support 
from the states attending the Conference to turn the three-mile 
territorial sea from an item of customary law into one of convention 
law. States identified positions on the breadth of the territorial 
sea ranging from three to twelve miles. Eleven states wanted a 
contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea, some merely for customs 
and sanitation functions, and some for security and for fisheries 
jurisdiction as well
The Conference had thus failed to fulfil the UK's hopes that the law 
of the sea would be sufficiently tight to prevent coastal states
extending their jurisdiction. During the period between the 1930s 
and 1940s, an increasing number of states had begun to claim a 
territorial sea in excess of three miles. Having been unable to 
achieve its aims through the Conference, the UK had taken recourse to 
the International Court of Justice, and had unsuccessfully challenged 
the legality of the Norwegian practice of measuring its territorial 
sea from straight baselines across the skaergaard 6. In response to 
a British submission that certain sections of the baseline did not 
respect the general direction of the coast, the judges stated that 
"however justified the rule in question may be, it is devoid of any 
mathematical precision" This judgement, therefore, effectively 
gave a carte-blanche for states to draw straight baselines between 
islands or across estuaries, a right to which a number of states had 
had recourse by 1967. The UK itself, while in general opposed to 
coastal state extensions of jurisdiction, had employed straight 
baselines in 1964 to close the Minches to foreign vessels.
More serious a challenge to UK policy than the uncertainty about 
baselines, however, were claims to extended jurisdiction in the water 
column justified by reference to the resources of the continental 
shelf. As a result of the heavy depletion of terrestrial oil 
reserves during the Second World War, states had begun to look with 
covetous eyes upon the oilfields lying below the seabed. The 
urgency of the situation led even Britain to suppress its worries 
about coastal state extensions, and in 1942 to negotiate with 
Venezuela a boundary dividing the "sea-bed and sub-soil outside of 
the territorial waters" ® between Trinidad and Venezuela. This was 
followed in 1944 by a declaration by the government of Argentina 
deeming the epicontinental sea to be a temporary zone of mineral 
reserves, and then in September 1945, by the so-called 'Truman
Declaration':
"Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently 
utilising its natural resources, the Government of the 
United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil 
and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas 
but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as 
appertaining to the United States, subject to its 
jurisdiction and control."^
This claim had produced little dissension among maritime states, 
since it emphasised that the waters above the continental shelf 
beyond the territorial sea remained High Seas. However, Peru and 
Chile, for whom, because of the narrowness of the continental shelf 
off the West coast of South America, emulating Truman would have 
produced scant prizes, responded in 1947 with a claim to two hundred 
miles of sea floor and water column. This began a movement among 
South American countries for laying claim to a 200-mile "patrimonial 
sea", incorporating water column as well as seabed. The "Santiago 
Declaration" of 1952 saw Ecuador, Peru and Chile uniting to lay claim 
to marine space 200 miles from baselines.
This stance had found sympathy with other groups of developing 
countries, often for reasons of regional antagonism rather than 
principle. For instance, "Arab" states tended to favour extensions 
of coastal state jurisdiction in order to control the Gulf of Aqaba, 
and thus regulate the movement of shipping into the Israeli port of 
Eilat. Especially after 1957, the 'international community' grew as 
post-colonial states obtained independence. Being predominantly 
poor, or at least politically comnitted to preventing developed
states from exploiting their resources, these states tended to favour 
wide territorial seas, and some extravagant claims were made. New 
states could also argue convincingly that they had played no part in 
formulating the law of the sea, and were therefore not bound by it.
With the prospect of many more states' attaining independence during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, leading maritime states (including 
Britain) saw it as imperative to settle the remaining law of the sea 
issues, notably that of the breadth of the territorial sea. The 
year 1958, therefore, saw the First United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, which succeeded in codifying and consolidating marine 
law into four 'Geneva Conventions' As had the Hague Conference 
it relied heavily upon technical and legal experts, although more 
inputs were overtly 'political', that is, expressions of state 
interests, than had been the case in 1930.
Some concepts which had not been included in the report of the Hague 
Conference were incorporated in the Geneva Conventions. Technical 
agreement was reached on the treatment of bays which have coasts 
belonging to a single state, and the existence of 'historic' bays was 
confirmed, although they were not identified Coastal state 
sovereignty over continental shelf mineral resources and sedentary 
species was confirmed as was the use of straight baselines for 
indented coastlines and fringing islands, largely incorporating the 
wording of the ICJ decision. The median line was adopted for the 
delimitation of territorial seas between adjacent states * . The 
'contiguous zone' was also incorporated into convention law, and in 
this zone a state would be able to exercise the necessary controls to 
a distance of twelve miles from baselines to:
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"(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or 
territorial sea; (and)
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed 
within its territory or territorial sea." ^
The zone was intended by its original sponsor, Canada, as a 
compromise which would enable coastal states to exercise some special 
powers beyond their existing territorial sea without extending their 
sovereignty.
Despite its obvious success, the 1958 Conference failed to make 
headway on a number of issues. No progress was made in determining 
the status of the waters between the islands of an archipelago, in 
defining estuaries, or in identifying historic bays. Above all, no 
firm agreement was made on a standard width for the territorial sea, 
a compromise of a territorial sea of six miles and a contiguous zone 
of six miles narrowly failed to coimtand the necessary two-thirds 
majority of the Conference's eighty-six participant states. A 
further attempt to solve these remaining problems led to a Second 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1960, which broke 
up without making any significant contribution.
The situation in 1967
International marine law in 1967 thus rested upon an uneasy mixture 
of unilateral assertions, customary practice, and convention law, 
principally based on the Geneva Conventions of 1958. The 
Conventions represented a triumph for the maritime states, especially 
with regard to navigation. On the High Seas, defined as "all parts
of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a state" 15, a regime of flag state jurisdiction 
was to hold sway. The Conventions were thus very satisfactory for 
the FCO position. The Geneva Convention on the territorial sea and 
the contiguous zone provided for a clear right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea:
"There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of 
foreign ships through straits which are used for 
international navigation between one part of the High Seas 
and another part of the High Seas or the territorial sea of 
a foreign state" 16.
A coastal state could take "the necessary steps" to prevent passage 
which is not innocent 17, but this did not amount to much. The 
criminal jurisdiction of the coastal state applied to a foreign 
commercial ship passing through the territorial sea only in specified 
limited circumstances, and the only power which could be applied 
against a warship was to require it to leave the territorial sea . 
The Geneva Convention on the High Seas placed no limitation on 
navigational freedoms.
The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf confirmed the 
sovereignty of coastal states to the resources of the shelf in as 
deep water as could technically be explored. This exploitability 
criterion effectively laid the seabed open to progressive annexation 
by coastal states as the technology of exploitation improved.
"the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the
depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.
The only limit to navigation would be a 50C-metre safety zone around 
sacn installation related to the exploitation of these resources. 
The UK had accordingly taken steps to divide the continental shelf 
between itself ana other states of the North Sea littoral, using the 
ICJ and the application of the median-line principle. Under a 
section of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 
permitting straight across baselines and highly indented 
coastlines , it had been able effectively to shield the important 
inshore fishing areas of the Minches and the Firths of Forth, Clyde, 
and Moray, from the High Seas regime. The Bristol Channel was 
accorded similar protection by having been proclaimed an historic 
bay.
Despite its willingness to extend internal waters in this fashion, 
the UK was alarmed at the inability of the 1958 Conference to define 
a standard width to the territorial sea. In effect this was left 
open to state interpretation and the UK had therefore set itself 
firmly against attempts by states to extend their sovereignty in this 
way. VJithin the context of this overwhelming concern with 
navigation, international fisheries law was essentially a by-product. 
Since the sovereignty of a coastal state extends to the outer limit 
of the territorial sea no rights of fishing by foreign vessels 
within the area were provided for in the Convention. However, 
foreign fishing vessels were guaranteed innocent passage, and in 
return had to observe the coastal state's fisheries regulations:
"Passage of foreign fishing vessels shall not be considered 
innocent if they do not observe such laws and regulations 
as the coastal state may make and publish in order to 
prevent tnese vessels from fishing in the territorial
sea."“1“1
In fact, the rights of states to protect coastal fisheries 
specifically from foreigners were very limited. The coastal state 
possessed no exclusive right to the fisheries resources of the 
contiguous zone. Even if a North-West European state were to make 
use of the ill-defined width of the territorial Sea and extend its 
sovereign jurisdiction, it would have found it impossible 
unilaterally to extinguish historic rights established by a European 
Fisheries Convention of 1852, since the Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone stated:
"The provisions of this Convention shall not affect 
Conventions or other international agreements already in 
force, as between States Parties to them." ^
These limitations on the effective power of coastal states over 
coastal fisheries resulted from a general conviction in 1953 that 
zones of fisheries jurisdiction could not be extended without 
affecting navigational freedoms. Firstly, fisheries jurisdiction 
established a claim over a resource in the water column, and was thus 
a blurring of the distinction between the continental shelf, managed 
by the coastal state, and the High Seas above it. Coastal state 
jurisdiction over fisheries beyond the territorial sea was therefore 
a threat to the unity of the concept of the High Seas. Also, since 
the exploitability criterion allowed coastal states progressively to
the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of 
tne High Seas 2->, committed states to regulating the activities of 
their nationals- This provided that states should co-operate for 
conservation purposes and to obtain MSY from fish stocks 2°„ In the 
pursuit of effective functional co-operation, this Convention 
partially negated one of the central gains of maritime states from 
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. It 
conceded that coastal states had a special interest in conservation, 
and permitted them non-discriminatory conservation measures, "based 
on appropriate scientific findings", on the High Seas to an undefined 
distance: "in any area of the High Seas adjacent to its territorial 
sea" 2^.
It was the reliance placed upon "appropriate scientific findings" 
which was to prove an area of disagreement- The dispute settlement 
procedure, with special commissions of five members to hear disputes 
with advice from the UN Secretary-General, the ICJ, and the FAC e"J, 
was to be little used. An optional protocol, signed by the UK, gave 
the ICJ jurisdiction over all contracting parties 2<^ . Iceland 
refused to sign, leaving its way open to declare an extension of its 
jurisdiction by reference to conservation and without reference to 
the ICJ. .
Disappointed by the Conventions' failure clearly to define a 
territorial sea in excess of three miles, and thus help it to reverse 
the imposition of three miles earlier in the century, Iceland had 
almost immediately moved to take advantage of the lack of a clear 
distance criterion, unilaterally extending its fisheries jurisdiction 
to twelve miles in 1953- This had met with staunch opposition from 
the UK. and from 1958-61 RN frigates had patrolled Icelandic waters
to enforce the British 'right' to fish there. Other states had 
followed Iceland's lead, and it had soon become evident that the UK 
was out of step with the majority of its neighbours. The move to 
twelve-mile zones of fisheries jurisdiction had been regionalised by 
the Fisheries Convention 30 in early 1964, and only then had the UK 
extended its limits in accordance with this Convention by the Fishery 
Limits Act of 1964 33. This tardiness illustrates the lack of 
influence of the British inshore fishing industry in government 
counsels, providing a precursor to FCO handling of later moves to 
extend fishery limits. The Foreign Office had applied a principle 
in 1960-4 which it was to apply in the 1970s. This was to oppose 
coastal state extensions of jurisdiction until they appear 
inevitable, and then to participate in multilateral negotiations to 
ensure an orderly transition to the new regime. The Fisheries 
Convention granted the coastal state exclusive jurisdiction over 
fish-stocks to a distance of twelve miles from its baselines, with a 
guaranteed right for the nationals of states whose fishermen had 
fished between six and twelve miles from a coast between 1st January 
1953 and 31st December 1962 to continue to do so. These historic 
rights constituted a serious limitation upon the powers of the 
coastal state in its extended zone of jurisdiction. Although the 
coastal state was empowered to exclude fishermen of new entrant 
states, and to apply conservation measures equally to fishermen of 
all states, it had no right to limit the fishing effort or catch of 
nationals of these states with historic rights. Also, because the 
rights were enjoyed by states rather than by individual fishermen 
there was no limit on the intensity of foreign fishing effort.
The Regional Fisheries Conmissions
If the global regime was potentially unstable, the UK had had a happy 
experience of regional co-operation. The UK had worked to encourage 
inter-governmental co-operation in fisheries management in part in 
order to prevent any crises of regime which might threaten the High 
Seas. In addition there was a recognition that effective 
conservation required due attention to the nature and location of 
fish stocks, regardless of the boundary between the area of coastal 
state jurisdiction and the High Seas. This co-operation had 
gradually established regional regimes covering the whole of the 
North Atlantic (Figure 5.1). Under these the boundary between 
fisheries limits and High Seas was one between coastal state 
enforcement and flag state enforcement of the same international 
regulations. The Copenhagen-based ICES remained the forum for the 
interchange of scientific research into fisheries in the 
North-Eastern Atlantic, providing evidence for governmental and 
intergovernmental decisions. As might be expected (see Chapter 2), 
measures designed to prevent growth overfishing had been fairly 
successful, while recruitment overfishing had been largely ignored. 
It had been decided at the annual meeting of the ICES in 1939 to 
establish a commission to make regulations about mesh sizes, but it 
was not until 1946 that this was achieved, by the "Overfishing 
Convention", which came into force in 1954 The form of that 
Treaty current in 1967 bound fourteen states to co-operate, through a 
"Permanent Commission", in preventing overfishing in the area North 
of 48 degrees North and between 42 degrees West and 32 degrees East, 
excluding the Baltic, and laid down minimum net and landed fish sizes 
for the principal species 33.
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in increasing yield 35 had led the states to establish the North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) 36, with a "permanent 
Secretariat" (actually one official and two typists on part-time 
secondment from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) in 
London. The Commission, which consisted of one voting Commissioner 
from each member state, met only once per year 3^. Its area of 
concern was larger than that of the Permanent Commission, in that it 
covered the whole of the ICES area, that is, the North Atlantic North 
of 36 degrees North between 42 degrees West and 51 degrees East, 
excluding the Baltic, the Mediterranean and certain small areas. 
The Commission incorporated the Permanent Commission, and enjoyed a 
wider mandate than the latter, being empowered to recommend closed 
seasons, closed areas and the prescription or proscription of fishing 
gear, all measures tackling growth rather than recruitment 
overfishing. Provision was also made for any other 
non-discriminatory conservation measures agreed upon and ratified by 
two-thirds of the states 3®. The area was to be divided into three 
regions, each with a Regional Conmittee.
The FCO placed great faith in the NEAFC regime, both because it had 
presided over a considerable increase in aggregate catch and because 
it involved functional co-operation between government departments 
directly concerned with fisheries, thus safeguarding the High Seas 
from coastal state extensions without the excessive interference by 
diplomats which might bring wider foreign or economic policy 
considerations into play. Since the narrow limits regime was to the 
FCO's preference, this functional co-operation accorded special 
advantages to the UK. In addition to providing the Secretariat, the 
UK acted as repository for all treaties relevant to the Commission.
The British government, therefore, responded warmly to NEAFC 
initiatives, and the UK was the first state to ratify the NEAFC 
Convention, as it had been for the Treaty on Overfishing which 
preceded it.
By 1967, despite the NEAFC1s spectacular success in expanding the 
catch, certain deficiencies were becoming apparent in its operation.
Mesh size regulations had not prevented large by-catches of 
undersized fish of species other than the target species, and had 
been shown to benefit the smallest species available for capture, 
since only its juveniles ran no risk of entrapment in a net intended 
for another species. The larger the adult form of a species, the 
greater the number of nets of which its juveniles could fall foul.
The young of the largest food fish, like cod and haddock, ran the 
risk of capture in every net save those actually set for their 
parents. Mesh size regulations thus contributed to a decline in 
food fish stocks and a rise of stocks of species too small for useful 
exploitation for human consumption ("trash species"), like sandeels 
and sprats. This in turn provided the stimulus for a rapid 
expansion of "industrial" fishing, especially from the mid-1960s 
onwards (see Figure 9.2), with new, smaller meshes and even worse 
by-catches. Also, the growth in catches in the 1950s and 1960s 
encouraged fishermen from Spain, Portugal, the USSR and Bulgaria, who 
had not previously fished in the NE Atlantic, to begin doing so.
These damaging effects were not obvious in 1967, because the limits 
of annual yield for many species had not yet been reached, and 
because a succession of mild Springs in the 1960s favoured larval 
survival.
The Coimiission had thus proved a useful body in expanding catches
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while stocks were plentiful, but could not be so when catch 
reductions were required to save threatened stocks. There was no 
incentive for any signatory state unilaterally to stop its nationals 
from fishing such a stock, while other states might permit their 
nationals to continue. The Commission could do little to prevent 
non-signatory states from fishing in its area, because the bulk of it 
was High Seas. The only way to bring these newly-entrant states 
under the Convention was to recognise their right to a share of the 
catch. This had the effect of making reductions in effort still 
more difficult to achieve. Also, any NEAFC initiative could be 
sabotaged by the objections of any three member states, a provision 
which discouraged radical new initiatives
This inability to protect stocks was beginning to point to impending 
disaster in herring, although few other stocks appeared to be in 
danger. Two extremely valuable stocks of herring, which might in 
their prime have yielded a sustainable annual catch of two million 
tonnes, were on the point of collapse. Fishing the East Anglian
stock ceased in 1967, to be followed by the Atlanto-Scandian the 
following year. In addition, the Arcto-Scandian cod stocks had 
narrowly escaped collapse during the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
because fishing was not reduced in the face of poor recruitment 
As the Corrmission's decision-making body consisted of state
representatives rather than scientists, there was no means of
translating ICES evidence on recruitment into changes in catch 
levels. Even had there been such a system, the NEAFC would have 
been faced with two difficult problems: that of distributing the 
allowable catch between states, and that of ensuring that fishermen
complied with undertakings made in the NEAFC. Policing was solely
in the hands of flag states, the only international limitation upon
state independence being a clause in the 1882 Fisheries Convention 
requiring vessels on fishery protection duties to fly a blue and 
yellow pennant . Most member states showed little enthusiasm for 
a system which would permit states to search each others' fishing 
vessels, and although states were begining to denounce the Fisheries 
Convention there was no rush to embrace a system of joint 
enforcement. The Commission was thus wholly dependent upon 
flag-state policing The framework for joint enforcement was 
agreed upon in the NEAFC in 1967, but ratification was long denied by 
states for whom the general principle of freedom of navigation was 
more important than effective conservation of fish stocks.
Fisheries in the North-Western Atlantic were regulated by the 
International Comnission for the North-West Atlantic Fisheries 
(ICNAF). This Commission had been established in 1949 by a meeting 
of representatives of the principal states fishing the area The 
North-West Atlantic's most important coastal states, the USA and 
Canada, were enthusiastic supporters, having co-operated extremely 
successfully in the regulation of Pacific halibut before the War. 
As originally constituted, ICNAF's area of operations was divided 
into five sub-areas. Subsequent reorganisation had increased this 
number to six by 1967 (see figure 5.1). Each sub-area had a panel 
representing those states whose nationals habitually fished there, 
the UK being represented on the panels for sub-areas One (West Coast 
of Greenland) and Three (Grand Banks). Each sub-area was further 
sub-divided because of the localised nature of stocks. ICNAF 
enjoyed the following advantages which the NEAFC lacked, and by the 
mid-1960s was a much more experienced and effective body than its 
counterpart. Firstly the Commission was responsible for obtaining 
and collating its own scientific information ^ : this strengthened
the power of scientists to influence decisions. Secondly ICNAF had 
begun work with a fairly ambitious programme, whereas the NEAFC had 
slowly evolved from the Permanent Commission. Thirdly although both 
Conmissions were empowered to establish overall catch limits on the
Neither Treaty had, however, foreseen a necessity for this overall 
catch to be allocated as quotas between states.
ICNAF also took a broader view of its task than the NEAFC, and the
consisted of thirteen states, ten of them also being members of the 
NEAFC (see Figure 5.2). Policing had been internationalised, a 
protocol of 1965 permitting the Commission on its own initiative to 
make proposals for national and international measures of control on 
the High Seas. It had been agreed that from 1969 onwards states 
would be able to inspect each others' vessels 4®.
Britain was also represented on the General Fisheries Council for the 
Mediterranean, which since 1952 had been involved in the interchange
approval of two-thirds of member states 45, in the case of the NEAFC 
any member state could refuse to abide by agreed catch limits 4®.
Convention had been extended to molluscs in 1961 4^ and to hood and 
harp seals in 1963 4®. By January 1967 the Commission's membership
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of biological and oceanographic information 51 The Council was of
no importance to the British fishing industry, membership being 
exercised on behalf of UK colonies in the Mediterranean. After the 
independence of Malta in 1964, membership served no purpose and the 
UK withdrew from the Council in 1968
In 1967 there was little dissatisfaction with either the NEAFC or 
ICNAF except among some marine biologists. With the benefit of 
hindsight, however, it is difficult to see why the experience of the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC) was not seen as a portent for 
that of the NEAFC. The establishment of the IWC in 1946 had been 
prompted by the same motives and scientific work which inspired the 
Fisheries Commissions. The avowed purpose of the Whaling Commission 
was to ensure a whale catch at MSY ^ , and its membership consisted 
of all states . engaged in whaling at the time of its establishment. 
By 1967 the Commission had shown itself to be totally ineffective in 
preventing a continuous decline of stocks for almost every species. 
Whaling by UK citizens had ceased; British membership had been 
primarily maintained in order to reduce the allowable catch, a goal 
shared by the majority of the members. However, decisions had to 
obtain agreement of three-quarters of the members present and voting. 
Thus the minority of members still engaged in whaling, and hoping at 
least to amortise the capital invested in their fleets, were able to 
set catch levels substantially above those recommended by the 
scientists. In the absence of agreement at an annual meeting there 
was an ever-present danger that whaling countries would denounce the 
Convention, so even in a situation of declining stocks it was the 
majority who wished to lower allowable catches greatly, rather than 
the still-whaling minority, who were under greater pressure to come 
to terms. Hiis situation was to be mirrored in the NEAFC in the 
early 1970s, and the power of a minority of IWC-member states
determined to protect the investments of their nationals was a 
precursor of wrangles in the NEAFC about industrial fishing for 
herring and about High Seas salmon-fishing. The NEAFC was also to 
experience another IWC problem, that of its own enlargement. As 
more states joined the Commissions they had to be allocated shares of 
the catch and the problem of obtaining agreement became compounded by 
the growing number of states involved. Moreover the new members had 
only recently attained the capacity to exploit the stocks in question 
and therefore were not keen to reduce their catch. This problem was 
an extremely grave one for the IWC, to the extent that the proportion 
of members voting for a complete ban on whaling was to decline during 
the 1970s, despite an unmitigated decline in whale stocks.
A sumnary of UK policy on international fisheries questions in 1967
The fishing industry performed three main roles for British 
government. Two of these were economic: to supply food to a state 
heavily dependent upon food imports, and to provide work in some 
regions which offered few alternative sources of employment. These 
two roles were primarily the concern of MAFF and the Ministry of 
Labour respectively. The industry's third role was performed by the 
distant-water industry alone. By asserting the right of UK citizens 
to fish close to the shores of other states, it strengthened the hand 
of the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office in their high 
policy concern that a maximal interpretation of High Seas freedoms 
should be maintained in international law.
The question of fisheries limits was regarded by the Foreign Office 
as too vital for UK policy as a whole to allow any other government 
Department a share in international negotiations on the issue. In
1967 this fact was not important in determining policy outcomes, 
since the interpretation of the national interest held by the Foreign 
Office was also endorsed by the Ministry of Defence, MAFF, and the 
Board of Trade. There was common agreement between them that the 
United Kingdom should endeavour to maintain the narrowest possible 
limits to national jurisdiction. If extensions had to be conceded, 
then this should be done simultaneously by as many states as 
possible, in order to minimise international disputes and to ensure a 
predictable international environment.
In keeping with the concept of maximum state freedoms on the High 
Seas, all policing of fishing and related activities beyond fisheries 
limits should be undertaken at the behest of flag states. 
Inter-state co-operation should take the form of intergovernmental 
contacts between specialised government agencies bound by mutual 
undertakings to constrain their nationals according to agreements 
formulated. The only exception was the ICNAF Joint Enforcement 
Scheme, whereby, under circumstances of complete reciprocity and 
non-discrimination, the UK had relaxed its preference for flag-state 
enforcement. The maintenance of fish stocks was to be ensured by 
this intergovernmental activity, bolstered by scientific advice, and 
the Fisheries Commissions were the appropriate decision-making 
bodies. Rights and duties appertained to states, international 
persons, rather than to individuals. For this reason foreign access 
to fish stocks within national fisheries limits was to be determined 
by reference to historic rights, that is, whether or not any citizens 
of another state had habitually fished in an area. This implied 
that states could not limit the aggregate fishing effort of other 
states enjoying historic rights within their fisheries limits but 
beyond the territorial sea, although they could prevent encroachment
by newly-entrant states. For the UK this zone lay between the three 
and twelve-mile limits.
The Foreign Office did not concern itself with the economics of the 
fishing fleet. The common view of the Board of Trade, MAFF and the 
Ministry of Labour was that government subsidies were proper and 
necessary. One type of subsidy was the shouldering by government of 
some responsibilities for research, and was regarded as permanent. 
The perishable nature of the catch and uncertain fishing prospects 
had forced such a development in the early 1930s, and proper 
scientific information about fish stocks was vital if the free seas 
policy was to be reconciled with the biological realities of fish 
populations. Postwar economic losses had added another type of 
subsidy, refined by the Fleck Committee, which was meant to improve 
the efficiency of fish catching and processing. The prevailing 
opinion in Whitehall was that when the fleet was "modern" and 
"competitive" this subsidy would no longer be necessary.
On the question of anadromous fish, there was general agreement that 
government policy should seek to maximise the run of fish, and there 
was a clear determination in the Foreign Office and MAFF that the key 
to the protection of British salmon outside British fisheries limits 
lay with ICNAF and NEAFC. The distribution of the anadromous catch 
among UK domestic interests was to be in accordance with internal 
economic and political pressures, and in 1967 there was no clear 
government policy as to the action which should be taken.
Summary of Part II
Fisheries is an issue area with specific biological and economic
imperatives. In 1967 the fisheries regimes holding sway over the 
fishing grounds of interest to the UK were not primarily designed 
with these imperatives in mind, but were formulated in order to 
minimise state interference with High Seas freedoms. That is not to 
say that the regimes were wholly inappropriate for the management of 
fisheries. HMG had played a leading part in the institution of 
functional intergovernmental Fisheries Garnissions. However, these 
Commissions were hampered by the flag state authority central to the 
concept of the High Seas, and were therefore insufficiently 
authoritative to ensure the adjustments necessary in fishing effort 
in response to stock changes.
The structure of Whitehall ensured that the UK did not use its 
authority to help create a strong and authoritative system of 
fisheries management. Fisheries was a relatively low economic and 
strategic priority when compared to other principal uses of the sea, 
and policy on issues of relevance to fisheries questions were 
subordinated to other interests, notably that of freedom of 
navigation. The principal domestic importance of fisheries was its 
contribution to employment, and the latter could more easily be 
maintained by subsidies than by a new maritime regime predicated on 
the nature of fisheries and inimical to more vital UK marine 
interests.
The fisheries "sponsoring departments" occupied a weak position 
within the Whitehall structure. This problem was compounded by the 
fact that the message which the fishing industry conveyed to them was 
confused by the organisational fragmentation of the industry and by 
the lack of congruence of the interests of the inshore and the "deep 
sea" sections of the industry. Parliamentary activity on fisheries
questions was often inappropriate and ill thought out, with no 
partisan differences. While several MPs were dependent upon the 
votes of fish-processing workers there were few constituencies where 
fishermen constituted a sizable proportion of the electorate. These 
constituencies mostly centred around the home ports of the deep sea 
fleet, with the votes dependent upon the inshore fleet being 
distributed between many more ports.
The international regime rested largely upon the Geneva Conventions 
of 1958, and was based upon a maximal area of High Seas and a narrow 
band of coastal state control. The fisheries comnissions were 
attempts to reconcile the legal regime for the freedom of fishing and 
the biological imperative for catch limitations, and had met with 
considerable success in times of expanding catches, following the 
stock gains of the Second World War, but promised to be less 
successful in times of falling stocks. No mechanisms existed to 
limit fishing effort or capacity, and thus the scene was set for 
economic losses and stock decline. These problems were exacerbated 
by the willingness of governments, including that of the UK, to use 
subsidies to render their fishing industries' economics less shaky, 
thus building in overcapacity.
These uncertainties were intensified by a mounting tendency for 
states to claim enlarged territorial or patrimonial seas and by a 
number of gaps in the Geneva Conventions. These included the lack 
of a distance criterion for the seaward boundary of the territorial 
sea and the contiguous zone, and the absence of an effective boundary 
to the continental shelf because of the exploitability criterion. 
While these issues did not directly concern fisheries, they had two 
main implications for fisheries law. Secondly, although the
Convention on the Continental Shelf clearly defined the sedentary 
species appertaining to the coastal state, claims to the shelf bore 
upon claims to the water column. Apart from the explicit link 
between shelf and water column asserted in the Santiago Declaration, 
there was the more pedestrian problem that bottom trawling for 
demersal fish beyond fisheries limits, the right of any state, could 
damage sedentary stocks, which were solely the property of the 
coastal state. In the face of these challenges the UK had an 
extremely long-term maritime policy of refining the law of the sea to 
perfect the freedom of the seas, and HMG, especially the FCO, was 
structurally unprepared for a re-examination of that policy, which 
was regarded as fundamental.
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CHMIiNGES TO THE SHAPE OF THE POLICY AFTER 1967
If the UK's devotion to a narrow limits policy had a long history and 
appeared to be effectively underpinned by the coincidence of a number 
of factors, many of these factors entered a period of rapid change 
from 1967, presenting repeated challenges to the maintenance of 
policy. Although the underlying rationale of HMG's devotion to the 
freedom of navigation and the High Seas was one of FCO 'high' policy, 
the operation of most arrangements dependent upon it was devolved to 
sponsoring departments such as the Fisheries departments and the 
Board of Trade. These departments therefore bore the brunt of 
attempts to maintain policy in the face of challenges to it, and 
where policy change took place it was incremental, limited and 
subordinate to the overall 'high1 policy.
The number and variety of the challenges presented to the policy are 
remarkable. Firstly the period after 1967 saw a rapid growth in the 
relative importance to the UK of coastal state factors. In part 
this involved the decline in the strength of maritime factors. The 
number of vessels in the merchant navy and the shipbuilding industry 
both continued to shrink as they had done almost continuously since 
the First World War, and UK-registered merchant tonnage was gradually 
surpassed by that of several other states. The Royal Navy's 
dependence upon narrow straits close to the shores of developing 
countries also declined, with a withdrawal of all British forces 
stationed East of Suez by 1971. The UK dependence upon seaborne 
trade remained undiminished, but after British accession to the 
European Economic Community there was a gradual reorientation of UK
trade relationships from distant Commonwealth countries to European 
ones.
The decline in the strength of these maritime factors was accompanied 
by a rise in the importance to the CJK of coastal state factors. 
Some of these involved the exercise of High Seas freedoms close to UK 
shores. The number of collisions and founderings in the Channel and 
the Dover Strait increased rapidly, arguing for greater coastal state 
control over traffic routeing. A growing public awareness of the 
pollutive potential of waste materials dumped on the continental 
shelf also led HMG to seek stronger powers over what was dumped and 
where. In both cases the initial governmental reaction was to seek 
a flag state solution. Another coastal state factor rapidly growing 
in importance was the rise of the continental shelf oil industry. 
It promised to make extremely large contributions to employment and 
to GNP (the balance of payments issue vanished with the floating of 
most major currencies in 1971). Most telling however was the manner 
in which oil became almost the principal strategic concern of the 
West as a result of the OPEC oil price rise and the QAPEC oil boycott 
of 1973-4. The rise in the number and technological sophistication 
of terrorist groups made the task of protecting oil-related 
installations on the shelf more difficult and argued for stronger 
controls upon navigation through the oilfields.
Secondly a Resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1967 led to the 
reopening of international dicussions of the law of the sea, and to 
negotiations very different from the Conferences at the Hague and 
Geneva. In these former Conferences states with traditional 
maritime interests constituted a larger proportion of the states 
involved, and non-political institutions like the International Law
Commission had been employed to find technical solutions to problems. 
In the renewed negotiations issues were much more political, with the 
UK and other maritime states initially threatened by a majority of 
developed countries politicised by the Group of 77 into supporting 
drastic increases in coastal state powers. Hus, coupled with 
linkings between particular marine issues defined by the committee 
structure adopted in 1970 by the UN Seabed Committee (SBC) and the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 3), 
meant that the UK had to make concessions on some issues in order to 
attain its goals on other issues. The conduct of the Seabed 
Committee and the Conference provided a backcloth for almost fifteen 
years of international relations on marine issues, and also 
intensified the importance of bilateral relations on fisheries such 
as those between the United Kingdom and Iceland.
A third development which posed problems for the existing policy was 
UK accession to the European Economic Comnunity. Apart from the 
long-term reorientation of UK trade relationships mentioned earlier, 
it was a major factor in effecting a rise in the political profile of 
the inshore section of the fishing industry, whose interests were 
given little attention by HMG in the Accession negotiations. The 
Common Fisheries Policy, to which the UK was forced to accede, 
weakened HMG's rights over fish stocks by generalising historic 
rights of access beyond a narrow strip, and also forced the fishermen 
to improve their organisation in order to fulfil the CFP's marketing 
provisions. The inshore industry's resentment brought them new 
political allies, such as the Scottish National Party and a strong 
anti-Common Market element in the Labour Party, which raised the 
saliency of inshore interests to basic 'high' policy questions like 
the integrity of the United Kingdom and its commitment to Western
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European co-operation.
Fourthly, there were challenges presented to policy by the 
shortcomings of the fisheries regime. The lack of authoritative 
control of fishing effort meant over-capacity, which yielded 
financial losses to fishermen, a decline of fish stocks, and 
international competition by differential rates of fuel and operating 
subsidies. The lack of controls over industrial fishing resulted in 
the economic extinction of herring stocks in the North-Eastern 
Atlantic and heavy demands from Scottish fishermen for food fisheries 
to be given priority.
Fifthly, these systematic problems increased pressure on coastal 
states and territories with few maritime concerns to extend their 
jurisdiction over coastal fish stocks. The most important of these 
extensions, and the one couched in legal terms least acceptable to 
the FCO, was that by Iceland, but there were others. Such 
extensions had the advantage for the coastal state that they could 
influence events at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea. The pressure was on the FCO to make catch concessions to 
riparian states in exchange for legal formulae which did not 
prejudice the UK position at that Conference. These catch 
concessions diverted parts of the UK deep sea fleet into uncontrolled 
waters, increasing aggregate fishing effort in those waters. This 
increased effort often led fishermen who had traditionally fished in 
uncontrolled waters to press for limitations of catch or effort to be 
applied there. Catch concessions to coastal states also undermined 
the deep sea industry devotion to the narrow limits policy, reduced 
its size and therefore influence, and brought resentments between it 
and the UK inshore industry into the open as its trawlers began to
ply UK coastal waters.
A sixth issue with long-term implications of a possible change in UK 
fisheries policy was organisational change within the fishing 
industry. The loss of access to distant and middle waters, together 
with financial losses and the increase in vertical integration in 
frozen food companies, resulted in a rapid reduction in the number of 
trawler firms. The rise of oligopoly was mirrored by a TGWU drive 
to unionise trawler crews, and a growth in Trade Union concern for 
shipboard working conditions and for industrial safety. These twin 
developments helped to undermine the bipartisan consensus behind the 
access rights of the trawler fleet, and a number of Labour MPs began 
openly to criticise the trawler firms. The deep sea section of the 
industry also lost influence with government as it lost access to its 
traditional fishing grounds and thus became proportionately less 
important than the inshore section as a provider of food supplies and 
of employment. Where large trawlers could be redeployed closer to 
home, notably in the winter mackerel fishery off Cornwall, they 
engendered Parliamentary opposition from local Conservative and 
Liberal MPs, vying to be thought the more effective in the protection 
of Cornish rights. There were also changes in the organisation of 
the inshore industry. The marketing provisions of the CFP required 
fishermen to set up Producer Organisations, and the resultant 
experience, resentment at the access provisions of the CFP, and a 
lack of confidence in the Fisheries Organisation Society, together 
with some very high-handed Board of Trade actions with regard to 
vessel safety surveys led to the foundation of two new campaigning 
bodies, the Scottish Fishermens' Federation (SFF) and the National 
Federation of Fishermen's Organisations (NFFO). Some inshore 
fishermen resorted to direct action like blockades, and several
parliamentary seats with inshore fishing ports passed to third 
parties, notably to the Scottish National Party, in 1973-74. This 
fact, together with the fear that the SNP might declare Scottish 
independence if it won more than half Scotland’s seats, lent an 
urgency to government sympathy with inshore concerns.
A final, and seventh concern was the growth of a large High Seas 
fishery for salmon spawned in the UK. A number of domestic 
pressures operated to make it imperative that the government should 
effectively strengthen its claim to anadromous fish spawned in the 
UK. Without this sanction, no domestic investment to improve or 
safeguard salmon stocks was likely to be forthcoming. This issue 
did not per se argue against the narrow limit views, but it did 
produce another goal for which HMG needed a sanction from UNCLOS 3, 
and which might possibly require UK concessions on other issues.
Taken collectively, these developments weakened the narrow limit 
consensus in UK government, and partially isolated the FCO's 
strategic concerns. Policy change is not mechanistic, however, and 
the key elements in determining the time and nature of change were 
developments at UNCLOS 3.
CHAPTER 6
THE RISE IN THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO THE OK OF COASTAL STATE FACTORS
The exercise of high seas freedoms close to UK shores
One of Grotius' principal arguments in favour of relatively 
unfettered navigation was that it was not dangerous. Increasingly 
this assumption was demonstrated not to be invariably the case in UK 
waters. UK shores and waters suffered shipborne pollution, both 
accidental and deliberate; lives were wasted through the careless 
conduct of vessels, especially in the Channel, and dangerous cargoes 
found their way into British coastal waters. In addition vessels 
continued to dump unstable waste on the UK continental shelf. The 
thrust of these developments, coupled with an increasing public 
concern about safety and environmental pollution, was to raise the 
relative importance of coastal concerns in UK policy making. 
Although fish stocks have been shown to be adversely affected by 
water quality the complaints of fishermen about pollution were not 
specificially responsible for this change in governmental attitude, 
because of fishermen's relative lack of organization and political 
influence. Fisheries policy was affected because the government 
position on fisheries limits was largely a spinoff from its view on 
navigational issues. A change in the relative importance to the UK 
of coastal and maritime factors had considerable implications for UK 
policy on navigation, and thus incidentally on fisheries limits.
The paradox of the UK's situation was that as well as having a very 
large merchant fleet, she had off her shores one of the world's 
busiest straits - the Dover Strait. In addition to the hundreds of
vessels each week plying the Strait, there was a considerable traffic 
between the opposite shores, with a constant possibility of 
collision. With both the UK and France claiming only a three-mile 
territorial sea, the bulk of the strait lay within the High Seas. 
The vagueness of the extent and nature of the Contiguous Zone meant 
that it was difficult to institute any permanent traffic-separation 
schemes in the Dover Strait without giving other states spanning 
straits a precedent for expanding their own maritime jurisdiction.
Despite the success of IMCO in combating pollution, there remained a 
number of problems which had not been solved by 1967 and which argued 
either for tighter arrangements to enforce regulations or for 
limiting the freedom of navigation. One of these was the problem of 
mariners and states who flouted IMCO procedures. A small number of 
vessels continued to discharge oily water into the sea. Where this 
took place outside the territorial sea and contiguous zone, there was 
nothing which a state suffering pollution as a result of such 
discharge could do except notify the flag state of the offending 
vessel, and some states had very bad records in punishing their 
vessels for breaches of IMCO regulations .
Another problem lay in the sheer size of supertankers, and the 
increased pollution which a single collision or foundering could 
cause. From the mid-1960s onwards there was a very rapid increase 
in the size of new individual tankers as it became obvious that there 
were economies of scale in transporting oil in large vessels. It 
also became obvious that the foundering of a giant tanker could 
produce oil pollution on an immense scale and that if an accident 
should occur on the High Seas effective measures by the coastal state 
could be delayed. In March 1967 such fears became a reality when
the Liberian-registered supertanker Torrey Canyon was wrecked beyond 
the territorial sea off Cornwall, gradually releasing a cargo of 
crude oil which coated holiday beacnes as far East as the Channel 
Islands and killed over 50,000 seabirds.
The disaster presented three important challenges for policy. It 
showed that three miles was now inadequate to safeguard UK shores 
from the effects of activities on the High Seas. It also emphasised 
the limitations of the sectoral approach to marine issues, especially 
in relation to an emergency. Since oil leaked slowly from the 
damaged vessel, BP experts suggested that the government should bomb 
the wreck and destroy the oil remaining aboard. The 
extra-territorial location of the wreck and its Liberian registration 
meant that there was a reluctance to take such action- The duty 
officer in the Ministry of Defence was from the earliest stages of 
the disaster in regular receipt of Coastguard reports concerning the 
potential size of the pollution problem, but although he telephoned a 
succession of government departments he was unable to obtain a 
directive. This was partly because the wreck occurred late on a 
Friday, and only when he contacted the Cabinet Office on the Sunday 
morning was some relevant action initiated. Attempts to contain the 
oil were hampered by the fact that the necessary detergents and booms 
did not exist in sufficient quantities, and valuable time was lost in 
making new manufacturing arrangements. After a week in which tne 
oil continued to spread, the Cabinet reluctantly decided to bomb the 
vessel in order to destroy the small amount of oil remaining aboard.
The Torrey Canyon affair also highlighted another problem. A 
supertanker had foundered with disastrous consequences in the 
relatively-uncluttered Western approaches, it was perhaps quite
likely that a similar accident might occur in the crowded and shallow 
Dover Strait. Compulsory pilotage or traffic routeing would reduce 
the probability of such an accident, and yet the narrowness of the 
strip of coastal state jurisdiction prevented such schemes. The 
disaster provided a clear indication to public opinion and civil 
servants alike that the freedom of navigation cherished by UK 
shipowners for the Straits of Gibraltar, Malacca and Hormuz might 
contain disadvantages when exercised in the Channel. This sentiment 
was subsequently reinforced by a growing number of vessel casualties 
in the Dover Strait, as Figure 6.1 shows. Concern mounted not only 
about these accidents, but about the lack of an authoritative means 
of directing traffic in the aftermath of a shipwreck. For instance 
a period of several months in the Winter of 1970-1 saw a succession 
of four vessels collide with the wreckage of a single ship in the 
Strait, with the loss of sixty-four lives. The position of the 
wrecks was clearly marked with lights, but many captains apparently 
chose to ignore the voluntary routeing system around the area.







To the problems of oil pollution resulting from founderings beyond
the territorial sea and of collisions due to the lack of
authoritative traffic control schemes was added the problem of
vessels carrying hazardous cargoes in transit close to UK shores.
The Geneva Convention accorded the coastal state no control over, or 
even right to be notified about, the cargoes passing through its 
territorial sea. Two serious incidents occurred in December 1971:
the Somali motorship "Atlantic Ocean" lost drums of dimethylene from 
her deck and the "Germania" went down off Cornwall with a cargo of 
chemicals. MAFF had to warn fishermen to examine their hauls for 
drums before taking them aboard. The foreign registration of the 
ships, together with the use of trade names in the Germania's cargo 
manifest, meant that it was 14th January before the Department of the 
Environment was made aware that her cargo was dangerous Two 
years later thousands of rounds of ammunition were washed into the 
Western Channel from the decks of the Israeli ship "Galila" Such 
developments tended to develop within the Board of Trade support for 
greater coastal state control over routeing, and to clarify the 
legitimate concern of maritime states as being for swift and 
expeditious transit rather than unrestricted navigation.
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Another problem was the dumping of waste material at sea. Dumping 
fell largely into three categories: the discharge of routine 
(catering, sewage, etc.) waste from vessels in transit; the disposal 
of obsolete equipment by persons involved in the continental shelf 
oil industry; and the deliberate placing of toxic waste onto the sea 
floor. Jettisoning waste from passing ships, although unsightly, 
posed no serious threat either to marine life or to holiday beaches, 
while abandoned industrial equipment was a problem which inflicted 
itself almost solely on fishermen, who suffered snagged nets. It 
was the deliberate disposal of toxic waste at sea which presented the 
most complete threat to the ecosystem, and it was accordingly this 
type of dumping which created the most intense parliamentary and 
media pressure for reducing the freedom of waste disposal. There 
was no system of recording which pollutants had been dumped, or their 
location.
Graat public concern about dumping developed in the late 19ô0s, 
largely a spinoff from a wave of environmental concern in that 
period0, together with the work of Agencies of the UK Government and 
of the House of Commons Sub-Committee on Science and Technology, 
wr.ich took up marine pollution following the wreck of the Torrey 
Canyon As the vast majority of dumped wastes resulted from the 
Second World War or later, there was as yet little evidence of 
leakage on a sufficient scale to alarm fishermen, who were in general 
far angrier about discarded oil-related equipment.
The government's solution to all these problems was to contain change 
within existing institutions. The fact that the marine environment 
was becoming a matter of concern to other states raised the 
possibility of new local and regional arrangements which did not 
accord with either the existing law of the sea or the UK's perceived 
marine interests. Even some of the UK's maritime IMCO partners were 
beginning to look for alternative arrangements to flag state 
controlsd. The FCO was anxious to prevent the emergence of a new 
and inexperienced international organisation to control marine 
pollution, or even worse to hand powers to coastal states in such a 
way as to provide for differential regimes off different coasts, and 
lobbied hard for the establishment of international rules on marine 
pollution to remain the preserve of IMCO
Thus the problem of vessel-source pollution was faced by tightening 
IMCO rules. Aware of the implications for increased coastal state 
discretion of its own bombing of a foreign-registered vessel beyond 
its territorial sea HMG moved swiftly to limit the circumstances in 
which a coastal state might take action against a foreign vessel on 
the High Seas- The result was the International Convention Relating
to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties, signed in 1969 With no limitations as to distance 
it provided for the right of a coastal state to take on the High Seas 
such measures as might be necessary to protect its coastline and 
related interests from pollution of the sea by oil, but only 
following upon a maritime casualty which might reasonably be expected 
to result in major harmful consequences to its coastal population. 
This Convention was designed to permit remedial but not preventative 
action by the coastal state. The Board of Trade also moved towards 
a position of IMCO-backed compulsory traffic separation schemes in 
narrow straits and sensitive areas. In March 1971 the UK proposed 
to IMCO's Maritime Safety Committee that flag states should agree to 
compel their vessels to obey a traffic separation scheme in the Dover 
Strait. This move was followed by a meeting on May 12th between 
Board of Trade representatives and their counterparts from Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands to formulate the details of the scheme. 
Aware of the possible precedent effects of the UK's involving itself 
in such a coastal state arrangement the government was anxious to 
make it clear that "none of the delegates was prepared to take action 
on a unilateral or even multilateral basis outside the framework of a 
properly ratified IMCO agreement" The following October the UK 
played a major part in drafting the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea, designed to speed up entry into force 
of IMCO regulations by requiring states to object within a specified 
time rather than positively to ratify. The Board's shift to 
favouring compulsory traffic separation schemes was not an immediate 
result of the Torrey Canyon affair, but occurred over the four years 
of mounting accidents between 1967 and 1971. It was not a radical 
change in policy. The UK policy was to favour the maximum freedom 
of navigation commensurate with safety, and there had been a change
in vhat policy appeared most appropriate to this end. Moreover flag 
state control remained firm UK policy, with IMCO to be strengthened 
as the forun in which states decided which particular international 
standards they would apply to their own vessels. The UK also relied 
on IMCO to deal with the problem of dangerous cargoes; in September 
1971 the UK asked the Organisation's Maritime Safety Committee to 
empower its Dangerous Goods Sub-Committee to study the packaging, 
labelling and storage of hazardous cargoes with a view to minimising 
pollution risks.
Dumping was until 1970 a matter of little public concern, but in that
12year three things considerably raised its status in public opinion . 
The first was the Report, in August, of the Technical Committee on 
the Disposal of Solid Toxic Wastes, one of a range of specialist 
bodies on marine issues established by the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Science and Technology. The Report provided opponents 
of dunping with scientific information as to its incidence and on the 
technical limitations of packaging materials. Secondly, in
December, the Council, on Environmental Quality recommended the
1Rcessation of ocean dunping in British coastal waters . The third
cause was that over the winter of 1970-71 a large nunber of canisters
containing ferric chloride were washed up on the Isle of Wight.
They were traced to a consignment dunped by the Royal Navy into one
of six 'deeps’, used for this purpose since the Second World War, and
thought to be safe, in that the waste was effectively contained by 
14the rock structure .
The fact that much of the dunped waste was military in origin, 
together with the connection between dunping and other forms of 
land-source pollution, led FWG to seek a flag state solution outside
15 155the IMCO framework 1 . MAFF, whose Fisheries Division IC oversaw 
marine pollution, took a lead in relation to its counterparts in 
other North Sea littoral states. It convened two regional 
conferences; one in London in June 1971 was followed by another in 
Oslo in October, which resulted in the signing in February 1972 of 
the "Oslo Convention", the "Convention for the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping from ships and aircraft" 16. States bound 
themselves to monitor and control, by the issuance of licences, 
dumping from vessels registered in their states. The disposal at 
sea of a substance could be prohibited provided all national 
authorities in the N.E. Atlantic area were to approve. The 
Convention also established a Commission to co-ordinate the work of 
signatory states in monitoring the marine environment. Having 
obtained a regional agreement, the FCO moved swiftly to safeguard the 
flag state control by globalising the agreement. In June 1972 the 
United Nations Conference on the Environment convened at Stockholm. 
The British delegation (consisting of representation from the FCO, 
the Department of the Environment and MAFF), fired both by a genuine 
concern about dumping and by the FCO's desire to seek 
globally-consistent legal regimes, urged that an international 
instrument be formulated, with provisions similar to those of the 
Oslo Convention. The Stockholm Conference duly requested HMG to 
convene a global Conference on dumping before November 1972. At 
this Conference, which took place in October at Lancaster House, one 
hundred states agreed upon the London Dumping Convention, a global 
version of the Oslo Convention 17.
HMG thus managed to deal with these issues in ways which presented no 
threat to flag state jurisdiction. That is not to say that the 
problems, particularly those of jettisoning of waste from passing
vessels, were solved. The principal effects of these developments, 
however, were the strengthening of coastal state factors in UK 
policy-making and some breaking down of the sectoral barriers 
dividing marine issue areas, which eased the path of policy change. 
The Torrey Canyon affair encouraged those sections of society 
concerned with tourism and amenities to take an interest in marine 
policy. Better co-ordination between sectors was also encouraged by 
a number of administrative reorganisations which took place during 
this period . The Ministries of Housing and Local Government, of 
Works and of Transport were amalgamated to form the Department of the 
Environment in 1970, and the number of Local Authorities was lessened 
by the Local Government Act 1972 19. The Water Act 1973 20 created 
a small number of Water Authorities, which replaced a multiplicity of 
local authorities and "quangos" previously responsible for the 
treatment of sewage. The Department of Industry and the Board of 
Trade were amalgamated to form the Department of Trade and Industry 
in 1970.
The rise in the importance of North Sea oil and gas production
Another development raising the significance to the UK of coastal
factors was a growth in the apparent economic potential of the
continental shelf. The opposition to, and uncertainty about,
natural gas, diminished as the Labour government concentrated public
attention upon the balance of payments. The importance to the
latter of reducing industrial costs, coupled with the low price of
21methane, totally undermined domestic opposition . The
nationalised gas supply industry began a programme of conversion of 
gas-burning facilities to methane.
157It also rapidly became clear that the UK sector of the North Sea 
shelf contained vast reservoirs of oil. This commodity was widely 
regarded as the cheap, clean and mobile fuel of the future , and by
1969-70 it was fairly clear that UK production would be able to equal 
domestic consumption by the mid-1980s. The value of the oil to the 
UK economy would be augmented by a possible boost to the engineering 
and shipbuilding industries should they involve themselves in 
developing oil-related technology. Since North Sea waters were 
colder and rougher than any others where continental shelf mining was 
already taking place, the experience gained by British firms on the 
continental shelf might be valuable in gaining them further business 
as oil exploration elsewhere in the world moved into deeper waters. 
Government was heavily involved; from December 1967 the Natural 
Environment Research Council undertook a review of the potential of 
the continental shelf 23, investigating ocean circulation, tides, 
biology and pollution, which led to a new hydrographic survey in 
November 1970. The National Research and Development Corporation 
also oversaw a number of projects relevant to the exploitation of the 
shelf, and in 1972 the Marine Technology Requirements Board was 
created to identify research and development requirements and to put 
customers in touch with researchers and the Department of Trade and 
Industry.
Economically, therefore, the oilfields promised to be of inrmense 
though indeterminate importance, and ensuring that the North Sea 
regime was appropriate for their development was an important task 
for government. Since the oilfields were so important, ensuring 
their security also became vital. The 500 metre safety zone laid 
down by the Continental Shelf Convention was probably sufficient to 
prevent collisions between vessels and oil rigs, but it did not
answer the problem of terrorism. This issue was considered by the 
Central Policy Review Staff after a submission in 1973 to Lord 
Rothschild, its Secretary, by L. Reed (C - Bolton E) 24. This 
problem, together with a massive oil price increase agreed by the 
Organisation of Petroleum Countries and the imposition in the Autumn 
of 1973 of a ban on oil exports to states deemed friendly to Israel 
by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, moved the 
importance of the continental shelf mining industry from the economic 
to the strategic realm 2 .^ Protection of the oil installations from 
terrorism might be achieved by clinging to the existing law of the 
sea but also by developing regular patrol procedures and quick 
reaction schemes for emergency action, and possibly by building a few 
patrol vessels. Protection from enemy action in the event of a 
full-scale war, however, presented a direct challenge to the FCO and 
Ministry of Defence preference for the freedom of navigation. By 
the existing law of the sea a war might begin with Soviet vessels 
poised 500 metres from oil installations. In this light, the 
opportunity to loiter over other states' continental shelves looked 
less attractive.
Apart from raising problems for existing policy, the growth of the 
importance of the shelf also appeared to present considerable 
opportunities to the UK. If there was oil in the North Sea there 
might well also be oil in the Celtic Sea, and no other state barred 
the way between Scotland and the edge of the continental shelf. In 
order to ensure that this remained the case the small island of 
Rockall was incorporated into the territorial limits of the UK. The 
island lies some 220 miles to the West of St. Kilda, being the 
highest point on the Rockall Bank, an area of shallow water rich in 
fish stocks. The UK had claimed the island as its territory in
1591955, but in 1972, motivated by the wish to expand the UK continental 
shelf, the government rushed a seven-line Bill through all its 
Parliamentary stages in a few days, incorporating the island into 
Scotland While Ireland and the Faroes were just as distant from 
Rockall as was Great Britain, the seizure provided the UK with 
potential for substantial territorial gains of continental shelf. 
While these gains would be largest if territorial criteria were 
decided upon, even a depth formula would be of great value because of 
the extent of the Rockall Bank. The incorporation also generated a 
twelve-mile fisheries zone of over 450 square miles and in the event 
of a general extension of fisheries zones would generate a lot more. 
This fact was hardly a consideration, since at the time there was no 
market for, or machinery to exploit, its main fish species, the blue 
whiting. The principal motivating factor was the continental shelf 
oil, and from 1975 the Department of Energy's annual "brown books" 
showed Rockall as generating a shelf for the UK . Although the 
shelf was the motivating factor, the seizure of Rockall was 
subsequently to have great significance in other ways, both in that 
it was to be single-handedly responsible for generating more than a 
fifth of the total EEC fisheries zone (and potentially Exclusive 
Economic Zone), and that it was to contribute to the UK decision not 
to sign the Law of the Sea Treaty after 1982, for fear that the 
island might be deemed insufficiently habitable to generate its own 
Exclusive Economic Zone or Continental Shelf. The renewed interest 
in, and commitment to, the exploitation of the shelf was magnified by 
the 1974-9 Labour government’s policy of public involvement in the 
continental mining industry, with the establishment of the British 
National Oil Corporation. For both Conservative and Labour 
governments in the 1970s and 1980s, it became a principal policy 
objective to maximise the extent of the shelf in the Celtic Sea
coming under UK control. Given that there is a variety of 
geographical formulae for establishing the extent of the shelf, this 
meant that the UK entered the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea with a policy goal which had not been important in 
1958 and 1960, a fact which effectively weakened the UK's bargaining 
position in relation to other issues, including fisheries.
The decine in importance to the UK of shipping and shipbuilding
Rising coastal state interests corresponded to the continuation of a 
very long decline in the UK's maritime interests. A number of props 
shoring up the supremacy of shipping as the UK's foremost marine 
interest began to weaken in 1967. In that year, for the first time 
in several centuries the total UK registered tonnage was surpassed by 
that of another state. Although the Liberian flag, which supplanted 
the Red Ensign, was for most of its users one of convenience rather 
than one of primary allegiance, to be pushed into second place was a 
disastrous psychological blow. The benefit accruing the UK 
shipbuilding industry from the UK fleet was declining even faster 
than the size of that fleet as new Far Eastern suppliers stepped up 
production, and as early as March 1968 only 29% of tonnage on order 
for UK shipping companies was to be built in British yards. This 
decline in both industries was to continue throughout the period, and 




One of the elements arguing for shifts in policy on the fisheries 
regime has been change during the period in the relative importance
of Britain's marine interests. In part this change, especially in 
relation to strategic matters, has been a question of perception, 
both in Whitehall and among the UK public. For instance, access to 
continental shelf energy supplies seemed more vital after 1973-4, 
when OPEC quadrupled the posted price of oil and OAPEC cut off 
supplies to states thought to have aided Israel in the Yom Kippur 
War. Similarly the well-being of the shipping industry gradually 
began to appear less of a high policy issue in the face of a 
continuous decline in the proportions of UK trade being conducted 
further afield than Western Europe. Apart from perceived strategic 
factors, there are also objective measures of economic importance 
which indicate that during the period major changes took place in the 
UK orientation towards marine-related industries. The most 
noteworthy elements of this were the decline in the UK merchant 
fleet, which was the principal imputed beneficiary of a High Seas 
policy, a considerable increase in concern about marine pollution 
among both government and public, and the growth of continental shelf 
mining. The latter two considerations argued for more centralised 
government direction, and for extended UK competences over ocean 
space beyond, in order to minimise future pollution and to encourage 
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CHAPTER 7
the RE-opanuG of httehnaticmal negotiations on toe law of the sea
The rise in the relative importance to the UK of the coastal state 
factors was gradual, and many of the UK's new requirements could be 
met by activity within existing functional intergovernmental 
organisations. In contrast, the reopening of international interest 
in the law of the sea which took place frcm 1967 threatened the very 
ground rules of these functional organisations, and required HMG to 
adopt a complex stategy involving seme concessions to change. The 
resultant negotiations extended, in the forms of the United Nations 
Seabed Ccmnittee and of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, until the end of 1982, and thus constituted the 
principal motivating factor behind PCO bilateral contacts on law of 
the sea issues. For UK fisheries policy this pre-eminence of UNCLOS 
3 was only eclipsed by the EEC in October 1976 after the decision of 
Ccrmunity states to make a concerted extension by EEC member states 
of their fisheries limits to two hundred miles on 1st January 1977.
Unlike the previous Conferences on the Law of the Sea it appeared 
evident frcm the first that maritime states would be on the 
defensive. Paradoxically, although the number of coastal states 
claiming wider zones of jurisdiction in the water column had 
continued to increase ^, the initial threat to maritime states came 
frcm an attempt to forestall their own possible claims to extended 
jurisdiction. It is self-evident that maritime states are also 
coastal states, in the sense that they have coastlines, though not in 
the political sense of wishing to extend their jurisdiction over the
water column off their shores. It is also self-evident that most
maritime states are also developed ones, since a merchant marine is 
both a determinant and a reflection of a country's wealth. The 
possible delinking of the continental shelf and the water column was 
very much in the interests of the developed maritime states. Under 
the exploitability criterion they might make use of seabed resources 
to any depth at which exploitation was technically feasible, and 
developed states alone could hope to possess the required technology. 
Whichever developed states could acquire the capacity to mine the 
deep seabed could take advantage of the High Seas and Continental 
Shelf regimes to exploit the mineral wealth of the deep seabed, 
notably polymetallic nodules, aggregations of metals covering much of 
the ocean floor.
The process by which international discussion on the law of the sea
was re-opened centred around the 'Pardo proposal' of 1967. Pardo,
the Maltese ambassador to the UNO, introduced into the General
Assembly Resolution 2340 (see Figure 7.1) that the seabed beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction constituted "the cannon heritage of 
omankind “ . Pardo was alarmed by informed Press reports that
companies frcm the developed world were poised to mine manganese 
nodules frcm the deep seabed, and wished to establish that they were 
res ccrmunis rather than res nullius. The General Assembly 
responded by establishing an Ad-Hoc Seabed Ccmmittee of thirty-five 
states to consider the question of promoting international 
co-operation in exploiting the resource. The UK was appointed as 
one of the Carmittee's Vice Presidents, and remained so after the 
Ad-Hoc Caimitteee was given a more formal existence the following
3year by Resolution 2467A
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Extremely optimistic estimates of the reserves of copper, cobalt, 
manganese and nickel in the nodules, and the concept that they 
constituted a "ccnmon heritage", attracted the attention of the Group 
of 77, the organisation of developing countries which had evolved in 
connection with the UNCTAD negotiations. With the enlargement of 
the international ccmnunity, as colonial territories became 
independent, the Group's membership had swelled to around one 
hundred, and, whereas at UNCLOS 1 and 2 the developing countries had 
been in a minority, they now constituted a considerable majority of 
the participant states, and had recent favourable experience of 
concerted action to achieve cannon objectives. The Group was united 
in its opposition to any regime by which individual companies or 
states could mine the deep seabed.
Although the terms of reference of the Seabed Ccmnittee only required 
it to look at the deep seabed, it soon began to discuss other aspects 
of the law of the sea. This was possible because many states did 
not at first have a coherent strategy, merely falling behind regional
4or power bloc positions on matters of low importance to them . 
Initially the Latin Americans, the only regional group of developing 
countries with a clearly-established position on law of the sea 
matters, were able to use the resentment against developed states 
over the deep seabed issue and to characterise themselves as 
developing coastal states with resources threatened by developed 
maritime states. They were thus able to take advantage of the Group 
of 77 1 s opposition to maritime states' perceived desires to exploit 
the cannon heritage. They characterised this rapacity as similar to 
the threat posed by the distant-water fishing fleets and 
oil-discharging merchant vessels of the maritime states to the 
coastal envirorments and resources of developing coastal states.
The Latin American strategy succeeded in obtaining Group of 77 
backing for extended coastal state jurisdiction over the water 
column, and the maritime states found themselves on the defensive. 
The strategy was aided by the paucity of land-locked states, to whan 
extensions of coastal state jurisdiction offered little, in the 
Seabed Ccmnittee. Buzan puts it thus: "By linking the overall 
coastal state position to the image of developed states plundering 
the resources off the coasts of developing countries, the developing 
coastal states were able bo achieve a substantial measure of support 
for their position within the Group of 77 despite the fact that 
coastal state policy held no direct advantage for many developing 
countries" ^ .
Not all the Group of 77 states in the SBC argued for a drastic 
enlargement of the territorial sea per se, but the majority wanted 
coastal state control over vessel-source pollution. To compensate 
for the fact that many developing countries had older vessels more 
prone to leak oil than the more modem vessels of developed states, 
there was pressure for stricter rules on construction and use to be 
applied to the latter than to the former. In addition scientific 
research off the coasts of developing states was characterised by 
sane of their spokesmen as intended to obtain unfair information 
about coastal resources.
With the maritime states on the defensive, the Group of 77 moved 
closer to a full-blcwn Conference on the Law of the Sea with General 
Assembly resolution 2574A 6 of December 1969, which asked the 
Secretary-General to ascertain the feelings of member states towards 
such a Conference. Aware that a Conference was likely to prove 
unsympathetic to its narrow-limit views, HMG abstained on the vote.
The Latin Americans continued to give firm leadership to the Group of 
77. The high water mark of their strategy came with the 
Declarations of Montevideo and Lima in the sumner of 1970. In the 
Declaration of Montevideo, the nine Latin American states claiming 
200-mile zones or territorial seas asserted that coastal states had 
the right to determine the limits of their own jurisdiction over both 
the seabed and the water column. The Declaration of Lima, which 
came three months later, was similar in content, but also enjoyed the 
support of five other Latin American states . As a result of all 
this activity the Ccrmittee1 s mandate was extended to cover all areas 
of the law of the sea, and the UN Seabed Committee (SBC) became a 
preparatory body for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS 3).
To some extent this strategy was self-defeating. After the 
Ccrrmittee' s mandate was widened to include the preparation for a new 
comprehensive Conference on the Law of the Sea by General Assembly 
Resolution 2750C of December 1970 , the membership of the Seabed 
Ccnmittee almost doubled, and states without access to the open sea 
unimpeded by the zones of maritime jurisdiction, continental shelves 
or territory of other states (variously 'zone-locked', 'shelf-locked' 
and ' land-locked' states) joined the Ccimittee. After three years 
of the issue being aired, this gave states a better opportunity to 
assess their own best interests, and weakened the relative position 
of the territorialists a little.
Be that as it may, the prospects for the FCO position looked bleak in 
1970. The UK was already developing new interests for which she 
would require sanction frcm UNCLOS 3, specifically the maximisation
of the coastal state-managed continental shelf, and the strengthening 
of the control of the state of origin over anadrcmous fish stocks on 
the High Seas (see Chapter 11). The growing range of her concerns 
meant that the UK would have fewer issues on which she could 
potentially make concessions. On the other hand, the prospect of an 
UNCLOS 3, with perhaps a negotiated extension of coastal state 
control under fixed conditions, was greatly preferable to a host of 
unilateral and regional extensions of coastal state jurisdiction 
without an international convention.
The F00 stategy, after its initial reluctance on 2574A, was therefore 
to go along with the preparations for UNCLOS 3, and the IK voted in 
favour of Resolution 2750C. Within this context of co-operating 
with preparations for UNCLOS 3 there were four main strands to UK 
strategy. The first was to prevent options being closed by the work 
of the SBC. HMG feared attempts by coastal states to draw up the 
Conference agenda in such a way as to make a reduction in High Seas 
freedoms a fait accompli. It held that General Assembly resolution 
2750C had given the role of formulating the Conference agenda to the 
General Assembly rather than to the SBC, and that the latter was not 
expected to draw up draft Treaties on every issue . In practice, 
since the SBC had adopted a consensus mode of procedure, the UK could 
probably have blocked any agenda items which it found objectionable. 
To have done so might, however, have united a number of states behind 
the position to which the UK objected, thus ossifying the Conference. 
Rather the task of the Ccmittee, according to the UK delegation, was 
to adopt a flexible attitude, and to allow any state or states to 
propose additional items for inclusion in the "list of subjects"
The acceptance for inclusion in the list of any item did not 
prejudice the position of any delegation with regard to the inclusion
173of any item in the Conference agenda. Even after the expiration of 
the Committee's deadline for the submission of new proposals, the UK 
held that amendments to existing proposals should be accepted 
The UK adopted this "wait for the Conference" stance from a knowledge 
that most of the participating states in the SBC would support 
extended coastal state jurisdiction, which could potentially threaten 
navigational freedoms. Hoping for the development of package deals 
at the Conference, the FCO did not wish to give away any options in 
advance.
Secondly, the UK tried to show developing countries that developed 
states had to be given incentives to participate in the SBC and 
UNCLOS 3, because they were content with the existing law of the sea, 
which in the UK view empowered developed states to mine tne seabed. 
The common heritage resolutions had shown the FCO an example of an 
issue whose symbolic importance to the developing countries far 
exceeded its short-term economic potential for the UK. the mining of 
seabed minerals. In order to instil a sense of urgency into the 
proceedings so as to encourage concessions on navigation and on the 
extent of coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf, the 
UK opposed General Assembly resolution 2467C. acceptance of which 
would have implied UK support for a limitation on the range of 
possible international regimes for the deep seabed wnich might 
emerge^. It also voted against the 'moratorium resolution', 2574D. 
of 15th December 1969, which treated the matter of seabed mining as 
sub judice. and whicn warned:
"Pending the establishment of the aforementioned
international regime:
A. States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound 
to refrain frcm all activities of exploitation of the 
resources of the area of the seabed and ocean floor, and 
the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction. B. No claim to any part of that area or 
its resources shall be recognized."
Thirdly the UK hoped that it could in sane measure negate the Group 
of 77 majority at the Conference because of the diversity of the 
geopolitical needs of the Group's membership and through manipulation 
of the rules of procedure. The PCO played for time, hoping that the 
unity which the Group of 77 had so far demonstrated, largely because 
of the deep seabed issue, would crack when all aspects of maritime 
policy were open for discussion, especially since landlocked states 
were still under-represented at the SBC. To an extent this was so. 
Fran 1970 onwards, developing-country support for the territorialist 
position weakened, as alternative formulae for extended economic 
jurisdiction were gradually formulated. Land-locked and 
geographically-disadvantaged states began to express concern about 
the erosion of the international area, and specialist groups of 
coasted, states emerged. A  Straits States Group, for instance, 
consisting of states spanning straits, wanted more control over the 
routeing, construction, and demeanour of vessels passing through 
straits, and were less concerned about wholesale extensions of 
jurisdiction.
Two members of this group, Indonesia and the Philippines, along with 
Fiji and Mauritius, advocated the concept of an "archipelagic state", 
whose territory encompassed the sea between its islands even where 
the distance between those islands exceeded twice the width of the
territorial sea. Differences of position also arose between states 
in relation to the breadth of their continental margins. The wider 
the margin, the more advantageous was a geological formulation of the 
extent of tne coastal state-managed sea floor, while narrow margins 
made a distance criterion more attractive.
The UK used the difference of emphases between coastal states to 
detach archipelagic states from the rest. At first UK 
representatives attempted to prevent any pre-Conference concession to 
the concept of an archipelagic state, urging that a draft item 
heading "Archipelagoes" should be replaced by "Straits between the 
islands of an archipelago" '***« Then, after overtures to Fiji, which 
were to lead to the foundation of a contact group between maritime 
states and archipelagoes (styled the "UK-Fiji Group on Straits") she 
offered to concede the concept of an archipelagic state, providing 
that innocent passage could be safeguardeo- The decision as to 
which states would constitute archipelagic states was to be made by 
examining the ratio between the areas of land and water in each 
state1-*.
Partly this concession was intended to divide states consisting of 
archipelagoes from other supporters of strong coastal state 
jurisdiction. This strategy was fairly successful, as indicated by 
a defection of Philippines and Indonesia from the Straits States 
Group 1 . In return Fiji sponsored a proposal that a regime of 
innocent passage should apply through and over the islands of an 
archipelago Similarly the UK joined with the USSR, the USA, 
France and Japan (the Group of Five) in an attempt to detach the 
Straits States Group from the wider coalition of coastal states. 
The Group suggested a general extension of territorial seas to twelve
miles, with the provisions of the 1958 Convention for innocent 
passage through it being retained. A new regime of transit passage 
(quick and expeditious transit) would be applied in straits under 
coastal state jurisdiction . The extension to twelve miles was 
little more than had been offered in 1960, but implied a big increase 
in the number of straits which could not be traversed without 
entering the territorial sea of a riparian state. In this context, 
the package represented a downgrading of international rights in 
straits and effectively a concession. In another sense, however, 
the regime of transit passage represented for UK interests an advance 
over the old regime of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 
From the maritime point of view it was less open to coastal state 
definitions of "innocence", and fran the riparian point of view it 
gave support to authoritative traffic control in the Dover Strait.
The fourth strand in UK strategy was to participate in the informal 
"Committee of Jurors" (also called the "Evensen Group" after its 
convenor, Evensen of Norway). With a membership which altered 
according to the issue under discussion, this group proved invaluable 
in circumventing impasses in the plenaries, and successively turned 
its attention to a number of issues. The group operated both in the 
SBC and in UNCLOS 3, which convened in December 1973. At the SBC it 
concentrated upon traditional law of the sea issues, that is those 
dealt with by Sub-Ccmnittee II. The Sub-Carmittee structure of the 
SBC helped to define issue linkages, and also served as a model for
the Ccrrmittee structure of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
19Law of the Sea :
" Sub-Ccnmittee I - to prepare draft treaty articles
embodying the international regime, including an
international machinery, for the area and resources of the 
seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Sub-Ccnmittee II - to prepare a comprehensive list of 
subjects and issues relating to the law of the sea and to 
prepare draft treaty articles thereon.
Sub-Ccnmittee III - to deal with the preservation of the 
marine environment (including the prevention of pollution) 
and scientific research, and to prepare draft treaty 
articles thereon".
The strategy of waiting and making piecemeal concessions paid off, 
and weakened support for the territorialist position. Between 1971 
and 1973 a ccmprcmise was formulated within regional groups, capable 
of attracting support frcm the majority of developing countries. 
This ccmprcmise combined a zone of coastal state jurisdiction over 
the resources of both the shelf and the water column with residual 
rights of navigation and overflight. The Asian-African Legal 
Consultative Ccnmittee (AALCC) discussed the Law of the Sea at the 
request of Indonesia in the Sunmer of 1971. In June, resolutions of 
the Organisation of African Unity's Council of Ministers linked the
extent of fisheries jurisdiction and the width of the continental 
20shelf . In November the second ministerial meeting of the Group 
of 77 affirmed coastal states' rights to the resources off their 
coasts, vhich marked a subtle shift away frcm the bald territorialist 
position. In January of the following year a paper presented to the 
AALCC by Kenya advocated an "Exclusive Econcmic Zone" (EEZ), and this 
received majority support. In the light of these developments a
number of Central American and Caribbean states introduced, by the
. 21 Declaration of Santo Dcmingo in June 1972 , the concept of the
"patrimonial sea". This would extend frcm the outer limit of a
12-mile territorial sea to a limit not exceeding 200 miles from 178
baselines. The patrimonial sea differed fran the territorial sea in 
that the freedom of navigation and the freedom to lay cables and 
pipelines would be maintained with seme restrictions. Where the 
margin extended beyond 200 miles the coastal state would maintain the 
right to exploit the resources of the whole of it. The development 
of the concept of a patrimonial sea, although it was intended to 
unify all Latin American states, merely served to weaken the 
territorialists still further, with six states who had voted for the 
Declaration of Lima signing that of Santo Dcmingo, but with the eight 
hardest-line territorialists standing aloof . The same month saw 
a seminar of QAU members at Yaounde in Cameroon reccrmending an outer 
limit of 200 miles for the state continental shelf and proposing that 
"the exploitation of the living resources within the economic zone
should be open to all African states, both landlocked and near 
23landlocked" . Perhaps this formulation was aided by the fact that 
a much larger proportion of Africa's states is landlocked than is the 
case for Latin America. As a result of this seminar Kenya sulmitted
to the Sunmer 1972 session of the SBC draft articles on the exclusive 
24economic zone , embodying the Yaounde conclusions.
With the Kenyan proposals the Exclusive Economic Zone was given a 
clear definition. The zone was limited on the shelf as well as on 
the water column to 200 miles frem baselines, and extensive powers 
were accorded to the coastal state to control marine pollution and 
scientific research. Discussion was largely thrust away from 
regional groups and back into the SBC, with the battle shifting to 
the precise arrangements for the EEZ. The latter was ensured a 
future by a Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea made by a 
meeting of the QAU heads of state in June 1973 Forty-one
African countries thus lined up behind the EEZ, although they were 
unable to agree upon the width of the Territorial Sea ^ . The 
period 1968 to 1973 thus saw a shift in emphasis frcm the "caimon 
heritage" to coastal states' rights, and by the latter year the bulk 
of the Group of 77 had united behind the concept of the EEZ. This 
proposal was also favoured by most developed states which advocated
the extension of coastal state competences, such as Norway, Iceland,
. 27Australxa, New Zealand and Canada , because they feared the effect 
on trade of unilateral coastal state rules on navigation.
The EEZ, thus formulated, offered an alternative to the
territorialist position, and held out to maritime states the offer of
freedom of navigation and overflight (except insofar as pollution
threatened). It also offered to landlocked states access to the
resources of neighbouring coastal waters, although it did not make
clear how this could be given while providing the coastal state with
significant economic gains frcm extension. As might be expected,
the issues on which the UK strove to prevent a Seabed Ccnmittee
prejudgement were largely those concerned with traditional High Seas
freedoms. The debate became most strident towards the end of the
Carmittee's work, after the EEZ had been clearly formulated and had
received Group of 77 support. UK delegates spoke against the
inclusion on the agenda of the "Exclusive Economic Zone" as a
separate item frcm "High Seas". Such a separation would have
implied that the regime of the High Seas would not automatically
28apply, and that residual rights would rest with the coastal state
The attempt to treat the EEZ as a fait accompli received strong 
support, however, especially frcm developing countries. Fifty-five 
members of the Group of 77 presented a draft agenda which included an
EEZ in Which coastal states exercised full control over scientific 
research, and in which rights of navigation would be confined to 
"straits used for international navigation", effectively a limited 
right of transit passage . The UK responded, jointly with France
and the Netherlands, with a list of amendments to this draft agenda
30 . They suggested replacing the title in 138/66, "6. Exclusive 
Econcmic Zone" with "6. Exclusive economic zone or other coastal 
state economic jurisdiction or rights beyond the territorial sea". 
There was also an attempt to add to the list a sub-item implying that 
scientific research was a legitimate freedcm, as well as an activity 
to be regulated.
The UK had very little success in changing the wording of the list of 
subjects and issues. The list, as passed by the Seabed Caimittee to 
the General Assembly, presented the issues of "High Seas" and 
"Exclusive Economic Zone" as separate items and the item on 
"Archipelagoes" was unchanged. In its plea for flexibility the UK
achieved more success, as the Seabed Ccmnittee provided the General
. 31Assembly with several alternative draft articles on most issues
The General Assembly did not debate the list or the agenda, but
merely passed them on to the Conference. The Assembly convened the
Conference with the challenge to "adopt a Convention dealing with all
matters relating to the law of the sea." The Conference was left to
create its own procedure, with the addendum "that the problems of
ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a
whole" 32.
The division of maritime issues into the three areas defined by the 
Seabed Ccmnittee' s Sub-Ccrmittees was confirmed by the first session 
of the Conference in December 1973 in New York City (see Appendix I),
wnicn initially carried on its worn with three Committees patterned 
on the Sub-Committees of the Seabed Committee. This was inevitable, 
in that the Seabed Committee's report consisted of a large number of 
alternative draft Treaty articles whose order was largely determined 
by the Sub-Committee structure. The First Committee was to consider 
the seabed regime and machinery, while the Second Committee was to 
discuss general aspects of maritime law and the Third Committee the 
marine environment, research, and the transfer of technology. The 
problems of issue-linking across Committee boundaries were thus 
identical to those of the Seabed Committee.
The UK and its partners in the 'Group of Five', in which the EEC 
'Six' was now taking an active part in place of France, now adopted a
new strategy. At the first two sessions of the Conference they
launched a revolt over the normal General Assembly rules of
conference procedur=> 33 » especially rules 37, 39 and 40, taking as a
springboard a "gentlemen's agreement" adopted by the General 
Assembly-3^ . They demanded that decisions should be made by 
'consensus' rather than by voting. It is not difficult to 
understand why this was so. The 'Group of Five' had encountered the 
superior voting power of the Group of 77 at UNCTAD, and were in 
favour of the status quo on most marine issues. Whereas in the mid 
stages of the Seabed Committee the Group of 77 was divided, it was 
now united in favour of the EEZ, which also enjoyed the support of 
some developed coastal states. A procedure which nullified 
numerical voting power and gave to any stats a veto against any 
nascent provision of the new Convention would strengthen their 
position by preserving the status quo on contentious issues. The 
matter was resolved at the Conference's second session at Caracas by 
the acceptance by Conference of a set of compromise proposals
35suggested by the President. Mr H.S. Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka 
In the case of prolonged disagreement over a substantive matter, the 
President would, on the request of fifteen representatives, be able 
to defer a vote for ten days- During this 'cooling-off period' the 
President or the Chairman of the Conference body concerned would seek 
"to facilitate the achievement of a general agreement" on the point 
or points at issue. If no further agreement were reached and unless 
a further deferment were decided upon, there would first have to be a 
determination, by the same majority as required for substantive 
decisions, "that all efforts at reaching general agreement have been 
exhausted." Only then could a vote on the substantive issue take 
place. The majority required by the rules for the adoption of a 
substantive decision would be two-thirds of those present and voting 
"yes" and "no" in Plenary, and a simple majcrity of those voting in 
Committee, provided that the majority in Plenary included at least a
majority of the states participating in the Conference 3b In
essence, then, the UK, along with its partners in the Group of Five, 
was successful over the Conference rules of procedure, because it 
managed to alter the traditional General Assembly rules and 
substantially to nullify the superior voting power of the Group of 
77. The United Kingdom was elected as one of the thirty-one 
Vice-Presidents of the Conference, thus gaining a seat on the 
Conference's forty-eight member General Committee, and therefore a
seat at the future debates on Conference procedure 37
The variety and complexity of the issues under discussion, and the 
number of states represented (over 150) made decision-making very 
difficult, and the consensus mode of procedure increased the problem. 
There was no incentive, under the new rules, for compromise, because 
agreement required that no delegation strongly object to any draft
article. The Conference therefore became a marathon, and was to 
provide a back-cloth to maritime activities until it finally reached 
a Convention in December 1982. By the end of the first session of 
the Conference what had looked like a major threat to the UK's 
maritime position had not proved fatal, and yet the overwheIming 
majority of states favoured an Exclusive Economic Zone. Consensus 
removed the urgency for the UK to come to terms, but on the other 
hand for her to fail to do so might result in a large number of 
unilateral extensions outside the framework of UNCLOS 3. It was 
therefore important that the UK should show flexibility in UNCLOS 3, 
and despite the Conference1s longevity, events there became the real 
engine behind pressure on the FCO to rethink law of the sea policy. 
The number of states, and the range and variety of issues involved 
led to the proceeding of negotiations by means of a cosmetic plenary, 
with real progress being made in groups of smaller states, seme of 
than formal or of long duration, and seme of than informal or 
short-lived. Buzan and Miles have analysed in detail the 
process of decision-making in UNCLOS 3. Buzan has classified the 
formal groups into 'external' and 'internal' groups. The former are 
those whose raison d 1etre lay outside the Conference, for example the 
Group of 77, whereas internal groups were formed to deal with issues 
specific to the Conference. He has further subdivided 'internal' 
groups into 'Sectional Interest Groups', those formed to pursue a 
particular interest, such as the Land-locked and 
Geographically-disadvantaged State Group, and 'Compromise Groups', 
which exist to formulate compromise on particular issues. There 
were a number of Ccmprcmise Groups, most of which ceased to function 
after they had produced a text acceptable bo the states concerned 
with their particular issue. By far the most successful of the 
Compromise Groups was the "Evensen Group". Appendix I indicates the
groups of states in which the UK participated; I have attempted to 
apply Buzan's classification to them.
Stannary
The Pardo Resolution, ail though concerned with the deep seabed, led to 
the reopening of international discussions on all aspects of the law 
of the sea, and, after a process of several years, to the convening 
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The 
Seabed Ccmnittee and the Conference were to provide a backcloth to UK 
marine policy over the whole of the decade, a backcloth which ensured 
that the PCO remained intimately aware of law of the sea issues and 
attempted to ensure that events in any sector of marine policy did 
not have implications detrimental to the UK's negotiating position. 
This vigilance was to contribute to the longevity of two disputes 
with Iceland during the period 1972-6, disputes which centred around 
legal questions on which both states were trying to strengthen their 
position in customary law so as to improve the chances of their 
wishes being adopted in a future law of the sea convention.
The Conference was to become from 1967, until a widespread round of 
extensions of fisheries zones in 1976, the determining factor in UK 
activities on marine policy issues. For the fisheries sector, apart 
from the Cod Weirs, it may have had a settling effect, in that the 
renegotiation process may have restrained unilateral activities by 
other states. In relation to navigation close to the shores of UK 
states, an activity the legality of which, it had always been 
assumed, was strengthened by the existence of distant-water fishing, 
the negotiations led the PCO and the Board of Trade (in all its 
manifestations) to analyse what precisely were the UK's specific
needs, and to re-examine the assumption that any extension of coastal 
state competences could not be contained frcm spreading to other 
competences. Since it was obvious that seme extensions would be 
difficult to prevent, the F00 had resolved to make than less 
territorial. To seme extent this policy had been successful by the 
end of the Seabed Ccrrmittee1s work, through the use of concessions to 
states consisting of archipelagoes, and through the tactic of 
delaying decisions until a Conference should mobilise as negotiators 
landlocked and other geographically-disadvantaged states with no 
interest in coastal state extensions. By 1972-3 it was obvious that 
the nost likely outcome was an Exclusive Economic Zone, and this was 
to lead the F00 into a realisation that perhaps competences in the 
water column could be effectively delinked.
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CHAPTER 8
UK ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN ECCNCKIC COMUNTTY
UK accession to the European Economic Community, which took effect 
from 1st January 1973, had considerable long-term repercussions in 
reshaping UK fisheries policy and determining the principal issues 
with which it is concerned and the fora in which it is expressed. 
In the short term, it raised the rancour of inshore fishermen, and of 
Scottish herring fishermen, for whom it coincided with a rapid 
decline in herring stocks because of overfishing; it was a 
contributory factor in creating a level of militant solidarity 
previously unknown in such an individualist industry. It has thus 
been significant in improving the level of political organisation 
among inshore fishermen, more so north of the Wash and Liverpool Bay 
than elsewhere in the UK. Its effects in relation to conservation 
methods, and in relation to the size, structure and deployment of the 
UK industry, have also been profound. Accession permanently altered 
the fish marketing system in relation to the point of first sale, by 
replacing some of the roles of merchants, the HIB and the WFA with 
Producers' Organisations. It also reorientated the UK's trade 
relations away from distant dominions and towards Western Europe, and 
began to downgrade the obsession with access to distant straits. In 
the longer term, accession led to the co-ordination of foreign policy 
on many issues with other member states. This reduced the UK's 
freedom of action somewhat, but increased the likelihood of a UK 
policy being successful, provided the other EEC member states could 
be persuaded to adopt it. Thus EEC member states jointly extended 
their fishery limits on 1st January 1977 to 200 miles and accession 
was eventually to bring the Community into the NEAFC as a partner,
imposing a more stringent and potentially more authoritative regional 
regime over much of the North-East Atlantic. In the short term, 
however, it weakened conservation, by weakening state powers in this 
area without imposing a tight EEC system. The contrast between the 
competences which the UK would enjoy within its new 200-mile zone 
were it not a member of the EEC and those accorded by the Community's 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) also provided the basis for a long-term 
rift between member-states over fisheries.
Membership of the Community has had considerable implications for the 
process of policy-making, as well as for its content, blurring an 
already tenuous distinction between foreign and domestic policy where 
fisheries are concerned, and altering the range of institutions 
bearing upon policy outcomes. It was also to result in a growing 
co-ordination between the policy positions of member states in 
relation to external negotiations, though the UK was to dissent from 
EEC submissions on fisheries to UNCLOS 3 for cosmetic reasons. 
Perhaps its greatest significance in relation to fisheries, however, 
was its role in closing to the UK the option of widening its own 
exclusive fisheries limits, an option which in 1971 appeared to be 
unthinkable, but which within three years had become quite attractive 
to many in the fishing industry.
The UK applied to join the Community in conjunction with three of its 
EFTA partners, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway. The same four states 
had sought to join the Community from 1961-3, but had been rebuffed 
primarily as a result of Gaullist suspicions of the UK's ability to 
be 'a good European'. The successful application formally began in
1970. Concurrent with negotiations, the existing six member states
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("the Six") formulated a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), to create a
strong position from which the would-be entrant states would have to 
negotiate concessions. This, therefore, put the entrant states at a 
disadvantage through their being unable to play a part in the initial 
formulation of the CFP. The fact that the essential elements of the 
CFP were precipitously pushed through EEC institutions iinnediately 
prior to UK entry has created a deep and lasting resentment among 
many sections of the fishing industry. They feel that the prime 
purpose of the policy was to steal fishing grounds which would 
otherwise have been wholly under UK control. As VJFA chairman 
Charles Meek put it in 1976:
"I cannot believe that if we were starting from scratch... 
anybody would have had the impertinence to suggest that 
hands should be laid by others on this British resource...
We have a common agricultural policy but we do not share 
land and we do not share crops and we do not share our 
beef, and why should we share the fish?... Those of us 
concerned with British fisheries, of course, find it very 
odd that the Common Fisheries Policy should eventually be 
put together just in time for our entry"
Undeniably the entry application was responsible for the accelerated 
formulation of a CFP by the Six, but to think of this as a malignant 
conspiracy to lay hands upon British fish appears to be an 
exaggeration. In 1970, when the formal membership application was 
lodged, there was little reason to believe that the global move to 
wide fishery limits favoured by the coastal state coalition in the 
SBC would actually occur. Moreover the FCO, as a steadfast opponent 
of such extensions, might have been expected to welcome the narrow 
limits in the CFP as additional support for its position, as in the
193event it did in 1976-7. If the Common Fisheries Policy were 
specifically designed to poach fish, the future EEZs of the UK and 
Norway contained the bulk of the fish stocks within 200 miles of the 
baselines of the four applicant states. However, the economy of the 
UK was much less dependent on fishing than those of any of the other 
three applicant states (see Figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1; The importance of the fishing industry within the 
national economies of the Ten during the Accession negotiations .
Exports of fish and fish Fishermen (excluding











Belgium and Luxembourg 20,461 0.2 1,264 0.03
Denmark 194,473 5.5 15,457 0.67
France 48,982 0.2 37,000 0.18
West Germany 77,534 0.2 6,669 0.03
Ireland 13,988 1.1 5,861 0.53
Italy 16,432 0.1 115,281 0.59
Netherlands 129,405 1 .0 4,030 0.09
United Kingdom 69,623 0.3 21,651 0.09
Norway 300,483 11.7 44,972 3.00
While the timing of the introduction of a CFP resulted from the 
membership application, its seeds are contained in the Treaty of 
Rome. That Treaty, however, makes no concession to detail. To 
understand the widespread resentment of the CFP held by many British 
fishermen, and of the multi-partisan opposition to it which prevailed 
among most MPs from 1976, it is vital to appreciate that the form 
which the CFP has taken is in no way inherent in the aims and basic 
philosophy of the EEC. The Treaty's relevant paragraph states:
"The common market shall extend to agriculture and trade in 
agricultural products. 'Agricultural products' means the
products of the soil, of stock farming and of fisheries and 
products of first-stage processing directly related to 
these products"
The passing reference to fish as 'agricultural products' helps to 
explain the production and marketing system adopted in the CFP. The 
successful creation of common markets for agricultural staples during 
the 1960s, with guaranteed minimum prices to the producer, led the 
European Commission to treat fish in a similar fashion. However, 
the structural arrangements which it proposed, involving free access 
for vessels from all Community states up to the baselines of the 
territorial sea, had no precedent in agriculture, and bore more 
resemblance to the 'free competition' in manufactures which the 
Commission wished to encourage. A German farmer could by 'right of 
establishment' (local residence) farm land in France. Similarly it 
might have been expected that the area within the existing 
twelve-mile limit, or at least the territorial sea, would be treated 
as 'national soil', as a finite resource in which only residents of 
the coastal state could fish Instead the regulations on the
structure of the industry eventually put forward by the Cortinission 
relied on the operation of free competition:
"In respect of fishing in the maritime waters coming under 
its sovereignty or within its jurisdiction shall not lead 
to differences in treatment of other member states 
equal conditions of access to and use of the fishing 
grounds ... for all fishing vessels flying the flag of a 
member state and registered in Community territory". ®
Its solution was to attempt to treat a finite resource as infinitely
exploitable, and failed to take account of either biological 
limitations upon wild fish production or the extreme natural 
fluctuations in recruitment. The Commission may have believed that 
free competition in fisheries, as in manufacturing industry, would 
itself produce a 'rationalisation' of the fishing industry, creating 
a tendency to fewer and larger industrial units. If so, there was 
no recognition of any social value in the maintenance of small 
self-employed fishermen, and the proposals offered little to the 
Scottish or Norwegian inshore fishermen, for whom alternative 
employment was scarce. This was in sharp contrast to an 
agricultural policy which encouraged the small producer to remain in 
business. To be fair, the Six had no comparably dependent regions, 
and Commissioners and their staffs may not have understood the 
overwhelming importance of fishing to Northern Norway and Scotland. 
Small French and Italian fishermen in the Mediterranean had less to 
fear from competition from trawlers because the more complex species 
mix in warmer waters and the lower primary food productivity of the 
Mediterranean mean that few larger vessels fish there, and, moreover, 
the Mediterranean was specifically excluded from the CFP. There was 
no mention of conservation of stocks, nor of the effect on fisheries 
of marine pollution, although these were issues of mounting concern 
to the fishing industry at the time. Such omissions were not 
coincidental; they merely reflected the industrial and agricultural 
orientation and experience of the Community 6.
Given the EEC's successful experience of rapid industrial and 
agricultural growth during the 1960s and an almost continual rise in 
aggregate fish production since the War, it is reasonable to infer 
that the proposals were not specifically designed to endanger the 
fishing industries of the applicant states. Indeed, since 1961, a
'Eurocrat' had been formulating proposals, and those actually adopted 
had first been submitted to the Council of Ministers in 1968 ^. The 
change in tempo which coincided with the accession negotiations did 
however result largely from a policy reversal by the French 
Government which was designed to maintain French access to stocks 
close to UK coasts. From 1961 France had attempted to obtain 
special privileges for coastal fishermen and suggested the 
application of the principle of the 'right of establishment'. The 
rapid conclusion of an agreement on the CFP during 1970 was possible 
because France dropped her opposition after the Hague Sumnit of 
November 1969, at which enlargement of the Corrmunity was agreed upon 
in principle.
This French volte-face resulted partly from the disposition of the 
French catch and partly from a Quai d'Orsay assessment of overall 
French interests in relation to the accession negotiations. Like 
the UK, France possesses both a 'deep>-sea' fleet (la peche 
industrielle) and an 'inshore' fleet (la p£che artisanale), although 
as in the UK the principal distinction is in terms of proprietorship 
rather than fishing grounds. La peche artisanale was much more 
important to France (12,396 vessels in 1970) than was la pfeche 
industrielle (922 vessels). For this reason France was concerned to 
protect the grounds habitually fished by her coastal fishermen from 
encroachment by German, Dutch and Belgian trawlers. Furthermore, 
there are political reasons why the French should have been so 
insistent on guarantees for her coastal fishermen. Nearly half of 
France's fishing boats, and half of her catch, both by weight and 
value, were concentrated in the Direction de Nantes and the Direction 
de Saint-Servan, the two of France's five fisheries administrative 
districts covering the regions of Bretagne and Pays de la Loire ®.
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The Directions relied heavily on shellfish, most of which are 
sedentary species found close to the coasts, and these formed the 
most important part of the French catch by value. Unrestricted 
trawling by large German and Belgian vessels in the area could have 
damaged shellfish beds very severely. The departements comprising 
the Directions had been an important Gaullist bastion throughout the 
life of the Fifth Republic, and any hint of Government insensitivity 
to the fishermen's needs might have combined with strained 
centro-Breton relations over agriculture to undermine this Gaullist
Qsupport .
The applications to join the EEC by the four EFTA countries reversed 
the significance of the CFP for the French government. While in 
relation to the rest of the 'Six' the French fishing interest was a 
coastal state one, in relation to the UK the French interest was 
'distant-water'. Much of Direction Nantes' demersal and pelagic 
catch, even though taken by pecheurs artisanales, was taken North of 
the Channel median line. Furthermore, la peche industrielle, based 
mainly in Boulogne, comprised, inter alia, freezer trawlers operating 
off Norway and the Faroes and freshers working the Channel, the 
Southern North Sea and the Irish Sea. French access to the 
applicant countries' waters needed to be maintained, and so the 
French Government's position shifted to support of a five-year delay 
in the full implementation of a policy allowing free access for all 
member countries. The shellfishermen could be protected by gear 
restrictions in the name of conservation, and thus the French 
Government was quick to ban double-beam trawling, a form of fishing 
practised predominantly by Dutch and Belgian vessels.
197
A more telling reason for the French policy-change was the desire of
the French Foreign Ministry to build up strong negotiating positions 
in relation to the applicants. Although the potential political 
strength of the British inshore interest was not obvious at the time, 
it was evident that the other three applicant states, Norway, Ireland 
and Denmark, would each require guarantees for their own inshore 
fishermen, the last more concerned for the Faroese and Greenlanders 
rather than for metropolitan Danes. If they could be made to 
bargain for these guarantees, France might gain concessions.
As might be expected, the applicant states tried to prevent the 
formulation of a Common Fisheries Policy by the Six. The UK asked 
in Autumn 1970 for a deferment on the final details until after 
accession, but to no avail. In general the UK had too many other 
areas of interest to enable the negotiators to concentrate upon 
fisheries. Nor was there a MAFF departmental view which stressed 
the rights of inshore fishermen. Apart from the more effective 
access of the Trawlers Federations to the Fisheries Secretary, the 
Ministry had a number of more vital interests to safeguard. Sir 
John Winnifrith, whose post as Permanent Secretary at MAFF from 
1959-68 had straddled the 1961-63 and 1967 talks, had argued 
consistently against UK membership of the Coninunity even before 
the proposals on a CFP were published. Continued access to cheap 
food from Australia and New Zealand and sugar from the Caribbean were 
vital MAFF concerns, threatened by membership of the EEC. There was 
also the possibility of a Conservative backbench revolt, not by 
fishing constituency MPs, but by a hard core of Commonwealth 
loyalists and members worried about the possible loss of sovereignty 
which EEC membership might entail. Some of the latter might never 
be placated, but long-term guarantees for Commonwealth trade might 
reconcile the former to membership. The Common Agricultural Policy
also raised some Conservative Party hackles: and farmers and 
consumers obviously constituted a much more powerful coalition than 
fishermen In the event, therefore, UK negotiatiors left 
discussion on fisheries until the arrangements for accession were 
close to completion ^ . The Norwegians likewise delayed discussion 
of fisheries. The issue was of vital importance to them, and they 
wished to be able to deal with it specifically, rather than to accept 
conditions as part of an overall package deal involving other issue 
areas.
The CFP, therefore, unfolded with no substantive UK input. This 
strategy of delaying discussion of the fisheries issue was at the 
time accepted by both front benches. In February 1970 the 
Commission submitted draft regulations to the Council of Ministers. 
On 30th June, the same day that the UK opened negotiations, the 
European Parliament accepted the plan submitted by the Commission. 
The UK immediately "reserved" its position on the Plan. In Autumn 
the UK asked the EEC for a deferment on the final details of the 
Common Fisheries Policy until after UK accession, but on 20th October 
the EEC Council passed two regulations, one on the structure of the 
fishing industry and one on the marketing of fish and fish products, 
^  to come into effect on 1st February 1971. Article 2, Section 1 
of the regulation on structure stated that:
"Rules applied by each Member State in respect of fishing 
in the maritime waters coming under its jurisdiction shall 
not lead to differences in treatment of other Member 
States. Member States shall ensure in particular equal 
conditions of access to and use of the fishing grounds 
situated in the waters referred to in the previous
subparagraph for all fishing vessels flying the flag of a 
member state and registered in Community territory."
A breathing space, albeit a brief one, was to be allowed for 
specified regions particularly dependent on fishing. Article 4 of 
Regulation 2141/70 allowed that:
"By way of derogation from the provisions of Article 2, 
access to certain fishing grounds situated within a limit 
of three nautical miles calculated from the base lines of 
the Member State bordering on the areas concerned may be 
limited, for certain types of fishing and for a period not 
exceeding five years from the time of entry into force of 
this Regulation, to the local population of the coastal 
regions concerned if that population depends primarily on 
inshore fishing."
These provisions caused extreme disquiet among organisations 
representing inshore fishermen. Five years after entry into force 
of the regulation, vessels of all EEC member states would be able to 
fish up to the baselines. The UK, moreover, had few areas primarily 
dependent on fishing. The fears of small UK inshore fishermen were 
further aroused by provisions for the coordination of the structural 
policies of the member states to obtain "increased productivity 
through restructuring of fishing fleets" After some of the 
stocks which the inshore men had, since 1964, regarded as their 
property had been shared with rapacious aliens, the UK Government, in 
co-ordination with the parent governments of those aliens, would 
enforce a programme of fleet reduction on its fishermen.
The marketing regulations were far more detailed and complex than 
those on the structure of the industry and were obviously heavily 
influenced by the marketing regulations which had been introduced for 
agricultural produce. Common marketing standards on quality, size, 
weight, packing and labelling would be established (Article 2), 
together with a system of inspection at all stages of distribution. 
Supply would be concentrated by means of networks of "Producers' 
(fishermen's) Organisations", the members of each Organisation 
disposing of their products in a cortmon way (Article 5). These 
Organisations, which would be eligible for state aid during their 
first three years of existence, would each fix a withdrawal price 
below which they would not sell products supplied by their members 
(Article 7). For some fresh or chilled fish a guide price would be 
established for the whole European Community each year. These 
species were to include, inter alia, herring, cod, haddock, whiting, 
mackerel and plaice (Article 8), most of the species most important 
to the UK. Compensation for the withdrawal of products from the 
market would only apply to those not used for human consumption 
(Article 10). An intergovernmental "Management Committee for 
Fishery Products" would be established to deal with details and 
conditions unforeseen in the Regulations (Article 28). By the 
activities of these Producer Organisations the market mechanism was 
intended to help in inducing structural changes, encouraging the 
smaller fishermen to group together in order to weather competition 
from the larger firms. The marketing provisions presented problems 
for inshore organisations, especially Scottish ones. Small ports 
might be rendered unviable by the need for expensive packaging and 
labelling equipment, and the Community-wide guide prices would place 
Scottish fishermen at a disadvantage compared with fishermen closer 
to large markets.
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Both Labour (October 1964 - June 1970) and Conservative (June 1970 - 
February 1974) Governments which sponsored the negotiations took the 
view that the UK's inshore fishing interest was small compared with 
other concerns. Attempts to bring the CFP into the parliamentary 
arena were rebuffed. Soon after the February 1970 draft regulations 
were published, Grimond (L - Orkney and Shetland) suggested that MAFF 
cooperate with other applicant countries in forming a common policy 
on 'stock conservation' and on coastal state jurisdiction . Hoy, 
Parliamentary Secretary for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food dismissed 
the suggestion, labelling such action premature. The FCO also hoped 
that Norwegian insistence would result in adequate protection for 
coastal fishermen without British concessions. However, the concern 
of inshore men was instantly aroused, and at a meeting with 
representatives of Scottish inshore fishermen's associations on 
December 15th 1970 Rippon, the UK Chief Negotiator and Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster, and Campbell, the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, were told of inshore dislike of the proposals ■*'®. 
Nevertheless, HMG did not wish to jeopardise the negotiations by 
being too insistent on inshore rights. The Government knew that it 
would have difficulty in gaining acceptance from anti-Market 
Conservative MPs of the cost of aligning to the EEC farm policy and 
of the eventual phasing out of tariff preferences for vulnerable 
Commonwealth producers. There was a possibility that the revolt 
would spread to MPs with constituents engaged in inshore fishing at 
the same time, imperilling HMG's Parliamentary majority. MAFF's 
External Affairs Division, which provided most of the Ministry's 
negotiators, had little knowledge of fish since the Fisheries 
departments usually provided their own external representation, and 
consequently the fisheries case was not stressed as strongly as were
other agricultural and food supply concerns. Speaking in Brussels 
in March 1971, Rippon announced that there were three areas of 
critical interest to the UK as yet unsolved: New Zealand, sugar, and 
the financial contribution ^7. when pressed in Parliament as to why 
HMG had been so much less forceful than the Norwegians in opposing 
the CFP, Buchanan-Smith (C - Angus N and Mearns), Under-Secretary of 
State for Home Affairs and Agriculture at the Scottish Office, and a 
member of the negotiating team, replied:
"Every Government applying for membership of the Community 
must make their own tactical assessment of the situation.
The Norwegians have approached the matter in their way.
They are perfectly entitled to approach it in their way, if 
they wish to do so"
This statement tacitly admitted that HMG's 'tactical assessment' had 
not found the interests of the inshore fishermen to be as crucial to 
the UK as other concerns. Indeed, the Norwegian single-minded 
concentration upon the fisheries issue gained without UK concessions 
terms more favourable to inshore men than those in the CFP as 
formulated in 1970. An impressive coalition had been forged, which 
consisted of urban leftists and fishermen and foresters from Northern 
Norway, and the Norwegian parliament had resolved that Norway would 
not enter the Community unless the CFP was altered. In May 1971 the 
applicants were offered a six-mile limit for a transitional period in 
the place of the three-mile one envisaged by Regulation 2141/70. 
Ministers reacted favourably, and gave the impression that they 
genuinely expected inshore fishermen to be satisfied. Royle (C - 
Richmond), the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, argued that since Cardigan Bay and the Minches were safe
behind baselines, and since a number of EEC member states already 
enjoyed historic rights to fish between six and twelve miles from 
parts of the UK coasts, the proposed six-mile exclusive zone would 
entail little hardship for the industry 19. A similar argument was 
advanced by Prior (C - Lowestoft) the Minister of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, who told the House of Commons:
"If we opened our waters in the six to twelve-mile belt to 
other EEC countries which at present do not have 
traditional rights in that belt, there would be some, but a 
relatively small, additional weight of fishing carried out 
in that area. The total catch which comes from the six to 
twelve-mile belt is a comparatively small proportion of the 
total British catch." ^
Reaction from MPs was mixed, but from those who expressed an interest 
in fishing, the general attitude was one of criticism. Even MPs 
representing the home ports of the deepsea fleet, who may have seen 
in the CFP long-term guaranteed access to the shores of other states, 
like Faroe, Greenland and Norway, were cautious in expressing this 
sentiment. Questions from Johnson (Lab - Kingston-upon-Hull W), 
Wall (C - Haltemprice), McNamara (Lab - Kingston-upon-Hull N) and 
Sproat (C - Aberdeen S, from 1970) were phrased as requests for 
information rather than as statements of support .
The most vociferous Parliamentary opponents of the CFP during the 
negotiation period were Scottish MPs with an inshore interest. 
Active in criticism were Gilmour (C - Fife E), Stewart (SNP - Western 
Isles), Sillars (Lab - Ayrshire S to 1974, S L - Ayrshire S 1974-79), 
Maclennan (Lab - Caithness and Sutherland, to 1981, SD Caithness and
Sutherland from 1981) , Grimond (L - Orkney and Shetland), Gray (C - 
Ross and Cromarty, from 1970), Baker(C - Banff to 1974), Hutchinson 
(C - Edinburgh S) and Mitchell (C - Aberdeenshire W, 1970-74). By 
far the most active opponent, however, was Wolrige-Gordon (C - 
Aberdeenshire E to 1974). Having already violently attacked a 
decision of his own government to cut on economic grounds the rate of 
grant for vessel construction, he foretold 'new Highland clearances' 
resulting from the CFP. He foretold that the marketing system would 
damage small and distant harbours, because the grading system would 
require "an army of inspectors", while the common price system would 
give an advantage to the harbours closest to markets 22.
Parliamentary pressure from Scottish MPs inter-reacted with pressure 
from fishermen's organisations and from the Herring Industry Board.
During the first three weeks of June 1971 six Scottish inshore 
organisations wrote to Prior arguing that the twelve-mile limit 
should be retained 2 . The Chairman of the HIB, observing the 
decline in herring stocks, claimed the following month that 100,000 
Scottish jobs were jeopardised by the CFP as it then stood 24. This
was manifestly an overestimate, given the possibility of processing 
imported fish and the large proportion of the UK herring catch coming 
from within the six-mile limit, but it helped to increase the already 
considerable inshore alarm.
There is no evidence that the pressure from the Government's own
backbenchers, to whose sense of conviction and constituency duty was
added a resurgence of the Scottish National Party, led the UK
25negotiators at Brussels to pay more attention to fisheries . The 
Government left the fisheries issue until last, as it had intended, 
taking the crucial parliamentary vote on entry on 28th October 1971,
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before the negotiations on fisheries were complete
In order to calm Scottish Conservative backbenchers, and to prevent 
the revolt from spreading to South Coast MPs, some Cabinet Ministers 
hinted privately that carefully-phrased gear restrictions introduced 
in the name of conservation could exclude the larger foreign vessels 
from within twelve miles of UK baselines, even in the absence of 
exclusive UK rights of access. There were already precedents for 
such a course. Apart from the French ban on double-beam trawling 
within the twelve-mile limit, the West Germans had barred vessels of 
more than 200 horsepower from operating close inshore. These 
regulations, though supposedly non-discriminatory in form, 
predominantly adversely affected Dutch flatfishermen Large and
powerful domestic vessels do not operate close inshore, while small 
foreign vessels are not economic at long distances from port, because 
of their low capacity relative to travelling time. Therefore any 
restriction on vessel size, such as the German one, inordinately 
affects foreigners. Plaice, moreover, the food fish most favoured 
in the Netherlands, lie in shallow waters at the harvestable stage. 
That the UK could openly emulate the French and Germans was suggested 
in Parliament by Buchanan-Smith (C - Angus S to 1974), a Fisheries
Minister with a strong inshore fishing interest in his own
constituency. As a Minister and a member of the negotiating team he
was committed to the successful conclusion of negotiations, while as
• 27a constituency MP he was worried about inshore restiveness .
The other applicant countries also wanted better guarantees in the
CFP for inshore fishermen. In addition to Norwegian fears, the
Danes were concerned that the special dependence of the Faroese and 
Greenlanders on fishing should be recognized and their interests
protected. The Irish also accorded a high priority to fishing. 
The French government, though it viewed open access as in the overall 
French interest, was anxious not to anger the Bretons by being seen 
to grant other fishing-dependent regions of the EEC special 
privileges denied to Brittany. The stage was therefore set, once 
fishing remained one of the few outstanding and unresolved issues, 
for derogation from the CFP in favour of the applicants. First the 
UK established a common position with Ireland and Denmark, isolating 
the Norwegians, who continued to insist upon a permanent twelve-mile 
zone reserved exclusively for their own fishermen. These three 
states then negotiated with the Six from this common position of 
acceptance of the concept of a CFP, but demanding a generous and 
gradual approach to implementation. In order to expedite final 
agreement, the Britsh tried to persuade Norway to weaken its stance. 
On the eve of a session at which Rippon was hoping to conclude the 
talks, Prime Minister Heath sent a telegram to his Norwegian 
counterpart Bratteli. It put strong pressure on the Norwegian 
government not to be too unyielding, hinting that delay would be 
unprofitable for Norway. It failed to cow the Norwegians, who 
leaked the text of the telegram to the Press.
Final agreement was reached at a Brussels meeting of llth-12th 
December 1971, attended for the UK by Prior, Rippon and 
Buchanan-Smith. The negotiations were able to find a solution 
acceptable to all interested territories except Norway and the 
Faroes. At least until 1982 each state would retain full 
jurisdiction out to twelve miles. They would also have power to 
control, on a non-discriminatory basis, size and types of fishing 
gear, until, under the provisions of Article 102 of the Treaty, the 
Community should have developed its own conservation regime, a task
which should have been completed by 1st January 1979. Fishing 
rights beyond six miles would be generalised to all EEC member 
states, except for large areas "where the baselines are not in 
themselves a sufficient safeguard or where the stocks are already 
fully exploited", where existing rights would remain, ungeneralised, 
out to twelve miles, again to remain effective until 1982.
The French, in accepting this solution, insisted on re-creating the 
twelve mile exclusive limit in some of their own most sensitive 
coastal areas. The Quai d'Orsay's tactical assessment of the 
situation had been brilliantly conceived. France had gained the 
protection she sought for some of her coastal waters, and had 
improved her own access to UK waters. The agreement also included a 
safeguard against any general extension of fisheries jurisdiction in 
the future. Such an extension was feared by the distant-water 
fleets of the UK, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany because 
of internal political developments in Canada and Iceland as well as 
demands made in the SBC. A formal undertaking was made that in any 
area beyond twelve miles from baselines where a member state might 
exercise jurisdiction, no discrimination between member states would 
exist . The Marine and Transport department of the FCO, 
preoccupied with pressure at the Seabed Committee for extended 
coastal state jurisdiction and the consequent threat to existing High 
Seas freedoms, saw the CFP as a new guarantee of the continued 
existence of narrow limits. MAFF Ministers also saw it in this way 
and stressed the opportunities with which the agreement would provide 
Britain's trawler fleet. Prior told the Comnons in June 1971, "we 
of course want to see fair and equitable arrangements on access to 
coastal waters throughout the enlarged Community" .
Such a desire was understandable, but these arrangements had been 
made without Norwegian or Faroese concurrence so that Denmark, 
Ireland and the UK had produced a situation in which UK vessels could 
be barred from the only coastal waters to which their access could 
usefully be improved. Norway, as by far the biggest exporter of 
fish among the Ten, could benefit greatly from tariff-free fish 
exports to the other members of the Community, but only if she could 
protect her fish resources from direct exploitation by Conmunity 
fleets. At the time a continuation of the twelve-mile jurisdiction 
on the terms accorded to her by the European Fisheries Convention 
would have suited her well. Norway's negotiators needed an 
agreement which promised the permanency of the twelve-mile temporary 
derogation from the CFP which the Six were willing to offer. This 
region's dependence on fisheries was far greater than anywhere else 
in the Six, and the extreme depth of Norwegian coastal waters made 
them more suitable for exploration by very large trawlers than any 
other coastal waters in the Community.
Afraid of creating a precedent for other issue areas, the Six would 
not agree to permanent exceptions. In the days following the 
agreement of llth-12th December, the Norwegian delegation of four 
senior Ministers, deserted by the other applicant states, found 
itself trying to negotiate with a group of officials and diplomats 
who had no power to strike a political deal. This latter group felt 
bound by the principle that there should be no permanent exceptions 
to Community rules. The only concession obtained by Norway was an 
agreement by which the Council of Ministers would decide, on the 
basis of proposals from the Commission and according to prevailing 
circumstances, whether and how the exceptions to the CFP should be 
prolonged after 1982.
Rippon's agreement satisfied few of the cognoscenti. The Aberdeen 
Press and Journal carried the following Editorial on 14th December:
"The fishers themselves will have to live under a suspended 
death sentence until their fate is decided in Brussels...
The member nations of the Six know this full well. They 
agreed to the continuation of twelve-mile and six-mile 
limits in the secure knowledge that quite soon they will be 
able to press for what they believe to be their rights, the 
opening of all Britain's fishing grounds to foreign 
trawlers."
The Labour opposition universally vilified the agreement. A leading 
anti-marketeer, Shore (Lab - Stepney) accused HMG of having betrayed 
Norway, and suggested, prophetically, that HMG's actions might have
onprevented Norway from joining the EEC . A considerable number of 
other Labour MPs, including the Shadow Foreign Secretary, attacked 
the document as a mere stay of execution. Even distant-water Labour 
MPs, among them Hughes (Lab - Aberdeen N from 1970), Johnson and 
McNamara attacked the agreement vehemently. McNamara argued that 
the isolation of Norway might encourage her unilaterally to extend 
her fishing zones to fifty miles and that the Faroes and Greenland 
might follow suit. The threat to "our deepsea fishermen" was 
greater than that to the inshore fleet .
It also failed to satisfy the majority of Conservative MPs active in
*30the inshore interest . While Baker applauded it, Gilmour called 
it a "disaster". Disaffection involved Conservative MPs from all 
coastal parts of the UK. Roberts (C - Conway) claimed that the
generalisation of existing rights in Liverpool and Cardigan Bays 211
would reduce fishermen "to poverty". Mills (C - Torrington) 
suggested that Devon and Cornwall fishermen would use force to 
exclude foreign fishermen. While many Conservative MPs pointed out 
the advantages in the agreement, few coastal MPs were among them.
However, the possibility that the Norwegian government might not sign 
the Treaty of Accession appeared to recede late in December. The 
Norwegian Government reluctantly accepted a ten-year guarantee of a 
twelve-mile limit for her northerly regions alone, on the 
understanding that the Council of Ministers would decide the
situation after 1982. Feeling that a mere ten years' reprieve was a 
betrayal of Norwegian fishermen, Hoem, the Minister of Fisheries, 
resigned. Nevertheless, Norway signed the Accession Treaty, making 
ratification dependent on the outcome of a referendum in September 
1972. Owing partly to the opposition of the fishermen, this
referendum went against Norwegian membership and prevented Norway's 
ratification of the Treaty. This strenuous parliamentary opposition 
had a number of lasting effects. Firstly it bound together inshore 
fishermen of all political persuasions, in the belief that the CFP 
was opposed to their interests, and that neither Whitehall nor the 
Conservative leadership regarded their concerns as central to the 
"national interest". Secondly, it made fishing a live national 
issue, such as it had not been for many years. Thirdly, it appeared 
to corriTiit the Labour Party to change the CFP on its return to office. 
The Labour Party's failure to attempt reform after its return to
office in 1974 was to lead to direct political action by inshore
fishermen.
33On 22nd January 1972 the Treaty of Accession was signed in
Brussels. It contained significant departures from the CFP in the 
interest of regions especially dependent on fishing. Until 31st 
December 1982 there was to be a zone of six nautical miles from 
baselines within which a coastal state could restrict fishing to 
vessels "which fish traditionally in those waters and which operate 
from ports in that geographical coastal area" 34. Also, fishing 
rights in substantial proportions of the zone between six and twelve 
miles from the UK coast were to be reserved to the UK and to states 
enjoying historic rights. Protected areas were to be the Orkneys 
and Shetlands, the North East of Scotland from Cape Wrath to Berwick, 
the North East of England from the River Coquet to Flamborough Head, 
the South-West from Lyme Regis to Hartland Point, and County Down 33 
(see Figure 8.2). These were areas in which the retention of the 
twelve-mile limit was thought by MAFF and the FCO to be most vital. 
They felt that the Firths, the Minches and Cardigan Bay were well 
protected by baselines, so the West of Scotland and Mid-Wales were of 
less concern to the UK negotiators. The other acceding states and 
France each obtained similar guarantees that existing rights only 
would operate out to twelve miles in particular areas. In addition 
it was generally accepted, though unwritten, that Norway would be 
permitted to maintain a twelve-mile limit in some areas even after 
1982 3®. Largely as a result of Norwegian pressure, the bias of the 
2142/70 marketing system against the periphery was alleviated in the 
Treaty. Member states were to be allowed to give medium-term 
assistance to Producers' Organisations, and withdrawal prices were to 
be adjusted by conversion factors based on the cost of transport to 
market 37.
The provisions of the Treaty of Accession represented a massive 
advance in the protection of inshore fishermen over the proposals in
Figure 8.2: The Fisheries Limits for Britain 
and Ireland established by the Treaty of Accession 38.
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2141/70 and 2142/70. The sources of 95% of the UK's inshore catch 
by value were to be safeguarded from foreign incursions for ten 
years. However, there were two main areas of inshore contention. 
Firstly there was the resentment of fishermen in those areas where 
historic rights had to be generalised under the Treaty. The 
reprieve for other areas made their misfortune all the more galling. 
Particularly angry were Northumberland fishermen and those working 
the Irish Sea. A twelve-mile limit from baselines in Galloway, 
Antrim and the Isle of Man would have made the Northern Irish Sea a 
UK preserve. The new arrangements threatened not only the Irish Sea 
herring industry, rapidly deteriorating as a result of overfishing, 
but a new and expanding queen scallop fishery based on Galloway and 
operated mostly in the six-to-twelve mile zone. Its products were 
exported predominantly to continental Europe and the USA. Much 
recent capital investment now appeared threatened by the possibility 
that fishermen from France, a principal export market, might 
themselves catch the scallops
Political pressure brought to bear on HMG about these exclusions 
created no prospect of renegotiations but other concessions were made 
to sweeten the pill. In response to requests from Milne (Lab - 
Blyth to 1970, Ind Lab - Blyth, 1970-74) that the twelve-mile limit 
for Northumberland should be retained, Prior arranged for improved 
Fisheries Protection Surveillence in the area. On some occasions in 
February and March 1972 as many as three of the Royal Navy's six 
Fisheries Protection Vessels were deployed off Northumberland 
In answer to a debate on fishing limits in the Irish Sea raised by 
Brewis (C - Galloway to October 1974), Prior hinted that a MAFF 
decision to ban heavy beam trawling, though ostensibly a conservation 
measure, had been taken because it was a style of fishing used
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Another area unprotected by a twelve-mile limit was the South Coast, 
East of Lyme Regis. A considerable number of ports each supported 
small numbers of inshore fishermen, their usual catch being 
high-priced demersal fish such as sole and plaice. During June and 
July 1972, the Fisheries Organisation Society (see page 75) organised 
the presentation to Parliament of a series of identical petitions 
calling for the retention of the Fishery Limits Act 1964 for an 
indefinite period ihe South Coast fishermen were in a much 
weaker position than their counterparts in Scotland and 
Northumberland. Their prosperity was not viewed by their neighbours 
as essential to the well-being of the region, nor did their MPs see 
fisheries as a burning constituency issue. Thus none of these 
petitions attracted more than seventy signatures, nor did any of the 
MPs presenting them take any other anti-CFP action which appears on 
the Official Record.
After Parliament had ratified the Act of Accession without revision 
on 18th October 1972, the Society used a different strategy, It 
organised another petition calling for gear restrictions phrased so 
as to reserve coastal waters for local fishermen. A series of 
petitions was presented during November and February 1973, calling 
for the banning of all beam trawling on the grounds that it was 
damaging to flatfish and shellfish stocks. The petitions claimed 
these species for the UK as sedentary species under the Continental 
Shelf Convention However, the inconclusive nature of the 
scientific evidence and the fact that a modern fleet of beam trawlers 
from Brixham trawled Sussex and Hampshire waters made it difficult 
for the government to acquiesce.
A more disconcerting aspect of the Treaty for inshore fishermen was 
the situation which would prevail after 1982. Government spokesmen 
held that the Treaty implied a fair and open-minded review for the 
period from 1983 onwards, rather than an automatic reversion to the 
spirit of 2142/70. Baroness Tweedsmuir, Minister of State at the 
Scottish Office, told the House of Lords:
"If unanimity cannot be reached, then each country has the 
right of veto if they have declared a particular question 
to be of vital national interest" 44.
Similarly Rippon told the Commons:
"I must emphasise that these are not just transitional 
arrangements which will automatically lapse at the end of a 
fixed period" 45.
This view was not endorsed by Deniau, the EEC Fisheries Commissioner. 
L'Europe reported [translation]:
"M.Deniau stressed the distinction which is to be made 
between the situation of Norway on the one hand and of 
Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark on the other. The 
three last-named countries accept the principle that the 
Community regime of unrestricted fishing must be introduced 
in the end. The negotiations are to settle the length and 
nature of the transitional period and exemptions. Norway, 
on the other hand, is asking for permanent exemption"
The argument that the exemptions were other than transitional is also 
challenged by the statement in Article 100 of the Treaty of Accession 
that the special arrangements were derogations from the CFP.
Membership of the EEC, which came into effect on 1st January 1973, 
had great significance for subsequent UK diplomatic and political 
activity in relation to fishing. It heralded a weakened role for 
the NEAFC, which the EEC largely ignored. The Commission took its 
time in creating its own conservation regime as envisaged by Article 
102, and the ICES was not consulted by the EEC until late 1975, 
despite its unique expertise in relation to stock size and 
conservation. Membership of the EEC also entailed a harmonisation 
of policies towards third countries, and therefore at UNCLOS. In 
general, membership reduced the number of options available to the UK 
Government in the face of domestic and external developments.
The CFP, as embodied in the Treaty of Accession, appeared to the 
inshore fishing industry to be detrimental with few compensating 
advantages. HMG in general, and the Conservative leadership in 
particular, appeared to have demonstrated the low relative value 
which it placed upon inshore fishing. The political costs were 
rapidly apparent. Even if fishermen were of rather insignificant 
numbers, their plight incurred widespread public sympathy in their 
areas of strength. In 1973 a Liberal was elected for the previously 
safe Conservative constituency of Berwick-on-Tweed, corresponding to 
the part of Northumberland excepted from the twelve-mile limit, and 
over the two General Elections of 1974 inshore dissatisfaction was a 
major factor in the capture by the Scottish National Party of six 
coastal parliamentary seats from the Conservatives ^ . Even the 
deep sea industry was not pleased. The guaranteed access to
Norwegian coastal waters which they had expected vanished when the 
Norwegian referendum came out against Community membership.
Accession had two major significant effects on fisheries policy apart 
from those immediately concerning fisheries. Firstly it vastly 
increased the saliency of fisheries issues by associating them with 
an extensive and extra-parliamentary struggle between opponents and 
supporters of UK membership of the Conmon Market.
Secondly, accession to the EEC began a longer term revolution in the 
co-ordination of UK policy, which involved a reduction in the power 
of the FCO relative to other Departments, transforming its role 
towards Western Europe from that of lead department to one of 
co-ordinating positions of other government departments into a UK 
policy, with the effect of subordinating "high" policy to "low" 
policy. A small European Secretariat was established within the 
Cabinet Office.
This corresponds with a Cabinet sub-committee chaired by the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Secretary. The latter represented the UK on the 
Council of Ministers which considers Community external policy and 
topics which do not fit into the separate agendas of a number of 
Technical Councils - for Agriculture, Transport, Finance, etc. Two 
European Cocrmunity Departments were established within the FCO, one 
dealing with internal Community affairs and the other with external 
affairs (the coordination of foreign policy between member states). 
UK representation on each Community institution consisted half of FCO 
personnel and half of representatives of domestic departments, with 
the FCO in overall control. This has resulted in a shift from 
geographical to functional departments within the FCO and, as Wallace
has observed, has weakened the FCO in relation to Western European 
affairs:
"The FCO has, unavoidably, become less and less a 
department dealing with a discrete sector of policy, 
labelled 'foreign', and more and more a coordinating and 
monitoring department representing the political dimension 
of overseas policies which are the primary responsiblity of 
other ministries . . . the FCO has become a coordinating 
department without the sanctions over other departments 
which it would require for effective coordination” 48.
Soon after the Treaty's entry into force, pro-market MPs began to 
stress the potential value to the fishing industry of grants for 
vessel construction from FEOGA, the Community's agency for assistance 
to agriculture. In practice they were little used; by April 1974 
grant applications had been approved for only twenty-four vessels for 
UK fishermen, at a cost to EEC funds of £4.7 million. 
Pro-Marketeers also stressed that the EEC would give the UK a boost 
in fisheries disputes with third parties. On the other hand, 
anti-market MPs found injustice in EEC states being allowed to catch 
fish which might under other arrangements have been caught by British 
vessels, and in EEC regulations which would threaten the autonomy of 
HMG in giving aid to the industry. A Commission restructuring plan 
of early 1974 which sought to reduce Europe's fleet by limiting to 
16-18% the permissible grant by any state for the construction and 
improvement of fishing vessels from 1975 was regarded with much 
suspicion. After mid-1974 it became apparent from developments at 
UNCLOS 3 that an Exclusive Economic Zone would became a general 
global reality fairly soon (see Chapter 13). As a consequence more
MPs began to oppose the CFP as constituted, because dividing the 
North-East Atlantic into 200-mile EEZs would give the UK title to the 
lion's share of the fish in the areas which would come under the 
jurisdiction of the Community. They argued that the UK's large 
contribution to EEC fish stocks should be reflected by reserving a 
large proportion of the catch for UK fishermen.
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SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS WITHIN THE FISHERIES.
The challenge to existing fisheries policy presented by the rise in 
the relative importance to the UK of coastal state factors and by the 
emergence of new external forums like the EEC and UNCLOS 3 were 
accompanied by extensive problems within the fisheries regime. As 
Chapter 2 demonstrates, effective fisheries management requires 
constant monitoring of stock levels in order to determine what yield 
can safely be taken without causing a decline in stocks, and 
authoritative intervention to limit effort to an appropriate level. 
Even within an appropriated fishery this is difficult, since stocks 
fluctuate with changes in recruitment and predation, and since there 
is often a by-catch of a species other than the target one. 
Moreover effort cannot be limited by temporarily taking vessels out 
of a fishery without economic losses to their owners, since capital 
and maintenance costs are incurred even when vessels are laid up. 
Within a Hign Seas fishery success is even less likely, since there 
is no limitation on entry, and fishermen may fish wherever returns 
seem highest provided that their vessel and gear is capable of 
exploiting that fishing ground- The limitation of effort by one 
state or firm will encourage others to increase or maintain effort.
Whereas up to and until the mid-1960s effort and yield had been built 
up almost constantly since the Second World War, from the mid-1960s 
onwards catch limits began to be reached, and recruitment overfishing 
was occurring in almost every stock. The existence of guaranteed 
floors to landing prices ("minimum landing prices") may have slightly 
encouraged over-supply even at such a time of recruitment
overfishing^, while major increases in the costs of fuelling vessels 
from 1974 contributed to economic losses, which in turn led to 
political pressure for subsidies. Since for many North-East 
Atlantic states the fundamental consideration was the maintenance of 
employment in peripneral areas, subsidies were usually forthcoming, 
and so over-capacity was maintained. The situation was less severe 
in the ICNAF area, with fewer states involved and with the USA and 
Canada having no tradition of routine subsidy in peacetime. For the 
UK, this fundamental problem of fisheries management was compounded 
by a rapid build-up of Danish and Norwegian 'industrial' fisheries, 
directed large scale fishing with small mesh nets for reduction to 
fish meal. Industrial fishing destroyed stocks, especially the 
herring at which much of it was directed, angering Scottish 
fishermen, starving the HIB of funds, and directing the attention of 
drifters and seiners to other stocks. This increased the pressure 
on the new target species. The scarcity of stocks undermined the 
unity of the fishing industry behind a national approach, causing 
disagreements between UK fishermen using different types of vessel or 
gear, or from different localities.
Where possible the FCO and MAFF dealt with problems according to 
habitual operating procedures and standard assessments of UK 
interests. Where administrative arrangements had to change, this 
was done as far as possible within the framework of existing 
institutions rather than by creating new ones. These myriad 
problems were therefore tackled by strengthening the rules of the 
NEAFC and ICNAF, an effort which failed since the underlying problems 
had not yet been addressed: those of over-capacity and lack of 
effective management mechanisms appropriate to a common property 
resource of fluctuating size. Fisheries scientists, employees of
the statutory bodies, and many fishermen therefore gradually lost 
their confidence in the fisheries regime.
Over-capacity
Many of the problems resulted fran a serious over-capacity in the 
ccmbined fishing fleets exploiting the North Atlantic. Reviewing 
the period since 1945, scientists at the MAFF Fisheries Research 
Laboratory in Lowestoft have concluded:
"Worldwide, wherever stocks have collapsed or fisheries 
have encountered economic difficulty, excess capacity has 
proved to be either a major cause or a major problem to be
dealt with subsequently, once stringent management has been
2recctrmended"
The concept of fishing capacity can best be explained as ' catching 
ability' . It is not a measure of the size of a fleet, but the
amount of fish which that fleet can catch in a given time. 
Improvements in catching technology can therefore increase capacity 
even if the number and tonnage of a fleet remain constant. A number 
of reasons why overcapacity is almost inevitable in a High Seas 
fishery have already been explored in Chapter 2. The fact that the 
High Seas regime permitted many states to fish a cannon stock 
militated against early action by any state to reduce its cwn 
capacity to a level concomitant with OSY, since reduction by any one 
state would raise the yield per unit effort for others . The 
extreme variation in cohort size for each species of fish requires 
that fishing effort be varied considerably frcm year to year, while 
the large capital investment in modem fishing vessels needs to be
amortised steadily over a number of years. Even for a vessel 
withheld frcm fishing, the depreciation and maintenance costs cire 
considerable. Therefore the adjustment costs to an economy of 
reducing capacity may exceed the amount of subsidy necessary to 
maintain a fleet at its current size In addition, domestic 
political pressure against unemployment may make it difficult for a 
state to reduce its fleet, an action for which there is no incentive 
except in concert with other states.
In addition the 1960s had specific problems which contributed to 
over-capacity. Seme states, notably the USSR and Poland, vastly 
increased their effort in the North Atlantic fisheries. Also in the 
years 1962-7 climatic conditions had been extremely favourable for 
larval survival. This raised stock levels and encouraged 
unrealistic investment in new fishing capacity, either in new vessels 
or in better catching technology. When recruitment fell again, 
there was a reluctance to reduce either capacity or effort 
accordingly. The principal causes of excess capacity, however, were 
political decisions taken in a number of European states in the early 
1960s to place their faith in improved catching technology and more 
efficient vessels as the antidote to financial losses by fishermen. 
Such a solution had been embodied in the Fleck Report of 1961. Its 
philosophy was a recipe for overcapitalisation, and its decisions 
were not rooted parimarily in fisheries science, but in social and 
strategic policy:
"The industry does not play a major role in the national 
econcmy, for it contributes under 1 per cent to the Gross 
National Product. It is relatively more important however 
to the econcmy of Scotland, and it is of considerable local
importance both at the major fishing ports and at a large 
number of inshore ports, many of Which can offer little 
alternative employment; and historically at least the 
fishing fleet has always had a strategic role. Our terms 
of reference require us to consider the size and pattern of 
an economic fishing industry; and for social and possibly 
strategic reasons, as well as for its value as a source of 
first class protein, we have thought it our first duty to 
consider whether the industry cannot be made econom ic at 
the present or even a higher level, and have been reluctant 
to believe that it must seek stability at a lower level of 
production"
The Report's economic recommendations had been implemented by the Sea 
Fish Industry Acrt 1962, with construction and improvement grants 
available for ten years for vessels of all fishing sizes, and with an 
operating subsidy similarly to be eliminated over ten years. It was 
considered that after this period the better catch rates and greater 
fishing/travelling time ratios of the newer vessels together with 
more imaginative marketing would enable the industry to make profits 
once more. Had the UK been the only state pursuing such a stategy 
it might have proved effective, but most of the other states fishing 
the same grounds pursued similar policies, resulting in excess 
capacity. The level of subsidy given by centrally-planned states 
like Poland or the USSR is hard to calculate, but Norway's total aid 
to her fishing industry in 1968 was £45 million compared with £7-8
7million in the UK .
The UK contribution to this general crver-capacity was maintained by a 
variety of government subsidies. The rates of the construction and
improvement grants instituted in 1962 were raised in 1968 in the face 
of deep-sea losses, and lowered again in October 1970 with a return 
of profitability. The political cost of the complete cutting off of 
grants and loans seemed to government Ministers to be too great, and 
by the Sea Fish Industry Act 1973 the ten-year period envisaged by 
Fleck was extended, even though the industry had experienced four 
years of good profits. The manner in which these subsidies were 
totally unrelated bo any considerations of fisheries management is 
illustrated by the fact that in two years the allocated budget ran 
out several months before the end of the financial year, in October 
1970 ® and in December 1973.
If construction and improvement grants encouraged the development of 
excess capacity, operating subsidies maintained it. In the face of 
heavy inports of Scandinavian white fish in 1967-8, the subsidies 
instituted by the Sea Fish Industry Act 1972 were re-adjusted to a 
sliding scale related to profitability, according to which they dried 
up in 1973. There were a number of other minor subsidies to the 
industry. Among these was naval expenditure on charts, maps, and 
fisheries protection, but given that the Fisheries Protection 
Squadron doubled as the Mines Countermeasures Squadron, the full
oexpenditure cannot be attributed to the industry . The cost of the 
fisheries departments and the DAFS fishery cruisers can also be 
viewed as a form of subsidy.
An additional problem was the exclusion of UK vessels frcm the waters 
off the coasts of other states. This, which is dealt with in detail 
in Chapters 10 and 14, exacerbated over-capacity by diverting vessels 
into the remaining uncontrolled fisheries. This provided both 
vessel owners and HMG with the problem that to permit vessels to be
scrapped would weaken any attempt by the UK to return to the fishing 
grounds or to find alternatives. This therefore presented HMG with 
a powerful temptation for yet further subsidies, especially in the 
light of differences of interpretation as to what would happen to the 
access provisions of the CFP in 1982. With the intention of 
maintaining the fleet intact as a bargaining counter pending the 
revision of the CFP or the formulation of an UNCLOS Convention, the 
inccming Labour Government instituted on 27th February 1974 a system 
of daily payments to vessels over forty feet in length. After a 
delay, it also restarted the system of construction and improvement 
grants, albeit with only twenty months' assurance This 
piecemeal system of operating subsidies became the norm, with small 
intervals, until the beginning of 1983, when the size of the UK's 
expected annual catches finally became clear, while construction and 
improvement grants were continued by the EEC1 s FEOGA fran the end of
1975.
The decline of fish stocks
This over-capacity, repeated in many other states, resulted in the 
collapse or catastrophic decline of almost every fish stock in the 
North-Eastern Atlantic. With the fundamental problem not 
susceptible to solution within a High Seas fishery, MAFF reacted with 
attempts to strengthen Fisheries Catmission regulations. Apart frcm 
the proved efficacy of the NEAFC in eradicating growth overfishing in 
directed fishing, incrementalism and the terms of reference granted 
to most individual MAFF officials led them to try to improve existing 
machinery rather than to press for institutional innovation, which 
anyway might threaten the UK's high policy positions. MAFF opinion 
considered that extensions of coastal state jurisdiction were
incompatible with regional conservation regimes, and implied 
single-state regimes. Officials felt strongly that in order to be 
effective conservation regulations should be scientific and 
practical, and that fish are no respecters of man-made boundaries, 
with the result that no single state regime could conserve stocks. 
The NEAFC appeared to be a rational development frcm the ICES, and so 
appeared to be the best basis for effecting conservation in a 
scientific manner.
The PCO's support of the NEAFC was of course less the result of 
fisheries issues than of the obsession with the maintenance of the 
High Seas. Its firm faith in the continuation and strengthening of 
regional Fisheries Ccmnissions was clearly expressed at the SBC's 
Sub-Ccrmittee 2. In reply to Icelandic statements about forthcoming 
extensions of jurisdiction to protect fish stocks close to her 
shores, UK representatives stated that the most sensible mode of 
effecting conservation was by regional management schemes. Where 
such schemes appeared to have been ineffective they should be 
strengthened ^ . The UK expressed its suppport for 
A/AC.138/SCII/L4, by which regional or international fisheries
organisations would determine MSY (equivalent to OSY) and regulate
12fishing accordingly
The overfishing was largely recruitment overfishing, but despite the 
fact that the NEAPC1 s best-developed conservation tool was the 
increase of permitted mesh sizes there was also a severe problem of 
growth overfishing resulting from a by-catch of larger species than 
the target one. A large proportion of ensnared undersized fish die, 
even if returned to the sea immediately. There was also same 
evidence that in high-volume pelagic fisheries the mesh size approach
does not prevent small fish being trapped in the cod end by the crush 
of other fish. Much of the by-catch was as a result of industrial 
fishing (see below), but small mesh fishing for nephrops (scampi) was 
also a major problem. Thus the Irish Sea whiting stock came under 
serious threat, and by the mid-1970s the equivalent of annual 
recruitment figures was being caught and discarded at sea by Northern 
Irish nephrops fishermen alone ^ .
That recruitment overfishing should occur was inherent in an 
unmanaged fishery. Years of Fleck-style increases in technology and 
therefore capacity had been cushioned by the favourable climatic 
conditions of the mid-1960s; with the return of smaller year classes 
of cod, haddock and plaice from 1970 onwards it became obvious that 
the productivity of the North Eastern Atlantic would decline, as was 
predicted in an OECD report of that year. The fisheries departments 
reacted bo these developments by proposing successfully in May 1970 
that the right and duty of the NEAFC to limit effort and catch where 
appropriate be introduced into the Ccnmission1 s Treaty. The NEAFC 
annual meeting was to set a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) according to 
ICES reccrrmendations. Fran its inception this innovation appeared 
unlikely to succeed. The consent of all but three of the members 
was required for any initiative to be adopted, which put states who 
were less concerned about overfishing at an advantage, in that their 
canpliance had to be ensured.
Pressure from member states unwilling to write off substantial 
investment in fishing fleets meant that Total Allowable Catches 
(TACs) set by NEAFC were substantially higher than those recatmended 
by ICES. Catches were therefore above OSY, and even though ICES 
recamended lower TACs each year, stocks continued to decline.
These inflated TACs were, in the event, almost invariably exceeded. 
For those ICES stocks, like North Sea haddock, exploited by a number 
of states, there occurred in each new season a race between fishermen 
to catch as large a share of the TAC as possible. The TAC was 
generally slightly exceeded in the confusion, and during the 
remainder of each year a by-catch further depleted the stock. A 
proportion of each TAC had to be allocated to by-catches, and as no 
TAC was set for sane of the smaller 'trash* species, like sprats or 
sandeels, by-catches remained high.
MAFF therefore favoured reducing the free-for-all by the division of
each TAC into state quotas. The UK took the lead in this
development, which was easier to obtain in ICNAF than in the NEAFC,
given the lcwer number of states involved and their greater
experience of international fisheries management. MAFF had high
hopes that quotas would curb overfishing; when ICNAF introduced
state quotas for threatened fish stocks with effect frcrn 1st January
1973, Stodart (C - Edinburgh W), Parliamentary Secretary to AFF, told
the Cannons: "It is the first large-scale use of this highly
effective form of conservation, and Her Majesty's Government welcomes 
14it" . By 1974 there were quotas for all stocks in the ICNAF area, 
which by diverting fishing effort into the North-Eastern Atlantic, 
increased the pressure on the NEAFC to act likewise.
NEAPC quotas, when they came frcm November 1974, proved ineffective 
in halting the decline in stocks. It proved even more difficult to 
formulate quotas than to agree on TACs, because with declining stocks 
it had to be agreed on which states the reductions in catch should 
fall most heavily, and on what criteria such a decision should be 
made. The criteria eventually decided upon for the allocation of
quotas were recent historical catches: thus those most responsible 
for overfishing were rewarded, notably the industrial fishing states, 
which were allocated large herring quotas. Quotas eased the 
free-for-all pursuit of a share of TAC by replacing competition 
between fishermen of many states by competition between fishermen of 
the same state. The helplessness of the Ccrtmission in the face of 
state intransigence remained, and quotas exacerbated the problem of 
NEAPC TACs' exceeding ICES recaimendations. Whereas with a reducing 
TAC the state with the largest capacity can at least satisfy itself 
with the knowledge that its vessels are likely to obtain the biggest 
share of that TAC, with quotas the actual distribution of catch is 
shifted into the political arena. Thus an extremely acrimonious 
argument developed between the UK and Denmark over herring, as the UK 
argued that a catastrophic decline in stocks was principally because 
of Danish industrial fishing, and that Danish quotas should be 
slashed much more vigorously than those of other states. MAFF also 
successfully argued at the 1974 meeting of the NEAFC for another 
innovation, closed seasons, initially for North Sea herring. Like 
quotas and TACs, this development encouraged vessel owners both to 
invest in catching technology which could achieve a high catch over a 
short period, and to divert their attention to other stocks during 
the closed seasons.
The NEAFC innovations were insufficient to safeguard stocks. They 
did nothing to address the problem of over-capacity, and indeed by 
rewarding those vessels which could catch great numbers of fish in a 
short time, may have exacerbated it. Also, given that seasons for 
different stocks differ, vessels were encouraged to exhaust the quota 
on one stock and then to assault another. Of course not all vessels 
were sufficiently versatile to do this economically, notably the
larger trawlers, but purse seiners were ideal. TACs invariably 
exceeded ICES reccrrmendations, and for most stocks catches far 
exceeded OSY, and most producers suffered economic losses. Another 
problem lay in the fact that both quotas and TACs referred to 
landings rather than catch. An honest fisherman, finding in his 
nets fish of a species for which his country's quota was exhausted, 
would throw them back, and a large proportion would die from shock or 
injuries sustained in the net. A less honest fisherman could 
indulge in ' klondyking1 , selling then at sea to a vessel frcm another 
state, notably Soviet or Bulgarian factory ships, and, if he wished, 
understate his catch. As a result of all these deficiencies most 
stocks of fish continued to decline.
One example of how ineffective NEAFC controls were in practice can be 
observed in the North-East Arctic. Heavy fishing of cod in 1968-70 
and a wastefully large codling catch in 1973-4 convinced Norway that 
mesh sizes must be increased and a quota introduced. In March 1974 
the USSR, UK and Norway agreed upon a trilateral catch of 500,000 
tonnes The NEAPC meeting of November endorsed this, adding a 
quota of 50,000 tonnes for other states, making a TAC of 550,000 
tonnes, but ignored mesh size. The USSR became convinced that 
stocks were more numerous than the NEAPC estimate, and withdrew frcm 
the agreement. That year, one million tonnes of cod were taken frcm 
the stock. Frcm then on Soviet vessels continued to ignore both 
quotas and TACs for NE Arctic cod and haddock, and the 1976 haddock 
catch exceeded TAC by 37 per cent.
The inability of the NEAFC to protect stocks, let alone rebuild them, 
was clear. The North Sea herring spawning stock declined fran two 
and one half million tonnes in 1953 to 250,000 tonnes in 1975
The West of Scotland hake fishery, once Fleetwood1 s mainstay, had 237
collapsed in the mid-1960s. Sane flatfish stocks were also in 
decline in the face of high catches by Dutch beam trawlers and 
others, for instance the North Sea sole stock declined almost 
continuously frcm 100,000 tonnes in 1966 to 39,700 in 1978
These failures, and others like then, weakened the faith of both 
fishermen and fisheries scientists in the NEAFC regime, and led many 
of them to move towards support for appropriated fisheries .
Industrial Fishing
The NEAPC' s failure was partly attributable to the massive demands of 
industrial fisheries. Much of the considerable increase in
aggregate catch over which the Ccrnnission had presided during the 
1950s and 1960s was attributable to 1 industrial1 fishing directed at 
shoaling species for reduction to fish meal (see Figure 9.1). In
1950 29,000 tonnes of fish, or two per cent of the total North Sea 
catch, was taken for industrial purposes. By 1960 industrial
landings had grown to 357,000 tonnes and 23 per cent of the total,
and by 1974 2.1 million tonnes of fish (66 per cent of North Sea
landings) were caught for industrial purposes
Directed industrial fishing in the North Sea has largely been 
undertaken by the Danes and Norwegians. The Moume herring stock, 
West of the Isle of Man and supporting an expanding food fishery 
based on County Down, was subjected to directed industrial fishing by 
vessels fran Ireland. Directed industrial fishing by UK fishermen 
was miniscule, although damaged fish, and herring failing to attain 
the minimun landed price had since the 1950s been reduced by the 














238Figure 9.1; Industrial fisheries in the North Sea 20.
A. Total catch and the Danish catch, 1950-74.
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industrial fishing for Norway pout by British vessels as a means of 
alleviating the plight of herring fishermen whose catches were 
declining. DAFS undertook a study to this effect in late 1970, but, 
finding that such a fishery would involve a high and unavoidable 
by-catch of the juvenile haddock and whiting located on the same 
grounds as the adult pout, gave no support to the idea. A White 
Fish Authority experiment on directed pout fishing produced a catch 
of which only 44 per cent was pout. Industrial landings in the UK
in 1973 thus totalled only 36,000 tonnes valued at £1,082,000, of
21which only 21,000 tonnes was taken by British vessels
In general, the inshore fishermen of Scotland regarded industrial
22fishing as immoral and repugnant . In response to the DAFS study, 
there was an immediate deluge of complaints from fishermen's 
organisations. The Herring Industry Board and the Scottish Trawlers 
Federation also protested to the Secretary of State, and urged the 
severe limitation of the practice. This opposition was not merely 
based upon a sentiment that fishing for human consumption was more 
honourable than fishing for animal consumption, industrial fishing 
was in itself highly deleterious to stock conservation, for a variety 
of reasons. By 1970 directed industrial fishing was undertaken by 
highly specialised vessels vnth snail mesh nets and onboard 
facilities for partial reduction. The use of fine mesh nets was 
made possible by the fact that it did not matter to the industrial 
fishermen what species was taken. All that was important was that 
fish stocks were dense. Hence the first directed intensive
industrial fishery was the Bloden fishery, based on the nursery of 
the North Sea herring, and thus concentrating on juvenile fish. 
Although frcm 1970 onwards the rising price of herring, informal 
complaints from DAFS, and the development of fisheries for Norway
pout, sprats and sand-eels led to a decline in directed industrial 
fishing for herring, the by-catch remained a very serious problem. 
The small size of sprats and sand-eels, the principal factor which 
made than trash species, meant that the mesh intended for them would 
ensnare almost all "protected" species. Only the Southern North Sea 
sand-eel stock was fairly distinct in range fran stocks of other 
species; in every other industrial fishery it was almost impossible 
to avoid catching food fish. Directed industrial fishing for 
herring and the large by-catch of protected species meant that sixty 
per cent of the industrial catch of 1970 consisted of species 
habitually used for food (see Figure 9.2).
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The fisheries departments reacted, predictably, by taking the issue 
to the NEAFC, and achieved sane success. At its 1970 meeting, the 
Catmission introduced rules limiting the proportion of protected 
species in an industrial catch to twenty-five per cent by weight, of
which forty per cent could be undersized individuals. As undersized 
fish weigh less than adults, the ten per cent of the total catch 
consisting of juveniles of protected species still represented a 
massive loss to the food fisheries.
These rules arguably met with seme success, in that the proportion of 
protected species in the North Sea industrial catch declined fran 
60.8% in 1970 to 23.1% in 1974 (see Figure 9.2). However, this 
improvement was more due to the collapse of the herring stock, than 
to a shift of industrial fishing effort to stocks less mingled with 
protected species, like the Norway pout stock in the mid-North Sea 
and the Southern sand-eel stock. Seme of the apparent decline in 
the proportion of protected species was probably a result of 
under-reporting by industrial fishermen. There was little to stop 
this since the speed of onboard reduction to "grey liquid cement" ^ 
made verification very difficult, and enforcement was still a flag 
state responsibility.
Be that as it may, the fisheries departments tried again, and at the
NEAPC meeting of May 1974 reccrmended the reduction in the permitted
by-catch of undersized protected species frem 10 to 5 per cent by 
25weight . By that year the threat to herring stocks had become so 
serious that any attempt to conserve them without reducing the 
industrial catch would have been ludicrous. The Danes and 
Norwegians offered to the NEAPC alternative evidence to that of the 
ICES, and the matter was shelved for a year, pending the results of 
studies on the feasibility of by-catch limitations. The foliowring 
year, half of tile TAC for North Sea herring had to be allocated for 
industrial by-catches alone1
The NEAFC had therefore failed to make further progress against 
industrial fishing, despite its catastrophic effect on stocks. In 
addition to destroying the once massive stock of herring, largely by 
directed fishing, the vast size of the industrial catch meant that 
the by-catch of almost every protected species depressed the yield of 
the food fisheries. By moving to smaller target fish like sand-eels 
and sprats, which tended to increase in numbers as their predators' 
stocks were fished out, industriad, fishing had effectively made 
nonsense of the carefully-formulated NEAFC rules on mesh size. 
Apart frcm its biological effect, its purpose and methods imparted a 
messianic fervour to opposition among Scottish drifters and purse 
seiners to a narrow fisheries limits regime. It thus in large part 
contributed to SNP electoral victories in the principal Scottish 
herring ports in the two General Elections of 1974. It also 
resulted in North-East Scotland1s purse seiners1 being diverted to 
West of Scotland herring and South-Western mackerel, with a knock-on 
effect as those habitually exploiting the new targets became 
dissatisfied. Herring drifters began to press more vigorously for 
the legal right to drift for salmon, with little success, but many 
began to participate in illegal drifting.
Disagreem ent o ver fish in g  methods
New rivalries as fishermen competed for less plentiful stocks 
resulted in a mounting series of accusations that particular types of 
fishing gear were damaging to fish stocks and demands that their use 
should be restricted. Many inshore MPs and even MAFF dabbled with 
compliance, especially after UK accession to the EEC, because de 
facto discriminatory gear restrictions offered a possible means by 
vhich UK fishermen could reduce competition frcm fishermen of other
member states without the UK's leaving the Ccnmunity. Where such 
restrictions were successful, they brought the UK into conflict 
within EEC institutions with the victims' states, and where 
unsuccessful, they led the frustrated inshore fishermen towards 
political pressure for vigorous action by HMG to revise the CFP.
Two sets of accusations were levelled at particular types of fishing 
gear. The first, levelled at purse seines and at monofilament nets, 
was that they were injurious to the undersized fish who were intended 
to escape the net. The second was that certain methods of bottom 
trawling were damaging to flatfish and shellfish. This was not a 
new argument: trawling had been banned within the Scottish 
three-mile limit for a century. MAFF's responses were generally 
more political than scientific. Where a type of gear was an 
innovation and where the conservationist argument for its prohibition 
was clear, MAFF could move quickly. Thus a shift by sane fishermen 
to nylon monofilament nets was quickly squashed by MAFF in 1970. 
Where prohibition of a method of fishing would involve great capital 
loss to a well-established section of the UK fishing industry, 
however, little was done. Thus, despite repeated years of 
representations frctn the Herring Industry Board fran 1971, no serious 
attempt was made by fisheries departments or a single MP to obtain 
the banning of purse seining. Similarly, MAFF swiftly complied with 
requests for the banning of double-beam trawling because this method 
was not used by British fishermen. Many fishermen concerned with 
bottcm-living species such as flatfish and shellfish claimed that the 
beams used to hold the trawl net open damaged species with which they 
came into contact.
In March 1971 the Milford Haven Trawler Owners' Association submitted
a paper to MAFF and the Welsh Office linking the depletion of sole 
stocks with heavy incursions by twin-beamers from Belgium and 
Holland . While most of the sole off Pembrokeshire were harvested 
beyond the twelve-mile limit, the paper raised the probability of 
between fifty and one hundred of these vessels ccntnencing work within 
Morecanbe Bay, most of which lay within that limit. After 
consultation, MAFF responded on 9th February 1972 with an order 
forbidding fishing within the twelve-mile limit of England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland by beam trawlers whose beam or beams had a total 
length of eight metres or more . DAFS did not act likewise since 
Scottish waters are generally too cold for flatfish. The effect of 
this order was to ban double-beam trawling within twelve miles, 
because single-beam trawlers rarely have such large beams.
Single-beam trawling was a far more difficult issue because such 
trawlers made up the bulk of the Brixham fleet. Fran the first 
representations that single-beam trawling be banned, MAFF spokesmen 
countered that there was no evidence that the method had a damaging 
effect on sedentary species . During 1972 and 1973 many coastal 
Conservative MPs pressed for a ban. An ICES Report to NEAPC in May 
1973 concluded that the decline in flatfish stocks was attributable 
to overfishing in general rather than beam trawling in particular. 
Despite this Report, at the beginning of 1974, with a General 
Election pending, Stodart announced that the Government intended to 
introduce a ban . The change of government prevented this ban s 
implementation, but the issue became a partisan one as previously 
unenthusiastic Conservative front-bench spokesmen such as Prior and 
Buchanan-Smith (C - Angus N and Meams) spoke confidently in favour 
of a ban. After a further study MAFF concluded in October 1975 
"that beam trawling, while an efficient method of fishing, is no more
30 Indamaging to the sea-bed than conventional trawling gear" 
many ways these attempts to ban particular types of gear constituted 
an effort to ignore the underlying political and econcmic problems 
with the fisheries regime, and their lack of success served to 
concentrate attention upon the need for a revision of the CFP.
Economic Problems
Overcapacity and the decline in stocks meant that econcmic losses, 
contrary to the Fleck expectation, became almost endemic. Only frcm 
1969 to the OPEC oil price rise in early 1974 were all sections of 
the industry making good profits, and there was even an 8% gain in 
total anployment in fisheries frcxn 1970 to 1973. There were a
number of other reasons for losses. One was the low price 
elasticity of demand for fish. Despite publicity drives by the WFA 
and new developments in storage and packaging pioneered by the Torry 
Research Station, total consumer demand for fish fell slightly but 
steadily. Although demand for seme luxury species, notably 
nephrops, expanded considerably, this was more than offset by a 
decline in the mass market for white fish, especially wet (unfrozen) 
fish. Prices fluctuated widely in response to variations in supply, 
since fresh fish has to be sold quickly, but lew prices created 
little extra demand. The relative price inelasticity of wholesale 
demand for fish combined with a high fixed cost of processing and
distribution, to ensure that the sltrnp in landed prices was not
31proportionately reflected in a lewering of the retail price
Secondly there were extreme seasonal variations in supply. The 
quantity of newly-landed fish available on the UK market is partly a 
function of the favourability of climatic conditions and of fish
migration patterns, as well as of the level of foreign and domestic 
subsidies to fishermen, and so varies greatly from month to month. 
The operators of freezer trawlers are less affected by such price 
fluctuations than wet fishers, since onboard freezing enables a 
highly perishable ccmnodity to be stored and retailed at a steady 
rate, independent of seasonal fluctuations in catches.
Customary seasonal fluctuations in supply were exacerbated from 1970
by the introduction of Total Allowable Catches. The resultant rush
by fishermen to catch as early as possible in each year as large a
share as possible of the unrealistically high TACs recaimended by the
NEAFC increased seasonal differences in supply and contributed to
fluctuating prices. When from November 1974 national quotas were
introduced, the battle for catches became one between vessels frcm
the same state. The total effect of all this was most unsettling.
For instance, in March and April 1975 the wholesale price of fish
added 23.8%, having lost 25.5% in January and February. Similarly,
the average price for a kit (140 lb) of cod fell frcm £28.50 in
January 1974 to less than £12 in May ^ . This meant that the
earnings per trip of the average Hull fresher fell by over £10,000 in
four months . The White Fish Authority reacted to such problems
by using its reserve price system, and by buying fish into store.
To an extent this practice may have steadied prices by creating a
buffer stock, but it also encouraged foreign fishing vessels to land
their fish in a port whose reserve price was high, further increasing 
34oversupply .
The economic position of the industry was also weakened by an uneven 
flew of imports. During this period most of the UK1 s NEAFC partners
were labouring under the same regime as the UK industry, so there was
no state whose vessels consistently attained a higher catch rate per 
unit effort. Norway and Iceland were able successfully to export 
frozen fish to the UK, however, for a number of reasons. The first 
was their proximity to fish stocks. Since most white fish 
concentrations were towards the North of the NEAFC area, they could 
be obtained by Scandinavian fishermen with less travelling time than 
the UK fleet would require. In addition exchange rates and 
differential rates of subsidy sometimes permitted UK prices to be 
undercut. Prices for a particular species obviously varied between 
countries according to consumer tastes, and changes in support prices 
also affected trade. Since Britain constituted the principal 
European market for white fish it received much of the white fish 
caught by vessels of other states. In addition, Norway's extensive 
subsidies to her fishing industry gave her exports an advantage. To 
these considerations was added another, once UK trawlers began to be 
excluded frcrn Iceland. In the period before capacity had been 
increased to compensate for the excluded trawlers, Icelandic vessels 
enjoyed an appropriated fishery with a relatively lew fishing 
capacity, and thus high yields. Poland and the USSR, when in need 
of foreign exchange, also exported fish very cheaply to the West.
HMG's favoured means of damping down imports was tariffs. Inports 
of frozen fish, mostly frem Norway, heavily depressed landed prices 
during 1967 and 1968, and the white fish fleet was suffering 
considerable losses. Fishing port MPs argued that the high level of 
Norwegian subsidy and a devaluation of the Icelandic currency 
amounted to unfair trading H. Hughes (Lab - Aberdeen N to 
1970) called for a separate Ministry of Fisheries to deal with 
"foreign competition" The position of Norway as an ETTA partner 
made unilateral action by the UK difficult, but after an unsuccessful
attempt to obtain voluntary quotas from the exporters, HMG extended a 
ten per cent ad valoran duty on wet fish fran ETTA states to apply to 
frozen fillets. Subsequent negotiations within the ETTA framework 
replaced the duty with a system of minimum export prices, a system 
whose efficiency increased when Iceland acceded to ETTA in the 
following year.
Imports did not again beccme a problem until 1975, when a glut of 
fish in store was depressing landed prices. March 1975 was the 
month of peak activity. Since this corresponded with a period of 
vigorous internal debate as to the wisdom of continued UK membership 
of the Cannon Market, this issue was exploited, with seme
Conservative MPs calling for import controls to be applied against 
37non-EEC members . . The French Government exacerbated matters by
imposing such a ban, provoking fears that non-EEC inports might be
diverted to the UK market. Anti-Cannon Market MPs, on the other
38hand, called for a ban on imports frcm EEC states . The plight of 
the fishermen was thus being used as a weapon to make statements 
about the effects of UK accession to the EEC. MAFF believed that 
over-supply was temporary, owing to the condition of fish stocks and 
probable loss-induced falls in capacity, and was anxious not to 
provoke further retaliation by Norway and Iceland against the 
distant-water fleet, so it did not favour import controls. While 
striving to reduce the over-supply to the UK market by voluntary 
agreements with Norway and within the EEC on minimum import prices 
for cod and haddock, it took action to divert the surplus into 
industrial uses by raising the reserve price. These actions were 
largely effective, and Spring 1975 saw a recovery in fish prices.
To all this was added the OPEC oil price increase. Oil prices
increased sharply in the early months of 1974, in the wake of the Ycm 
Kippur War of October and November 1973. Within the space of a few 
months, £20 million per annum was added to the industry's fuel costs. 
For ports whose fishing grounds were already threatened by 
overfishing or foreign competition this was a disaster. The once 
prosperous port of Milford Haven had been declining for years as a 
result of Dutch and Belgian fishing for plaice on the Celtic Sea 
banks, and the oil price rise was a further blew. Fleetwood, whose 
traditional hake grounds off the West of Scotland were now shared 
with Spanish and Portuguese boats, Buckie, beset by overfishing of
herring, and Brixham, hard hit by a decline in plaice and sole
39stocks, all suffered particularly . There was heavy pressure from 
opposition MPs for fuel subsidies ^ . The Government had agreed 
with its OECD partners, however, that it would be preferable to 
permit the oil price increases to work their way through the economic 
system. This would prevent the massive economic distortion which 
would be occasioned by selective subsidies, encourage conservation 
and the further development of alternative fuel sources, and 
externalise seme of the UK's additional fuel costs through higher 
export prices. In the year beginning 1st May 1974, at a time of 
mounting stores of frozen fish, the real earnings of the inshore 
white fish fleet fell by thirty-nine par cent and of the herring 
fleet by fifty-four per cent 41. The result of these losses was an 
unprecedented level of political activity by fishermen, especially 
during 1974 to 1976, the period of maximum losses. Frcm then until 
the end of the period under review there was a steady loss of both 
vessels and jobs (see Figures 12.1 and 3.2), and the repeated 
introduction of short-term operating subsidies, especially to vessels 
over forty feet in length.
Conclusion
The High Seas fisheries regime tempered by regional intergovernmental 
activity had revealed, by the mid-1970s, the shortcomings implicit 
within it, especially when combined with a view of the domestic 
aspects of fisheries policy as primarily a branch of regional policy. 
By 1975 the UK trawler and seiner fleet was in a position of chronic 
economic losses which were only partly alleviated by repeated 
operating subsidies to maintain UK capacity as a bargaining counter 
pending settlement. The NEAPC had shown itself capable of 
innovation, but not to a sufficient extent to protect the herring or 
to render insignificant the industrial by-catches of protected 
species. Despite the Catmission1s ostensible basis in fisheries 
science, moreover, it proved unable to act in accordance with ICES 
recarmendations.
Although these shortcomings undermined the confidence of government 
officials and MPs in the regime, they did not in themselves argue for 
an appropriated fishery. There was overall over-capacity, and there 
would have to be extensive fleet reductions. For many fishermen, 
unilateral UK extensions of jurisdiction became the preferred 
formula, in the hope of concentrating these capacity reductions on 
the citizens of other states, but these in themselves would not have 
solved the problem that many fish found close to UK shores as adults 
spend their juvenile stage in the Eastern North Sea.
The real significance of these developments is that they caused at 
all levels a loss of confidence in the NEAFC, and a willingness among 
fishermen and MAFF officials to support unilateral conservation 
measures by the UK. It had become clear to the officials, though
not to fishermen, that no further fudging of the need to trim effort 
to a level appropriate to a sustainable yield could be afforded, and 
that there would have to be capacity reductions. There would have 
to be an authoritative intergovernmental or international body to 
effect these aims. The stage was therefore set for MAFF 
acquiescence to new roles being accorded to the European Caimission 
and the Council of Ministers. British inshore fishermen had become 
so dissatisfied with fisheries policy in general, however, that they 
could only be expected to accept an increased role for Ccmunity 
institutions if the access provisions of the CFP were substantially 
revised in the UK interest. Long-term dissatisfaction had developed 
among inshore fishermen. On the part of states with a greater 
relative dependence on fishing than the UK, such as Iceland, the 
collapse of stocks brought about attempts to revise the international 
fisheries regime frcm one of ccntnon property to one of state 
property, an aspect dealt with fully in Chapter 10.
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CHAPTER 10
THE DOSS OF ACCESS TO DISTANT-WATER AND MIDDLE-WATER FISHING GROUNDS
Continued fishing industry support of the High Seas fishery regime 
was threatened not only by the NEAFC's ineffectiveness in stock 
conservation but also by the gradual diminution of the relative 
importance of distant-water fishing grounds to the UK as coastal 
states reacted to declining stocks by attempting to reduce the level 
of foreign catch off their shores.
This progressive loss of access contributed to very considerable 
reductions in UK catch, especially of demersal fish (see Figure 
10.1). It diverted British deep sea trawlers into uncontrolled 
grounds, exacerbating overcapacity. It hit employment levels among 
fishermen and ancillary workers in the deep sea ports and made it 
imperative that new grounds be found for as many of the displaced 
vessels as possible to minimise restructuring. Extensive new 
grounds could only be acquired by a massive extension of British 
fisheries limits (with the potential for re-entering waters from 
which UK vessels had been excluded by means of swap arrangements with 
other states), and such an extension would only be able to provide 
grounds for displaced vessels if the Coimton Fisheries Policy could be 
revised so as to reduce the access rights of other Community states 
within the new limits. The loss of access thus both reduced the 
size and influence of the deep sea fleet and undermined its 
confidence in the narrow limits policy. In reducing the English and 
Welsh catch, it raised the relative importance of the Scottish fleet 
within the UK industry.
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The position of the United Kingdom
There were four principal territories off whose shores UK vessels 
were active to any great extent: Iceland, the Faroes, Canada and 
Norway. The fish stocks off their shores were by 1970 mostly 
suffering from recruitment overfishing. A 1969 study by MAFF's 
Lowestoft Laboratory forecast declines in yield per unit effort of 
between forty per cent and eighty per cent from 1965 to 1975 for all
the UK's distant-water grounds, assuming no jurisdictional changes or
2catch limitation agreements . There was thus good reason for these 
coastal states to wish to reduce the foreign catch off their shores, 
and each of them signalled to the UK their desire to do so.
The FCO, as usual, acted as the lead Department, and conducted the 
British case. FCO legal advisers sought consistency in UK positions 
over all aspects of UK transgovernmental and intergovernmental 
contacts, and the structure of co-ordination within the FCO helped 
them to define the problem. The same Under-Secretary oversaw both 
the UN department and the Defence department of the FCO. The strong 
concern of the defence establishment for the freedom of navigation 
was thus structurally transmitted to the FCO officials at UNCLOS 3. 
Similarly, a single desk officer in the FCO's Western European 
department oversaw British relations with Denmark (and therefore 
Greenland and the Faroes), Norway and Iceland. The FCO thus
attempted to ensure that the agreements with the various states were 
legally consistent with one another.
The negotiations were initially handled by low level FCO officials, 
with MAFF officials and scientific and legal staff as advisors. 
There were some bilateral meetings of fisheries officials, but these
were conducted under FCO tutelage. The FCO was naturally unwilling 
to concede extensions of coastal state jurisdiction in contravention 
of the High Seas and territorial sea regimes confirmed at Geneva in 
1958. Such extensions might create a customary law of the sea which 
could be used by other states to bring strategically vital straits 
under coastal state control without any right of transit passage. 
Extensions outside the UNCLOS framework would also undermine the 
"package deal" which the FCO hoped UNCLOS 3 would produce. 
International customary law requires an undefined number of 
sufficiently important states successfully to assert a principle in 
order for it to become law. It was therefore vital to FCO planners 
for the UK to avoid taking action which would involve UK recognition 
of any modification of the High Seas status of waters beyond the 
territorial sea, since this might lead to wide limits to coastal 
state jurisdiction becoming customary law in advance of a Convention. 
Coastal state extensions of fisheries jurisdiction was one issue on 
which the FCO might make concessions at UNCLOS 3 in order to gain 
guarantees for navigation and for global rather than state rules on 
vessel construction, and it was essential to the FCO that change be 
contained within the framework of the Conference. The FCO was 
determined not to be deprived of this bargaining counter by default. 
It was very willing to endorse conservation agreements, and to 
concede a reserved share of the catch beyond the territorial sea for 
states peculiarly dependent upon fishing, because such provisions 
were in accordance with the Geneva Conventions . Essentially, 
however, it had to assert the UK's sole theoretical right to 
determine where British citizens could fish beyond contiguous zones. 
The FCO was also anxious to prevent any linkage between the 
continental shelf and the water column, because of the argument of 
some coastal states, in particular Iceland, that coastal fisheries
were resources of the shelf.
The consensus mode of procedure had neutralised the superior voting 
power of the non-shipowning states, and so the UK had little to fear 
from UNCIOS 3, and every reason to wish to prevent extensions outside 
the Conference, even at the risk of concessions. If states could 
appreciate the PCO's position, amicable solutions involving a 
significant loss of UK catch could be formulated. The wording of 
the agreements was all-important. The Faroes, Canada and Norway 
were happy to accept catch reductions without legal concessions by 
the UK: Iceland was not. The FCO co-opted the deep sea industry 
and MAFF behind its high policy concerns, but eventually had to 
accept a higher loss of catch than it had turned down earlier in the 
dispute: due to Iceland's threats to leave NATO, whose maintenance 
was also a central high policy goal of the FCO.
The positions of the coastal states and territory
Iceland
Although the deep sea fleet had a number of habitual grounds, British 
effort at each varied with MAFF estimates of catch prospects (see 
Figures 10.3, 10.4 and 10.5), making it hard for the coastal 
fishermen to plan their activities. A MAFF study in 1969 forecast 
that Iceland would experience the slowest decline of the UK's 
distant-water fishing grounds, information which triggered off a 
doubling of annual UK effort off Iceland between 1969 and 1971 (see 
Figure 10.4). Whereas most of the exclusions were achieved by 
negotiation between the littoral state and the UK, in the case of 
Iceland the process of catch reduction resulted in animosity and
confrontation between the parties. The unique aspect of the 
Icelandic issue is that in all other waters the coastal state was 
willing and able to reach an agreement that was, however tenuously, 
within the spirit of the Geneva Conventions and did not prejudice the 
position of the UK at the on-going international negotiations. In 
the case of Iceland, effecting a reduction in the UK catch was only 
one of the Icelandic government's goals, the issue of jurisdiction 
being for historical reasons a vital one, and one on which a 
concession would be regarded by the Icelandic public as a defeat.
Rapid and sizeable shifts in fishing effort were unacceptable to a 
state like Iceland: her economy depended largely on fisheries (with 
80 per cent by value of her exports being fish or fish products), 16 
per cent of her working population were employed in fishing, 
processing and distributing the catch in 1971; and few means of 
raising living standards or exports other than increasing the Iceland 
catch. Her government had powerful domestic constraints which urged 
it to take a tough line in excluding foreign fishermen. During the 
period 1971-3, when the UK and Iceland were in dispute, the 
government was a left-wing coalition of the Progressive Party and the 
People's Union, and the rivalry between the coalition partners 
reduced the flexibility open to Icelandic negotiators.
The assertion of legal jurisdiction over the fisheries was a firm 
national goal of many Icelanders. Historically and geographically 
the fish resources were Iceland's; without them the island would 
have had few export opportunities. The three-mile limit had been 
imposed on Iceland in 1901 by agreement between the UK and the Danish 
Government who then held sway over the island, and to reverse this 
'betrayal' had been one of the firmest elements of Icelandic policies
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since complete independence in 1944. Fisheries were, in the words 
of an Icelandic Minister in 1951, the "conditio sine qua non of the 
survival of the Icelandic people, for without than the country would 
not be habitable." The "real High Seas" were "the waters beyond the 
continental shelf" ^ . A Treaty embodying a clause giving Iceland 
jurisdiction over a broad band of fishery resources was therefore as 
important to Icelandic Ministers as was the prevention of such a 
clause to their UK counterparts. It was also an issue on which 
Icelandic public opinion felt strongly, whereas the PCO1 s 
narrow-limit views, however well thought out, provoked only 
indifference from the UK public.
Ccmnitment to the struggle thus ran much more deeply through the 
Icelandic people than through their UK counterparts. Catch 
limitations were not enough, and an Icelandic government policy 
statement issued in July 1971, expressing the intention to extend 
Icelandic fisheries limits to fifty miles no later than 1st September 
1972 specifically linked fisheries and the continental shelf. Such 
a link had been recognized in Icelandic Law since 1948; a law of 
that year empowered the government to issue regulations extending 
fisheries limits over the shelf, with no requirement for the Althing 
to legislate. Icelandic writers had argued for many years that the 
wealth of Icelandic fish stocks resulted frcm the high primary food 
production of the shallow waters above the island's continental 
shelf. Ecologically the argument was incontrovertible, the more so 
because demersal fish do not feed in deep water. The linkage 
between the continental shelf and the water column was something that 
the FCO especially wished to avoid, however, because the difficulty 
of defining the shelf and the tremendous variation of its width in 
various parts of the world could lead to a chaotic situation as
Iceland had few international constraints encouraging her towards 
compromise. She was a member of NATO, but had only joined after 
considerable domestic debate and acrimony, and a substantial 
proportion of Icelanders, including the People's Union, remained 
either opposed to or somewhat suspicious of the Alliance. This also 
meant that the Icelandic government was little concerned at the 
prospect of damage to NATO which might result fran confrontation. 
The country had few other marine-related industries, and almost no 
merchant fleet or navy, so navigational concerns were of little 
interest to her. Her negotiating position in the Seabed Carmittee 
and UNCLOS 3 could be strengthened by successfully asserting and 
exercising rights over an enlarged zone of jurisdiction, thus helping 
to develop customary law in the direction of a link between the shelf 
and the water column.
The Faroes
states extended maritime jurisdiction.
The Faroes had an overwhelming relative dependence on fisheries, with 
58 per cent of the working population employed in fishing and related 
industries in 1971. She had however no domestic constraints which 
would prevent her negotiating an agreement with the UK within the 
spirit of the Geneva Conventions and submitting it to the NEAFC for 
ratification. The only significant international constraints on her 
encouraged her to accomodate the POO' s fundamental concerns, in that 
her parent state, Denmark, was a merrier of NATO and of the EEC. In 
addition Denmark had an interest in opposing large coastal state 
extensions because she would be 1 zone-locked1, in other words her
geographical position vis-a-vis other states meant that in the event
of sizeable coastal state extensions she would not obtain a fisheries 
zone of concomitant area Much of the Danish fleet also fished in
waters that would cane under UK or Norwegian jurisdiction in the 
event of a general extension of jurisdiction to 200 miles. Her
efforts on behalf of the Faroes were therefore made within the bounds 
of the Geneva Convention on the basis that the islands were 
especially dependent upon fishing, rather than applying any criteria 
of increased coastal state control.
Canada
Canada was steadily moving towards a consistent coastal state 
position. Since 1958 she had behaved like a coastal state on 
fisheries. She had a low relative dependence upon fisheries, with
0.98 per cent of her workforce, errployed in fishing and related 
industries in 1971. However, the provinces of the Eastern Seaboard 
bordering the grounds fished by the UK: Newfoundland, Quebec, Prince 
Edward Island, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, were relatively more 
dependent on fisheries than Canada as whole, and Canada's federal 
structure gave than electoral significance. She did not however 
behave like a coastal state on navigation ®, more because of a desire 
to maintain freedom of movement for NATO warships than because of 
fears of damage to her merchant marine. She had few other maritime 
industries. Canada's once sizeable merchant marine new constituted 
less than one per cent of world tonnage, and anyway consisted largely 
of Great Lakes ore and grain carriers rather than ocean-going 
vessels^. In 1969 the ruling Liberal Government begem to show an 
interest in limiting navigational freedoms, and then only within the 
straits between the islands of Arctic Cemada, because of fears of 
spillage from temkers carrying oil frem the Alaskem North Slope. It
did not argue for general coastal state control of straits, but for 
special rights for coastal states in sensitive areas, and an Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act embodied this concept.
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The UK was able to defer to Canadian demands because a substantial 
extension of Canadian fisheries jurisdiction could be made without 
laying claim to anything beyond twelve miles frcm baselines. 
Pearson, the Canadian Prime Minister during the mid-1960s, had held a 
strong cornutment to multilateral action and had therefore blocked in 
Cabinet pressure for Canada to adopt a twelve-mile exclusive fishing 
zone along the lines of the European Fisheries Convention until 
phase-out negotiations with the many foreign nations fishing within
Qtwelve miles of baselines were complete . The Fishing Zones Act 
1964 had therefore provided for an exclusive twelve-mile zone to be 
adopted by Order in Council when negotiations were complete, rather 
than directly laying claim to such a zone. Progress had been slow 
because most states fishing the area, including the UK, obstructed
Qphase-out negotiations . By 1970, therefore, foreign fishermen 
were still fishing up to the edge of the three-mile territorial sea. 
This situation began to change after the enactment of the Territorial 
Sea and Fishing Zones Act on June 26th 1970. Although this repeated 
the 1964 Act's provision that a twelve-mile zone of fisheries 
jurisdiction be introduced after consultation with other ICNAF 
states, it excluded foreign fishermen from many of their traditional 
grounds by introducing extremely long fisheries closing lines 
(baselines joining islands at the mouths of bays) to enclose, inter 
alia, the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy as internal
waters (see Figure 10.2). Five closing lines between them enclosed
82,100 square miles, including 60,000 square miles beyond twelve 
miles from the coast
The Canadian approach was thus couched in a form which was, with sane 
licence, justified by the Geneva Conventions and compatible with the 
UK's basic position at the international negotiations. The Canadian 
Cabinet had rejected their Ministry of Environment's bid to link the 
Canadian extension of jurisdiction to the rights of the coastal state 
over the resources of the continental shelf The POO welcomed 
this divorce and was anxious to separate the two concepts in 
international law, not least because it wished to maximise the extent 
of the continental shelf under UK jurisdiction without the need to 
concede greater coastal state control of the water column. 
Similarly, although the length of seme of the closing lines was 
greater than any the UK had previously recognised, the principle of 
straight baselines to enclose bays was a well-established one, had 
been found valid by the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 12, 
and was one by which the UK's coastal fisheries had profited 
considerably through the drawing of baselines between the various 
islands of the Outer Hebrides and across Cardigan, Liverpool and 
Morecambe Bays.
Although the F00 was anxious to prevent additional claims to the 
extensive patrimonial and territorial seas which locmed dangerously 
by 1970, the recognition of the Canadian twelve-mile fisheries zone 
embodied in the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act and in the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act accorded with established 
European practice under the European Fisheries Convention. The 
Canadian claim to a territorial sea might also bolster a possible new 
global consensus on a territorial sea of that width and help to 
undermine the broader claims.
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Canada had few domestic constraints which hindered her frcm 267
accatmodating the PCO' s determination not to weaken the legal concept 
of the High Seas, and indeed understood it. Although Canada 
strongly advocated coastal states' rights in the UN Seabed Caimittee, 
she excluded a 200-mile territorial sea formula and supported 
preferential rather than exclusive rights for the coastal state in 
its offshore zone 14. She was a member of NATO and the 
Conmonwealth, and a state which had gained considerable post-war 
prestige by her constructive role in aiding the development of 
international law and organisations. In addition, as both Canada 
and the UK were members of the Evensen Group frcm the latter' s 
inception, the mutual accomodation of the two states' positions was 
facilitated.
Norway
The fourth territory off whose shores UK vessels fished was Norway. 
In addition to extensive British effort off the South-Western coasts, 
many of the largest British vessels fished in the Barents Sea. 
Norway had quite a high relative dependence on fisheries, with 3% of 
the population employed in fishing, fish processing and distribution 
in 1971. This dependence was especially high in the country's 
Northern regions. While there was seme Norwegian industrial fishing 
off Lincolnshire and East Anglia, the foreign distant-water catch off 
Norway exceeded the Norwegian catch close to the shores off other 
nations. Fisheries issues alone probably therefore argued for 
Norwegian extensions of jurisdiction, but far nore than any of the 
other three territories Norway possessed a mix of marine-related 
industries. She had an extremely large ccnmercial fleet, the fourth 
largest in the world in 1971. In addition, like the UK, she was
becoming aware of the extent of her continental shelf oil reserves. 
She thus had an interest in extending her control over her coastal 
waters, but one tempered by a desire to avoid a variety of coastal 
state regimes governing the construction of vessels passing their 
coasts. Norway1s domestic constraints urging her to obtain a 
greater share of the catch off her coasts were strong, with the 
Northern area of the country so dependent on fisheries, but similarly 
so were the constraints imposed on her by the importance of her 
merchant navy. Norway1s marine-related industries contributed a 
very large proportion of her GNP, so although the range of domestic 
pressures upon her government were similar to those upon HMG, they 
were more intense. This degree of domestic ccfimitment, and the need 
to create an acceptable compromise between maritime and coastal state 
concerns was very important. In part Norway's situation explains 
the degree of motivation of Minister of Fisheries Evensen in seeking 
rapprochement between maritime and coastal concerns at the SBC and in 
UNCLOS 3.
The international constraints upon Norway militated against any 
unilateral extensions of fisheries jurisdiction. Like Canada, she 
enjoyed high prestige as an important contributor to international 
organisations. She was also a willing meirber of NATO, whose 
Northern flank could be weakened by any disagreement between Norway 
and the UK. Norway's prestige was also sustained by Evensen's role 
in the negotiations on the law of the sea, and to have taken any 
action which could have weakened the possibility of his success would 
have damaged this prestige. Undermining the Evensen Group' s chance 
of success would also have weakened the possibility of Norway's 
fishermen, merchant marine and oil industry's all obtaining a 
satisfactory ocean regime. In addition, Norway was not in a
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suitable position unilaterally to inpose and defend an extended zone 
of fisheries jurisdiction. Her over 33,500 miles of coastline would 
have been extremely difficult to police, and in the Barents Sea 
Norway would be in dispute over fisheries with the USSR, as she was 
already beginning to be over oil. The USSR was likely to be a 
robust opponent in a situation of confrontation, and to enter into 
such a situation without the sanction of international law would have 
been unwise.
Like Canada and the Faroes, therefore, Norway was primarily concerned 
to reduce the foreign catch off her shores and thus was happy with 
solutions which did not prejudice the FOO's legal position or 
threaten the Geneva Conventions. While Norway had been involved in 
bitter disputes with the UK in the past, both the innovations which 
the UK had resisted (the use of long straight baselines to enclose 
bays and the twelve-mile limit) were now favoured weapons in the UK's 
cwn coastal state armoury.
Hie agreements
Canada
The importance which the POO attached to the legal implications of 
the negotiations with these states led to the FOO's conducting 
negotiations, with meetings of fisheries officials in support. The 
new Canadian baselines and twelve-mile limit were endorsed by a 
meeting of Canadian and UK fisheries officials, and the changes were 
effected by Order in Council P.C. 1971-366 of 25th February 1971. 
British vessels were to cease fishing the Gulf of St. Lawrence on
26d
December 31th 1972, and within twelve miles of the Labrador and
Newfoundland baselines at the end of 1978 ^ . The effect of these 
exclusions on the total UK distant-water catch was not large, because 
the alternative attractions of the Barents Sea and the high relative 
costs of voyages to Canada had already caused a sharp fall in UK 
fishing effort off Canada over the period 1967-71 The catch was 
now still further reduced. Subsequent negotiation in ICNAF 
permitted a longer phase out in the Gulf of St. Lawrence (see 
Figure 10.3).
Figure 10.3: British landings (all demersal), excluding livers ^  
caught off the Canadian coast, 1967-82, expressed in tonnes.
Year labrador Grand Banks Gulf of St. Total
of Newfoundland Lawrence
1967 7,380 37,392 4.428 49,200
1968 9,496 20,320 — 29,816
1969 1,771 2,312 — 4,083
1970 2,116 443 — 2,559
1971 — 4,034 — 4.034
1972 3.542 7,823 — 11.365
1973 886 5,707 1,082 7,675
1974 1,476 9.348 394 11,218
1975 118 1,697 — 1,815
1976 — 230 — 230
1977 1,424 2,382 — 3,806
1978 252 442 — 694
1979 312 431 — 743
1980 713 12 — 725
1981 — — — —
1982 93 699 — 792
For Cod and Country - the confrontation with Iceland
The Icelandic saga unfolded at a leisurely pace, with the Regulation 
extending jurisdiction to fifty miles only being enacted on 14th July 
1972, a year after the first government announcement. Iceland was 
seeking a link between the continental shelf and the resources of the 
water column, and the choice of a fifty-mile zone sprang frcm the 
width of the Icelandic shelf. The timing of the claim, made under a
1948 law concerning the Scientific Conservation of the Continental
3ielf Fisheries, was partly intended to influence events at the SBC, 
and for the FCO it was important not to concede any resource 
jurisdiction in the water colunn as customary law. Existing 
convention law was rooted in the Geneva Conventions, and changes 
should not be accepted except through the multilateral discussions.
Although bilateral discussions took place from August 1971, both
sides also used the Seabed Committee to explain their positions. In
general Icelandic statements made there were good-naturedly used by
the UK as an opportunity to restate the FCO stance. Briefly, this
was that no extensions of coastal state jurisdiction over any aspect
of the water colunn beyond twelve miles from baselines were 
18acceptable , Iceland's claim was not to res nullius: it was an
attempt to deprive other states of a pre-existing right which
19accorded with both customary and convention law • In addition, 
the unilateral nature of the Icelandic action threatened to 
jeopardise the successful outcome of UNCLOS 3 by taking some issues 
outside it .
The UK reaction to the Icelandic legal position was to take the case
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Although this vras in
order under the 1961 Exchange of Notes which ended the first Cod War 
21 , it may also have been a delaying tactic and a means of maximising 
domestic support for the FCO's legal position. Given that the Court 
could only find precedent in convention or custom, it was generally 
expected to favour the status quo position, the UK one. Realising 
this, the Icelandic Government presented no case, leaving submissions 
by the German Federal Republic and the UK to dominate the Court's 
deliberations. There was a slight risk to the UK in this policy
given that in 1955 the ICJ had established in the Anglo-Norwegian
Soelf Fisheries, was partly intended to influence events at the SBC, 
and for the FCO it was important not to concede any resource 
jurisdiction in the water column as customary law. Existing 
convention law was rooted in the Geneva Conventions, and changes 
should not be accepted except through the multilateral discussions.
Although bilateral discussions took place from August 1971, both
sides also used the Seabed Committee to explain their positions. In
general Icelandic statements made there were good-naturedly used by
the UK as an opportunity to restate the FCO stance. Briefly, this
was that no extensions of coastal state jurisdiction over any aspect
of the water column beyond twelve miles from baselines were 
18acceptable , Iceland's claim was not to res nullius: it was an
attempt to deprive other states of a pre-existing right which
19accorded with both customary and convention law . In addition, 
the unilateral nature of the Icelandic action threatened to 
jeopardise the successful outcome of UNCLOS 3 by taking some issues 
outside it .
The UK reaction to the Icelandic legal position was to take the case
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Although this v«s in
order under the 1961 Exchange of Notes v*iich ended the first Ood War 
21 , it may also have been a delaying tactic and a means of maximising 
domestic support for the FCO's legal position. Given that the Court 
could only find precedent in convention or custom, it was generally 
expected to favour the status quo position, the UK one. Realising 
this, the Icelandic Government presented no case, leaving submissions 
by the German Federal Republic and the UK to dominate the Court's 
deliberations. There was a slight risk to the UK in this policy
given that in 1955 the ICJ had established in the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries case that fisheries constituted part of the resources of 2 ( 2  
the coastal state, a judgement used by Iceland in verbal skirmishes 
at the Seabed Cornu, ttee
The crucial nature to the UK of the legal issue at stake led the FCO 
to maintain a careful hold on the negotiations. The FCO's view of 
the disputes as a potential threat to the U K ' s multilateral marine 
interests was reflected in the leading role played by its Marine and 
Transport department, whose supervising Assistant Under-Secretary led 
British official delegations to Reykjavik. A  special Icelandic Unit 
was set up in the department; later to be moved to the Western
2"3European department as the dispute became overtly political .
Although many of the negotiations were conducted between MAFF 
officials and their Icelandic counterparts, this reflected the desire 
of the PCD to divert the Icelandic legal claim for a fifty-mile limit 
linked to the continental shelf to a technical one for a reduction in 
foreign fishing catch in the area. At ministerial level also the 
PCD dominated the negotiations, which did not begin until May 1972, 
almost a year after the Icelandic announcement of its intention to 
extend limits. Delegations were headed by a Minister of State for 
Foreign and Ccntnonwealth Affairs, Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.
As the dispute escalated so as to have wider foreign policy 
implications, leadership passed to the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Ccrrmonwea 1 th Affairs, Douglas-Heme (C - Kinross and W. 
Perthshire). Lady Tweedsrnuir was an excellent choice frcm the point 
of view of the PCD, and she was transferred frcm a post of Minister 
of State at the Scottish Office specifically to lead the delegation 
to Iceland. She was keenly aware of the strategic implications of a 
successful Icelandic extension of jurisdiction, having served as UK 
delegate to the UN General Assembly during the closing phases of the
1958-61 dispute with Iceland. She was also sister-in-•law to
Alistair Buchan, who had recently retired as Director of the
Institute of Strategic Studies, and who was keenly aware of the
traditional needs of the Royal Navy. Having served twenty years as 
MP for Aberdeen South, she enjoyed close relations with the Scottish 
Trawlers Federation, giving a Scottish dimension to a fisheries 
dispute of immediate significance only to Ehglish trawler firms, 
(although the STF must have been aware that an Icelandic success 
might provide an example for the Faroes to follow).
There was little disagreement between government Departments as to 
the significant aspects of the dispute. The Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Ministry of Defence were strongly behind the FCO, in 
that they were concerned about the limitations upon the freedom of 
navigation of merchant shipping and warships respectively which might 
be imposed by a general extension of coastal state jurisdiction. 
MAFF ministers similarly accepted the FCO's strategic Weltanschauung, 
and were able to strengthen domestic support for the UK position by 
concentrating public attention on the maintenance of the UK catch and 
access rather than the more esoteric issues of legal tactics. Che 
means was to refer to the loss of catch implied in the emulation of 
Iceland by other states. The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, Prior, told Parliament on 11th July 1972:
"A dangerous precedent wjuld be set up if we did not reach 
a satisfactory agreement. We fish across most of the 
North Atlantic and off the coasts of many nations. Some 
of these nations have ambitions for wider limits, and all 
of them want some means of preventing overfishing by 
vessels diverted from Iceland. If one nation successfully
defies international law, others will feel less strongly 
bound by [it]." 24
MAFF's Parliamentary Secretary Stodart told the House in January 
1973:
"I do not think it would be advisable for me to say 
anything off the cuff in a debate like this, particularly 
when the negotiations are being conducted primarily by the 
Foreign and Ccirmonwealth Office; but we have offered catch 
reductions of twenty-five per cent, and no one can say that 
that is an insignificant offer or one that lacks
goodwill."2^
Both the UK and Icelandic Governments had a high motivational 
investment in their respective definitions of the legal position, 
which was the real stunfaling block between them. Hcwever, in order 
to court global opinion both sides needed to negotiate, provided they 
could do so without appearing to be under duress. HMG also needed 
to negotiate in order to maintain the support of the deep sea sector. 
Since each side considered its legal position sacrosanct, the focus 
of negotiation shifted to catch limitations. The UK wanted to be 
seen to be willing to offer substantial catch reductions for 
conservation purposes, while not so substantial as to lose prestige 
or anger domestic opinion. The Icelandic government had to insist 
on very UK low catch levels because the Icelandic public would view 
any agreement which did not recognise an extension of Icelandic 
fisheries jurisdiction as a defeat, so alternatively there would have 
to be very significant reductions in the UK catch to salvage the 
government's standing.
In a sense, therefore, the currency of negotiations was catch levels, 
despite the fact that the fundamental difference between the two 
states was jurisdictional. The discussions began in May 1972 and 
shifted to catch levels when no progress on the legal aspects 
appeared possible. In July they broke down because the UK offered a 
30 per cent reduction, while Iceland insisted on 80 per cent. 
Following off-the-record discussions between the two foreign 
ministers at the NATO Council in New York City in Noventoer 1972 
Iceland offered effort reductions rather than setting specific catch 
figures. She wanted no freezer trawlers and no vessels of over 180 
feet in length or 750 tons in weight. The UK replied with an offer 
of a quota involving a 21 per cent loss of catch, but expressed a 
willingness to consider up to 25 per cent.
HMG's hardening attitude stemmed frcm a favourable verdict the UK had 
received frcm the International Court of Justice on 1st August. The 
ICJ forbade Iceland to enforce its regulations over foreign vessels 
more than twelve miles from the coast, and asked only for a 
limitation of the UK catch to 170,000 tonnes, only just belcw the 
UK's 1972 catch (see Figure 10.4). The next negotiations at 
ministerial level were not until May 1973. By then both sides were 
accepting the possibility of an interim solution pending the 
clarification of the legal position by UNCLOS 3. Lady Tweedsmuir 
opened the UK case with an absolute refusal to give way on the 
fifty-mile limit. The difference cn catch had narrowed, the UK 
demanding 145,000 tonnes and Iceland offering 117,000 tonnes.
Although catch levels had become the principal focus of the 
negotiations, the transnational unanimity of scientific opinion
proved as ineffective in formulating a settlement as it had been in 
persuading the NEAFC to set realistic quotas. Both sides 
subordinated fishery scientists to legal advisors because the legal 
question was the fundamental one in the eyes of both governments .
Prevailing fishery theory had not been internalised by the political 
27actors . On the rare occasions when Ministers referred to 
scientific evaluations of the fishery it was at the level of crude 
propaganda. For instance, despite the MAFF 1969 study, Royle 
asserted in December 1971 that:
"My scientific advisers share the views of the
international bodies concerned that stocks of white fish
28off Iceland are not at present being overfished."
Such a confident assertion served well when the UK was anxious to 
maintain access to fish, but when nearly two years later, after a 
decline in UK catch, government spokesmen wished to emphasise the 
ineffectiveness of the Icelandic harassment of UK trawlers, the 
depredations of this non-existent overfishing could be used in 
evidence. Stodart (as a MAFF minister, one might have hoped, in 
closer touch with the findings of fishery scientists than Royle) 
explained to Parliament: "The major reason for the decline in catch
is that stocks were less abundant. The effect of interference in
• • 20 fishing was not significant"
The announcement to the UK public that the dispute was about access 
to fish and catch levels was in part an attempt to ensure domestic 
support for the FCO conduct of the dispute. Little public support 
would have been forthcoming had the FCO appealed to the UK and global 
public in terms of its legal position and tactical intentions, but to
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scientific evaluations of the fishery it was at the level of crude 
propaganda. For instance, despite the MAFF 1969 study; Royle 
asserted in Decentoer 1971 that:
"My scientific advisers share the views of the
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Such a confident assertion served well when the UK was anxious to 
maintain access to fish, but when nearly two years later, after a 
decline in UK catch, government spokesmen wished to emphasise the 
ineffectiveness of the Icelandic harassment of UK trawlers, the 
depredations of this non-existent overfishing could be used in 
evidence. Stodart (as a MAFF minister, one might have hoped, in 
closer touch with the findings of fishery scientists than Royle) 
explained to Parliament: "The major reason for the decline in catch 
is that stocks were less abundant. The effect of interference in 
fishing was not significant"
The announcement to the UK public that the dispute was about access 
to fish and catch levels was in part an attempt to ensure domestic 
support for the FOO conduct of the dispute. Little public support 
would have been forthcoming had the FCO appealed to the UK and global 
public in terms of its legal position and tactical intentions, but to
be defending the rights of 'the fishing industry' sounded more noble. 
This involved maintaining a coalition of all the relevant domestic 
interests behind its position, a task much eased by the close 
relationships between the BTF and MAFF. The Federation's 
Director-General, Laing, shared the PCO views on the wider legal 
implications of the dispute for the shipping industry, and was 
regularly consulted. Contacts from individual firms, trade unions 
and the Federation of Trawler Officers' Guilds were not welcomed, 
lest differences of view within the industry should emerge and be 
exploited by the Icelanders. These bodies, and even the BTF itself, 
tried during the early stages of the dispute to by-pass HMG in order 
to reach an understanding with Iceland. In early 1972, for 
instance, the BTF inserted advertisements in Icelandic newspapers to 
try to persuade the Icelandic public of the merits of its case. In 
June the TGWU' s General Secretary Jack Jones and other TGWU and GMWU 
leaders went to Iceland, and on their return forced a briefing on 
Lady Tweedsmuir. As the possibility of violence increased the 
industry closed ranks behind a joint unions', trawler officers' and 
owners' "Deep-Sea Fishing Industry Ccmnittee" (DSFIC). The price of 
the Unions and Trawler Officers being consulted was for them to 
abandon any policy independent of the owners, and thus of the PCO. 
Fundamental areas of difference included the provision of naval 
assistance, which the Trade Unions largely favoured while the owners 
did not (see page 260), and the FGO's concern with the avoidance of 
creating legal precedents for further extensions of coastal state 
jurisdiction. The owners and the Trade Unions were concerned 
largely with catch levels, although the owners were more sympathetic 
to the PCO case, perhaps from fear of setting an example bo the
Faroes.
The government also sought parliamentary support, and therefore
unwittingly helped to undermine parliamentary consensus behind the
distant-water fleet. At least during the first eighteen months
after the Icelandic announcement of a future fifty-mile limit the UK
position had few opponents in either of the two main parties. The
twD Front Benches strongly backed the FOO line, which they
interpreted as the prevention of extensions outside the UNCLOS
framework. Even when on 21st May 1973 frigates were sent into the
disputed area the official opposition specifically and immediately
30approved of the action .
What back-bench expressions of opinion there were also supported the 
government, the most vociferous being MPs with distant-water 
constituency interests. Crosland (Lab - Grimsby to 1976) called the 
Icelandic demands "preposterous" . Hughes (Lab - Aberdeen N from 
1970) and Sproat (C - Aberdeen S frcm 1970) supported Government 
policy, stressing Scotland1s distant-water interest partly in order 
to discomfort the SNP ^ . Archer (C - Louth, 1970-74) was a 
hardliner, reacting to incidents of warp-cutting by Icelandic tugs 
with calls for the RN to be sent in. Gilmour (C - Fife E), with
extensive middle-water as well as inshore constituency interests,
33expressed a fear of contagion frcm Iceland to Faroe . Johnson 
(Lab - Kingston-upon-Hull W), McNamara (Lab - Kingston-upon-Hull N) 
and King-Murray (Lab - Edinburgh Leith) also supported HMG. The 
majority of these MPs understood the reason why the FCO was so 
adamant about access to Icelandic waters. Johnson knew that the FCO 
regarded the precedent implications for defence and shipping as more 
vital than access to fish, and, perhaps surprisingly, himself 
concurred. He told the Ccnrons, "There are much bigger issues than 
catching fish in this whole matter of international limits, it is
therefore my belief that the less said the better". He applauded
unreservedly the negotiating position adopted by Lady Tweedsmuir and
her colleagues . Of deep sea constituency MPs, only Prescott (Lab
- Kingston-upon-Hull E) was opposed to the F00 position, but kept
35silent in the face of overwhelming constituency pressure .
The minor parties did not share this harmony of purpose, not having 
been socialised into it by POO advisers. The SNP identified 
consistently with Iceland's case . As a small nation, its 
livelihood threatened by the greed and the power of larger and richer 
states, the Nationalists saw in Iceland an image of Scotland. The 
dispute was pursued by HMG in the interests of English distant-water 
fishermen and great-power chauvinists, while a similar extension of 
jurisdiction to that sought by Iceland was badly needed by Scottish 
herring fishermen. Furthermore, Icelandic fishermen were taking 
herring within 200 miles of the Scottish coast. At a time when 
Conservative Government spokesmen were emphasising the spectacular 
growth of inshore catches, the SNP's single MP, Stewart (SNP - 
Western Isles) rather prophetically asked:
"Will the Hon. Gentleman accept that it was the extension 
of the Icelandic limits which brought about the original 
extension to twelve miles which benefitted the inshore 
fishermen and that Britain was the last North Sea nation to 
extend its limits?"
The only Northern Irish MP with a fishing industry in his
constituency, Kilfedder (UUUC - Down North, 1970-79, UU - Down North 
frcm 1979) also supported Iceland's claim. French, Irish and
Belgian depredations of the Moume and Isle of Man herring stocks
made him identify strongly with the Icelanders, regarding their 
demands as justified by the "legitimate rights of any country to 
protect the rights of its basic means of livelihood" . The 
Liberal Party's position, as it evolved, was the most sophisticated 
of any party, in that it tried to marry coastal and distant-water 
interests, but this was partly because Iceland presented problems of 
constituency interest versus philosophy. The party had a strong 
belief in international law, and its spokesman on Agriculture and 
Fisheries, Hooson (L - Montgomery to 1979), was a QC and a recent 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Group for World Government, a body 
which had repeatedly expressed its opposition to coastal state 
extensions as seizures of the Ccrmnon Heritage of Mankind. The Party 
also strongly advocated EEC membership. On the other hand, several 
of its most important seats were in areas dependent cn inshore 
fishing, and many in the party had an idealised view of the 
independent fisherman. Most Liberal MPs decided that silence was 
golden. Although Beith (L - Berwick-on-Tweed from 1973), the 
Party's Fisheries Spokesman, and Pardoe (L - Cornwall N to 1979) were 
active in the inshore interest, they were silent on Iceland. Only 
Grinond (L - Orkney and Shetland) was willing to challenge the logic 
of the POO position, asking the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Cormonwealth Affairs in November 1972:
"If he could state the reason in equity why we can
apparently claim the oil under the sea far beyond the
39existing limits, but they cannot claim the fish?"
There were also Conservative dissenters. The only one of these 
representing an inshore constituency, Maclean (C - Bute and N. 
Ayrshire), ccnpared Iceland's plight in March 1973 with the
40 Several"harassment of the Isle of Arran by British trawlers" 
other Conservative back-benchers either actively or passively opposed 
being over-tough with Iceland, because of the fear that she might 
leave NATO. Miller (C - Brans grove frcrn 1970) openly argued thus 
throughout the dispute. The most outspoken Conservative dissenter 
was Reed (C - Bolton E, 1970-74). Reed felt that a general round of 
extensions was both inevitable and in the UK interest, themes which 
he developed in a Bcw Group pamphlet entitled "Fish and Ships" 
Throughout the dispute he repeatedly attacked the POO's position. 
Asserting to the Foreign and Carmonwealth Secretary that the UN
General Assembly had on 13th December 1972 voted 102-nil in favour of
42coastal state sovereignty over the waters above the shelf , he 
asked:
"In the discussions, what account is the Foreign Office 
taking of the fact that there is already a large measure of 
international support for the view that coastal states
should enjoy preferential or exclusive rights to resources
43overlying their continental shelves?"
Nor, like Stewart, was he adverse to an historical analogy:
"Does my Right Honourable Friend recall the previous 
dispute with Iceland when, for twelve years, the Foreign 
Office stuck to a particular line and it was discovered at
the end of the day that international camtunity support for
44that view had evaporated?
The course of the dispute did much to undermine the POO position, as 
disagreement between the UK and Iceland degenerated intothe
belligerent confrontation on the fishing grounds. The processes 
leading to this confrontation brought two of the PCO's principal 
goals into conflict with each other: the welfare of NATO and the 
maintenance of the Geneva Conventions as the basis of existing 
international law. In so doing they also weakened parliamentary 
support for the government's stance over Iceland, as MPs concerned 
about the safety of NATO and those who objected on humanitarian 
grounds to the UK's "bullying" the Icelanders disassociated 
themselves from government policy. The Icelanders had much more to 
gain frcm the introduction of force into the dispute than the UK. 
Both British and Icelandic foreign affairs and defence officials knew 
that harassment by Icelandic gunboats sufficient to deter UK trawlers 
frcm fishing might force a response by frigates, the UK lacking 
seagoing military vessels of equivalent size and purpose to the 
gunboats. The Fisheries Protection Vessels were incapable of 
operating in such rough seas or of remaining on station far frcm base 
facilities for a sufficient period, and were also too slow. The 
officials of both states knew also frcm the first Cod War that such 
an 'unequal* confrontation between frigates and gunboats would 
engender world sympathy for 'poor little' Iceland oppressed by the 
might of a modem Navy. Military confrontation, or even the threat 
of it, between NATO allies would also bring in other NATO states who 
would be likely to pressurise the UK to make concessions. Force had 
other attractions for Iceland. Its intention was to demonstrate 
effective control of territory in order to encourage international 
recognition of Icelaind's claim, control which could be demonstrated 
by forcing the UK trawlers to withdraw. For the same reason, HMG 
had to demonstrate the ability, as well as assert the right, of its 
citizens to fish cn the High Seas. Iceland could also use 
confrontation to raise the cost in money and prestige of continued
access for the UK. Harassment would also raise UK costs in that it 283
reduced catches and destroyed fishing gear, creating demands frcm 
trawler owners for government compensation. The use of force, once 
embarked upon, created problems for the negotiations, with the UK 
refusing to negotiate until harassment should cease and Iceland 
refusing to negotiate until the frigates were withdrawn.
The advantages of confrontation being entirely cn the side of the 
Icelanders, UK Governments were very wary of ccmnitting frigates, and 
did their utmost to make Parliament think that interim arrangements 
were just around the comer . Nor were they alone m  their 
distaste for the use of the RN. The BTF regarded naval assistance 
as synonymous with uneconomic fishing in protected boxes, while the 
TGWU and The Federation of Trawler Officers' Guilds were more in 
favour because of the risk to their members' lives frcm Icelandic 
harassment. In September 1972 gunboats began bo cut the trawl wires 
of UK trawlers. At first HMG placed its hopes in developing a 
device to protect warps frcm damage, but this proved insufficient. 
On October 16th the trawler Aldershot was damaged in a collision with 
a gunboat, and the Deep Sea Fishing Industry Carmittee asked for 
frigate patrols just outside the fifty-mile limit. Wall (C - 
Haltemprice) suggested that such action would amount to recognition 
of Iceland's claim, and asked for a brief RN incursion into the 
disputed area, with no confrontation. This was not done, but 
harassment continued. Frcm January 1973 onwards HMG adopted the 
solution of using ocean-going tugs, registered in Liberia, to 
interpose themselves between the trawlers and the gunboats, and their 
numbers were gradually increased to four, hired at considerable cost. 
After a six-week respite while Iceland repaired the damage wrought by 
an eruption of the volcano Helgefell, harassment restarted in earnest
in March. Shots were fired at trawlers and 119 warps were cut in a 
fortnight. HM3 then made the error of announcing its refusal to 
negotiate till harassment should cease, a decision Which rendered a 
bilateral solution almost inpossible. Throughout Spring 1973 Royle 
was telling Parliament that the Royal Navy would be sent in, hoping 
to calm belligerent MPs and to cow the Icelanders. Meanwhile in the 
face of pleas from the German Federal Republic, fearing for the 
integrity of NATO, and advice frcm the POO and the DSFIC, the 
frigates were not sent in. Eventually, after the combination of 
strong words and absence of action had become embarrassing, RN 
protection was granted in mid-May. On May 16th trawler skippers 
sent an ultimatum to MAFF stating that unless naval protection was 
granted within twelve hours, they would leave the disputed waters. 
When the demand was not met, forty trawlers left the zone. By 
simply refusing to fish and by withdrawing beyond Iceland's 
unilaterally-declared limits, the trawlermen could have created a de 
facto precedent of UK recognition of Iceland1 s claim. It therefore 
possessed a trunp card in its game with the FCO and the Ministry of 
Defence. Not wishing to concede territorial control to Iceland, HMG 
sent two frigates into the fifty-mile zone on May 19th. Iceland 
inmediately retaliated by banning all British military aircraft from 
Keflavik, signalling to other NATO members that base facilities were 
dependent on a satisfactory solution to the dispute. The remainder 
of the dispute was conducted against a background of military 
confrontation on the fishing grounds.
The anplification of a threat to NATO vastly increased the urgency to 
the FCO of an agreement. If the maximisation of navigational 
freedoms was of great importance to the FCO, so was the preservation 
of a viable Western Alliance. The dispute oould, if unresolved,
result in Icelandic withdrawal, a principal policy goal of the 
People's Union. The strategic value of Iceland was as an unsinkable 
aircraft carrier from which to carry out surveillance of the gap 
between Greenland and the UK through which the Soviet Northern fleet 
has to pass on its way to the North Atlantic. Should Iceland close 
the NATO facilities at Keflavik or withdraw from the Alliance, 
surveillance would beccme much less effective, and a vital staging 
post for the resupply of the European front line would be lost to 
NATO. Worse still, the loss of the valuable foreign exchange and 
jobs generated by the Keflavik base might gradually lead the
Icelandic Government to consider requests by the Soviet Union for
. 46base facilities .
The Organisation had already played a key role in providing, through 
its regular Council meetings, an opportunity for meetings between the 
Icelandic and UK Foreign Ministers even during periods when 
negotiations were suspended and enabled them to hold informal 
discussions outside the constraining influences of domestic politics. 
Now, with the threat to Keflavik, NATO increased the pressure on the 
disputants to settle. Dr Joseph Luns, NATO's Secretary-General, 
offered himself as a mediator, and he was also able to obtain the 
services of Norway's Foreign Minister in a similar capacity.
NATO ’ played no significant part until the Royal Navy entered the 
fifty-mile zone in May 1973. On 23rd May the UK informed the NATO 
Council of its action, while on 28th May the Council received an 
Icelandic request to press for withdrawal of the frigates. The 
Council approved a statement encouraging both sides to pursue a 
negotiated settlement and appointed Luns as intermediary.
Discussions between Luns and representatives of the disputants met
with no success. The use of the Royal Navy eroded seme of the
parliamentary support for government policy. Distant-water Labour 
48 49 .MPs Johnson , McNamara , and King-Murray were unhappy with this 
decision. Weill, whose formative years had been spent as a Royal 
Marines officer, had at first been keen to use the Navy, but 
maintained a discreet silence after the Icelandic government 
threatened to withdraw from NATO. In addition Reed, many of whose 
constituency activists thought his attitude to the dispute disloyal 
to the Government and to the UK's international standing, shifted for 
tactical reasons his emphasis to the threat to NATO, an argument 
which he thought these activists would understand better. Apart 
from introducing such alliterative notions as "This House values 
Keflavik above the cod", Reed accused the PCD of not caring if "we 
blew a damn great hole in the defence of NATO", and he asked the 
Minister of State "to confirm that the principal task of the Royal 
Navy remains keeping tabs on the Soviet fleet and not getting 
entangled in fishermen's nets" .
On 12th June Iceland notified the USA that it would request a 
revision of the 1951 US-Icelandic Treaty by which the Keflavik base 
had been established. On 14th July the Icelandic PM suggested in an 
interview with a Reykjavik newspaper, Morgunbladid, that Iceland 
might reconsider its attitude towards NATO. Offers of mediation by 
the Norwegian Foreign Minister were rejected by Iceland, and Luns 
began to press Prime Minister Heath to back dewn for the sake of 
NATO. The settlement was largely at Luns' behest. On 14-15th 
September he visited Reykjavik to discuss the Icelandic plan to alter 
its relationship with NATO and a new threat to sever diplomatic 
relations with the UK. On 26th September Heath proposed a truce to 
his opposite number Jchannesson, and after talks with Luns on 30th
September Heath sent another message to the Icelandic PM. This 
announced the withdrawal of the RN and the chartered tugs, and 
invited Johanne s son to London. The Icelandic PM accepted and 
announced that diplomatic relations would be maintained. The London 
talks of 15th and 16th October by-passed the FOO, being between Prime 
Ministers and between fisheries officials. They were thus able to 
formulate an interim settlement.
A solution was paradoxically facilitated by the very intra-coalition 
struggles which had blocked agreement for so long. The two People's 
Union Ministers, Josephsson and Kjartansson, leaked the terms of the 
Heath-Johannesson agreement to the Press, an act of disloyalty vhich
cost them support at the crucial moment ^ . The agreement reached 
52 was wxthout prejudice to the position of either state with regard 
to the legal status of the waters beyond twelve miles from the coast 
and was merely couched as a two-year catch limitation agreement. 
The UK catch on the Icelandic continental shelf was to be reduced to 
an annual total of about 130,000 tonnes by a combination of closed 
areas, closed seasons and a reduction in fishing effort. This catch 
represented only a slight reduction from the actual British catch in 
the area in 1967, although it involved a significant fall from the 
very high UK catch levels of 1971 and 1972 (see Figure 10.4). 
Sixty-eight named UK-registered trawlers of above 180 feet in length 
and seventy-one of below 180 feet were to be allowed. Freezer and 
factory ship» were excluded. The agreement did not solve the basic 
jurisdiction questions and in the event provided only a respite of 
two years, after which confrontation was to begin again. This Third 
Cod War is dealt with in Chapter 14 because it was instrumental in 
HMG's decision to exterxl fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles in 
October 1976.
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Figure 10.4; British effort and landings (ali demersal) from the 
Icelandic Continental Shelf, 1967-79. Tonnes.
Values expressed in JBOOOs.
Year Weiqht Value Hours Tonnes Tonnes per
fishing per hour hour index
1967 152,372 11,595 308,560 0.4938 100.0
1968 128,510 9.144 216,485 0.5936 120.2
1969 110,454 8,452 157,271 0.7024 142.2
1970 134.611 13,144 199,524 0.6746 136.6
1971 171,905 22,317 300.667 0.5717 115.7
1972 151,192 23,510 319,610 0.4730 95.7
1973 126,493 29,084 277,891 0.4552 92.1
1974 116,014 24,606 233.382 0.4970 100.6
1975 98,311 23,152 212,947 0.4616 93.4
1976 59,372 20,631 145,011 0.4094 82.9
1977 cnwards — — — —
The Faroes
A non-discriminatory catch-limitation agreement with Denmark over the
C4.Faroes , was reached in December 1973. There was mutual concern 
over the conservation of white fish stocks, and about the special 
dependence on fishing of the Faroese economy, so that the UK had 
supported a move at the NEAFC' s Noventoer 1973 meeting to raise the 
minimum mesh size in use around the islands, and offered restrictions 
on foreign trawling up to twenty-four miles from Faroese coasts. 
The agreement, which was endorsed by Belgium, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Norway and Poland, established a Total Allowable 
Catch for cod and haddock of 52,000 tonnes. 32,000 tonnes would be 
allocated to the Faroes, 18,000 to the UK, and 2,000 as a by-catch to 
vessels of other states fishing for other species. UK and Faroese 
catches of species other than cod and haddock would be unrestricted. 
There would also be seasonal closures to trawling, and a restriction 
on the Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) of individual trawlers to the 
level habitually used before the end of 1973. This agreement was 
relatively painless for the UK fishing industry, in that it entailed 
no diminution of catch, but the Scottish Trawlers Federation
regretted the lost opportunities for expansion. It also paved the 
way for a progressive reduction in the UK quota for the Faroes in 
succeeding years. The nain ports affected were Leith and Aberdeen, 
and thus one significant result of the agreement was that it further 
exaggerated the inshore prevalence in the Scottish fleet.
Norway
Agreement with Norway was reached in January 1975, after several 
months of pressure by Norwegian fisheries interests for unilateral 
Norwegian extension of fisheries jurisdiction, prompted by the 
failure of UNCLOS 3 ' s Second Session at Caracas in the Sumner of 1974 
to reach a conclusion. The fact that the session appeared to agree 
upon the concept of a wide EEZ, and yet was stalled over the rights 
and duties of states therein, as well as over a number of other 
issues, exasperated many fisheries organisations. On August 19th 
1974 Toft, the Chairman of the Norwegian Fishermen's Association, 
declared, "We cannot sit with our hands in our laps and wait for the 
next Conference" Government Ministers were forced by the
political importance of the fishermen to pay lip-service to their 
demands. On the same day Norwegian Junior Fisheries Minister Bolle 
told a fishing audience in Trondheim:
"The situation after the Caracas Conference cannot prevent 
us frcm taking measures on a national basis. Such steps 
could not create problems for continued Norwegian 
participation in this field." ^
In reality Norway's global ccrmitments and maritime state concerns 
would not permit her to take unilateral action, and nothing was done
in this connection. The agreement between the UK and Norway 0 
awarded no formal preferential treatment to Norway. Closed seasons 
and areas, and trawler-free zones, would apply equally to both 
states, although in practice the latter gave preference to coastal 
and inshore long-liners and drifters. Policing was to be done by 
means of a joint scheme to protect the High Seas status of the zones 
beyond twelve miles. Norwegian Fishery Protection Vessels would be 
able to inspect UK boats, but would report infringements of 
regulations to HMG for enforcement. No loss of catch was to be
entailed for UK vessels, but Norway would not absorb diverted effort. 
The agreement proved ineffective in protecting stocks, as the UK 
effort during the open season and in the zones open for trawling 
increased rapidly during 1976 and 1977, as trawlers diverted fretti 
Iceland concentrated on the Norwegian coast. Their catch per unit 
effort plumneted, and only recovered when UK effort was later 
considerably reduced (see Figure 10.5).
COFigure 10.5; British effort and landings (all demersal), fretn the 
Norwegian coast, 1973-78. Tonnes. Values expressed in iOOOs.
Year Weiqht Value Hours Tonnes Tonnes per
Fishing per hour hour index
1973 19532 3437 35755 0.5462 100
1974 24944 5461 30602 0.8151 149.2
1975 22728 4960 33585 0.6767 123.8
1976 24730 7441 39001 0.6341 116
1977 30172 12288 61987 0.4867 89.1
1978 15887 7384 39720 0.3999 73.2
1979 9827 4626 18971 0.5180 94.8
1980 6274 2516 11845 0.5676 103.9
1981 3847 1677 5832 0.6596 120.7
1982 4830 2112 5356 0.9017 165
Conclusion
The PCO only resisted with any vigour catch limitation agreements 
which required the UK explicitly to recognise coastal state
jurisdiction beyond the twelve miles from baselines agreed in the 
European Fisheries Convention. Taken collectively, the catch 
limitation agreements made with these other states marked a very 
slight tacit shift by the PCD away frcm its previously-unequivocal 
stance in favour of a ' free seas1 regime. Even the less painful 
agreements defined areas of sea different frcm the NEAFC areas and 
imposed restrictions on UK activity there. The Icelandic experience 
demonstrated the limitations of maritime power in a conflict that is 
not a war. A small state without a navy had seriously embarrassed 
the RN, and the diplomatic costs had been high, much international 
sympathy going to the underdog, and Iceland showing herself willing 
to play the NATO trump card.
In relation to fisheries, the agreements suggested that an extensive 
restructuring of the UK deep sea fleet might be inevitable, since 
many of the larger trawlers could not fish economically anywhere but 
in the Northern waters for which they were built. The freezers and 
factory ships excluded fran Iceland were largely diverted by their 
owners to the Barents Sea and to the Norwegian coast, but the 
Icelandic agreement rendered surplus thirty fresher trawlers. A 
great loss of catch was also entailed, which further fuelled demands 
even frcm the erstwhile deep sea industry that the UK extend its own 
fisheries limits in sane way. In wiping out a large proportion of 
the UK's demersal catch the agreements led to pressure on the UK 
public to change its tastes and upon fish processors and retailers to 
inport cod and haddock. They weakened the power of the BTF and OTF, 
leading to their merger, and they similarly reduced the earnings and 
influence of the White Fish Authority. They also signalled to MAFF 
and the Ministry of Defence that fisheries protection was a discrete 
task requiring specialised vessels. Finally and most importantly.
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the agreements suggested to the PCO that some increased coastal state 
jurisdiction in the water column would probably have to be conceded, 
and that it would be in the UK's interest if UNCLOS 3 could reach a 
resolution during the two years prior to the expiration of the 
agreement with Iceland.
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CHAPTER 11
PROBLEMS FOR POLICY PRESETTED BY THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF ANADRCMOUS
FISH.
HMG's support for the regime mapped out by the Geneva Conventions was 
also affected by developments within the anadromous fisheries sector. 
Unlike other changes within British interests, these developments did 
not argue for the UK to take a more strongly coastal state stance. 
Indeed extensions of coastal state jurisdiction, unqualified by 
specific reference to anadromous fisheries, would have been harmful 
to UK salmon interests because they would have brought the marine 
concentrations of salmon under the control of state regimes. The 
significant role played by developments in the anadromous fisheries 
sector in the re-evaluation of existing policy was that they 
strengthened HMG's need to obtain international sanction for a 
principle that was already enshrined in British law, namely that the 
state of origin of anadromous fish should have jurisdiction over them 
wherever they are to be found. The need to obtain such a sanction 
strengthened the relative value to the UK of a new Conference on the 
Law of the Sea. UK needs in relation to anadromous fisheries 
created a negotiating target which could not be obtained merely by 
changing or maintaining boundaries, and thus required that the issue 
be dealt with as a separate item at the Conference. Success on this 
item thus might require concessions on other issues.
Within the High Seas regime, the concentrations of adult salmon off 
the coast of Greenland were extremely vulnerable, but luckily until 
the mid 1960s little attempt had been made to harvest them. Salmon 
had been for over a century a matter of extreme political
significance to Scotland, since there were vivid memories of 
struggles between lairds and crofters over the right to harvest 
adults returning to spawn. During that century legislation had 
largely been designed to strengthen the rights of ownership, but had 
no underlying economic rationale, and deep divisions on the issue 
remained within Scottish society.
The tragedy of the late 1960s and early 1970s was that it was only 
when HMG was for the first time managing to take a rational 
'development' approach to Scottish anadromous fisheries that 
fishermen of other states began to trawl for salmon, and on a scale 
large enough to threaten the long-term safety of the stock. With 
the appointment of the Hunter and Bledisloe Corrmissions, and the 
establishment of the Highlands and Islands Development Board, 
government was at last attempting to develop salmon fisheries by 
encouraging stocking, and by maximising revenues generated by them.
Unfortunately the Danes were also making use of the potential of 
salmon for regional development purposes, and had provided loans and 
grants to fishermen in their dependent territories of Greenland and 
the Faroes to begin trawling for salmon at their places of maritime 
concentration. Therefore at the same time as the UK was effectively 
removing many of the barriers to the progress upriver of the 
returning adults, the catch on the High Seas and in the territorial 
seas of other states was rapidly increasing. This fact united the 
diverse Scottish interests competing for access to the catch, and 
resulted in intense diplomatic and political activity. Through the 
NEAFC and ICNAF, and by means of high-level bilateral contacts 
between the UK and the offender states the UK eventually managed to 
limit the catch by other states, but she failed to eliminate salmon
fishing outside UK fisheries limits
At the same time as this was happening the EEZ was emerging as a 
referent principle within the SBC and UNCLOS 3, and a general move to 
EEZs without an exemption (a 'species' approach) for salmon would be 
a disaster for UK salmon interests. Therefore, once the EEZ became 
a referent principle of the negotiations the need for the UK to 
obtain UNCLOS 3 sanction for a separation of anadromous fish from 
geographical definitions of state jurisdiction became compelling. 
Strangely, therefore, the need for such a separation required the UK 
to support the principle of the EEZ in order to obtain better terms, 
as otherwise unilateral extensions might leave salmon unprotected 
from coastal state tyranny.
The division of domestic opinion
As detailed in Chapter 4, anadromous fisheries was a semi-autonomous 
policy area administered by DAFS Fisheries II Division and MAFF's 
Fisheries I Division. Anadromous fisheries was of greatest 
importance to Scotland, and contributed considerable tourist revenue 
to both the Highlands and the Southern Uplands. Whereas in relation 
to marine fisheries in 1967, no claim was advanced to any stock 
beyond 12 miles from baselines, the Sea Fish Industry Act 1962 had 
laid claim to UK jurisdiction over all anadromous stocks spawned in 
the UK, no matter where they were located. HMG's external policy 
was to maximise the number of adult fish returning to UK waters.
Who could harvest these fish was a matter of some contention. There 
was political competition for the catch between the riparian owners, 
who enjoyed the support of the Highlands and Islands Development
Board, and a variety of others who wished to take the fish. These 
latter included herring drifters, coastal netsmen, and sports anglers 
lacking the wealth necessary to pay the high rod fees charged by the 
riparian owners. It was the experience of heavy punishments for 
poaching on the feudal estates in the nineteenth century which made 
this issue of access so emotive. Grimond (L - Orkney and Shetland) 
evoked Gladstonian memories when he claimed that "the whole course of 
legislation on salmon fishing is regarded around Scotland as being 
heavily biased in favour of the interests of riparian owners and 
letters" . On the other hand, Conservative MPs representing the 
main salmon-rodding areas argued that restocking and improvements to 
encourage spawning would not take place without the continuation and 
possible strengthening of legislation to protect the interests of the 
owners .
Despite years of increasing legal protection for riparian owners, 
there was little investment in encouraging optimal spawning 
conditions for anadromous fish, which were treated, as were marine 
fish, as a part of nature's bounty which required little care or 
encouragement. If there was domestic agreement on external policy, 
there was intense rivalry between domestic interests wishing to 
harvest anadromous stocks. The distribution of the costs and 
benefits involved in stock maintenance is more clearly evident than 
is the case for marine fisheries, and domestic legislation is 
essential if benefits are to accrue to cost-carriers. Conditions in 
the inland spawning waters largely determine recruitment, and the 
costs of creating optimal spawning conditions fall partly upon the 
owners/managers of these waters and partly upon public authorities. 
The fish require a clear run upriver, unimpeded by water pollution or 
obstructions. The spawning areas themselves can be rendered more
productive by purposeful manipulation of habitat or by 'farming' 
smolt (small salmon) until they are of a sufficient size to avoid 
large-scale predation. In order for investment in greater smolt 
production to take place it is necessary that the benefits from the 
greater catch of adult salmon accrue to the cost-carrier. The 
tendency for the majority of anadromous fish to return to their 
birthplace renders this feasible. The fish, however, spend the 
larger portion of their lives away from the spawning grounds and in 
1967 could potentially be cropped on the High Seas, in the 
territorial waters of any state or territory through whose waters 
they passed, including those of Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes and 
the UK itself, or down-river from the spawning grounds.
In fact, stocking experiments had shown that they yielded a poor 
return, because so many of the additional recruits were harvested 
before they returned to their birthplace. These problems had been 
addressed by the Hunter Report (see pages 96-101). The Hunter 
Commission had opted unashamedly for maximising the revenue from 
anadromous fisheries, which implied reserving access to those able to 
pay high fees. Sports anglers who could not afford to fish for 
salmon could benefit by increased stocking of lakes with trout. 
Statutory protection should therefore be extended to trout lakes as 
an incentive to investment. Anadromous fish should be taken only 
inland of river mouths, and new methods of counting passing fish 
(escapement) should be developed in order to gain more information 
about stocks. Fluvial pollution and obstructions should be 
countered and removed by government action.
Although the Hunter Report had made recommendations which were 
biologically and economically sound, implementation was very slow,
and op to 1972 no government had either enacted or rejected the 
Report's recommendations in these areas. If owners were reluctant 
to invest without an assured return, as they were especially in the 
period 1967-72, the height of High Seas salmon fishing, then 
Government investment would be needed. This too would present 
problems. Large sections of the UK population might have baulked at 
the government's spending £90 million (1970 prices) to improve 
facilities on the estates of wealthy Scottish landowners. On the 
other hand, to compensate the Treasury by compulsory purchases by 
public bodies of fishing rights and of land for fish hatcheries would 
have jeopardised the willingness of rich foreigners to pay high 
prices for a week's angling in Scotland. Exclusiveness was thought 
to be a major factor in keeping the price of a rod high. This 
compulsory purchase of rights would also have swelled still further 
the cost to the Treasury. The report became a source of selective 
ammunition for those putting pressure on HMG.
The sheer variety of interested actors in the UK and the bitterness 
between them implied that to have produced a decisive policy would, 
by favouring one of the groups involved, alienate the others. 
Coastal netsmen, actual and potential salmon drifters, riparian 
owners, anglers and tourist proprietors were all keenly interested in 
the decisions which would emerge. Their conflict of interests 
permeated the main parties. The Labour leadership was, as architect 
of the HIDB, sympathetic to the Board's view that maximum revenue and 
employment would be generated by limiting access. However, most of 
the Party's Scottish supporters and MPs wanted legislation to enable 
the Scottish population at large to fish for salmon and trout in 
Highland rivers and lochs. The Conservative Party was in an even 
more difficult position. Enjoying the support of the majority of
riparian owners, drifters, netsmen and proprietors of tourist 
establishments, its members knew that to clarify the Party's position 
on Hunter in favour of one group might alienate its support in other 
groups.
Removal of the administrative and pollutive barriers to restocking
From 1972 onwards, however, many of the domestic barriers to 
restocking were removed, especially those of water pollution and of 
the diversity of domestic authority over the journey between the 
twelve-mile limit and the spawning ground. The improvements 
resulted largely from the movement for cleaner coastal waters 
discussed in Chapter 6. Preliminary studies conducted for the 
Select Committee on Science and Technology showed that, although 
major disasters such as the wreck of the Torrey Canyon might have a 
spectacular ecological effect, the cumulative results of land-source 
pollution were much more serious. The logic that cleaner coastal 
waters required cleaner rivers led to pressure for legal and 
administrative changes that were also of benefit to anadromous fish, 
which became a barometer of water quality. For instance, a 
Commission of Enquiry on Pollution in certain Estuarial and Coastal 
Waters, under the Chairmanship of Sir Eric Ashby, recommended that 
the powers of River Boards and Local Authorities be strengthened to 
create bodies with the "ability to allow the passage of migratory 
fish at all states of the tide" Ashby also recommended that all 
discharges of industrial and sewage effluent to tidal waters and 
estuaries, together with sewage discharges from vessels, should be 
brought under statutory control by mid-1974 at the latest. In a 
letter to Ashby dated 30th November 1972 the Department of the 
Environment undertook (in principle), to ensure better monitoring of
water quality by River Authorities, and to seek an integrated policy 
for waste disposal. It also announced a decision to inaugurate one 
Authority per river basin, a principle which had already been under 
consideration since the Mitchell and Wilson Reports. Industry would 
be required to supply local authorities with information on 
discharges, and would be encouraged to eliminate pollutants before 
discharge by the levying of fees equivalent to the full cost of waste 
disposal. The Water Act 1973 * brought England and Wales into line 
with Scotland by inaugurating one Water Authority per river basin and 
gave each the duty of improving the passage of migratory fish. By 
statutory instrument 5 Water Authorities were empowered to issue 
licences out to the six-mile limit, and fishing for anadromous fish 
beyond that limit was prohibited. The unfortunate effect of this, 
along with the CFP's six-mile limits over much of the coast, was to 
permit foreigners but not British fishermen to drift salmon; but 
taken in conjunction with the Water Acts it brought all anadromous 
fish in a single river basin under a single authority, and also 
chanelled licence fees to bodies one of whose statutory functions was 
to increase freshwater fisheries. Less progress was made in 
controlling pollutive discharges to coastal waters, since, although a 
Control of Pollution Act ® empowered the Secretary of State for the 
Environment to bring such discharges under control, the powers had 
still not effectively been used at time of writing, pending an EEC 
agreement on the definition of water pollution.
Reducing domestic competition for the harvest
If the pollutive and administrative barriers militating against 
investments in stock improvements were to a considerable degree 
removed, the reduction of the toll of salmon taken by UK citizens
other than the cost-carrier was less than fully achieved. Without 
some means of ensuring that benefits were distributed fairly in 
relation to costs, there was little hope of increasing the run of 
salmon and trout, which argued for government protection of the 
return on any additional investments made by riparian owners. The 
political costs of so doing, however, and of offending the other 
sections of society concerned about access to the fish, were 
considerable. Apart from the historical associations in Scotland of 
the issue of access to salmon, the absence of bold initiatives along 
the lines of Hunter's recommendations was in part a function of a 
lack of interest among either fishermen or their MPs in the overall 
question of the conservation of the resource. Most MPs involved in 
trying to influence government policy on anadromous fish took 
single-interest approaches. This made it even harder to effect a 
compromise between the differing interests. A number of Scottish 
upland MPs ignored the threat to salmon posed by the Greenland 
fishery, and concentrated instead upon trying to influence the 
distribution of the UK salmon catch among competing domestic 
interests. In general, Labour and Liberal MPs urged the Government 
to increase access for the ordinary Scottish population but ignored 
the question of increasing stocks A number of MPs acted on 
behalf of netsmen, in an attempt to prevent the replacement of 
coastal netting by fluvial netting. Campbell (C - Moray and Nairn 
to 1974) claimed in 1969 that if the Hunter recommendation to this 
effect were implemented, over half of Scotland's coastal netsmen 
would have to leave the industry ®. Similarly, the National Council 
of Salmon Netsmen of England and Wales appointed an MP, Temple (C - 
Chester) as its President because it recognised that, while no 
Government would dare to ban coastal netting only in Scotland and 
risk a repeat of the anger over differential laws on drifting, a
national salmon policy might include a ban.
The legal discrimination against Scottish drifters itself continued 
to be questioned. Three MPs took the drifters' side during the 
period under review, Wolrige-Gordon (C - Aberdeenshire E to 1974), 
Ewing (SN - Moray and Nairn 1974-79) and Beith (L - Berwick-on-Tweed 
from 1973). All of them represented drifting ports, Wolrige-Gordon 
Peterhead and Fraserburgh, Ewing Buckie and Lossiemouth, and Beith 
Amble and North Sunderland. Wolrige-Gordon, at issue with his party
here as on most aspects of fishing policy, argued that far from 
working to phase out the High Seas salmon fishery, HMG should take 
steps to encourage UK drifters to join in. He dismissed the emotive 
predictions of extinction as "claptrap", since the Scottish salmon 
catch had remained fairly steady over the period 1963 to 1971 despite 
the growth of High Seas drifting 9. He argued that the CFP 
provisions would allow Europeans to drift salmon imnediately beyond 
UK fishery limits. Why then should Scots not join the fishery 
Beith, likewise, claimed that catch statistics were evidence that 
drifting was not harmful. Any decline in Tweed catches could be 
attributed to seals rather than to the Northumberland drifters. 
Ewing gave vigorous but short-lived support for salmon drifting. 
Soon after her election she was persuaded by Lossiemouth fishermen to 
call for legislation to permit salmon drifting in Scottish waters 11. 
She soon subsided into inactivity, however, because she was beginning 
to appreciate the complexity of salmonoid politics and to realise the 
dangers to the SNP of over-identification with any specific section 
of the interested Scottish population.
The variety of positions, and the tenacity of their advocates, not 
only prevented a thorough and co-ordinated implementation of the
Hunter Report, but also delayed its piecemeal application. The 
Labour Government of 1966-70 evaded the issue. Repeated questions 
from Dalyell were answered with the assurance that implementing 
legislation would be introduced "as soon as parliamentary time 
permits", which, as it transpired, was never. The order prohibiting 
salmon drifting in Scottish waters was repeatedly renewed, though 
whether or not it was to be made permanent was never clarified. The 
subsequent Conservative government actually reneged on one of 
Hunter's recommendations. Perhaps partly because of Secretary of 
State Campbell's constituency interest, a Noverrber 1971 White Paper 
on "Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries in Scotland" declared fluvial 
trap fishing to be impracticable. Coastal netting would therefore 
be maintained, with entry to the fishery regulated by licence. The
talcing of salmon from boats within Scottish fisheries limits was 
13banned . The White Paper and the Statutory Instruments met with 
criticism from angling associations, who were frustrated about access 
and by the continuation of coastal netting, and frcm would-be 
drifters. It may have contributed to the high SNP polls of February 
1974 in the drifting ports of Lossiemouth, Buckie, Peterhead and 
Fraserburgh (see page 217).
Even if coastal netsmen were to continue in operation, they were not 
radically to increase their catch. In late 1974 and early 1975 
coastal netsmen began to set gill nets frcm boats into the most 
advantageous channels, whereas previously gill nets had been set from 
cobles or frcm the shore. By threatening to increase the proportion 
of salmon taken by coastal netting this development represented a 
disincentive to the owners and occupiers of inland waters to invest 
in stocking. DAFS was alarmed and cn 7th March 1975 Secretary of 
State Ross announced a ban on the use in Scottish waters or off
Tweedmouth of any gill net set or fished from a boat 14
Some action to help the anglers concerned about access was taken in 
1976. As recommended by Hunter, government encouragement was given 
to trout stocking, but no move was made to increase public access to 
salmon. The Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Scotland) Act 1976 
gave the Secretary of State the power to make a "protection order" 15 
on waters for which he had received valid proposals for fishery 
improvements by which "there would be a significant increase in the 
availability of fishing for freshwater fish in inland waters" ^ . 
It was thought that this would especially encourage stocking with 
trout, and thus was an attempt to increase access of Scottish anglers 
to game fish. In this vein, the Secretary of State should be 
satisfied that fishing should be available:
"(1) to a degree, which he considered reasonable having 
regard in particular to what is, in his opinion, the 
demand, by persons who are neither owners nor occupiers of 
a right of fishing for freshwater fish in the waters to 
which the proposals relate nor members of a club which is 
such an owner or occupier in those waters, for fishing in 
that area, and
(2) on such terms and conditions as he considered 
reasonable" 17.
Anglers thus had the propect of greater trout-fishing opportunities, 
but there had been no improvement in their access to salmon. As a 
result, taken collectively, the incremental changes which were made 
in Scotland subsequent to Hunter amounted to a compromise, but one 
which had mildly moved in favour of the riparian owners. While the
logic of Hunter that for real improvement in stocking all catching 
beyond river mouths should be phased out was apparent to officials 
and Ministers alike, no government had acted to phase coastal netting 
out completely because of the dire political and economic costs of so 
doing. The established balance between salmon interests was 
therefore untouched. Coastal netting was allowed to remain but with 
no radical technical innovations permitted which might tip the 
balance between netsmen and rodsmen in favour of the former. The 
owners and occupiers of inland anadromous fisheries had to make 
improvements in the full knowledge that the coastal netsmen would 
also benefit, but net licence fees to the Water Authorities were to 
contribute to the reduction in water pollution which would in turn 
increase the salmon runs. Owners were to continue to be protected 
against the depredations of urban anglers by the price mechanism.
The fact that Scottish legislation was becalmed did not prevent new
legislation for England and Wales, new Acts being passed in 1972 and
1975, encouraging stocking by assuring protection to riparian owners.
1 ftThe Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1972 , introduced by
Wingfield Digby (C - Dorset W) extended closed seasons, prohibited
some methods of fishing and established the power of search in cases
of suspected poaching. It also made it an offence to introduce fish
19to a water without permission of the owner. The 1975 Act 
consolidated the 1923 and 1972 Acts, signalling government acceptance 
of the status quo in English salmon legislation.
Successive governments therefore failed to develop a rationed policy 
towards salmon, and the long period of indecision served to raise the 
political involvement of the various salmon interests, with some 
long-term implications for high policy in that some would-be salmon
drifters probably voted SNP in the two General Elections of 1974. 
The failure of government to implement Hunter was not all indecision, 
however, because the advent of an extensive fishery off Greenland 
prevented HMG's guaranteeing a return to investment.
Hie development, of a large-scale marine fishery for salmon
There was scant incentive for HMG firmly to side with the riparian 
owners and to ban fluvial netting. A  high return would still not
have been guaranteed to riparian owners because of the harvesting of 
UK salmean by other nations on the High Seas and within the Greenland 
fishery limits. After the 1962 ban can Scottish coastal drifting 
(see page 97) the UK had obtained an NEAFC ban on all drift-netting 
within 150 miles of Scottish baselines, but this had no effect on the 
fair more serious High Seas fishing off Greenland. Atlantic salmean 
frem both Europe and North America mingle off Greenland for much of 
their adult lives. Fishing by Greenland natives began in 1957, 
generously encouraged by grants from the Danish Government, in an 
attempt to raise Greenland' s per capita O S IP . In this aim it was 
successful, and by 1965 individual Greenland fishermen were netting 
£5,000 for three months1 work . Such rewards attracted others to 
the fishery. In 1965 Faroese, in 1967 Danish and in 1968 Swedish 
and West German fishermen entered the fishery for the first time, 
concentrating on the High Seas inmediately beyond Greenland' s fishery 
limits and during migration on the waters surrounding the Faroes. 
Greenland fishermen caught salmon both on the High Seas and within 
their own fisheries limits.
During 1972 Greenlanders caught 1,306 tonnes of salmon in total, 
while High Seas drifting by other states produced catches of 402
2 1 In 312tonnes for Denmark, 178 for Norway and 147 for 
order effectively to secure salmon spawned 
predation at sea the UK would need to obtain the 
fishing within Greenland's fishery limits, 
appear to be an option, and it was the High Seas
the Faroes . m  
in the UK from heavy 
banning of salmon 
This did not at first 
fishing of salmon
which became the bête noire of salmon lovers.
Foreign netting in the oceans provided problems for the FCO as well 
as for the Scottish Department. Although UK legislation laid claim 
to anadromous fish spawned in the UK wherever they might be, any 
attempt to enforce this law within Greenland's fishery limits would 
have been contrary to the Geneva Conventions. As two-thirds of the 
salmon catch at sea took place within fishery limits, even a 
successful cessation of High Seas netting might not markedly affect 
the return to the UK. Furthermore, the salmon congregating around 
Greenland's coasts did not carry the flags of their states of origin, 
so differentiation between stocks was impossible. Since UK 
ownership of the Greenland salmon concentrations could not be 
asserted, the only sensible principle would be a general right of all 
states to prevent all fishermen, including their own, from taking 
salmon at a distance from river mouths where their state of origin 
would be uncertain. Practically, such a regime would be best 
enforced if it designated the outer edge of the fishery limits of the 
state of origin as the point beyond which salmon could not be taken. 
Until Convention law on anadromous fish had been revised by UNCLOS 3, 
however, the UK could in practice only obtain Fishery Commission 
sanction to ban High Seas fishing and could not really expect Denmark 
and Greenland to impose a ban on catching within Greenland fishery 
limits, a fishery which was completely in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
The harvest provided the only detailed information on stock levels, 
and scientists and salmon interests in the states of origin, Britain, 
Norway and Ireland, feared the worst. In the Spring of 1968 British 
salmon interests convened a Conference in London to which the fishery 
authorities of Denmark, as the parent state of Greenland and Faroes, 
the chief offenders, were invited but declined to attend. Sir Hugh 
Mackenzie, Director of the Atlantic Salmon Research Trust, called 
upon HMG to take drastic action to curb High Seas fishing. He told 
the Conference:
"We have three years at most in which to end high seas 
fishing. Otherwise Salmo salar will have passed the point 
of no return to extinction" 22.
Throughout the period, especially during the height of High Seas 
salmon fishing from 1969-73, the government was pressured by domestic 
interests concerned with some aspect of the Hunter Report or the 
fishing off Greenland. Much of this domestic pressure was applied 
by or through Members of Parliament. The MP most active and 
influential in pressing Governments on anadromous fish questions was 
Dalyell (Lab - West Lothian) 23. He was extremely active in trying 
to reduce catches between Greenland and the Faroes 2 .^ He asked 
more than twenty parliamentary questions on the matter, and went 
personally to see the Danish Ambassador. Anxious to circumvent the 
FCO tendency to see the matter as one of High Seas freedoms, he 
argued that the danger of extinction to the Atlantic Salmon was a 
special issue divorced from other fisheries matters and urgently 
required imaginative government action. He suggested the use of 
'Socialist channels' to influence the ruling Social Democratic
parties of Denmark, Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
should this fail, a boycott on Danish products and the despatch of 
Fishery Protection Vessels to Greenland. He also contended that the 
UK should co-ordinate its actions with other states of origin 
suffering from the fishery, such as Canada, the U.S.A., and Ireland.
A few other MPs also urged HMG to put pressure on Denmark. Apart 
from Dalyell, the MP most active in this connection was Mitchell (C - 
Aberdeenshire W, 1970-74), whose constituency embraced two of the 
most productive salmon waters in Scotland, the Dee and the Spey. He 
pressed the government without suggesting specific methods, to obtain 
the cessation of High Seas fishing. Ridley (C - Cirencester and 
Tewkesbury), whose constituency spanned the Severn, also asked a 
considerable number of Parliamentary questions on the matter, while 
Beamish (C - Lewes), though having no major salmon rivers in his 
constituency, also pressed for action .
The FCO had no wish to jeopardise the universality of marine law by 
permitting one emotive issue to burst the bounds of the regional 
machinery for consultation on fishery issues. To have done so would 
have looked especially ludicrous in view of UK insistence on a right 
to High Seas cod fishing off Iceland. FCO Ministers parried MPs' 
suggestions of alternative approaches to Denmark with a firm 
insistence that ICNAF and NEAFC were the appropriate bodies for 
pursuing UK aspirations on anadromous fish, and that the EEC and EFTA 
had no place. In practice much use was made of informal meetings 
between Prime Ministers to cajole reluctant states into failing to 
oppose Fishery Commission limitations on salmon netting. In March 
1970 Prime Minister Wilson wrote to his Scandinavian counterparts 
about anadromous fish but refused to place copies of his letters in
26the Commons Library . Similarly he discussed salmon netting with 
the West German and Swedish Prime Ministers Brandt and Palme during
their visits to London in March and April 1970 but kept the
27discussions off the record .
The period of most intense diplomatic activity on foreign netting was 
1969-72, a period straddling the Wilson and Heath Governments. 
While pressing within the Commissions for the elimination of High 
Seas salmon fishing, Ministers tried to ward off domestic pressure 
for extraordinary action by reassuring MPs that Denmark was very 
ready to come to terms . Within the Fishery Commissions the UK 
had powerful allies, Canada, the USA, the USSR, Iceland, Ireland and 
Norway all had substantial spawning populations of salmon. It was 
necessary to pursue the matter in both Commissions, because of their 
overlapping membership and because the main netting area straddled 
the boundary lines between the two Commissions' areas of 
jurisdiction. The UK proposed in both Coimtissions in 1969 that High 
Seas netting of anadromous fish be prohibited. The Scientific 
Committees of both Commissions backed such a measure, holding that 
without it little investment in stock growth would occur. The 
majority of states were in favour but Denmark, Sweden and the Federal 
Republic of Germany dissented (Sweden was not a member of ICNAF) 
while expressing a willingness to discuss alternative conservation 
measures. The following year the UK obtained from ICNAF a 
limitation of both catch and vessel tonnage to the level of 1969, and 
from both Commissions closed seasons for the Greenland fishery. 
These arrangements were reaffirmed in 1971, but the significant 
progress came in the following year, spurred by heavy informal US 
pressure on recalcitrant states. iCNAF's 1972 meeting agreed upon a 
gradual phasing out of the High Seas catch by 1976. The NEAFC with
26the Commons Library °. Similarly he discussed salmon netting with 
the West German and Swedish Prime Ministers Brandt and Palme during
their visits to London in March and April 1970 but kept the
• 07discussions off the record
The period of most intense diplomatic activity on foreign netting was 
1969-72, a period straddling the Wilson and Heath Governments. 
While pressing within the Commissions for the elimination of High 
Seas salmon fishing, Ministers tried to ward off domestic pressure 
for extraordinary action by reassuring MPs that Denmark was very
O Qready to come to terms . Within the Fishery Commissions the UK 
had powerful allies, Canada, the USA, the USSR, Iceland, Ireland and 
Norway all had substantial spawning populations of salmon. It was 
necessary to pursue the matter in both Commissions, because of their 
overlapping membership and because the main netting area straddled 
the boundary lines between the two Commissions' areas of 
jurisdiction. The UK proposed in both Commissions in 1969 that High 
Seas netting of anadromous fish be prohibited. The Scientific 
Comnittees of both Commissions backed such a measure, holding that 
without it little investment in stock growth would occur. The 
majority of states were in favour but Denmark, Sweden and the Federal 
Republic of Germany dissented (Sweden was not a member of ICNAF) 
while expressing a willingness to discuss alternative conservation 
measures. The following year the UK obtained from ICNAF a 
limitation of both catch and vessel tonnage to the level of 1969, and 
from both Commissions closed seasons for the Greenland fishery. 
These arrangements were reaffirmed in 1971, but the significant 
progress came in the following year, spurred by heavy informal US 
pressure on recalcitrant states. iCNAF’s 1972 meeting agreed upon a 
gradual phasing out of the High Seas catch by 1976. The NEAFC with
its greater number of 'guilty' states and lacking US and Canadian 
participation, postponed consideration of a ban, merely adding some 
closed areas around Iceland. In 1973, however, the NEAFC agreed 
that salmon catches in international waters should be restricted to 
1935 tonnes and phased out from December 1975. An annual quota of 
1100 tonnes would be allowed within Greenland's fishery limits from 
that date. The use of the Fishery Commissions therefore proved 
somewhat efficacious in that catch limitations were obtained together 
with a ban on High Seas fishing. Understanding had been shown of 
Denmark's problems, that salmon netting provided significant revenue 
for both Greenland and the Faroes, peripheral regions which like 
Scotland offered few alternative sources of employment. The gradual 
approach adopted by the NEAFC prevented abrupt adjustment costs, 
enabling Denmark to accept the High Seas ban. HMG's approach 
therefore looked at the time as though it would prove successful if 
slow.
While the principal determining factor in this solution was the 
Highland economy's dependence on tourism the legislative log-jam was 
only broken by NEAFC and ICNAF restrictions on salmon catching at 
sea. The setting of TACs for the Greenland catch meant that all 
marginal increases in stocks would be for the benefit of UK citizens, 
so investment in stocking was thus encouraged. Paradoxically the 
existence of a constant Greenland catch raises the proportionate 
increase in the potential UK catch as a result of investment in 
stocking a water above the proportionate increase in stocks resulting 
from that investment.
Conclusion
The complexity of salmon politics was such that for several years no
clear rational policy emerged, and successive UK governments tried to
maintain the existing balance between salmon-catching interests in
the UK rather than to take any bold but unpopular steps which might
assist in regenerating stocks. There were however improvements in
water quality and the administration of inland waters was simplified.
The inadequacy of the High Seas regime to effect a rational
conservation and management for salmon was demonstrated by the growth
of the Creenland fishery. In combatting this good use was made of
the fisheries commissions, and even though direct prime ministerial
contacts had to be used in addition to activity in the commissions
themselves, a solution had been reached by 1972-3 which looked as
though within three or four years it would be possible for Hater
Authorities and riparian owners to make investments in stocking and
to be assured of an increased run of salmon. Two factors, however,
prevented this becoming a reality. One was the growth of illegal
salmon drifting on a large-scale off North-East Scotland, especially
after the UK applied stringent conservation measures on herring in
1975-6. Far more serious, however, was the crystallisation during
1972-3 of the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone. If a High
Seas regime put highly migratory species at a disadvantage, a North
Atlantic consisting solely of zones of state jurisdiction over
resources found in those zones could be even more disastrous. Under
such a regime UK-spawned salmon would spend their lives in Greenland
fishery limits and have to run the gauntlet of Iceland's and the
Faroes' in order to return home. Therefore with the emergence of
9 9the EEZ as a 'referent principle’ of the international
negotiations, the solution of phasing out salmon fishing on the High
Seas looked as though it might prove irrelevant. Under almost any 
of the alternative formulae for the KK7. the right to determine quotas 
would belong to coastal states, and so Greenland, Iceland and the 
Faroes would control fishing over much of the path of the returning 
salmon. Since the EEZ was so firmly embedded in all draft texts at 
UNCLCS 3, the UK would have to plead for special sanction for its 
claim for jurisdiction over salmon spawned in the UK.
The FTR7, put at risk the several years' work in encouraging 
restocking, and argued that the UK would need to work hard for 
special arrangements within the FEZ for anadrcmous fish. 
Paradoxically, this made it more imperative for the UK to offer to 
accept the ffv. in principle, in order to facilitate a compromise. 
The UK had to try to obtain international sanction for states of 
origin to exert the principal jurisdiction over anadrcmous stocks. 
Therefore the anadrctnous fisheries issue increased the likelihood of 
the UK1 s accepting the EEZ.
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CHAPTER 12
THE DECLINE IN THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE DEEP SEA SECTOR, AND THE RISE
OF THAT OF THE INSHORE SECTOR
In 1967 the deep sea sector of the fishing industry had enjoyed a 
level of organisation and political influence which the inshore 
sector did not even attempt to match, but for a variety of reasons 
the former lost this pre-eminence over the following decade. The 
deep sea fleet became smaller and weaker, as a result of a loss of 
fishing grounds, and of extensive penetration of its markets by 
imports, factors which resulted in the scrapping, sale or conversion 
of vessels and the loss of many jobs, both shipboard and in ancillary 
industries. Many firms left the industry, which resulted in the 
concentration of the ownership of the deep sea fleet in a few firms, 
often ones with extensive interests in other industries that provided 
than with the financial resilience to withstand the economic losses 
so often sustained in fisheries. This monopolisation coincided with 
a mounting awareness among sane Trade Union officials and Labour MPs 
that shipboard working conditions and disciplinary procedures were 
extremely poor, with the result that the bipartisan consensus behind 
the distant-water industry, still largely intact in 1972-73, began to 
collapse, and Labour MPs began to demand improvements in working 
conditions in return for economic or political support for the deep 
sea sector. By mid-1974 the trawler industry was itself calling for 
an EEZ, as a means of re-establishing UK access to the distant and 
middle waters frcm which it was now being excluded.
In contrast, the inshore sector improved its organisation, partly as 
a result of the need to establish Producer Organisations under the
marketing provisions of the Cannon Fisheries Policy and partly 
because the range of issues over which inshore men felt aggrieved was 
so extensive that they were stirred into the establishment of more 
effective campaigning organisations like the National Federation of 
Fishermen's Organisations (NFPO) and the Scottish Fishing Federation 
(SFF). In the same way as the BTF and STF had managed to co-opt 
into membership many near- and middle-water trawlers, the new 
organisations were strengthened by a still-growing seiner fleet, 
based on Grimsby and North-East Scotland, whose owners shared with 
the inshore vessels a concern for the conservation of the pelagic 
stocks close to Britain1s shores. In addition to being better 
organised the inshore fishermen were also angrier at the prospect of 
foreigners fishing up to the baselines in 1982, at rigidly-applied 
vessel safety surveys introduced by the Department of Trade, by the 
effect of industrial fishing on food fisheries, and by the collapse 
of herring stocks. They demonstrated their willingness to vent this 
anger by political action, like blockades, and by third party voting.
The most telling reasons for the rise in the saliency of inshore 
interests to HMG, however, was that the sector found new groups of 
political allies within Parliament. The first was the Scottish 
National Party, which made a significant electoral breakthrough in 
the two General Elections of 1974, including a very strong shewing in 
inshore areas while articulating a policy of rapid extensions of 
fisheries jurisdiction. The Labour Goverrtnent of 1974-79 made the 
appeasement of Scottish particularism a priority because further SNP 
electoral gains might lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom, and 
paid great attention to inshore concerns as a consequence. Secondly 
the Parliamentary Labour Party included a number of MPs who opposed 
British membership of the EEC, and for whcm the Caimon Fisheries
324
Policy as originally formulated provided an excellent example of an 
asinine Ccnmunity arrangement which could and should be opposed. 
Thirdly there was a loose grouping of back-bench MPs, representing 
inshore fishing areas, of various parties, but consisting mostly of 
Conservatives, who had been driven by constituents to pay closer 
attention to inshore concerns.
The decline in the political influence of the deep sea sector
As Figure 12.1 illustrates, the size of the deep sea fleet declined 
throughout most of the period, with especially heavy losses of 
vessels during the times of acute econcmic crisis, in 1967 and frcm 
1974 onwards^ and with recovery, concentrated in the near and 
middle-water fleets, only frcm 1980. These declines were especially 
marked in the distant-water section of the fleet frcm 1974, as it 
became obvious that there would be no rapid large-scale return to 
their traditional fishing grounds. This rapid shrinkage of the 
distant-water fleet coincided with repeated heavy econcmic losses. 
Most of the vessels diverted fran distant waters could not fish 
economically in warmer waters with a greater species mix, and in 
addition, since their principal target species were cod and haddock, 
soon found the UK market for these fish supplied by imports frcm 
Canada, Norway and Iceland. The latter clearly enjoyed a higher 
yield per unit effort than had the UK vessels, because the reduction 
in fishing effort off their shores occasioned by the departure of the 
UK fleet contributed to stock growth. Thus the inports were very 
ccnpetitively priced, and the British market was exceptionally 
vulnerable to these inports since few other European populations have 
a particular taste far white fish.
325Figure 12.1: Tcadiaas quer 80' in  Lurgth registered at 3lst EBoatar 1. 
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1967 153 27 269 4 « 2 126 128 182 395 577 -4.7
(89.5) (108) (95.4) (93.9) (101.6) (100.8) (91.4) (97.2) (95.3)
1966 131 32 253 416 2 125 127 165 378 543 -58
(».6) (128) (89.7) (87) (100.8) (100) (82.9) (93.1) (89.7)
1969 125 34 244 403 2 127 13 161 371 532 -2.0
(74) (136) (36.5) (84.3) (102.4) (101.6) (80.9) (9Œ..3) (87.9)
1973 123 36 229 388 2 122 124 ia 3a 512 -38
(72) (144) (81.2) (81.2) (98.4) (97.6) (80.9) (86.4) (84.6)
1971 124 37 206 366 3 114 117 164 319 483 -5.7
(72.5) (148) (72.7) (».6) (91.9) (92.1) (82.4) (78.5) (798)
1972 123 41 202 366 4 H O 114 168 312 480 -0.6
(72) (164) (71.6) (».5) (SB.7) (89.7) (34.4) (768) (80.5)
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(32.7) (152) (53.2) (51) (52.4) (53.5) (4B.7) (52.9) (51.6)
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(24.6) (136) (47.1) (43.7) (46.7) (46.5) (38.7) (47) (44.3)
1979 22 31 124 177 0 46 46 53 173 23 -168
(12.8) (124) (44.0) (37.0) (37.1) (36.2) (26.6) (418) (368)
1980 10 29 112 157 0 34 34 45 146 191 -14.3
(9.3) (116) (38.9) (32.9) (27.4) (268) (22.6) (36) (31.6)
1981 10 23 126 159 0 32 32 33 158 192 -*0.5
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(5.8) (») (49.3) (35.1) (14.5) (14.1) 04.6) (38.7) (30.7)
The weakening of the deep sea sector obviously limited its ability to 
affect the course of government policy, an inability that was 
compounded by the erosion of the bipartisan support which the sector 
had once enjoyed. This erosion resulted primarily from
organisational changes within the industry. The most significant 
such changes were the growing monopolisation of ownership in the deep 
sea fleet, and partly as a reaction, mounting pressure frcm Hull and 
Aberdeen Labour MPs and the TGWU for a government stake in running 
the industry. It was inevitable that the relative importance in the 
deep sea fleet of small trawler-owners should dwindle. The size of 
the fleet was in almost continual decline (see Figure 12.1) - though 
this decline did not imply a proportionate fall in capacity since the 
new vessels were generally larger, and equipped with better catching 
and processing technology. This technology was expensive and larger 
firms were better placed to obtain the necessary capital. The
necessary investment, even after grant, for a new trawler was very 
high relative to the turnover which that vessel could generate 
The only growth portion of the fleet, the freezers and factory ships 
(see Figure 12.1), was overwhelmingly the fief of large firms, seme 
of which were also involved in processing and storage on land and for 
whose catch there was therefore a more certain market than existed 
for the smaller wet-fishers at the mercy of fluctuations in quayside 
demand. The technocratically-minded Labour Government of 1964-70 
encouraged the tendency to monopolisation of ownership, seeing in 
modem technology and in economies of scale the means successfully to 
ward off foreign competition ^ . The Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation (IRC), formed in 1964 to encourage mergers, held talks 
with the industry in 1968. The following spring it was announced
that two of the largest deep sea fleets, the trawler interests of 
Associated Fisheries and of the Ross Group, would amalgamate, and
that the IRC would nominate a Director. British United Trawlers 
(BUT) was cwned 74% by Associated Fisheries and 26% by the Imperial 
Group, a giant company with substantial interests in the food and 
tobacco industries. In 1973 BUT took over the Ranger Trawler fleet 
and by December 1974 owned over'half of the UK's freezer trawlers, 
one-third of all trawlers in England and Wales, and shares in fifty 
Scottish vessels ^ . Associated Fisheries had invested heavily in 
downstream activities, such as food processing, distribution and cold 
storage, and its partly-owned subsidiaries, Ross and Eskimo, were 
each responsible for a whole range of frozen foods in addition to 
fish . Three firms, British United Trawlers, Boston Fishing Group 
Holdings and Marr owned between them fifty-two per cent of English 
and Welsh trawlers over eighty feet in length, with no fewer than 
thirty-eight other firms sharing the rest of the fleet . The 
Scottish fleet, which increased its capacity up to 1974, was not so 
completely dominated by a few companies, but even here approximately 
sixty per cent of the trawler fleet was owned by the five largest 
firms
With the industry dominated by a few large firms the case for casual 
enployment seemed v/eaker. The period saw mounting pressure by the 
TGWU for the trawler industry to be decasualised and for erployment 
legislation to be made applicable to trawler crews. There was a 
feeling among Union activists that the lack of technical knowledge 
among deckhands and their indiscipline were products of the casual 
system which denied them guaranteed year-round employment, earnings 
and a career structure. However, in the mid-1960s the TGWU launched 
a campaign to eliminate casual work. In 1967 Dave Shenton, the 
Regional Secretary of the Hull branch became the first National 
Fishing Officer of the Union. Shenton's successor, Jack Ashwell,
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devised the first comprehensive decasualisation plan and an 
integrated set of political and economic demands for employed 
fishermen. Ashwell relied heavily on advice frcm officials of the 
National Union of Seamen, with when co-operation had developed during 
a 1965-7 series of strikes in Hull. Ashwell also included among his 
membership building workers, whose employment was still on a casual 
basis, and dockers, who were decasualised in 1967 under the National 
Dock Labour (NDL) scheme 7. On advice frcm MAFF officials the 
fishing wharves were exempted frcm the scheme so that the 1 lumpers1 
and 'bobbers' (fish porters) were not decasualised. The officials 
argued that a financial burden would be imposed upon share fishermen 
if they lost the right to unload their own vessels, so fishing 
wharves were exempted on the grounds that most of than were used by 
share fishermen as well as employees .
The first port to introduce a decasualisation plan was Aberdeen. 
Armed with Ashwell' s scheme the Aberdeen branch of the TGWU organised 
a strike of trawlermen in 1969. The strike fulfilled many of its 
objectives. A register of fishermen was established to provide a 
pool of labour outside which employees could not recruit workers.
The share of earnings provided by wages was raised relative to bonus
9 , out suggestions of six-month guaranteed contracts came to naught 
• A Conservative government came to power in June 1970, and gave 
no encouragement to decasualisation. Although the Merchant Sltipping 
Act of 1970 established redundancy money for laid-off seamen with two 
years' "continuity of employment" ^ , this provided no protection for 
trawler crews, who had to sign off at the end of each voyage and 
therefore could not achieve this continuity.
Another issue on which the TGWU and seme Labour MPs disagreed writh
the trawler companies was the harsh discipline on board trawlers. 
Progress here was also extremely slew. Three-quarters of a century 
of merchant shipping legislation had treated the shipping and trawler 
industries as essentially identical for disciplinary purposes, 
although share-fishermen were exempt. Although there was a less 
convincing case for penal sanctions for breaches of discipline aboard 
trawlers undertaking short voyages than aboard ocean-going cargo 
vessels, in practice if the law on trawler discipline were reformed 
it would prove difficult to deny merchant seamen equivalent 
treatment. If discipline were to be reformed consultations 
embracing both the shipping and trawler industries would therefore 
have to take place and any reccnmended changes be implemented in a 
Merchant Shipping Act. The desire for co-ordination prevented any 
new major provisions on discipline in the 1970 or 1974 Merchant 
Shipping Acts but a partial solution was found within the trawler 
industry itself. The determination of owners and officers to keep 
shop-stewards off the vessels, together with a growing unionisation 
of the crews led to the establishment, starting with Aberdeen in 
1969, in most trawler ports of Joint Disciplinary Carmittees, 
representative of the Owners' Association, the TGWU and the Trawler 
Officers' Guild, and a further Ccnmittee to discipline officers. 
Together the action of these Ccmnittees meant that the skipper 
maintained his legal right to enforce his authority with penal 
sanctions, but that in practice both skippers and crewmen were under
the restraint of possible fine or censure. While the general
• • 12 opinion remained that the Disciplinary Ccrmittees worked well ,
many in the unions felt that officers often exercised their authority
in a high-handed manner.
The effect of union pressure on discipline and decasualisation was to
make the media. Parliament and public aware that employed fishermen 
had interests other than the desire to maintain access to fishing 
grounds, and that on many issues the interests of vessel owners and 
fishermen were not identical. This was further manifested by a 
mounting media concern about safety.
Fishing is an extremely dangerous occupation; and although a large
number of inshore fishermen, especially frcm North-East Scotland,
died at work ^ , accidents involving distant-water vessels were far
more influential in changing safety regulations, for two reasons.
On the one hand the loss of a trawler with twenty or thirty men
aboard has a far greater impact on the public mind than the loss of
one or two men in a small boat. Secondly, since most inshore
fishermen are self-employed, the costs of any improvements to the
safety equipment of their vessels fall on them, whereas distant-water
crews could, through unions and through MPs, press for improvements,
secure in the knowledge that additional costs would fall on their 
14employers .
The loss of vessels was not the only cause of death or severe injury 
to fishermen. Frequently a crew member would be injured while
climbing aboard, in the absence of regulations requiring proper 
access facilities, and accidents involving fishing gear were also 
fairly cannon. There were, in fact, few specific rules governing 
the operation of fishing boats. The Merchant Shipping Acts 
established minimum manning levels for vessels while under way, but 
no such regulations existed bo cover vessels while actively engaged 
in fishing ^ . This fact, combined with the bonus system, served to 
force trawlermen into working continuous shifts, fishing for up to 
eighteen hours at a stretch. Tired fishermen are more likely to
bee one careless, and the accident rate was therefore linked with 
conditions of work. Skippers often insisted that their crews should 
fish in appalling weather conditions, in order to compete for the 
coveted "Silver Cod" award, an annual prize for the skipper with the 
highest aggregate catch. Since skippers had been accorded sole 
authority aboard by the Merchant Shipping Acts, with penal sanctions, 
crews had no redress
The Pearson Enquiry of 1966 had found that conditions for anployed 
fishermen were "deplorable", and that "the incidence of both fatal 
and other accidents is much too high and must be reduced" ^ . Then 
on a single day in January 1968 three Hull trawlers, the "Rcmanus", 
the "Pendot" and the "Ross Cleveland", went down in exceptionally bad 
weather with the loss of fifty-eight lives. As a result relatives 
organised a campaign, arguing that the vessels should have taken 
refuge in port. This campaign became a national one as the Press 
warmed to a voluble seventeen-stone fish skinner from Hull, "Big Lil" 
Bilocca, who provided a media-worthy focus for the campaign in the 
immediate aftermath of the sinkings . The folk-singer John 
Connally composed a ballad about the sinkings, denigrating "the men 
who have built their fortunes on fishermen's lives" . In Hull
there was a campaign against the "Silver Cod" award, in which a 
replica of the award was painted to appear blood-spattered, and taken 
round the streets. The campaign was successful. Prime Minister 
Wilson had previously agreed to present the award, but under pressure
from within his party he backed down. The award was presented that
20year for the last time and has since resided in a Hull museum
The triple tragedy prompted the appointment of a Royal Ccntnission on 
Trawler Safety. The Hoiland-Martin Report was published in the
following July. The report recormended improvements in construction 
and equipment requirements but also attributed the accident record of 
the industry to lax regulations over working conditions and crew 
training standards. The approach of the Board of Trade and its 
successors to implementation was a gradual one; many of the 
improvements were not legislated upon for several years because of 
cost or implications for conditions and construction standards in 
passenger and merchant ships 22. Only after intense political 
pressure did they become law. A new Merchant Shipping Act passed in 
1970 implemented few of Holland-Martin's reccnmendations on safety, 
for instance a reccrmendation made by Pearson and repeated by 
Holland-Martin and by the Rochdale Committee of 1970 22 that there 
should be a statutory requirement for a gangway to provide fishermen 
with access from quay to vessel 2^ was ignored by the 1970 Act, 
possibly because in certain harbours it was impracticable because of 
the tides, although a Maritime Notice reccnmendation was issued
In 1970 the International Labour Organisation enacted an order for 
all member states to institute a system of compulsory notification to 
government of all accidents involving seafarers. This helped to 
provide those arguing for tighter safety standards with more accurate 
statistics. Sane of Holland-Martin1 s recarmendations on the 
equipment of fishing vessels were introduced by the Fishing Vessels 
(Safety Provisions) Act 1970 . The trawler fleet was to be 
swiftly modified, while consultations were to be set in motion to 
improve the safety of inshore vessels. As recompense, in August 
1971, HMG agreed to provide half of the cost incurred by the deep sea 
fleet in instituting these regulations.
Holland-Martin also suggested stability tests, and here action was
very slow. Officials of the Board of Trade were reluctant to act 
swiftly in extracting the implications of Holland-Martin for inshore 
vessels, arguing that many of the poorer fishermen would be driven
out of business by the cost of improvements if regulations were
. 27over-stringent .
In November 1971 a consultative document was issued which detailed 
hew seaworthiness and stability tests for all fishing vessels over 
twelve metres (approximately forty feet) in length could be phased-in 
over a six-year period. The document envisaged that, while new 
vessels would have to conform strictly to Departmental standards, a 
policy of "reasonable and practical" application would be adopted for 
existing vessels. The Board demonstrated no sense of urgency on the 
matter, and the issue was therefore passed to Working Groups on the 
rules, which proceeded at a leisurely pace, meeting thirteen times 
between April 1972 and June 1974.
The early 1970s thus saw seme improvements in the working conditions 
of employed fishermen, but to nowhere near the extent that the TGWU 
would have washed. Sane in the TGWU and in the Labour Party viewed 
the industry as dominated by a few large firms, who had through 
collective arrangements with MAFF and the Department of Trade 
succeeded in exempting themselves frem much recent legislation on 
working conditions. The sectored, arrangements had not accomodated 
Union demands, and therefore the only way to circumvent the 
obstruction of the sponsoring departments was by political action. 
The TGWU's new National Fishing Officer fran 1973, David Cairns, was 
of this opinion, and saw an opportunity when the BTF pressed for fuel 
subsidies after the OPEC price rise. He responded w/ith a revised 
policy statement on decasualisation, which argued that "the industry"
had already received substantial government grants and loans for 
vessels, processing plants and co-operatives. The figures for all 
White Fish Authority advances to the entire fishing industry, both 
inshore and deep sea, were presented in such a way as to appear to 
refer only to the trawler industry,: and the document asserted that:
"It is time that the principle of 'no public finance 
without public accountability' was asserted more vigorously 
for the case of the trawling industry. The Union's
proposal for a fundamental reform in employment
relationships is one essential part of this process" .
Cairns' opposition to fuel subsidies and the growing strength of the
TGWU in Hull effected vigorous opposition of all three Hull MPs to 
29such subsidies . Cairns also advocated the nationalisation of the 
deep sea fleet, and obtained parliamentary support for this view frcm
Prescott, McNamara and R. Hughes (Lab - Aberdeen N, 1970 onwards)
30 . Johnson preferred only partial and voluntary nationalisation of 
uneconomic firms so as to maintain enployment ^ . Prescott and 
Cairns disagreed with Johnson, arguing that the private control of 
land-based processing, storage and transport would prevent a 
state-owned trawler fleet fran operating successfully in competition 
with private firms and that therefore nationalisation of all vessels, 
except for those operated by share fishermen, as well as of 
processing and distribution facilities, would be the only successful
course. Partial nationalisation on a voluntary basis would obtain
32for the public the least economic portion of the fleet
By 1974-5, therefore, the vigorous bipartisan Parliamentary support 
for the deep sea industry evident in 1967 had largely vanished, and
several of the Labour MPs representing trawler ports were now deeply 
suspicious of the trawler owners' motives. Their advocacy of 
nationalisation was, in contrast to this point, of little importance, 
for given the uncertainty about fishing grounds (see Chapter 10) it 
was unlikely that even the most radical Labour government, let alone 
one dependent upon Liberal support, as the Government of 1974-79 was, 
would have taken into public ownership a fleet destined for 
considerable capacity reductions. The loss of Labour Party support 
for the trawler firms companies left the PCO's traditional 
assumptions somewhat exposed and deprived of the supporting argument 
that access to distant-waters was vital to maintain employment.
The defection of the deep sea fleet iron the narrow-limit view
The weakening of the relative position of the deep sea fleet and the 
collapse of its former bipartisan support was accompanied by the 
defection of the sector frcm the narrow limit views of the FCO. 
Given that the Iceland experience had taught that a continuation of 
distant-water fishing could not be imposed on a coastal state it had 
become probable that the only way to salvage access to such stocks 
without unacceptable force was to obtain seme greater leverage on the 
states off whose shores the UK fleet currently fished. This could 
in theory be achieved by extending British fisheries limits (which 
meant, given the PCO's penchant for managed change and for convention 
law, accepting the EEZ) and negotiating 'swap' arrangements, an 
option favoured by both the BTF and the T3WU. In practice this 
option was almost closed by 1974; since UK distant-water fishing 
concentrated on demersal stocks, notably cod, the principal stocks 
for Which access to them could be exchanged were pielagic ones. The 
harvestable concentrations of mackerel, then thought to be
underfished, were off Devon and Cornwall, rather distant from 
Iceland, Canada and Norway. The obvious attraction was herring. 
While the UK's imputed future EEZ had once been extremely rich in 
herring, the stocks had been vastly overfished, and the several 
years' moratorium necessary to permit herring stocks to be rebuilt to 
the extent where they could sustain a sufficient catch to attract 
large-scale swap arrangements would have bankrupted most trawler 
firms whose vessels had lost access to distant-water stocks. 
Therefore the UK would need to obtain leverage on Iceland and Norway 
by introducing into UNCLOS 3' s draft texts an obligation on the 
coastal state to allcw the aggregate catch in its EEZ to approximate 
to OSY. Since the coastal states off the UK's distant-water grounds 
obviously lacked sufficient capacity to harvest OSY, access for 
British vessels .could possibly be maintained for sufficient time to 
permit British herring stocks to rebuild while the coastal states 
increased their own capacity. This scenario could further be 
improved by obtaining a clause granting preferential treatment to 
states whose nationals had habitually exploited a stock, but such a 
strategy was not without its problems for HMG. Firstly it would 
have strengthened the claim to continued access of the foreigners 
fishing in the future UK EEZ. These foreigners already had a strong 
claim because of the existing formulation of the Ccntnon Fisheries 
Policy. If foreign fishing of herring stocks were not reduced they 
could not be rebuilt sufficiently to render swap arrangements 
feasible, and SNP support in North-East Scotland might grow still 
further.
In an attempt to influence both government and conference, on 8th May 
1974 employers and union issued a joint declaration in favour of 
200-mile EEZs. They urged that states be required to pursue Optimum
Sustainable Yield and to allocate the surplus to habitual fishers.
This shift by the deep sea industry was accompanied by the defection
of a number of back-bench MPs frctn the narrow-limits position. For
instance, TGWU-sponsored McNamara dropped his vehement stance against 
33 . .extensions . Similarly, the BTF acceptance of an EEZ prompted the 
Conservative Parliamentary Party's new Fisheries Sub-Ccxrmittee to 
propose an EEZ with the Ccmrvon Fisheries Policy adjusted to give 
member states sole control of their own waters 34. This call had 
attractions for both pro- and anti-Ccnmunity MPs of both Conservative 
and Labour Parties. In emphasising the advantages of a UK-managed 
EEZ over an EEC-managed one, anti-Market MPs saw a means of weakening 
public support for continued EEC membership. Pro-Market MPs wished 
to obtain a revision of the CFP to show that the Ccnmunity was 
flexible and capable of growth.
The net result of all these changes was to reduce the political 
influence of the deep sea sector and to replace its support for 
narrow limits to national jurisdiction with support for the broad 
concept of the EEZ.
The rise in the political influence of the inshore sector
The decline in the political influence of the trawlermen was mirrored 
by a rise in the political influence of the inshore sector. They 
became much better organised, partly because of the network of 
producer organisations set up under the marketing provisions of the 
CFP. This was not the only reason. One motivator was the fear of 
1982, with the prospect of foreigners fishing up to baselines. In 
1973 the Scottish Herring Producers' Association, many of whose 
members were being forced by the shortage of herring to pursue white
fish, and the Scottish Inshore White Fish Producers’ Association 
joined together with four smaller local fishermen's associations to 
establish the Scottish Fishermen's Federation. By 1974 most 
Scottish inshore fishermen belonged to this body directly or 
indirectly, only the North Scottish Light Trawl Fishermen's
Association, representing seme Moray Coast fishermen, and the Orkney 
Fishermen's Association remained aloof 35. The Federation selected 
as its goal a fisheries zone of fifty miles exclusive to UK 
fishermen. There were three main reasons for this. Firstly the
Association felt that it would enable the UK to co-ordinate its 
extension with Iceland, which had announced its own fifty-mile 
exclusive zone fran 1972. Secondly, such a zone protected frem 
foreign competition the bulk of the Scottish white fish catch and 
almost all of the remaining concentrations of adult North Sea 
herring, as Figure 12.2 demonstrates. Lastly, the inshore fishermen
were not attracted by an EEZ unless it provided the coastal state 
with a wide guaranteed exclusive zone, because they rightly feared 
that MAFF might be happy to trade fishing rights in the UK zone for 
distant-water concessions. They also knew that even a very generous 
interpretation of the Revision Clause in the Treaty of Accession 
would imply foreign fishing close to UK shores for perpetuity. In 
addition it would give UK fishermen exclusive access to both the 
Sunrner and winter concentrations of mackerel, off the West coast of 
Scotland and South-Western England. As Figure 12.2 demonstrates, 
the foreign catch within fifty miles of UK baselines far exceeded 
that taken by British fishermen, and much of this consisted of 
Eastern European catches of mackerel. The Scottish purse-seiners 
deprived of fishing opportunities by the decline of herring stocks 
were ideally suited to take mackerel, another pelagic fish. The 


























































37 340Scottish academics and MPs 3 . The general expectation by 
mid-197^ that the UK would eventually adopt a 200-mile EEZ 
translated this fifty miles into an interim demand until 
UNCLOS 3 had finally settled its Convention, with the hope 
that a larger exclusive zone might then be established.
The organisation of inshore fishermen also improved in 
England and Vfeles, as loose affiliation to the Fisheries 
Organisation Society gradually gave way to closer 
affiliation to a body new in 1976, the National Federation 
of Fishermen's Organisations, which called for action to 
reduce imports and for an exclusive fifty-mile limit, and 
which managed to embrace most inshore fishermen in its 
membership.
Not only did the inshore industry's better organisation and 
united stance make it more vital for MAFF to pay more 
attention to its views, but the marketing provisions of the 
CFP also gained the fishermen powers traditionally wielded 
by the statutory bodies. The nominal division between the 
economic functions of the Producers' Organisations and the 
political functions of the NFFO and the SFF was not a gulf. 
For instance, the Chief Executive of the Scottish Fish 
Producers' Organisation, Lawrie, also served on the 
Executive Board of the SFF, while the NFFO increasingly 
began to provide the secretariats for Producer 
Organisations south of the border.
Inshore electoral disaffection and its political consequences
The experience of the period after 1971 produced extreme disaffection 
among inshore fishermen, which was powerful enough in Scotland and 
the North East to have electoral consequencies. The causes of their 
anger were legion, but industrial fishing and problems related to oil 
exploration, as well as the virtual collapse of the North Sea 
herring, affected Scottish fishermen much more profoundly than their 
English and Welsh counterparts. They were incensed at the continued 
inability of the NEAFC to conserve stocks or to reduce the industrial 
by-catch. Even after quotas had been introduced, the way in which 
they were pegged to states' catch-levels over recent years angered 
Scots fishermen, especially with regard to Denmark, whose directed 
industrial fishing for herring had played such a part. In short, 
the quotas were rewarding the culprits. By the time that TACs were 
introduced, the herring by-catch of industrial fisheries was so large 
that only half of the TAC for herring could be allocated to directed 
fishing. There was universal hatred of the policing system: it was 
generally claimed that British fishermen conformed to NEAFC 
regulations and were thwarted by dishonourable foreign fishermen . 
South Coast fishermen were infuriated by MAFF's continued failure to 
ban beam trawling, while Scots fishermen were disturbed about the 
snagging of nets on seabed installations and debris arising from oil 
development. The CFP was a particular target for inshore derision, 
initially because of anxiety about the review clause, and as a 
world-wide extension of fisheries limits became a probability, 
because of its role in robbing Britain of the fish in what might 
become her EEZ. There were also feelings of hostility to the 
marketing provisions of the CFP. The Producer Organisations found 
that they had no power to regulate British fishermen operating
outside their individual areas of jurisdiction. The inflexibility 
of the system meant that fish retailed in fishing ports might cost up 
to five times the local landed price.
During 1974 extra worries were added. Inshore fishermen feared that 
the National Dock Labour Scheme might be extended to make it 
impossible for small fishermen to unload their own boats, imposing 
crushing labour costs upon them. They were also concerned about the 
costs of implementing safety rules, which they saw as imposed on 
inshore fishermen primarily to reduce the death-toll of TGWU members 
in the deep sea fleet. The exclusion of vessels under twelve metres 
in length from the new operating subsidies intended to maintain 
capacity was resented. The argument that small vessels had 
protected grounds and were not therefore threatened by extensions 
rankled, especially with the South-West long-line mackerel fishermen 
to whom the Buckie or Grimsby purse-seiner was as much an enemy as a 
Soviet trawler. Shellfishermen, operating in small numbers in 
sheltered bays along most of the coast, but especially numerous in 
Galloway, Northumberland, and in North-west Wales, were angry over 
the increase of week-end skin-diving for lobsters by recreational 
divers, and at the government's failure to ban such part-time 
shellfishing
On top of all these complaints came the continuous economic losses 
after the oil price explosion. The realisation that capacity 
reductions would be needed, given the diversion of deep sea vessels 
from their traditional grounds, led many inshore fishermen to suspect 
the motivation of the Department of Trade's swift progress on 
Holland-Martin in 1974-5, after several years sloth. Stability 
tests, which were introduced for inshore vessels in 1975, were
characterised as a contrived means of reducing capacity. In fact 
the change of pace on stability tests was largely the result of 
Ministerial changes. Following the change of Government in February 
1974 the Department of Trade was staffed with Ministers who regarded 
the issue of safety as more important than the economic concerns of 
the inshore fishermen. By June safety surveys had not yet started, 
and many other of Holland-Martin's recommendations had not been 
implemented, including those on occupational safety, crew rest 
periods and accommodation and crew discipline. Under-Secretary of 
State for Trade Clinton Davis (Lab - Hackney C) pressed officials for 
speedier action, with the full approval of his Secretary of State, 
Shore (Lab - Stepney and Poplar). Moreover, Shore appointed 
Prescott, for whom the welfare of seafarers was a personal crusade, 
as his Parliamentary Private Secretary, a post that Prescott only 
accepted on the understanding that he be allowed a great deal of 
initiative in pressurising officials on Holland-Martin 40. Prescott 
possessed considerable knowledge of the situation and attitudes of 
employees in the merchant fleet and to a lesser extent of Hull 
trawlers, but he had little understanding of the attitudes of 
self-employed inshore fishermen. On matters of safety, he tended to 
bracket all categories of mariners together as "seafarers". Hence a 
report which he produced in 1971 as the National Union of Seamen's 
representative on a Department of Trade and Industry Committee on
Maritime Safety which reported in 1971 compared accident rates for
41European and UK "seafarers", with no subdivision into categories 
The pressure which he applied on the Holland-Martin Report was meant 
to tighten up safety in the inshore fleet, but was not drawn from 
specific experience of that section of the industry. The Working 
Group's work was speeded up, and ten meetings were held between June 
and November 1974, almost as many as in the previous two years.
These we re followed by a series of 'teach-ins' which took place at 
the end of 1974 and beginning of 1975
Coincidentally this period of activity corresponded with another 
spate of trawler accidents. In March 1974 the trawler "Gaul" went 
down, at a cost of thirty-six lives. Later in the year two more 
trawlers were lost, the "Ian Fleming" and the "Trident". The
enquiry into the loss of the "Trident", which went down less than 
twelve miles from the Scottish coast, found that the cause was 
"probably insufficient stability in her design" Pressure for
real progress on Holland-Martin increased. The Department of 
Trade's Working Party was, however, unable to delay much longer in 
the face of pressure from Clinton-Davis and Prescott, with the 
Government heavily committed to consultations with the TGWU on 
economic and social matters. New construction and equipment 
regulations were introduced ^ . While the cost of rectification
would qualify for a construction and improvement grant, high survey
45fees would have to be found by vessel owners . A large proportion 
of the vessels tested during the first year failed, and stability 
tests became a major contributory element to an inshore blockade of 
fishing ports in 1975 (see Chapter 13).
In view of the number of issues angering inshore fishermen, it is not 
surprising that their disquiet was demonstrated electorally from 
1973-4. Even though fishermen nowhere constituted a large
proportion of the electorate, in areas where they were strong there 
was wide public identification with the fishermen's lot. A number
of Parliamentary seats in peripheral areas passed out of the hands of 
the two main parties in 1973-4, in ten of which the inshore fishing 
industry appears to have been a significant factor The
Conservative Party, both as the architect of the Treaty of Accession
and as the dominant party in rural England and Scotland, suffered
most severely from the disaffection, although the Labour Party lost
four seats in Wales to third parties. At a by-election in 1973 the
Conservative seat of Berwick-on-Tweed, whose coastline roughly
corresponded to that unprotected by a twelve-mile limit, fell to the
Liberals. The February and October 1974 General Elections saw six
Conservative-held Scottish inshore fishing seats fall to the SNP,
Aberdeenshire East, Angus South, Argyll, Banff, Galloway and Moray
and Nairn. This cataclysm swept away Secretary of State for
Scotland, Campbell (C - Moray and Nairn), and the Minister for Trade,
Noble (C - Argyll). Also, in disposing of the main critic of his
party's policy towards inshore fishermen, Wolrige-Gordon (C
Aberdeenshire E), it signalled to inshore Conservative MPs that it
was necessary, not only to disassociate oneself from the party's
policy, but to change it. It would be facile to identify fishing as
the sole cause of the SNP gains: the Highlands had long been aware
of central government neglect, and there had been a steady decline in
47Conservative fortunes in the area since the mid-1950s
Oil-related developments, and the SNP slogan "It's Scotland's oil”, 
with the claim that an independent oil-rich Scotland would become 
Europe's richest state per capita were also important. However, it 
cannot be denied that more than half of the SNP gains of 1974 came in 
inshore constituencies.
The SNP gains had two important consequences for UK fishing policy. 
Firstly it created a Parliamentary Party untrammelled by the 
great-power worries which obsessed the FCO and the leaders of the two 
main parties, and with little interest in the fate of the 
distant-water fleet. The Party's MPs were able to articulate, as
Stewart (SN - Western Isles from 1970) had done single-handedly in 
the 1970-4 Parliament, the view that the interests of the UK 
fishermen lay with emulating Iceland, not with opposing it. The 
SNP's manifesto for both General Elections of 1974 had promised a 
200-mile zone of fisheries jurisdiction, of which the first 100 miles 
would be reserved to Scottish fishermen Secondly, the 
Nationalist successes could not be dismissed, as perhaps was the case 
with the gains in Wales by Plaid Cymru and the Liberals, as a 
temporary rebellion of the Celtic fringe. The 3NP won three 
traditionally Labour seats, polled well in the Central Lowlands and 
came close to seizing such solid industrial seats as West 
Stirlingshire and West Lothian. To the Labour Government which came 
into office in February 1974 it was essential to stem the Nationalist 
tide and to prevent the further minor gains in popularity which would
allow the Party to gain a large number of further seats, mostly at 
49Labour's expense . Many Labour MPs regarded their defeat as 
imminent. Two lowland MPs left the Party to form the Scottish 
Labour Party, with their own political survival as one possible 
motive.
The SNP was not a mere pressure group for regional issues, it aimed 
at a completely independent and neutral Scotland, and was able to 
mobilise very large numbers of active supporters, especially among 
young people. The Party held that since a simple majority of each 
of the Houses of the Scottish Parliament had in 1707 sufficed to 
create the Union, a simple majority of Scottish MPs would suffice for 
Scotland to secede therefrom. Not only did the SNP threaten the 
integrity of the UK and the strength of NATO, it also was bidding to 
take away much of North Sea oil, which, although not yet on stream, 
was expected by media and public alike to be a panacea for all
Britain's economic ills. At the same time as the FCC was 
manoeuvring at the SBC and UNCLOS 3 to maximise the state-controlled 
continental shelf, the SNP was threatening to deprive the UK of much
of its new-found oil reserves with its cry of "It's Scotland's oil"
50. The Labour government had to do everything possible to champion 
Scottish concerns in order to entice away some of the SNP's potential 
voters. This strategy included, inter alia, introducing legislation 
for the devolution of power to a Scottish Assembly , and vigourously 
championing the interests of inshore and herring fishermen. If the 
latter were permitted to become permanently alienated from the big 
parties, North-East Scotland could become an Nationalist heartland 
regularly returning a sizeable contingent of MPs able effectively to 
articulate SNP policies in a way which might eventually so weaken 
support for the other parties as to give the SNP thirty-six seats and 
to lead to UDI.
The second effect on fisheries policy of the SNP successes in inshore 
fishing constituencies was that they signalled to the surviving 
Conservative MPs in Scotland that they should display active support 
of inshore interests. To Grey and Gilmour were added the now 
stridently inshore voices of Douglas-Hamilton (C - Edinburgh W from
1974) and Buchanan-Smith (C - Angus N and Mearns). Free of the 
shackles of government, they could argue for a permanent operating 
subsidy for inshore fishermen and for a greater preference for 
coastal states within the CFP ^ .
By transferring the responsibility of multilateral constraints to 
the Labour Party, the General Election of February 1974 liberated the 
tongues of a number of Conservative MPs representing English 
constituencies with an inshore interest. Two groups of Conservative
back-benchers were voluble on inshore matters. Sussex MPs Luce (C - 
Shoreham), Irvine (C - Rye), Warren (C - Hastings) and Bowden (C - 
Brighton Kemptown from 1970), representing areas important for 
coastal flatfisheries, continued their campaign against beam 
trawling. They arguea that if the method could not be banned, a 
prohibition on fishing within the twelve-mile limit by vessels in 
excess of twenty-five Gross Registered Tons would have the same 
effect. A trio of Cornish MPs, Nott (C - St. Ives), Mudd (C - 
Falmouth and Cambourne) and Hicks (C - Bodmin) was extremely active 
in opposition to an invasion of the mackerel grounds: not only by 
French and Soviet trawlers but also by Scottish purse seiners 
displaced by the collapse of the North Sea herring. For instance
c n
Hicks favoured the unilateral adoption of a fifty-mile limit , 
while Mudd complained of the plight of Cornish fishermen, 
unsubsidised because their boats were under twelve metres in length, 
seeing their "fishing grounds constantly and consistently raped by 
the fishermen of Scotland who do enjoy the subsidy" .
The Labour Cabinet, therefore, found itself under intense pressure to 
work for the interests of inshore fishermen. The SNP constantly 
hounded the Government from 1974, calling for a redress of inshore 
grievances and for a fifty-mile exclusive limit (the Party's strength 
in the herring ports explains their choice of fifty miles). Its MPs 
called for controls on fish imports, for the abolition of NEAFC 
quotas in favour of a general extension of limits and for 
government-financed minimum price schemes Some of the Party's 
MPs argued that if all nations in the North-Eastern Atlantic were to 
extend their fisheries limits Norway and Iceland could be allowed to 
take a quota of British herring in exchange for a UK quota of the cod 
from those two countries. Unsurprisingly, the SNP's MPs
representing herring ports did not endorse this suggestion.
The new Scottish Labour Party (SLP) also pressurised the Government 
in the inshore interest. Sillars (SL - Ayrshire S) told the House 
that:
"The most important factor in obtaining confidence,
stability and viability in the long-term is a fundamental
change in the Coitmon Fisheries Policy of the Common Market" 
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The renewed parliamentary attention to inshore concerns was not 
confined to Scotland. The ranks of those Liberal MPs active in the 
inshore interest were also reinforced. To Grimond were added the 
newly-elected Beith (L - Berwick-on-Tweed from 1973) and Howells (L - 
Ceredigion from 1974). Eeith was the Party's official spokesman on 
fisheries from October 1974 onwards.
To the effect of the SNP gains must be added the boost to inshore 
concerns provided by disagreements over UK membership of the EEC. 
The Labour government which took office with minority party support 
in February 1974 had resolved deep divisions within the Labour Party 
as to continued British membership of the EEC by promising a 
referendum on whether or not UK membership should continue. The 
majority in the Cabinet was probably in favour of continued 
membership on new terms, and one way to reconcile a greater 
proportion of the UK population to this situation was to be seen to 
"do something" for inshore fishermen. The government renegotiated 
certain terms of the Treaty of Accession, but not the CFP. However, 
all through the 1970s many anti-Market Labour MPs expressed
enthusiastic and voluble support of HMG's pursuing a strong line 
within.the CFP.
The new government therefore quickly moved to allay some grievances 
of the fishermen. After pressure from MPs for Scottish 
representation at UNCLOS retired DAFS Fisheries Secretary Aglen was 
included in the UK delegation for each session of UNCLOS from Caracas 
onwards. The problem of oil-related damage to fisheries and fishing 
equipment was tackled by the establishment in July 1974 of a 
Fisheries and Offshore Oil Consultative Group 56. Its members 
consisted of representatives of the SFF, BTF (later of the British 
Fishing Federation), United Kingdom Offshore Operators' Association 
(UKOQA), DAFS, MAFF, the Scottish Development Department, the 
Department of Energy and the Department of Trade. The group was to 
meet most often in Aberdeen, with the following terms of reference:
"To exchange information on general matters concerning the 
fishing and oil industries, to discuss broad principles and 
to keep under review developments in connection with the 
exploration of offshore oil and gas resources with the 
object of fostering close relations between the two 
industries so that each may carry out its operations with 
the minimum interference to the other" ^ .
The most serious concerns of the inshore fishermen, however, related 
to the regime itself, and could, it seemed to HI1G at that time, only 
be dealt with at the Law of the Sea Conference. Given the declining 
fortunes of, and respect for, the deep sea fleet and the latter's 
support for the EEZ, it appeared that if fisheries could be delinked 
from navigation HMG might be able to take a more strongly inshore 
line at UNCLOS 3.
Stannary
The period thus saw major changes in the organisational structure of 
the industry, with the deep sea fleet in decline and the inshore 
fishermen, in alliance with the purse seiners, improving their 
organisation and honing up their demands. These demands were 
presented extremely effectively, especially from 1974, through the 
use of blockades and of third-party voting, an effectiveness improved 
by the rise of the SUP and by a debate within the labour Party about 
the continuation of UK membership of the EEC. The deep sea industry 
lost the support of the Labour MPs who had been much of its previous 
strength, and lost its monopoly over political contact with MAFF. 
Indeed, reeling from limitations of access or catches on its 
traditional fishing grounds it lost its distinctive stance in favour 
of narrow limits and began to seek ccrrmon positions with the inshore 
fishermen.
Stannary of Part III
Existing policy on fisheries limits, which centred around a 
theoretical freedom of fishing on the High Seas tempered by flag 
states' co-operating with each other to enforce mutually-agreed 
regulations upon their own fishermen, was increasingly challenged by 
a considerable number and variety of developments during the period 
after 1967. Since fisheries limits policy was by and large a 
by-product of strategic policy, many of the challenges were presented 
by developnents wholly external to fisheries, seme of them involving 
changes in the balance of interests underlining that strategic 
policy. Although many of these developments have continued, and did 
not cease with policy change, it is important, in order to understand
why policy change took place, to look at these developments fran the 
perspective of 1974-76; the period during which the central changes 
of policy occurred.
By the mid-19701 s HMG had tried to confront a wide variety of 
challenges to its existing policy so far as possible within the 
framework of that policy. In many cases this approach had met with 
sane success, but in sane policy areas it had proved inadequate. 
There had been a decline in sane of those industries which had shored 
up the UK's maritime state position. The number of vessels in the 
merchant navy had been steadily in decline, as had its ranking in the 
world league table. Accession to the EEC and the ccmpletion of the 
retreat from empire had substituted short trade routes to Western 
Europe for global trade routes, rendering navigational concerns 
sonewhat less compelling.
The decline in these maritime state factors had been accompanied by a 
raising of the importance to the UK of coastal state factors. The 
most vital of these was the need to protect the new continental shelf 
mining industry, and if possible to establish the UK's title to the 
seabed to the West of Great Britain. In addition, the UK needed to 
strengthen its authority, either by traffic separation schemes or by 
compulsory pilotage, over the routeing of vessels passing tlirough or 
across the Dover Strait. Seme success had been met with here by 
recourse to IMCO, and in addition the UK had successfully sponsored a 
convention to control the dumping of toxic substances on the seabed.
There had also been a number of developments which occurred within 
the fisheries sector itself, sane, but not all, resulting directly 
frcm the fisheries regime itself. The inability of the NEAFC to set
TACS or quotas to a level appropriate to ICES reccnmendations, or to
obtain their enforcement. led to a decline in fish stocks and
financial losses among fishermen. These in turn worsened the
effects of the over-capacity which had in the first place led to
overfishing. Specifically, industrial fishing made nonsense of a 
scientific approach to stock conservation, because its lack of 
discrimination between species denied fisheries scientists 
information on stock levels: its initial concentration upon North 
Sea herring destroyed that stock.
These systemic problems within the fisheries were one cause of a 
spate of extensions of fisheries jurisdiction by states off whose 
shores the UK distant-water fleet was operating. These extensions 
worsened the effects of UK overcapacity, by directing seme of the 
larger UK trawlers into waters nearer to heme. This contributed to 
a general dissatisfaction among inshore fishermen towards the narrow 
limits policy.
There were also developments which created new external forums in 
which UK fisheries policy could be influenced. The gradual 
reopening of law of the sea issues which took place within the 
General Assembly, the Seabed Ccmnittee and UNCLOS 3 both created 
opportunities for and applied constraints to the PCO. On the one 
hand it fostered international negotiations on law of the sea issues 
at a time when the majority of states appeared to favour seme kind of 
extension of coastal state jurisdiction, while on the other hand it 
containedthe pressure for such extensions within a 
properly-formulated international conference, thus encouraging 
restraint by states who might otherwise have been tempted to try 
unilateral extensions. While the Conference did not determine
overall UK interests, it required that they be evaluated relative to
one another, and provided the source for the timetable of the placing
of UK policy change. Here UK policy had been fairly successful, in
that it had contained the coastal state majority and prevented the
Conference agenda being ossified in advance. The other development £
preventing a long-term change in the United Kingdom1 s external
environment was accession to the EEC. The EEC appeared initially to
p>eg narrow UK fisheries limits, and provided a new and long-term
forum in v»hich the fisheries regime could be discussed. This forum
had not really developed by the mid-1970's, but in the long run the
moving of so much domestic policy into a European context reduced the
separation of the domestic and external environments, and brought
much fisheries policy out of the realm of the PCO, increasing its
visibility to domestic public opinion.
Apart from those of its aspects vhich were directly concerned with 
fisheries, accession to the EEC affected fisheries policy by 
sponsoring changes in the balance of political forces. Since 
inshore fishermen were disunited and pxxsrly organised their interests 
received scant attention in the accession negotiations, a fact which 
in itself served bo arouse sane resentment within the inshore sector.
It is not inmediately obvious why the accession terms should so anger 
fishermen. The negotiations had in fact been fairly successful, in 
that 95% of the UK inshore catch had been protected by a twelve-mile 
limit and in addition the POO had obtained EEC sanction for its 
narrow limit views. The problem was twofold. Firstly the CFP gave
inshore fishermen little apparent hop» for wider limits should they 
require them in tire future, while secondly the very fact that the 
interests of the inshore industry so obviously counted for so little 
so far as HMG was concerned was in itself galling.
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The marketing provisions of the CFP strengthened inshore 
organisation, and the fact that the access provisions of the CFP, as 
originally constituted, seemed to be against the interests of the 
inshore sector strengthened the" latter's political leverage by 
aligning their interests with anti-market Labour MPs and the SNP. 
The latter were in a strong position to influence outcomes because of 
the possibility of Scottish UDI should the Party win more than half 
the Scottish Parliamentary seats, for which they needed only another 
10% of the popular vote. In relation to accession the UK had been 
successful in bolstering the narrow limits policy, therefore, but in 
relation to inshore fishermen's overall perception of the EEC, HMG 
had failed.
Within the overall context of these various challenges to policy, and 
the adjustments made in order to maintain that policy, there were a 
number of considerations which in 1974-76 argued for UK reappraisal 
of the narrow limits/maximal High Seas policy. Firstly, having 
insisted that the proper forum for considering change in the 
international legal regime was UNCLOS 3, and given that the 
Conference had decided to proceed by means of consensus, HMG could 
not be too rigid. The Conference had bo be seen to make seme 
progress and the developed countries had to be seen to be willing to 
accomodate sane coastal state or developing country demands. 
Secondly the UK needed to obtain UNCLOS sanction for a number of 
interests: apart from the desire to protect the Geneva Convention 
regimes of wide high seas and narrow territorial seas it seemed vital 
to maximise the extent of the coastal state-controlled continental 
shelf, so as to enable the UK to obtain control of as much as 
possible of the floor of the Celtic Sea, the Western approaches, and
of the area around Fockall. In addition the PCX) wanted to establish
the control of the state of origin over anadrcmous fish. The
navigational concerns had been refined down to a need for the right
of transit passage through straits and for innocent passage in the
territorial sea. Thirdly, HMG had proved incapable of preventing
the loss of access for the deep-sea fleet. In Keohane and Nye's
terms, the UK fisheries industry was both sensitive and vulnerable bo 
58extensions . A fourth problem was that HMG had shown itself 
unable and even unwilling to prevent overcapacity, and hence the 
destruction of fish stocks. Fifthly HMG was now tied down by the 
institutional framework and fisheries policy of the EEC. Changes in 
the fisheries regime were clearly necessary.
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POLICY ADJUSTMENTS
As has been noted in Part III, a number of challenges were presented 
to the narrow limits view on which UK fisheries policy was 
predicated. This fact, in itself, does nothing to explain why HMG 
should have decided to alter that policy.
The decision to alter a central feature of overall marine policy in 
this way requires a realisation that the costs of policy maintenance 
have begun to outweigh the costs of policy change. Such a 
realisation involves two things: firstly an appraisal, a weighing up 
of the implications and a relative consideration of the interests 
served by various policy options, and then an allocation of values to 
various interests. If the relative value allocated by a government 
to two interests shifts then policy change may appear warranted even 
if all other considerations remain constant. Similarly the costs of 
a particular high policy may far outweigh the benefits for a 
considerable period, but because sectoral policy is operated in a 
sectoral and self-contained fashion there may be no mechanism for the 
reappraisal of a high policy, and inertia might favour policy 
maintenance.
In the situation under review, both a change in values and a 
reappraisal took place. The change in values resulted partly from a 
reorientation of the UK's foreign policy focus from a global posture 
to a regional one, together with a similar reorientation of trade 
routes, which served to lower the paramountcy of navigational issues. 
In addition HMG's perception of the strategic value of oil rose
sharply with the 1973-4 oil crisis, rendering the strengthening of UK 364
control over the shelf a vital policy concern. The reappraisal was 
provided by the FCO activity in preparation for UNCLOS 3, where UK 
positions on a variety of law of the sea issues had to be set in 
relation to one another. j
We are concerned with the transformation of UK fisheries policy, but 
the minutiae of fisheries policy are subordinate to the fundamental 
nature of the fisheries regime, and three key policy decisions can be 
identified as being central to this transformation. The first is 
the decision by HMG, and the announcement at UNCLOS 3's second 
session at Caracas, that HMG was willing to accept the concept of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, providing that suitable safeguards for 
traditional High Seas freedoms within such a zone could be found. 
This first decision marked an appreciation that the mix of 
competences comprising sovereignty could be delinked, and that 
resource jurisdiction could be exercised without danger to the 
fundamental requirements of navigation, which were newly redefined as 
transit rather than the right to linger. The second central 
decision was made in 1976: namely to adopt a 200-mile fishery zone 
on a fixed date even without Conference agreement. This decision 
marked not only a symbolic move away from the UK aversion to law of 
the sea changes by customary law, but also the end of the 
interlinking between conferences on the law of the sea and fisheries, 
turning fisheries into a resource issue rather than a by-product of 
strategic policy. The third central policy change was the decision 
to take a vehemently national line within the EEC over the CFP. 
Chapter 13 explores the nature and purpose of these central shifts in 
policy, while Chapter 14 deals with the minutiae of policy 
adjustments subsequent to these central decisions.
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CHAPTER 13
THE MAJOR POLICY SHIFTS
As detailed in Chapters 6 to 12, the period from 1967 saw a growth in 
the relative importance to HMG of coastal compared with maritime 
factors. The rise in the price of oil precipitated by OPEC made the 
exploitation of deeper waters and smaller resevoirs more economically 
viable, while the OAPEC boycott emphasised the danger of being 
dependent on energy imports. The continental shelf was therefore 
both a strategic and an economic prize to be safeguarded, and the 
importance to the UK of gaining rights over resources to the 
continental margin was increased. The increased incidence of 
terrorism, and the relative vulnerability of oil platforms, argued 
for a shift in favour of greater coastal state control over 
activities in offshore oilfields than the right to control traffic in 
a 500 metre zone around each installation accorded to the coastal 
state by the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. A series 
of collisions, wrecks, founderings, and the accidental or deliberate 
discharge of dangerous cargo close to British coasts had also 
persuaded a reluctant Department of Trade in favour of greater, 
though limited, coastal state control over navigation. A 
twelve-mile territorial sea had already been offered to straits 
states in exchange for a limited right of transit passage, the former 
an apparent concession which would enable the UK more effectively to 
control traffic in the Dover Strait and to impose compulsory pilotage 
where necessary.
The growth of the saliency of these coastal factors was mirrored by a
decline in importance of the UK’s maritime concerns. The virtual 
completion of decolonisation and the prospect of re-orientation of 
trade from the Commonwealth to the EEC suggested the gradual 
replacement of the UK's long global supply lines with short ones 
concentrated on Western Europe. The growth of the continental shelf 
oilfields promised to reduce the UK's dependence on Gulf oil. The 
number of ships in the Merchant Navy was shrinking fast as vessels 
were scrapped or transferred to Liberian or Panamanian registration. 
By 1974 the merchant fleet, at twenty-nine million tonnes, had shrunk 
to only the the third largest comnercial fleet in the world.
The Royal Navy had also, apparently, shifted from a global to a 
regional posture. No British forces were now based to the East of 
Suez or at Simonstown in South Africa, and less reliance was now 
placed on surface ships. This is not to say that navigational 
rights were of no interest to the Royal Navy; in particular its 
interests in the Mediterranean had considerable implications for the 
law of the sea. Most of these, however, concerned transit through 
straits and navigation through archipelagoes, issues on which the UK 
had already had some success in the Seabed Conmittee.
This growth in the relative importance of coasted, factors to the UK 
had been gradual. The timing of policy shifts, however, was largely 
determined by the international negotiations, and the UK’s own 
coastal state concerns were not the first consideration. After 
having for so long been the principal opponent of coastal state 
extensions the UK offered at the Conference's first substantive 
session at Caracas to accept the concept of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone in return for guarantees for UK interests on certain law of the 
sea issues. There are a number of reasons for this timing, some of
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them international and some of them domestic
One reason for the decision to launch a policy initiative at Caracas 
lay essentially in the very success of FCO tactics at the SBC and 
UNCLOS 3. The UK had driven a wedge between the straits states and 
the coastal states in general by its work in the UK-Fiji Group on 
straits. Its success was in part due, according to Miles, to its 
ability to exploit the fact that most straits states were not 
specifically opposed to the maritime powers, but to regional 
antagonists ■*•. In the UK-Fiji Group (the Group on Archipelagic 
States) a compromise had been struck between the wishes of the 
maritime and straits states. Its essential elements were a right of 
transit passage through straits and one of innocent passage through 
the territorial sea coupled with a general extension of the latter to 
twelve miles. The fundamental FCO concerns about navigation were 
therefore assuaged.
Secondly, the outcome which the UK most feared, the possibility of 
UNCLOS 3's sanctioning sizeable extensions of territorial waters, had 
been made less likely by the almost universal state support for the 
general adoption of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones. This 
development offered the FCO both opportunities and dangers. On the 
one hand, it had reduced the probability of much wider territorial 
seas, per se, but on the other hand the nature of the EEZ was a 
matter for substantial disagreement between states, with some 
alternative draft texts claiming a package of coastal states' rights 
in the EEZ which differed little from sovereignty. These included 
the power to control and regulate scientific research, on the grounds 
that a coastal state would hardly be able to use the resources of the 
zone to optimal effect when other states were possessed of more
detailed information about those resources than itself 2 In 368
addition, many states argued that since damage to the economic 
resources of the EEZ could result from discharges, accidental or 
deliberate, from vessels in the zone, a coastal state should be able 
to establish regulations as to -the construction, equipment and 
manning of vessels passing through the EEZ In relation to 
fisheries itself, some states claimed that the coastal state should 
not only have sole jurisdiction over the fish resources of its zone, 
but should also have exclusive access to them
All these contentions were opposed to the concerns of substantial 
interests in the UK. Natural scientists and mining interests alike 
proclaimed the essential unity of scientific research. The merchant 
fleet, and the UK's invisible earnings from shipping and marine 
insurance, were equally as threatened by the prospect of differential 
coastal state regulations for the construction and operation of 
vessels as by the prospect of direct restrictions on navigation. 
The deep sea industry's support for the EEZ was predicated upon the 
hope that the legal formulation of the Zone require coastal states to 
be compelled to aim at OSY and to allocate to other states any 
surplus which their own fishermen could not harvest 5. Since the 
EEZ attracted overwhelming support from states at UNCLOS 3, the UK 
would only be in a position to prevent unattractive formulations of 
the Zone by offering in principle to accept the Zone providing its 
details were acceptable.
Thirdly, Caracas was chosen because it constituted UNCICS 3's first 
substantive session, since the New York session in December 1973 had 
dealt primarily with procedural matters. The policy of urging 
coastal states to wait for the Conference would backfire unless some
•t
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willingness to concede some of their wishes were shown at Caracas.
Whereas the SBC had initially been made up largely of states with a 
traditional interest in the sea, the widening of the ocean policy 
process to encompass all states brought in a large number of 
land-locked, shelf-locked or zone-locked states who would stand to 
gain little from extensive increases in coastal state power. The 
Conference could thus be expected to prove a more favourable 
environment than the SBC for limiting increases in coastal state 
powers, but only if maritime states were willing to enter into a 
dialogue with them and break up regional voting blocs as much as 
possible. Therefore, concessions had to be offered. In addition, 
the FCO's favourable experience of the Evensen Group had raised UK 
confidence in the possibility of the Conference's yielding a result 
of which the UK might approve. If the maritime states were to stand 
aloof, and refuse seriously to seek consensus, the territorialists 
might lose faith in UNCIOS and resort to unilateral extensions, 
ushering in a period of disputes and unmanaged change.
Fourthly, the experience of the Second Cod War had shown HMG that 
Iceland could not be cajoled. The association of this issue with 
the strength and effectiveness of NATO had brought in an element of 
high policy that argued for coastal state extensions, rather than 
against them. To an extent this was threatened by the rise of the 
SNP, but by far the greatest threat to it was the amply-demonstrated 
willingness of Iceland to consider withdrawal from NATO should the UK 
impose continued access for its fishermen to the stocks above the 
Icelandic shelf. Such a withdrawal would greatly complicate the 
task of patrolling the Greenland-UK gap, which had risen to be a 
primary strategic concern with the tremendous expansion of the size 
and capability of the Soviet Navy which had taken place since 1960.
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Indeed, the patrolling of this gap had become the RN's main NATO 
task. Since the UK-Icelandic agreement was due to expire in 
September 1975, if the UK wished to prevent another confrontation 
dangerous to NATO then it would need to throw its weight behind the 
development of a Law of the Sea Convention which would permit coastal 
states to extend their jurisdiction over fish stocks.
These high policy arguments for accepting the EEZ had been reinforced 
by changes in the organisation and policies of the fishing industry. 
As shown in Chapter 12, sections of the fishing industry had begun to 
reassess the narrow limits policy at the same time as the FCO 
resolved to resist the Icelandic claims. The desire of the inshore 
and seiner fleet to reduce foreign fishing close to UK shores was now 
allied with the deep sea need to find new grounds for the displaced 
vessels. The FCO could not allow the fishing industry support for 
extensions of fisheries limits, which increased rapidly during the 
first half of 1974, to be transmitted to the UNCLOS negotiations, 
since the UK had so many domestic interests which required sanction 
that a willingness to extend fisheries limits was one of the few 
concessions which the UK could offer in exchange. Luckily the two 
sections of the industry had somewhat different demands, with the 
trawler federations favouring an EEZ and the inshore fishermen of 
Scotland calling for a fifty-mile exclusive limit, since they did not 
want their already depressed herring stocks to be swapped away for 
access to Icelandic white fish.
Hie Caracas offer
Given that a general extension of coastal competences over marine 
resources was all that it could offer the coastal states at UNCLOS 3,
the FCO was not anxious for the issue of fisheries limits to develop 
great domestic political importance. However, with the new Labour 
government controlling a minority of the seats in Parliament after 
the February 1974 General Election it was important to show an 
interest in areas of public concern. In particular, the government 
was dependent on the votes of SNP MPs to maintain power. The FCO 
therefore tried to absorb fishing industry demands into the 
policy-making net, thereby playing for time. This was done by 
holding two seminars to gather domestic opinions on fisheries 
matters, to which were invited a variety of interest group 
representatives and academics The clamour of inshore men for a 
fifty-mile exclusive limit, distant-water representatives for a 
200-mile EEZ and of internationalist associations for the 
internationalisation of all resources in the water column beyond 
twelve miles from baselines presented the impression of universal 
disagreement and enabled the FCO to continue with its strategy 
without interest group interference ^ .
The re-formulation of UK marine policy presented a problem in that 
the UK now had a very wide range of interests for which it hoped to 
obtain UNCLOS sanction. In the SBC it had gained some navigational 
guarantees by offering transit passage and a general extension of 
territorial seas to twelve miles: if these gains were not to 
collapse the FCO must not give the impression that the UK was now 
taking a more coastal state position. The offer of an EEZ had to 
appear as an unwilling concession offered in exchange for specific 
guarantees, especially on navigation. Therefore the first 
substantive document submitted to the Second Committee at the Caracas 
session was the UK-sponsored "Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea 
and Straits". The Draft provided for an extension of the
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territorial sea to twelve miles, and for the navigational provisions 
of the apposite Geneva Convention to apply within the extended
Oterritorial sea .
The draft next provided for innocent passage as a normal right, but 
listed more specifically than had the Geneva Convention the acts 
which would not constitute innocent passage. The coastal state was 
to be allowed more latitude than had been the case in 1958. Even 
the temporary suspension of the passage of all foreign ships would be 
acceptable for security purposes. The coastal state would also be 
allowed to make rules, after due publicity, for traffic separation 
schemes, the protection of facilities, the preservation of the 
environment, the maintenance of customs, fiscal, imnigration and 
sanitary regulations, and to prevent unauthorised fishing. Coastal 
states would not be able to make rules applying to the design, 
manning or equipment of foreign ships unless these were expressly 
authorised by international rules. No scientific research would be 
permitted in the territorial sea without the consent of the coastal 
state. The provisions on criminal jurisdiction would be similar to 
those in the Geneva Convention, as would sovereign immunity for 
warships.
In straits wholly within territorial seas, a regime of 'transit 
passage' was to apply. Ships were to move as expeditiously as 
possible from one end of a strait to another. The definition of a 
strait was to be that of the Corfu Channel case, that it connected 
two parts of the High Seas together. A state or states controlling 
a strait would be able to formulate traffic separation schemes and 
sealanes, after such schemes had first been referred to the 
"competent international organisation" (IMCO) . The Articles also
373provided for the co-operation of maritime and coastal states in the 
establishment and maintenance of necessary navigational and safety 
aids in straits
Having laid down its draft text on the territorial sea and straits, 
the UK offered a new package deal, the essentials of which were 
revealed by a "special Representative of Her Majesty's Government", 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Ennals (Lab - 
Norwich N), when he visited the Conference on 4th July 1974, a 
gesture which served to underline the impression that the UK was 
making a new and generous offer.
The core of the new policy was a willingness to consider the concept 
of the EEZ provided that the rules holding sway in it were acceptable 
to the UK. Almost the only new competence which the UK was offering 
to coastal states was in fact control over fish stocks within 200 
miles from baselines, increased control which Ennals characterised as 
unwillingly offered, despite the almost unanimous support in the 
British fishing industry for extended coastal state jurisdiction over 
fisheries:
"On fisheries, we have supported the existing rules of law 
on narrow limits to national jurisdiction but with 
international regulations established by regional fishery 
commissions. This regime has seemed to be to the best 
advantage not only of our own fishing interests but of that 
of a number of other countries in the North Atlantic 
regions... our overriding concern is to help establish a 
generally acceptable Convention. The discussions in the 
Sea-Bed Committee and, indeed, the position already taken
in this Conference by previous speakers in the debate have 
made clear the imperative need seen by many governments to 
evolve a new regime of fishing which will take account both 
of modern developments in fishing techniques and of the 
pressing needs of coastal -states. In the interests of 
securing a general agreement on a new Convention we are now 
ready to discuss positively and constructively the concept 
of an economic zone of 200 miles as a measure of 
progressive development of international law. But if we 
are to create new rights, it is reasonable to look for 
balancing obligations. Our position therefore is 
conditional on the establishment of satisfactory rules for 
such a zone as well as the freedom of navigation" .
In exchange for this limited concession, the UK had a whole string of 
interests which it wanted sanctioned. Paramount among these were 
the rights of transit passage through straits and of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea, and of freedom of navigation and 
overflight in the EEZ:
"Firstly, we are a major shipowning nation. The UK fleet, 
at twenty-nine million tons, is the third largest in the 
world, representing about 10% of world shipping...We... 
regard it of the greatest importance that freedoms of 
navigation and overflight are not whittled away. Wte shall 
seek to ensure the preservation of the right of innocent 
passage through territorial waters and freedoms of 
navigation and overflight outside them... We also have 
defence comnitments which must not be imperilled... These
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interests, like those of other countries, require the
freedoms of navigation and overflight to which I referred 
earlier. In addition they require that ships and aircraft 
should be able to move freely, safely and expeditiously 
through and over straits and archipelagoes" 33.
Ennals also reiterated the UK's willingness to recognise a 
twelve-mile territorial sea in exchange for international 
guarantees for navigational freedoms in over one hundred 
straits used for international navigation which would 
thereby cease to exist. He also reminded the Conference 
of the UK's sponsorship of A/AC.138/SCII/L44 and support 
for the creation of a new concept of archipelagic state, 
subject to a clear definition and satisfactory navigational 
arrangements:
"Firstly it must contain a clear and objective definition 
as to which states may claim archipelagic status.
Secondly there must be satisfactory provisions for 
navigation and overflight by ships and aircraft through and 
over the archipelago" 13.
The compromise on offer was further expanded by members of the UK 
delegation at the Conference. Residual rights in the EEZ, for 
instance, should rest with the international community:
"The principle of exclusive rights for the coastal state to 
the resources of the water column out to a distance of 200 
miles...is not an attractive concept to my delegation.
Nevertheless we are prepared to envisage, as part of an 






rights, on the clear understanding that, as in the case of 
the continentali shelf, those rights extend to the resources 
and that, resource jurisdiction apart, the waters of the 
economic zone continue to be high seas" ^4.
The coastal state was offered only extended control over resources, 
and the UK threatened to oppose ainy attempt to extend coastal state 
competences in any other area:
"claims to other competences for coastal states not 
directly related to the exercise of jurisdiction over 
resources.. .put at risk the progress that has been made in 
the search for bases of agreement. They can only
prejudice a successful outcome to the Conference itself"
15
Attempts to obtain for coastal states exclusive jurisdiction over 
pollution control and over scientific research were definitely 
excluded, and were characterised as not in the interests of 
developing countries:
"The benefits from marine science flow indirectly to all
states coastal and landlocked. The nature of such
science, and the benefits which may flow from it,
frequently are on the scale of whole ocean basins and it 
may be essential to make observations in key areas far from 
the areas most likely to benefit. It is therefore 
essential to all mankind to maintain the degree of freedom 
which marine scientists have required in the past to make 
observations whenever they are required in the ocean. If
this had not been possible in the past, we should not have 
the working hypotheses that we now have to account for and 
predict the recurrence of the recent disastrous Nino 
conditions off Peru and the present disastrous drought in 
the Sahel zone of Africa. ? Marine science cannot be 
subdivided and it would be gravely prejudicial to science 
generally to give one coastal state the right to block 
research which is being carried out in the interests of a 
whole region; knowledge may well be gained from such 
research which could benefit the whole world" .
Any regulations on vessel construction and equipment must be on a
global scale;
"If coastal states have unconditional sovereignty entitling 
them to impose their own requirements regarding shipping 
design and construction there will inevitably be
differences of application. The result could well be that 
a ship able to go to country A could not pass through the 
waters adjacent to country B, its neighbour... It is less 
obvious but equally true that even regulations on discharge 
from ships if applied over a wide sea area are tantamount 
to regulations on their design and construction or
equipment... At present shipbuilders know the standards 
of construction they have to adopt to meet the
internationally-agreed discharge regulations. If however
shipbuilders were faced with a series of varying 
regulations it would be virtually inpossible to design 
ships that could move through all the areas that were 
regulated. As a consequence the economy of ship movement
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378would be drastically reduced and the costs of world trade 
would be significantly increased" 17.
In reality, therefore, the UK was giving little away, and the only 
new offer was the willingness to discuss coastal state control over 
the resources of the water column to a distance of 200 miles. This
was couched as though it were a concession by the UK, which had, 
according to UK representative Jackling, made "a fundamental change 
from our previous position... in an effort to contribute to general
1 O
agreement" . However, in addition to the fact that the bulk of
the UK fishing industry now argued for extended coastal state 
jurisdiction, the UK was not advocating jurisdiction untempered by 
regional fisheries arrangements. In order to obtain renewed access 
for British trawlers to lost grounds it was, moreover, hoping to 
compel coastal states with insufficient fishing capacity to ensure 
OSY within their EEZ:
"We should also wish to ensure that, in regard to living 
resources, due account were taken of their migratory 
habits, of conservation requirements and above all of the 
maximum utilisation principle. There must in our view be 
an obligation upon the coastal state to allow others, 
perhaps with preference for some, to fish for that part of 
the stock which its own vessels cannot by themselves 
harvest" 19.
The new policy involved no pretence of flexibility on two other 
issues on which the UK also required international sanction for its 
position. The UK continued to advocate that coastal state rights 
over the resources of the continental shelf should extend to the
1
margin, beyond the EEZ if necessary:
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"In Britain we expect to be self-sufficient in oil supplies 
by the early 1980s. For us the maintenance of our 
existing rights to explore and exploit the resources of our 
continental shelf, as well as the security of our 
installations from damage or destruction, accidental or 
intentional, are vital" 20.
In addition, there was the problem of anadromous fish, which in the 
absence of special arrangements for their conservation might prove to 
be the principal casualty of the EEZ. Therefore the UK attempted to 
distinguish them from other marine fisheries, strongly advocating a 
species approach:
"We also have a special interest in anadromous fish, 
particularly the salmon which breeds in British inland 
waters but migrates to areas outside our own fishing 
limits. Like all species, they are subject to the dangers 
of over-exploitation, but because of characteristic
patterns of migration we believe that special arrangements
21are appropriate for their conservation" .
Holding the Line
The next two years saw a concerted attempt by the British delegation 
to the Conference to obtain UNCLOS sanction for these interests in 
exchange for the introduction of the EEZ, while at the same time 
maintaining a strong line against any extensions of coastal state 
competences outside the UNCLOS framework. The situation was fairly
•»tfv
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acceptable in relation to marine fisheries, since a suitable formula 
for fisheries within the EEZ was negotiated within the Evensen Group, 
and was largely complete by the end of the Geneva Session 22. Its 
provisions entered verbatim into the first two draft texts produced 
by the Conference, the Informal Single Negotiating Text (SNT) 23, 
issued in May 1975 and the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) 
produced a year later 2^. The UK preference for regional
conservation organisations was bolstered , as was the requirement 
that coastal states aim at MSY (approximate to OSY) 26, and the
provisions on the latter issue stressed the rebuilding of stocks to
• • 9 7  .the requisite level . in the search for this position the UK
maintained a flexibility, and was the sole EEC member to dissent from
two Conmunity submissions on fisheries, one in August 1974 and one
OQin April 1975 • . These submissions, inter alia, attempted to
temper the rights of the coastal state in the EEZ with the statement 
that although regional fisheries organisations were the best way of 
managing fish stocks not confined to the EEZ of a single state, other 
types of regime could exist within customs unions 3®. This was to 
accord with Article 102 of the Treaty of Accession, but HMG wished to 
signal to the Community that it would not necessarily accept the 
latter as competent for stock conservation.
By the end of the Geneva session in May 1975 a generally-acceptable 
formula for fisheries had been reached. The coastal state was
required to ensure MSY (OSY) , with priority for any surplus not 
harvestable by its own vessels to be given to habitual fishers and to 
any developing countries in the region 33. On many other issues
negotiation continued, and the UK was still determined to prevent 





Foremost among the UK concerns which were not yet secured was of 
course navigation. At Caracas, the UK-Fiji Group (now 
popularly-styled "the Group of Thirteen"), a compromise group 
representing states with both ¿coastal and maritime interests, 
superseded the Group of Five as the main vehicle for organised 
opposition to the Straits States Group 32. The latter, thinned by 
some defections, and now consisting largely of the Arab Group plus 
Spain, reacted to the UK's Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea and 
Straits with alternative formulations reserving more competences to 
the straits state 33. At Geneva in 1975 the Straits States Group 
tried again to establish coastal state determination of navigational 
rights in Straits. However, the Group of Thirteen and two straits 
states with considerable dependence upon seaborne trade, Italy and 
Singapore, established that straits states should exercise 
jurisdiction for sanitary and safety purposes over vessels in 
straits, and that rules should be established within IMCO. Hie 
negotiations mostly took place outside the formal discussions of the 
Second Committee, but the Group of Thirteen's position was 
strengthened because the Committee's Rapporteur, Nandan, was a 
Fijian. The group responded to Group of 77 support for increased 
coastal state controls over vessel construction with a new proposal 
containing an element of port state jurisdiction. The proposal was 
presented by the UK and eight other shipowning states as "Draft 
Articles on the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
pollution" 34.
The intention was to create an international regime that would 
circumvent, without interfering with the flow of trade, the lack of 
enthusiasm of some flag states to enforce IMCO regulations. It was
hoped that the pressure for greater coastal state control could be 
reduced by charging any state into whose port a vessel suspected of 
breaches of IMCO regulations might put during the six months 
following the alleged offence to investigate, and to detain the 
vessel if necessary. Port state^jurisdiction was far preferable to 
coastal state jurisdiction so far as the maritime states were 
concerned, since the port state at least had a vested interest in the 
trade being pursued. Two further concessions were made in this 
document, firstly states exercising jurisdiction over "sensitive 
areas" were to be empowered to formulate relevant regulations and to 
lodge them with IMCO, a concession to Canada's Arctic regime. The 
second concession was to permit coastal states to request, and 
receive, certain information from vessels passing through their EEZs.
Part port-state jurisdiction was included in the SOT and the RSNT. 
In general the RSNT arrangements were probably acceptable to the UK, 
in that the text provided that coastal state regulations should 
accord with "international rules and standards established through 
the competent international organisation or general diplomatic 
conference ^", terminology usually implying IMCO. A coastal state 
right of boarding of suspected violators remained 36, together with a
IT
right to take proceedings under its own laws , but the spectre of 
coastal state regulation of construction and equipment had
disappeared. The RSNT was also a little easier on the superpowers' 
naval concerns than the SOT, in that sovereign immunity was 
confirmed, and sole flag state responsibility for violations of 
regulations committed by warship® established. The maximum penalty 
available to a coastal state was to require a warship to leave the
■50territorial sea immediately .
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383At Geneva the future regime for the conduct of shipping on the High 
Seas was largely settled by the Evensen "Consolidated Text on the 
High Seas" , incorporated in the subsequent Negotiating Texts. By 
the end of the session the UK's navigational interests in straits, in 
the territorial sea and on the High Seas were thus protected, and the 
assumption that navigational rights were linked to fisheries now 
looked incorrect. On many other issues, the UK met with less 
success, for example on the issue of residual rights. At Caracas 
the UK joined with the other eight member states of the EEC in 
co-sponsoring a Working Document on the High Seas, which asserted 
that the EEZ was part of the High Seas:
"It is the view of the co-sponsors that the principles and 
provisions contained in the High Seas Convention ... must 
remain in force for areas beyond the territorial sea" 40.
This view was for two years vigorously opposed by the strongest 
supporters of the EEZ, who held that residual rights should rest with 
the coastal state. The road to compromise was opened when in May 
1976 at the Conference's Fifth Session a new coastal state group 
launched an offensive to establish the EEZ as sui generis 41.
The UK also had not been able, by mid-1976, to establish that 
scientific research constituted a basic right, largely because the 
drifting apart of the Group of Five once its navigational 
requirements were safeguarded encouraged maritime states to examine 
more closely their individual interests in relation to scientific 
research. A very favourable draft, from the UK point of view, was 
submitted at Caracas by seventeen land-locked or 




42 Also at Caracasresearch as a fundamental right of all states
the UK, France and Italy joined with thirteen land-locked or
geographically- disadvantaged states in a short-lived Group on
Scientific Research 43, but the Group was unable to prevail against
the Group of 77. In subsequent sessions of the Conference maritime
states were even less successful on this issue. The SNT contained a
regime of implied consent 44, with an onus on the coastal state to
object within a specified time to a proposal for research in its EEZ.
In the RSNT, however, this was only to apply where the proposed
research was unrelated to the investigation of exploitable resources 
45, an Evensen compromise.
Similarly, since the Second Committee was fully occupied with the
EEZ, the UK made, no progress at Caracas in its bid to establish that
state jurisdiction over the continental shelf should extend to the
edge of the continental margin, rather than being defined as stopping
at the 200-mile limit. At Geneva the UK joined a
consciousness-raising and bargaining group of states with similar
attitudes towards the margin. This was partly an out-growth of the
46Coastal States Group, and partly a lobby on the Evensen Group 
It was small, the other members consisting of Canada, Australia, the 
USA, Argentina, Norway, New Zealand, Iceland and India, with Mexico 
and Brazil also contributing some input. Having established a 
common position allowing each coastal state either to delineate where 
the sediments from the shelf ceased or to draw straight lines 
connecting fixed points not more than sixty nautical miles from the 
foot of the continental slope 4 ,^ it succeeded in incorporating its 
decisions almost verbatim in a series of Evensen Group Texts 48. 
The group was not able to incorporate its detailed formulations in 
the SNT, although the latter did define the shelf as extending either
49 1976 saw
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to 200 miles from baselines or to the edge of the margin "*'3.  
no clarification of this situation, in that progress at the fourth 
session in New York City was hampered by a division of opinion
between two alternative formulae for the margin, the Hedberg 50 and
the Irish The RSNT formulation was thus almost identical to the 
SNT one, and although imprecise was fairly satisfactory to the UK 
position as defined by Ennals, since its vagueness permitted the 
coastal state considerable latitude.
Probably the issue area on which the UK was furthest from its 
preferred goal in 1976 was anadromous fisheries. Whereas Ennals had 
asserted the UK's special interests, both the SNT and the RSNT 
favoured coastal states rather than states of origin. While they 
proclaimed that "States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate 
shall have the primary interest in and responsibility for such 
stocks" ^2 it allowed them to set TACs only "after consultation with 
other states fishing these stocks" * . In addition the the 
enforcement of regulations was to be the object of joint agreement 
between states of origin and others 54, making it difficult for the 
former effectively to prosecute violators. It limited fishing to 
EEZs 55, but since these areas would cover almost the entire North 
East Atlantic and North Sea, this was of little use, and would negate 
the phasing out of high seas salmon fishing which the UK had 
negotiated in the Fishery Coimtissions ® . Most of the salmon 
migrating from Greenland waters to spawn in the UK would have to pass 
through the Faroese and Icelandic EEZs. This would make them liable 
to cropping by vessels of all three territories. In addition, the 
text allowed fishing beyond EEZs to continue where cessation would 
result in economic dislocation to states already fishing stocks 




to regional organisations, such as favoured by the UK, but they would 
only be used "where appropriate"
Pressure from the fishing industry for an extension of UK fisheries
jurisdiction
Thus by the end of the fourth session of UNCLOS 3 in May 1976, the 
conference was working with a draft text which accorded with many of 
Britain's interests as defined during the mid-1974 rethink, but which 
fell short on two of them: the freedom of scientific research and
the special role of the state of origin in the conservation of
anadromous fish. During those two years HMG had adopted no
significant unilateral innovations, not even submitting to the
temptation to adopt a twelve-mile territorial sea, which would have 
met with little opposition and which would, if carried out in 
conjunction with similar action by France, have allowed still further 
improvements to the traffic separation scheme in the Dover Strait. 
The fact that the EEZ package emerging at the conference looked as 
though it would be quite acceptable to the UK, especially when 
compared with the alternative of large numbers of unilateral or 
co-ordinated extensions of territorial seas as had appeared possible 
in 1969-70, made HMG all the more determined to do nothing to weaken 
the conference.
The problem with this position was that all sections of the UK 
fishing industry wanted their grounds to be protected, and did not 
feel able to wait until every aspect of the future law of the sea had 
been established to HMG's liking. The Scottish inshore and seining 
fleets had settled on a fifty-mile exclusive limit, and during the 
two years had been extremely restless. Another Ennals Seminar had
•»«V
taken place in January 1975 at which the majority of participants 
favoured a swift extension of UK fisheries limits, and yet no 
commitment or statement of long-term intent had been forthcoming from 
HMG. Then in the Spring of 1975 the Scottish inshore industry's 
discontent had erupted into direct action, which forced HMG to take 
more notice of those of its concerns which were not connected with 
limits, and also contributed to the improvement of the organisation 
of inshore fishermen. There were specific immediate catalysts for 
the revolt. Many owners of vessels less than 40' in length were 
angered by their exclusion from the system of flat rate daily 
payments for vessels above that size which had been in operation 
since February 1974. In addition there was dissatisfaction with the 
quota system. By November 1974, for instance, ninety-five per cent 
of the UK's quota for North Sea herring had been taken. This quota, 
which was only four per cent of the Total Allowable Catch, had been 
intended to suffice until June 1975. Many seiners from Grimsby and 
Peterhead moved to the West of Scotland where the UK had a more 
generous quota, and the resultant high level of effort in that area 
threatened to exhaust that quota also. The alleged dumping of fish 
onto the UK market by Eastern Europeans also provoked rancour. In 
mid-March 1975 a single Polish vessel disembarked 800 tonnes of 
frozen fish fillets in Hull, equivalent to a week's supply to that 
market. The Scottish inshore fishermen were also concerned that 
even if there were a general move to 200-mile limits they would not 
be protected from fishing because of the CFP. The Labour Party 
Manifesto of February 1974 had promised to renegotiate the terms of 
accession, a pledge which they had honoured, and with some improved 
terms. They had however made no attempt to renegotiate the CFP, and 





In late March 1975 a loose "Action Conmittee" based on Scotland 
co-ordinated a blockade of commercial ports to stop the inports . 
The response was nationwide and soon involved Fleetwood fishermen as 
well as their colleagues more normally considered ' inshore'• The 
fishermen had demanded a fifty-mile exclusive zone, a ban on imports 
of frozen fish from non-EEC countries (in the Summer fresh fish was 
to be excluded too), renegotiation of the CFP, and the extension of 
the subsidy scheme to all vessels. On 24th March a blockade was 
imposed on the Humber Estuary to stop imports from entering the ports 
of Hull and Grimsby. HMG reacted by peaceful negotiation and a 
conciliatory attitude. Peart, the Minister of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food rushed to meet the Action Committee. Following 
the meeting, MAFF officials hurriedly fixed up a voluntary agreement 
with Norway on minimum import prices. A few days later a more 
extensive blockade with more ambitious demands started, and by 31st 
March was UK-wide. Brown (Lab - Glasgow, Provan), the 
Under-Secretary of State at the Scottish Office, had refused to meet 
the Action Committee, upon which he had no desire to confer 
legitimacy. On 2nd April, however, he had met representatives of 
the STF and the SFF in Aberdeen, and then spoken to fishermen in 
Shetland. Brown assured them that the Government intended to modify 
the CFP, and would endeavour to meet their other demands.
The blockade held led to a permanent improvement in consultation 
procedures between MAFF and the inshore industry. In his statement, 
Brown agreed to convene a meeting, if possible on a national basis, 
within about ten days of the closure of the Geneva session of UNCIOS 
3 and of the meeting of EEC Agricultural Ministers in Brussels, that 
is, during May 1975. Despite these assurances, the Scottish 
Fishermen's Federation sent its own representatives to Geneva to put
its case for a fifty-mile limit. Following the Brussels meeting,
Brown again met representatives of the Scottish fishing industry in 
Aberdeen, and reaffirmed that HMG would safeguard stocks from 
overfishing and strive for modification of the CFP. Opinion within 
MAFF held that the direct action had resulted from the anachronistic 
nature and inadequacy of the old sectoral arrangements. The BTF had 
lost some of its separate interests and much of its economic and 
strategic importance and yet the inshore industry had not attained a 
comparable consultative position with MAFF. The latter therefore 
asserted its willingness to help the fishermen to improve their 
organisation. Rather than use the emerging network of Producers' 
Organisations as the basis of consultation between Government and the 
industry, MAFF chose the Fisheries Organisation Society as the
nucleus of a tighter inshore organisation and of a permanent
consultative arrangement between fisheries departments and inshore 
fishermen. The latter suspected the motives in this choice, and 
they preferred to operate through the SFF and in England through an 
even newer body, the National Federation of Fishermen's
Organisations, whose membership grew rapidly from 1977.
The FCO's attitude to the demands of the inshore fishermen was 
clearly defined by the need to present as concessions to coastal 
states changes that were, on balance, in Britain's interests. It 
could ask MAFF to offer the UK what it had offered Iceland - closed 
seasons and gear restrictions - but it could not offer any
territorial extension. The FCO view was opposed to any action 
outside UNCLOS 3. Thus a suggestion from Norway for co-ordinated 





The government also had to contend with demands from the trawler 
owners for extensions. Some of their vessels had been diverted out 
of Icelandic and Faroese waters, and they knew that others would 
follow. The need to extend UK limits so as to facilitate swap 
arrangements seemed pressing. As nearly as August 1974 Austen Laing 
had threatened:
"Strongly though we deplore unilateral action, we may be 
forced into a position where the United Kingdom Government 
would have to consider extending our own limits in order to 
protect stocks which are already being fished as much as 
they ought to be"
Pressure from the deep sea industry increased as it became obvious 
that UNCLOS 3 was stalled, especially since fisheries issues and most 
aspects of the EEZ were settled at Geneva. The industry did not 
share the FCO opinion that it should be patient. In November 1974 
the BTF called for a 200-mile EEZ by the end of 1976, whatever UNCLOS 
might do, arguing that an exclusive limit of six miles in a 
twelve-mile zone was equivalent to an exclusive limit of 100 miles in 
a 200-mile EEZ.
The distant-water fleet continued to contract. On 20th May 1975 the 
British Trawlers Federation wrote to MPs with fishing interests, 
asserting "the industry is in danger of total collapse, but very few 
seem to be noticing or caring." The Conservative Party had been freed 
by the General Election of February 1974 from the concern for 
navigation and from international commitments, and on 30th June 1975 
the Opposition front bench initiated a debate, in which MPs of all 
parties called for drastic action, but most of them omitted to state
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what action this should be. Some of them probably knew that a 
reduction in capacity was both necessary and inevitable, but such a 
view would have been most unpopular with fishermen, and most 
Opposition MPs probably preferred to shift the burden of decision on 
to the Government, or on to other states. The fleet shrinkage was 
portrayed as a disaster: both McNamara and the Opposition spokesman 
on Agriculture, Jopling (C - Westmoreland), estimated that the 
distant- and middle-water fleet would lose between 150 and 200 
trawlers during 1974 and 1975 62. Only Watt (SNP - Banff, 1974-79) 
dared to suggest openly that there was over-capacity, and that the UK 
should pay a scrapping subsidy. He was assailed as a traitor to the 
fishing industry by Bishop, the Government spokesman. According to 
Bishop such a subsidy, without regime change, would only have 
increased returns to foreign fishermen fishing the same grounds, and 
would, therefore, not necessarily have benefitted the rest of the UK 
fleet 63.
Both the government and the official opposition thus committed 
themselves to maintain a high level of capacity at a time when it was 
by no means certain that there would ever be any hope of that 
capacity being economically employed. It thus became imperative for 
domestic reasons to support the interests of both sections of the 
industry, a fuzziness of intent which was to lead to another cod war 
at the same time as the government was planning to adopt extended 
limits to its own jurisdiction over fisheries.
Sunmary
In mid-1974 HMG, faced with growing coastal state concerns within the 
UK, and with an overwhelming majority of states at UNCI/DS 3 favouring
some form of extension of coastal state jurisdiction, offered to 
concede the concept of an Exclusive Economic Zone favoured by the 
majority of developing countries. This offer was conditional upon 
mutually acceptable arrangements for the Zone, and specifically a 
formulation which maintained the rights of passage through straits 
and the territorial sea. While the negotiations at UNCLOS continued 
HMG ignored, so long as it felt able, the united stance of the 
fishing industry in favour of a UK extension of jurisdiction, since 
the FCO did not wish to lose the bargaining counter of resource 
extensions which it was offering the developing states at UNCLOS 3.
The reluctance to extend limits was accompanied by a bipartisan 
policy of making vague premises of support for the industry, such as 
Brown's committment to reform the CFP and the various undertakings 
made at the adjournment debate of 30th June 1975. These promises of 
support mobilised the fishing industry behind perhaps unobtainable 
demands, and ushered in a period of several years during which the 
industry, with its perceived public sympathy, was able to ensure that 
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Despite grand words in the debate, most significant contributions were 
made by members with an established concern for fishing, and towards 
the end of the debate there were only seventeen members in the House.
CHAPTER 14
THE MOVE TO A TWO HUNDRED MILE FISHERY LIM IT
The policy of containing change within the conference became 
untenable during 1976, because of a renewed clash with Iceland, which 
resulted in Iceland's again threatening to leave NATO. This, 
together with growing evidence of the inability of the NEAPC to 
conserve stocks, and with mounting political pressure frcm the 
fishing industries of EEC member states, led the EEC countries to 
by-pass the UNCLOS 3 negotiations and to declare their own 200-mile 
fisheries zones with effect frcm 1st January 1977. By 1976, 
although UNCLOS 3 appeared to be stalled, many of Ennals1 declared 
interests had been sufficiently ensured by the draft texts and the 
process of fragmentation into groups of states had been so thorough 
that a major re-opening of many of these issues looked unlikely. 
Also, the basic ocmprotnise of the EEZ had such universal support that 
it was unlikely to be ruined by a concerted succession of extensions 
outside the UNCLOS framework by powerful states, provided that those 
states acted in accordance with the formula in the current draft 
text. The EEC states did not declare Exclusive Economic Zones, but 
only fisheries zones, as did a number of other states during 1976-77, 
including Canada, the USA, the USSR and Japan.The extensions were 
possible because the course of UNCLOS 3 had effectively delinked 
fisheries and navigation.
The T h ird  Cod War
The two year agreement with Iceland was due to expire in November 
1975, and in July Iceland announced that it would be extending its
fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles in October. If the UK wanted to 
use the dispute to strengthen its position at the conference, so did 
Iceland. A dispute ensued which in many ways mirrored that of 
1972-3, with two principal differences - there was more danestic 
opposition and the escalation to violent confrontation was much more 
swift.
The significance of such a claim for events at UNCLOS 3 meant that 
POO Ministers were involved almost irrmediately. Leadership was 
exercised by Hattersley (Lab - Birmingham Sparkbrook) Minister of 
State at the POO, and sometimes by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Ccnmonwealth Affairs, Callaghan (Lab - Cardiff SE). One attempt 
was made to conduct separate scientific and legal negotiations ^, but 
the hidden hierarchical subordination of one bo the other prevented a 
satisfactory outcome. Furthermore, since the PCO would not give way 
on the legal issue, as in the earlier dispute, the only aspect on 
which a concession could be made was catch levels. Moss, MAFF's 
Deputy Secretary in charge of Fisheries and Food, was a hardliner on 
the catch issue, and both Hattersley and Callaghan regarded severe 
catch-limitations as damaging to UK prestige. There was thus little 
flexibility in the UK stance, and the lessons vhich Iceland had 
learned in 1972-3; that violent confrontation and threatening NATO 
wiould increase the cost of the dispute for the UK, were quickly 
applied.
Most sections of the 1972-3 coalition were still intact. There was 
little disagreement between government Departments as to the 
significant issues. The Department of Trade and the Ministry of 
Defence were still well- integrated into FCO policy, although MAFF 




and less willing to accord the PCD a monopoly of public relations 
than it had been in 1972-3. Although the majority of inshore
fishermen sympathised with the Icelanders, most pragmatically did not 
wish British trawlers to be diverted into British coastal waters.
Like MAFF, the BTF had lost its concern for the strategic views of
the PCO, and cared about access and about catch levels alone. The
threat of contagion to Norway and Faroe had almost vanished.
Neither the Federation nor Austen Laing as an individual were still
particularly concerned about the High Seas' downgrading, ccumitted as
othey were to the concept of a 200-mile EEZ . They were obviously 
concerned that their vessels should not be forced out of Iceland 
before the UK had developed its own EEZ, however, and provided 
advisors to the negotiations. The TGWU, partly through the
influence of National Fishing Officer Cairns, was unimpressed by 
confrontation with the Icelanders, suspicious of the trawler owners, 
and unconcerned with the balance in UNCLOS 3. It favoured 
withdrawing British trawlers frati the disputed area, paying 
compensation to the employees, and negotiating for seme continued
access . Little thought appears to have been given as to what
leverage could be applied. The position of the TGWU, plus the views 
of Heffer (Lab - Liverpool Walton), helped to move the Labour Party's 
National Executive Ccrmittee to a position by late 1975 of mild
4opposition to Britain's use of force .
Once violence had begun, a Deep Sea Fishing Industry CcrTmittee was 
established, as in 1972-3. The PCO attempted to convince the 
Icelanders that a settlement could be made directly between the 
latter and the Deep-Sea Fishing Industry Carmittee, a settlement 





In February 1976 the Ccnmittee 'volunteered' , after negotiations with 
the PCO, to limit its effort on the Icelandic Continental Shelf to 
105 trawlers with an implied catch of 100,000 tonnes. Such an offer 
could not have satisfied the Icelandic government, which had staked 
its politiceli survival on the question of legal jurisdiction.
The political parties took much the same positions as they had in 
1972-3. The Government took a tough line with Iceland, and its
position did not waver even in the face of opposition frem the 
National Executive Ccrrmittee of the Labour Party. The opposition 
front bench acted as their Labour colleagues had done in the earlier
5dispute, and expressed approval of the government's actions 
Buchanan-Smith was articulating a mutual front-bench understanding 
when he told the House :
"There is no dispute about the end which, I hope, the 
Government sire seeking to achieve, the extension of limits.
The dispute is about the means and the timetable for doing 
so. Iceland is taking unilaterali and illegal action in 
advance of multilateral negotiations"
There were a number of opponents of the government in both main
parties. Those in the Labour Party usually opposed the concept of a
big state coercing a small one. Stonehouse (Lab - Walsall N) spoke
of the PCO's "big power mentality" ^ . Luard (Lab - Oxford, to 1970,
1974-79), himself an authority on the law of the sea, and later to be
appointed HMG's Special Representative to UNCLOS 3, stressed the
paradox that the UK, having steadfastly opposed extensions of coastal
state jurisdiction, was itself expected to declare a UK EEZ and would
8have to maintain international credibility . Prescott, although a
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401Hull MP, shared Cairns' views on the dispute, and conducted
Qindependent negotiations with Iceland
New Conservative dissenters consisted mainly of persons concerned for 
the security of NATO. The most vociferous addition to those who had 
expressed fear on these grounds in 1972-3 was Lawrence (C - Burton). 
The other parties lined up as they had in 1972-3. The number of 
Plaid Cymru and SNP MPs had risen fran two to fourteen, and the 
latter were vailing to express what neither of the two main front 
benches were willing to state, that in the eyes of the government the 
dispute was not primarily about fish. A  particularly well-expressed 
attack upon the detached legalistic attitude of the POO was made by 
Watt (SNP - Banff, 1974-79):
"An even bigger worry is that negotiation wall be done not 
by the Minister of Agriculture and his team, who have seme 
knowledge of fishing and fish, but by the Foreign Office, 
which has none... Icelandic fishermen have been talking 
to British academics. One side went through the hard 
school of the North Sea and the North wands while the other 
came through the soft school of double firsts at seme 
University and straight into Westminster. It is little 
wonder that the talks failed....If the Foreign Office is to
be negotiator in the EEC, our fishermen will be the losers"
10
The SNP characterised deep sea fishing as a solely English industry, 
a characterisation which was not entirely accurate, since there vras a 
substantial middle—water industry based on Aberdeen. For the SNP, 
Aberdeen1 s two seats were worth forfeiting in exchange for about
twenty constituencies with an inshore industry. When an STF 
delegation came to London, no SNP MPs offered to meet it. Among the 
Liberals, only Grimond and Howells (L - Cardigan, from 1974) ventured 
into the Iceland debate. Howells called the Cod War "senseless", a 
dispute about something on which HMG itself was preparing a 
volte-face .
In many ways the course of the dispute mirrored that of 1972-3, 
although it escalated much more rapidly. Iceland had learned the 
propaganda gains to be derived frcm harassment, while the UK in turn 
had learned that fisheries disputes had a relentless logic of 
escalation. The special links between the Labour Party and the 
trade unions also meant that the Labour Government was under pressure 
to act decisively to protect trawlermen's lives. The first warp 
cuttings of November 1975 provoked naval intervention. On 12th 
December the Icelandic gunboat "Thor" fired live anmunition at the 
"Star Aquarius", probably as a signal to the NATO Council then in 
session.
Iceland used confrontation to raise the cost in money and prestige of 
continued access for the UK. The gunboats deliberately collided 
with frigates, causing severe damage on forty-one occasions between 
25th November 1975 and 10th May 1976. The dispute cost HMG £2 
million in compensation and vessel hire, in addition to many millions 
in repairs. The effect cn prestige was still more damaging; 
photographs of expensive, well-armed frigates limping away frcm 
Iceland with great gashes in their sides frcm collisions with 
tugboats only served to make Britain look ridiculous in the eyes of 
the world. Harassment also raised UK costs in that it reduced
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catches (see Figure 10.4) and destroyed fishing gear, creating
demands from trawler owners for government ccnpensation. Hie use of 
force, once errbarked upon, created problems for the negotiations, 
with the UK's refusing to negotiate until harassment should cease and 
Iceland's refusing to negotiate until the frigates were withdrawn.
The shift of negotiating focus to catch limitations occurred again. 
From the beginning the Foreign and Ccrrmonwealth Secretary was heavily 
involved, and talks between Ennals and Hallgrimsson, the Icelandic 
Foreign Minister, book place as early as 30th July 1975. This high 
ministerial priority resulted in part from the crucial state of the 
UNCLOS negotiations, vhich had just oorrpleted their third session at 
Geneva, and in part also from the danger of Iceland's distancing 
itself from NATO. In Novenber 1975 the UK negotiating team, headed 
by Hatters ley and Bishop, offered to reduce the UK cod catch to
110,000 tonnes, vhile the Icelanders insisted on no more than 65,000. 
To have accepted such terms would have involved a loss of prestige, 
despite the fact that scientific advice was unanimous in saying that 
the aggregate catch was too high. Pour months later Prescott, 
acting privately, obtained an offer of 70,000 tonnes. The UK 
developed two face-saving schemes in February 1976, by vhich catch 
levels oould be depressed considerably without the PCD backing down 
and without a change in the status of the waters. Hie first was to 
offer Icelandic scientists the opportunity to set a Total A1 leasable 
Catch, with the UK to be allowed twenty-eight per cent of it. 
Icelandic negotiators could not agree, because an increasing 
Ioelandic share of the catch was vital to the government's domestic 
popularity and plans for economic growth. The second face-saver was 
the 'voluntary' offer of a aatch of 100,000 tonnes made by the Deep 
Sea Fishing Industry Comuittee. This was not accepted either, and 
until June 1976 the initiative for a settlement lay outside bilateral
negotiations.
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Britain made no use of the ICJ, because the Court had beccme a less 
reliable ally in the face of a large number of state extensions of 
fisheries jurisdiction which had occurred in the interim. The Court 
had ruled on 25th July 1974 that it could not comment on the legality
of fifty -mile or 200-mile fishing limits, but that the unilateral
12extensions as used by Iceland were contrary to international law
The most significant multilateral institutions in this dispute were 
NATO and the EEC. Almost intnediately, NATO Headquarters in Brussels
offered to provide informed, non-diplanatic channels. As early as 
October 1975 there were informal discussions between Ennals and 
Evensen. Evensen was an excellent person to understand both points 
of view. Apart iron the ethnic affinity and common dependence upon 
fishing which Iceland and Norway shared, his role and experience at 
UNCLOS 3 gave him flexibility and prestige. On 28th November Prime 
Minister Wilson (Lab - Huyton) echoed Heath and offered negotations 
directly to PM Hallgrimsson, to no avail. In the third week in 
January, just before the NATO Council meeting in Copenhagen, Luns 
went to Reyjkavik. Extensive discussions took place on 19th 
January. Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary Callaghan were in Copenhagen discussing with Ministers from 
various NATO countries and that evening Callaghan and Luns flew to 
Brussels for further discussions. Luns was aware of the Icelandic 
reluctance to be seen to negotiate under duress, so he persuaded the 
UK to withdraw the frigates immediately. An attempt to repeat the 
success of October 1973 followed, under Luns' good offices. Talks 
took place in London between Wilson, Callaghan and Hallgrimsson on 
24-27th January, with British and Icelandic fishery scientists
meeting separately. It was at this meeting that the offer of 
twenty-eight per cent of an Icelandic-determined TAC (see page 403) 
was made. After extensive consideration fcy the Icelandic Cabinet 
the offer was turned down on 3rd February, partly because of 
differences between the parties making up the coalition. During the 
period of Icelandic deliberation Wilson wrote again to Hallgrimsson, 
stressing UK appreciation of the need to protect ccnrnunities strongly 
dependent on fishing and of the inperative need to conserve stocks. 
Wilson bold him that the UK was very happy to make substantial catch 
concessions, providing that the 1 freedom of the seas' was not 
compromised 13.
Following further warp cuttings the frigates returned on 6th 
February, and confrontation worsened to the extent that Iceland broke 
off diplomatic relations an 19th February. This breach of 
diplomatic relations led to NATO pressure being applied in earnest. 
The Nordic Council also emerged as a key body in the dispute. The 
three members of that Council who were also menbers of NATO, Denmark, 
Norway and Iceland, all had inportant fishing industries. Norway's 
role in the dispute was crucial. A member of both NATO and the 
Nordic Council, she had of course herself been involved in fisheries 
disputes with the UK in the past, and Frydenlund, her Foreign 
Minister, had offered to mediate.
On 29th February 1976 the Council's Praesidium issued a 
reoorrmendation to menber countries to press for the withdrawal of the 
British frigates, which were "preventing a peaceful solution to the 
conflict During March, Norway and the Faroes each made 
bilateral agreements with Iceland to limit their own fishing efforts 
in the Icelandic 200-mile zone * , hence divesting Norway and Denmark
of their own disputes with Iceland. On 26th March the Foreign 
Ministers of the Nordic Council states called for UK warships to be 
withdrawn.
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The United Kingdom was now dangerously exposed, as she had been in 
1961. All the other states with distant-water fleets fishing 
Icelandic waters, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, had now made bilateral agreements with Iceland tacitly 
giving seme recognition, even if not expressly stated, to Iceland's 
200-mile zone. There was discussion within the Ccrmunity of a 
concerted extension of jurisdiction by EEC states to 200 miles. 
However much the PCO might hope to reserve to itself relations with 
Iceland, media discussion within the UK conveyed UK fishing industry 
opinion to Iceland. This enabled Icelandic Ministers to point out 
the ludicrousness of the UK position. Ostensibly the PCO was 
fighting for the deep sea industry, whose largest representative 
body, the British Trawlers Federation, was at that time calling for a 
100-mile fishing zone reserved exclusively for UK ships. In March 
Hallgrimsson drew attention to the irony of this demand and announced
1 f tthat Iceland would be happy to accept the same
In the light of HMG' s political isolation it looked as though sane 
measure of extended fisheries jurisdiction could and must be 
conceded, hopefully without the total erosion of all rights which had 
been enjoyed under a High Seas regime. That this might be feasible 
was increasingly demonstrated with the emergence at UNCLOS 3 of the 
details of the Exclusive Economic Zone. Simultaneously with that 
Conference's Fourth Session in New York a retreat began, under 
diplomatic pressure from NATO states and wdth Norway playing a key 




407Prime Minister Nordii and Foreign Minister Frydenlund. Iceland 
tried to force the USA to choose between herself and the UK by 
requesting frail the USA the lease of two fast naval patrol boats. 
Secretary of State Kissinger's assurance to Callaghan that the 
vessels would not be provided prompted a firm warning from Minister 
of Justice Johannesson that Keflavik base might be closed ^ . This 
threat almost coincided with the elevation of Foreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary Callaghan to be Prime Minister. He was 
replaced by Crosland, who as MP for Grimsby had been a staunch 
opponent of catch concessions to Iceland. This erstwhile hardliner, 
confronted with mounting evidence of the threat posed by this dispute 
to the UK's most vital high policy concerns, now had to find an 
honourable way out of the crisis.
Three fundamental problems remained, of which the first was prestige.
The UK retreat could not be allowed to appear to be made under duress
frcm a minuscule nation equipped wdth converted tugboats. In fact,
as harassment proved more effective during the early days of May and
catches diminished, it proved increasingly difficult to demonstrate
that the Royal Navy could genuinely enforce the right of UK vessels
to fish in those waters. Low domestic cod prices because of high
imports damaged the economic position of the distant-water fleet, and
made trawler owners less wdlling to fish off Iceland. There was a
rebellion of trawler crews on 3rd May because of the government's
refusal to offer financial compensation to than for their loss of
earnings consequent upon the low catches. The number of trawlers
18engaged in fishing dropped on seme days below twenty-five . In 
another blow to the prestige of the Navy, it was announced on 20th
May that frigates were to be fitted with wooden fenders and sandbags





The second problem facing the FCO was how to make a volte-face on the 
issue which had brought about the U K 1 s intransigence in the first 
place, namely the need to avoid any formal concession to coastal 
state jurisdiction over fish resources beyond twelve miles frcm 
baselines. The UK had always insisted that any agreement would have 
to accord with the Geneva Convention formula that the coastal state 
has no absolute jurisdiction over the fishery resources in the High 
Seas adjacent to its territorial sea, but does have a ' special 
interest' . It had held that however massive the catch and area 
concessions made by the UK, policing of UK vessels must remain in the 
hands of the United Kingdom and there must be no explicit statement 
in the text relinquishing the High Seas status of the waters beyond 
twelve miles. As an indication of good faith, at the end of April
the UK asked trawlers to stay beyond twenty miles frcm Icelandic 
21baselines , but this was characterised as a voluntary flag state 
action. Now the UK was planning to adopt a coastal state line in 
relation to fisheries, and the switch had to be justified.
The third problem for Crosland lay in placating the hardliners. 
After having urged Moss, the English and Welsh Fisheries Secretary, 
to be firm, the FCO was not particularly worried about NATO. 
Crosland therefore revived a catch ceiling of 70,000 tonnes agreed in 
February 1976 between Einarsson, a senior official of the Icelandic 
Foreign Ministry, and Prescott during a visit to Iceland by the 
latter (see Appendix II). After indirect contacts, at the NATO 
meeting of 20-21 st May the Icelandic Foreign Minister offered 
Crosland an effort limitation agreement worth 70,000 tonnes. Moss 
did not consider the offer sufficient, and counselled Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Peart (Lab - Workington) that Iceland
was herself under pressure frctn NATO states, and that a better offer 
could be obtained. No such offer was forthcoming, and at an 
emergency meeting in Hull Moss agreed not to oppose the offer 
provided the UK would expedite its own adoption of a 200-mile limit.
The stage was now prepared for an agreement, with all the niceties 
observed to prevent British loss of face. Crosland went to the 
Conference of NATO Foreign Ministers early and spent 18th May in 
talks with Frydenlund. Before he left he told the House of Cannons:
"I should like above anything else to achieve a settlement
of this dispute in which there would be no victory and no
defeat, but in which both sides cane out with a reasonable
22and honourable settlement .
If this was Crosland's aim, Frydenlund did his best to fulfil it and 
to salvage UK prestige. Crosland explained to his Norwegian 
counterpart that the UK needed an interim right to fish until the EEC 
member states should extend their own limits to 200 miles. The 
Federal Republic of Germany was then urging restraint on its fellows 
in the hope that UNCLOS 3 ‘s Fifth Session in Autumn 1976 would 
finalise the shape of the future law of the sea and produce a 
Convention. Therefore, while Luns and the Norwegian Ambassador in 
Reyjkavik urged Iceland to permit an "interim" agreement which would 
not formally recognise Icelandic jurisdiction over the 200-mile zone, 
Frydenlund made a well-publicised speech on 19th May apparently 
appealing bo both sides. Norway was willing to mediate in the 
dispute but neither side wanted this to happen, he said. He asked 
that UK frigates be withdrawn from the disputed area, but eschewed 
the belligerent language of the Nordic Council1 s statement on the
matter. Their withdrawal should take place, suggested Frydenlund,
23because it would be 'psychologically helpful'
The following day, on 20th May, Agustsson told the NATO Conference
that it was "extremely likely" that Iceland would give formal notice
of her intention to leave the NATO organisation within six months.
Over the weekend he and Hallgrimsson met informally with Crosland
several times, with Luns and Frydenlund acting as mediators. Since
the EEC member states were discussing the extension of their own
fisheries limits to 200 miles, the legal question had lost most of
its former importance. All that was now vital was an interim
agreement for six months concomitant with an annual UK catch of about
70,000 tonnes of cod as envisaged in the Prescott deal. The UK
could not withdraw the frigates, however, until Iceland had agreed to
formal negotiations. Agustsson and Hallgrimsson conveyed the verbal
package to their relevant Parliamentary Cdimittees on 27th May, and
on 30th May the Icelandic Government announced that it had decided to
24' explore' whether it was feasible to reach a short-term agreement
In response the frigates were withdrawn as arranged and the UK
trawlers were ordered to cease fishing, with Treasury compensation
25for the crews while the agreement was being finalised
26By an Exchange of Notes on 1st June 1976 (the Oslo agreement) the 
two states agreed that the UK Government would limit British fishing 
effort to an average, over each month, of twenty-four trawlers 
fishing each day, with no more than twenty-nine in any one day, for 
the duration of a six-month phasing out agreement. The list of 139 
trawlers recognised by the interim 1973 agreement was to be pruned to 
ninety-three. Conservation areas were to be maintained as per the 
1973 agreement, and Iceland would be able to introduce more,
providing they were non-discriminatory in application. The system 
of policing designed to obfuscate the status of the waters beyond 
twelve miles applied in the agreements with Norway was adopted. To 
sane extent the UK recognised an extension of Iceland's limits, 
because it was agreed that no -UK trawler would fish closer than 
twelve miles frcm the baselines. This provision was only partially 
within the spirit of the European Fisheries Convention, in that 
historic rights were being disregarded. In form, however, the High 
Seas regime was maintained, because this was an agreement by the UK 
to prevent its own vessels frcm fishing in a certain area. The UK 
pledged itself to press the EEC to implement Protocol 6 to a 1972
07treaty of association between the Caimunity and Iceland , extending 
EEC tariff concessions for Icelandic goods, including fish, to a 
level as if the Protocol had been in force since 1973. The Protocol 
had not previously entered into force because of the fisheries 
dispute. The UK would also ask the EEC to negotiate long-term 
reciprocal fishing quotas with Iceland. The agreement would have 
reduced the UK annual catch off Iceland to perhaps 60,000 tonnes, but 
in fact it was soon overtaken by an extension of both Icelandic and 
EEC states' fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. Its importance lay 
not so much in the displacement of forty-six distant-water vessels, 
as in its removal of a final obstacle to the UK adoption of a 
200-mile fisheries limit (in practice, although the UK avoided any 
such claim, this was little short of an Exclusive Economic Zone) . 
Its other significant effect was to render inevitable the ultimate 
displacement of all UK trawlers working the Icelandic shelf. The 
effect of this was to further anger an already rebellious inshore 
industry and to bring about a cannon purpose within all sections of 
the UK fishing industry and within MAFF for the adoption of a 
vigorously coastal state fishing policy rather than an open access
4 1 1
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one. The displaced trawlers must have grounds, but should not find 
them at the expense of inshore fishers or of the near-water trawlers.
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With the Icelandic agreement HMG could no longer ignore the deep sea 
industry's need for grounds, and since many other important maritime 
states were now planning extensions it was clear that they could take 
place without any significant threat to navigation. Swap 
arrangements had vanished as a short-term possibility since there 
were no herring left to trade for distant-water white fish. 
Financial losses (see Chapter 9) and access-limitation agreements 
(see Chapter 10) had weakened the BTF's devotion to free enterprise. 
Icelandic harassment had succeeded in depressing British catches 
severely over several months, and the temporary subsidy scheme for 
larger vessels expired at the end of 1975. Together with low landed 
prices these factors premised severe fleet contraction unless secure 
grounds were obtained swiftly.
This led to a new relationship between erstwhile rivals, aided by the 
improving organisation of fishermen. In June 1976 the BTF and STF 
dropped their request for a 100-mile zone in order to co-ordinate 
with the SFF and NFPO a demand for a fifty-mile exclusive zone in a 
200-mile EEZ. This became the united policy of the Whole industry, 
and the relationship between the organisations and the MAFF 
Parliamentary Secretary with responsibility for fisheries became 
close.
The adoption o f  a  200-mile l im it
Sufficient grounds could only be found by an extension of UK 
fisheries limits. If these took place within the Ccrmunity
framework then vigorous government action would be needed to ensure 
that the required reductions in Ccnmunity capacity did not fall 
inordinately upon the UK, whose fleet included half of all the 
Ccrrmunity vessels which had been displaced since 1973. Despite the 
dislike of the EEC felt by many inshore fishermen, the Ccmnunity 
premised to be the only institution wrLth enough clout and will to 
permit an increase in UK fisheries jurisdiction wdth the maritime 
safeguards for which the FCO was concerned. However, the existing 
provisions of the CFP would not allow UK vessels exclusive access to 
any new grounds.
The neglected Article 102 (see page 207) might prove useful in
obtaining a workable conservation regime. The NEAFC proved
increasingly less able to set realistic TACs or to persuade its
members not to exceed its quotas. North Sea herring stocks
continued their collapse, and the NEAFC proved unable to cope. An
alternative conservation scheme was obviously badly needed. In 1974
the Fisheries Ccrrmission adopted at the UK' s suggestion closed
seasons for herring, but political pressure, especially frem the
Danes, continued to bid up ICES-recarmended TACs. The herring's
shoaling tendency and the use of sonar meant that increased scarcity
was no protection. The problem of the cyclical nature of herring
supplies was exacerbated by closed seasons and by the early
fulfilment of quotas, and the processing factories were much
disrupted. At the Carmission's 1975 meeting Denmark and Iceland
28objected to a North Sea herring quota of 250,000 tonnes , itself 
substantially higher than the ICES recommendation. Even the swollen 
TAC finally accepted was exceeded in four months, and in October 1975 
the Herring Assessment Working Group of the ICES recaimended a 




Herring Producers1 Association expressed its members' willingness to 
observe such a ban, but the proposal was rejected the following month 
by an emergency meeting of the NEAFC, which set a North Sea TAC at
87,000 tonnes. UK insistence that food fisheries should be given 
priority was rewarded by an enlarged UK share of the West of Scotland 
herring TAC, and by the banning of directed industrial fishing for 
herring.
The ICES recommended a total ban on herring yet again in February 
1976, but the NEAFC did not act accordingly, setting a totally 
unrealistic TAC of 160,000 tonnes for all NE Atlantic herring stocks 
for 1976-77. Norway objected to her quota and no decision was 
reached on this. Despite the ban on industrial fishing for herring,
Ireland continued to allcw her nationals to fish the Moume stock for 
industrial purposes.
Effort round UK coasts was increasing, as more of the sea came under 
extended zones of fisheries jurisdiction. To British, German and 
Belgian vessels diverted frcm Northern waters were added Soviet bloc 
and Iberian vessels diverted frcm off West Africa. By early 1976, 
the sloth of UNCLOS 3' s deliberations had demonstrated that it 
probably would not construct new Convention law in time to save 
depleted .fish stocks frcm destruction. On the other hand, most 
aspects of the 'Exclusive Economic Zone' had already been closely 
defined within the UNCLOS framework. There was, therefore, no 
reason why states should not adopt, unilaterally or in regional 
groups, legislation extending jurisdiction over resources so as to 
create a new customary law akin to the stalled Convention law. The 
need for new fishing grounds for displaced UK trawlers, as well as 




areas argued that UK limits should be extended. Abhorring 
unilateral extensions, and not confident of Britain's ability to 
exclude Polish and Soviet trawlers frcm its zone without help, POO 
and MAFF officials worked to co-ordinate the extension of econcmic 
jurisdiction with other states in the EEC. Any unilateral extension 
by the UK would have involved the UK in breaches of the Accession 
Treaty and posed a threat to the UNCLOS package. In February 1976 
the European Ccnmission produced a plan for state members of the 
Ccmunity to declare a 200-mile fisheries limit and to unite their 
fishery zones in the North Sea and Atlantic into an EEC pond . 
Each state would reserve a twelve-mile coastal belt for the exclusive 
use of its fishermen.
The Catmission's plan was not popular in the UK. The BFF argued 
that if the UK enjoyed an exclusive zone of six miles under a system 
of twelve-mile limits, there should be an exclusive 100-mile zone in 
a system of 200-mile limits. The Statutory Bodies argued for the
adoption of an exclusive limit of 200 miles. The Times Editorial of 
2nd March 1976 argued that since coastal states would have to bear 
the cost of conservation measures in their EEZs they should have a 
more generous exclusive belt than twelve miles. The same day, when 
the Plan was officially unveiled to the Council of Ministers, Foreign
and Carmonwealth Secretary Callaghan told his EEC colleagues that the
30UK would not accept so narrow a limit
Be that as it may, the UK's bargaining power was weak. She could 
not unilaterally defend a large national zone, and it was she who had 
the biggest fishing effort in the waters of third parties which was 
under threat. Such an effort would not be sustainable in the 
long-term, since most Scandinavian countries were anxious to expand
their fishing fleets to take up the new catch opportunities presented 
by 200-mile limits. The trawlers Which would be diverted would need 
grounds. The UK1 s need for an EEZ was thus much greater than most 
of her EEC colleagues, who could better afford to wait. There was 
little need to worry about implications of territoriality, since the 
most powerful maritime states, the USSR and the USA, were also 
preparing to extend their fishery zones, and would not do anything to 
weaken the navigational ccmprcmises formulated within UNCLOS 3. 
After the Iceland settlement, the Faroes, Canada and Norway all gave 
notice of their intention to adopt 200-mile zones on 1st January
1977. They did not propose to establish EEZs, only fishing zones. 
Aware of the increased pressure on their zones that this would mean, 
the Council of Ministers met at the Hague on 30 October 1976 and 
approved a Caimission Plan for a co-ordinated extension on 1st
January 1977. Their Atlantic and North Sea zones would be united to
31form a Caimunity zone ("the pond") .
In addition to the establishment of the zone of EEC fisheries 
jurisdiction, the Ministers made several decisions, seme of which 
could be used by HMG in pressing its case for a greater UK share of 
the catch. The Council declared that preference should be given to 
ccrmunities particularly dependent on fishing, citing Greenland, 
Ireland and the northern UK. These "Hague preferences" gave the 
Fisheries departments seme latitude, precisely because their effect 
was not clearly spelt out. Furthermore, it was established that 
until the EEC should have acceded to the NE2\FC and ICNAF, member 
states would act in concert in the Fisheries Ccntnissions. The 
Council also agreed that member states would be permitted, in the 
absence of a NEAPC agreement and pending the establishment of a 
cannon Carmunity conservation regime under Article 102, to adopt
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non-discriminatory measures to protect the fish resources off their 
coasts, provided the Ccnmission was consulted at all stages.
The Hague agreements also established that non-member states would 
only be permitted to fish in Ccnmunity waters in accordance with 
fishing agreements made between the Contnunity and third parties, and 
instructed the Ccntnission to begin negotiations. While this 
provision made it more likely that seme British fishing would be 
re-established in Northern waters, most reciprocal concessions made 
by the Ccnmunity would be at the expense of the UK. Except for 
tariff concessions, quotas of Northern demersal stocks could only be 
obtained in exchange for quotas of pelagic fish. None of the
pelagic stocks in the European pond were particularly appropriate for
swap arrangements, although in 1973 the pelagic catch by third
32countries in the Ccnmunity zone had been 600,000 tonnes . The
Skagerrak and North Sea herring stocks had both collapsed and to 
barter foreign access to the latter would have been politically 
inadvisable for any government. The West of Scotland herring stocks 
were fairly healthy but already adequately fished, while the 
South-Western mackerel was the life-line extended to many larger 
British vessels, and could not be spared for barter. Only a fairly 
lew catch in Northern waters would thus be obtainable by reciprocal 
access agreements. The alternative bait of improved opportunities 
for export of fish and fish products to the Coimunity market would 
also fell disproportionately upon British fishermen, since Norway and 
Iceland primarily produced cod, for which Britain was by far the 
biggest market. As most third country agreements would therefore be 
of little benefit to the UK the latter was in the years between the 
extension of fisheries limits to 200 miles and the formulation of a 
new CFP agreement in January 1983 to be presented with a number of
opportunities to block such agreements in exchange for an improved UK 
share of the catch in the pond. Although the UK's bargaining power 
in relation to its neighbours was generally weak (see page 41 5), here 
was an area of strength for the UK.
By the Fishery Limits Act of 1976 , UK fisheries jurisdiction was 
extended to 200 miles with effect frcm the beginning of 1977. This 
extension, while it provided for the negotiation of reciprocal 
fislnng quotas with non-EEC states , did not provide the UK with 
control over its own zone. UK Ministers were to be responsible for 
the conduct of fishing operations throughout the zone, but they were 
powerless to exclude vessels of EEC member states, because of the 
primacy of Ccmnunity over national legislation. The Act provided 
that the Minister could make orders requiring vessels fishing in the 
UK zone to hold a licence for particular species, but this could not 
cane into effect in the absence of a conservation regime. Figure
14.1 shows how national fishery zones encompassed most of the North 
East Atlantic. The rapid contraction in the UK trawler fleet 
continued unabated. Although the expulsion of Soviet, East European 
and Iberian vessels eased pressure on sane fish stocks, this was more 
than canpensated for by the diversion of German and British deep sea 
trawlers into UK waters frcm Iceland, the Faroes and the Barents Sea. 
Whereas in the absence of a CFP the government would perhaps have 
been able to exclude seme foreign vessels frcm the UK1 s 200-mile zone 
this was not an option under the CFP as constituted. Therefore the 
pressure on fish stocks imposed by increased effort and profitability 
led all sections of the industry to press for extensions of the UK1 s 
exclusive limits. A  diminution of the political influence of the 
statutory bodies which resulted frcm their poverty removed 100 and 
200-mile exclusive fishery limits frcm the political stage, and a
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fifty-mile exclusive fisheries zone became the united choice of the 
fishing industry by mid-1976. All political parties were carmitted 
to an EEZ, while both Labour and Conservative parties wished to show 
themselves to be as loyal to the inshore men as the SNP. In 
addition the governing Labour Party wanted to placate its anti-Market 
members, and the government wished to prevent a drastic reduction in 
UK capacity. Therefore the demand for an enlarged exclusive 
fisheries zone (albeit of indeterminate width) was by Sumner 1976 the 
UK's negotiating position with its EEC partners, and the stage was 
set for a long struggle within the Ccmnunity over fisheries.
The adoption of 200-mile fisheries limits was by far the most 
significant policy decision during the period 1967-83. It redefined 
tasks for policy in a number of ways. Firstly it took fisheries 
policy out of the plethora of institutions in which it was previously 
to be found, and concentrated it primarily in the EEC. The enhanced 
bargaining power of the EEC would be useful for swap arrangements, 
and the only way in which better fishing grounds were to be located 
was by obtaining a revision of the CFP. It thus defined the task of 
the UK as gaining a larger share of the catch in the EEC pond for its 
own fishermen (see Chapter 15). Secondly the 200-mile decision 
broke the interlocking pattern of British marine policy at UNCLOS 3 
and created a situation where UK negotiators had to work still harder 
to pursue remaining goals. By de facto accepting the concept of an 
EEZ without safeguards on these issues, the UK had removed the bait 
with which it had tempted coastal states. Remaining UK goals, such 
as obtaining the outer margin beyond 200 miles for the coastal state, 
and strengthening the powers of the state of origin over anadrcmous 
fish stocks, became single issue struggles involving groups of 
states. There was progress on the margin, since the formulae were
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already well advanced and because the Geneva Convention status quo
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effectively gave the whole shelf to the coastal state. Anadromous 
fish, however, required a shift from the existing position. In 
response, the UK joined with Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, 
Japan, Norway, UK, USA and the USSR in an "Anadromous Fish Group" at 
Geneva in Spring 1978. The group worked to reduce the powers of 
states other than the state of origin to fish anadromous stocks, and 
succeeded in marginally reducing those powers in the revisions to the 
ICNT issued at the close of the Geneva session. The change was the 
only significant revision in Committee II's part of the Informal 
Composite Negotiating Text allowed by Committee Chairman Aguilar at 
Geneva, an indication of the Group's strength. The revised text 
maintained the right of states to continue fishing beyond EEZs where 
they could suffer economic dislocation from cessation, but
established that permanent consultations must be held between 
interested states with regard to any fishing beyond EEZs, with the 
stipulation that only the danger of economic dislocation could permit 
continued fishing beyond the EEZ to be maintained
"Fisheries for anadromous stocks shall be conducted only in
waters landwards of the outer limits of exclusive economic
zones, except in cases where this provision would result in
economic dislocation for a state other than the state of
origin. With respect to such fishing beyond the outer
limits of the exclusive economic zone, states concerned
shall maintain consultations with a view to achieving
agreement on terms and conditions of such fishing giving
due regard to the conservation requirements and needs of
37the State of origin in respect of these stocks."
The Anadromous Fish Group appears to have regarded the revised text 
as the optimum that it would be able to obtain, since it did not
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operate at the Conference's eighth session in 1979. No further 
revision of the Article referring to anadromous fish had taken place 
by the end of the year. Taken in isolation, the text was not very 
suitable for encouraging investment in improvements on the spawning 
grounds since it permitted the taking of anadromous fish over a very 
large area of ocean. The areas of maritime concentration now lay 
within the Greenland and Faroe fishing limits. Since these two 
chose not to join in the CFP, the fact that their parent state was 
Denmark did not help the UK to obtain a Community regime. The text 
which entered the draft Convention on the Law of the Sea empowered 
the state of origin to set total allowable catches but established no 
formula for quota share-outs, leaving this to consultation. In 
addition, no definition of economic dislocation had been provided, 
leaving the rights of the state of origin firmly in the realm of 
diplomacy. In the event, the course of UNCLOS 3 has done nothing to 
conserve salmon-stocks and much to harm them. While the EEZ became, 
to all intents and purposes, customary law in 1976, UNCLOS 3 did not 
produce a Convention until 1982, and when, if ever, it will enter 
into force is a matter of debate. Therefore the claim of the Faroes 
and Greenland over the previously High Seas salmon stock was 
strengthened several years before the right of the state of origin to 
establish total allowable catches entered into force. Indeed, the 
states of origin moved away from UNCLOS 3 and into specific 
negotiations about salmon, which finally resulted in the signing in 
March 1982 of the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the
■3QNorth Atlantic . The signatories undertook to co-operate in an 
intergovernmental North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organisation, 
which started work in February 1984. By this time the Greenlanders
and Faroese moved over to drifting with iimiense monofilament nets, as 
had many of those drifting off Northumberland, albeit illegally. 
Partly as a result, the catches in Scottish rivers by 1982 were 
approximately one-tenth of the size of those in 1975 4®.
Anadromous fisheries were thus a casualty of the introduction of 
200-mile fishery limits. The Conference continued for four years 
(see Appendix I), with some issues not settled until 1982. The most 
intractable issues were those concerning arrangements for the 
exploitation of manganese nodules, the resource which had originally 
motivated Pardo to introduce Resolution 2340. Fisheries was however 
effectively decoupled from events at UNCLOS 3, and the latter are 
therefore of little relevance to the present study. Eventually a 
Law of the Sea Convention was adopted in April 1982. The USA voted 
against the Convention from objections to the deep seabed regime, 
while the UK abstained, on the grounds that "the provisions relating 
to deep seabed mining including the transfer of technology (were) not 
acceptable" 41. The USA followed up its objection by putting 
pressure on other Western countries not to sign. This pressure 
involved a visit to Western Europe by Donald Rumsfield, a former US 
Defence Secretary, a visit which helped to move HMG from a position 
of basic approval of the Convention on the grounds that it conferred 
important rights for civil and military shipping not available 
outside the Convention, to one of refusing to sign.
There is an additional factor, which may have have been of 
importance. The UK fishery limits enclosed 275,000 square miles, of 
which 100,000 were generated by Rockall alone. The Law of the Sea 
Convention forbade uninhabitable islands from generating zones, and 
were Denmark or Ireland to take the UK to the Law of the Sea Tribunal
provided for under the Convention's Dispute Settlement procedure,
Rockall might be deemed "uninhabitable", and the UK lose not only the 
fisheries zone but much of its continental shelf. The loss of the 
former would be of little consequence in the short term, since by the 
time such a case could have been heard by the Tribunal the percentage 
allocations of the catch to each state would probably have been fixed 
for several yaers. However, future CFP revisions might see a lower 
allocation of quotas to the UK in the light of the relative size of 
its zone without Rockall, and, far more importantly, the loss of the 
shelf might mean the loss of oil reserves.
The search fo r  a lt e rn a t iv e  grounds fo r  d isp laced  traw lers
The third significant result of the move to 200-mile limits was that 
it led trawler companies and MAFF to search for new fishing grounds 
for the displaced UK-registered vessels. Even though some of the 
displaced trawlers were suitable for use within 200 miles of UK 
coasts, the EEC 'pond' was unlikely to be able to provide them with 
sufficient grounds even with a major revision of the CFP in the UK's 
favour, since total UK capacity alone was sufficient to take more 
than half the sustainable yield in the entire pond 42. The majority 
of the displaced freezer trawlers could not fish economically in the 
North Sea anyway, given its lower density of high value stocks and 
its greater species mix than prevails in the Northern waters for 
which they were built. A few trawlers were converted to oil supply 
vessels or hydrographic survey ships, and a few more found employment 
in other countries' fisheries zones by relocation. The only 
advantages accruing to the trawler owner from the latter type of 
arrangement were an income, the continued employment of key 
personnel, and the writing off, over a realistic life, of the capital
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invested in the relocated trawlers. In 1977 British United Trawlers 
entered into a joint venture with a firm in Western Australia, by
vhich three mo d e m  freezer trawlers were moved from Hurrtoerside to 
43Albany . Seme trawler cvmers considered moving trawlers to the
Falk lend Islands dependencies in order to fish for Antarctic krill, a
resource of inmense wealth. this came to nothing, partly because
44the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 had to be revised in order to clarify
the question of access to the living resources of the Antarctic 
Ocean, a process which was not completed until 1981 45, and partly 
because »«3 opened negotiations with Argentina on the question of 
long-term arrangements for the Falklands and the South Sandwich 
Islands, vhich Argentina considered to be her territory. The 
construction of shore facilities on the islands would also entail 
considerable investment and a delay vrtiich the trawler fleet, with its 
high fixed oost, could ill afford. The investment might, in the 
event of a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, not be recoverable.
MAFF placed great hopes in a stock of blue whiting which gathers to
. 46spawn in early Spring between Rockall and the Shetlands . Initial
estimates of stock size were massively inflated, as successive
exploratory trawls by vessels under aontract to MAFF revealed.
Methods of processing the fish, so as to make them of use to human
beings, had still eluded MAFF scientists by 1983, due to their small
size and the 'spent' condition of most fish following spawning. The
seasoned nature of the stock also made the prospect of a substantial
permanent food fishery very slim. Industrial use of the fish would
have run counter to the strong prejudice among UK fishermen against
catching far reduction to fish meal, and in order to be economic
would require purpose-built vessels.
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There were also Ministry-encouraged experiments with the reduction to 
fish meal of scud, also called "horse mackerel", but these were not 
successful for technical reasons ^ . The one area of success in 
expanding or developing a fishery was the winter mackerel fishery off 
the South-West. The mackerel fishery had been primarily a small 
coastal one in 1967, but after the ICES' Mackerel Assessment Working 
Group declared the stock to be more abundant than had previously been 
thought, many Grimsby and Peterhead purse seiners, languishing from 
the demise of the herring, together with some large trawlers, began 
to participate in the fishery. A further niche in the mackerel 
fishery was created by the expulsion of Eastern bloc trawlers from 
the pond on 1st January 1977. In general, however, sufficient 
grounds did not exist for all of the displaced vessels. UK catches 
in the ICNAF area recovered slightly, but to a level totally 
insufficient to compensate for lost grounds. By the time the 
Council of Ministers finally decided upon quota levels there were 
only ten wet fishers and nineteen freezer or factory trawlers of 
above 140' in length left in service (see Figure 12.1), less than ten 
per cent of the distant-water fleet of a decade earlier. The rapid 
reduction in the UK fleet produced redundancies among fishermen, with 
twenty to thirty shipboard jobs lost for each trawler scrapped. 
There were some losses in processing, but employment in this area was 
kept up by increasing imports or landings of unprocessed fish from 
Poland, Iceland and Norway. Hull and Grimsby could offer displaced 
workers some alternative employment in connection with their growing 
role for intra-EEC trade, while the Aberdeen-based offshore oil 
industry absorbed many redundant fishermen and ancillary workers, and 
even some trawlers. Fleetwood was the hardest hit distant-water 
port, since there were few alternative sources of employment on the 
Fylde.
The loss of vessels prompted a reorganisation of what had been the 
distant-water industry. The BTF and STF, which had lost their 
previous monopoly of influence with MAFF, amalgamated to form the 
British Fishing Federation (BFF). r The BFF remained influential in 
shaping routine policy, because although the deep sea industry was 
declining in size, its wealth, organisation and united policy stance 
enabled it to continue to influence fisheries departments. Regular 
consultations now took place between the BFF, the SFF and the NFFO, 
and they tried to present MAFF with conrrton positions where possible. 
The extinction of distant-water fishing removed a major source of 
division within the industry. On external policy the three 
Federations were now agreed on a fifty-mile exclusive zone, in marked 
contrast to the . disagreements during the disputes with Iceland. 
There was still considerable disagreement about local limits, and the 
inshore fishermen resented large trawlers fishing close inshore. 
This problem was not as widespread as the number of trawlers 
displaced from other grounds might suggest. Off most of the 
Scottish coast trawling was banned within three miles anyway, and 
most of the other coasts lacked fish stocks in sufficient density to 
permit profitable exploitation by large trawlers. The problem was 
most acute in the mackerel's winter shoaling grounds off 
South-Western England. The practice of klondyking developed, by 
which purse seiners and mid-water trawlers would remain on the 
grounds throughout the winter season, transshipping their catch to 
Eastern European factory ships who could no longer fish in those 
waters. This practice was not only irksome to the Cornish, whose 
traditional method of long-lining prevents growth overfishing, but by 
evading landing restrictions resulted in the under-reporting of 
catches and the taking of undersized mackerel. MAFF took no action
428against klondyking until 1981, because of the role of the mackerel 
fishery in maintaining capacity pending a new CFP 48.
Hie growth of interest in restrictive licensing
Another development consequent upon the declaration of the 200-mile 
fishery limit was a growing interest among fishery economists in the 
use of restrictive licensing as a fisheries management tool. The 
division of the North Atlantic into state zones effectively removed 
the common property status of fish resources, although some stocks 
became the property of more than one state. This development would 
theoretically make feasible for the first time the restriction of 
effort to a level appropriate to the maximisation of economic rather 
than biological yields by al lowing fishing only by licence, and by 
limiting their issue either to vessels or individuals who had 
habitually fished a stock, or by charging high fees, or both. While 
such a policy would entail a gradual reduction in employment in the 
fishery, the multiplier effect of the enhanced producers' surplus 
should increase employment in the environs of fishing ports. 
According to McKellar, of the White Fish Authority Fisheries 
Economics Research Unit, this effect had been demonstrated in the 
British Columbia salmon fishery:
"The employment multiplier effect of this improvement has 
probably created more jobs in ancillary activities than 
were lost on vessels as a result of the restricted entry 
programme" .
According to the Canadian Fisheries Service:
•**
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429"the benefits of the programmes have been the change from 
static, no growth welfare-type fisheries to modern, dynamic 
growth fisheries with high returns to fishermen and solid 
ancillary support industries such as shipbuilding and 
electronics" 50.
The margin of error between MEY and the point at which recruitment 
overfishing would begin to occur would be such as to render stock 
collapse less likely than in the case of systems of fisheries 
management aimed at maximising the biological yield. Moreover, a 
restrictive licence scheme could permit licensed vessels to fish for 
a longer season than had been possible where closed seasons had been 
employed, and a more predictable season than quotas would permit. 
Licensing schemes are also much easier to police than TACs or quotas, 
permitting some suspected violations to be assessed without boarding 
the vessel. In addition, a licensed fishery can be expected to 
yield more complete statistical information than an unregulated one, 
and licence revenue might be used to fund research, regulation or 
enforcement (freeing those from Treasury caprice). Where an 
excessive number of licences had been judged to have been issued, 
such revenue could be used to "buy back” licences. Such schemes 
would also supply fisheries authorities with clear information as to 
increases in capacity consequent upon investment in new vessels or 
gear, although in order for such an evaluation to be really effective 
clear definitions would have to be formulated of the concepts of 
"effort" and "capacity", and to know how a purse seiner compares, for 
instance, with a long liner.
Licences also hold the advantage that they provide a relatively 
simple means of permitting foreign participation in a fishery. The
restriction of effort to named vessels in specified quantities 
established in the UK-Iceland agreements recognised the greater ease 
of enforcement than would be the case had quotas been imposed. Such 
an arrangement could have been further elaborated by charging an 
annual fee for each vessel, which would not only have utilised 
licensing as a means of sharing access, but also as a source of rent 
to the state owning the fishery.
Despite these advantages, and the considerable support felt in the 
technical arms of fisheries administration the UK introduced no 
restrictive licensing schemes in the immediate wake of the general 
moves to 200 miles in the North East Atlantic. The first reason was 
the CFP. Britain had agreed to a system of free access for 
Community vessels anywhere beyond twelve or six miles from her 
coasts, and this situation had not changed merely because the UK had 
adopted a new 200-mile fisheries limit. Licensing is only effective 
in an appropriated fishery. In order for the UK to establish 
restrictive licensing schemes, except in exclusive coastal waters, 
either the access provisions of the CFP would have to be revised in 
favour of the coastal state or clear national quotas would have to be 
established. Secondly even had Britain been prepared to defy its 
partners and to exclude them from a considerable portion of her 
waters many of the stocks harvestable in the UK's 200-mile zone spend 
their juvenile stages in the zones of other community states, with 
the result that the conservation of such stocks could not be ensured 
by UK regulations alone. The third reason for the non-adoption of 
licensing was the fact that it would weaken the government's 
negotiating position within the EEC. The surplus capacity 
consequent upon a welfare approach in a free-for-all fishery was 
exacerbated by the high number of diverted trawlers, and HMG wished
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to maintain this surplus capacity while it argued for a revision of 
the CFP, so that Britain's need could be seen to be considerable.
It was also hoped that the Conmission would be able to negotiate
access to the waters of third countries for at least part of the 
displaced fleet. Restrictive licensing would have prematurely
shrunk the fleet. There were also many political problems which 
restrictive licensing would entail. It would force the fisheries 
authorities, in the first instance, to choose between types of 
vessels. If this were done by an arbitrary bias in favour of
inshore vessels it could undermine the market competitiveness of 
British-caught fish, and if it were done by competitive licence fees 
it would have given the trawler companies an unfair advantage, with 
the resulting possibility of more inshore disquiet and a further 
massive electoral boost to the SNP. These initial problems would be
compounded over time, as experience in Australia and Canada had shown 
52 that restrictive licensing accelerates investment. This would 
mean that effort would tend constantly to increase, and licences 
would need to be continually reduced in number, with a concomitant 
reduction in direct employment. So long as the profit from fishing 
is invested locally this would not be a problem, but if large 
companies from other parts of the UK were to become involved the 
regional gains made by NE Scotland, for instance, might be reversed.
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In effect, therefore, there had been a growth of interest in 
licensing as a tool for the management of an appropriated fishery, 
but as yet such a fishery did not exist.
Summary
The FCO's attempt to contain all change in the law of the sea within
ilrir
the framework of UNCLOS 3 collapsed as a result partly of a renewed 
cod war with Iceland and partly as a result of systemic crisis in all 
the fisheries of the North Atlantic. It became evident as 
negotiations continued that fisheries could be delinked from 
navigation without detriment to the" latter, since discussions about 
the EEZ had broken up coastal state demands into individual 
competences. In addition, the extension by the UK was carried out 
in consultation with a large number of other developed states with 
both maritime and coastal interests. None of these states formally 
claimed an EEZ, which might have appeared a snub to the Conference, 
but it was resources which concerned them as coastal states; in 
relation to the remaining problems of the EEZ, such as scientific 
research, their interests were maritime ones. The extension of 
fishery limits to 200 miles confirmed a substantial reorientation of 
the trawler fleet, and this, together with pressure from all sections 
of the industry, made it imperative for the UK to take a coastal 
state line and to attempt to revise the CFP in its favour.
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CHAPTER 15 437
THE SEARCH FOR AN ACCEPTABLE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY
The move to 200-mile limits to coastal state jurisdiction over almost 
all the stocks fished by United Kingdom fishermen, together with the 
Hague decisions, concentrated fisheries policy upon the EEC and its 
institutions. It also effectively delinked fisheries from strategic 
and maritime policy. In concentrating UK fisheries policy upon the 
European Economic Community, it weakened the relative influence in 
policy determination of the FCO and strengthened that of MAFF. It 
sharply lowered the importance to the fishing industry of 
developments at UNCLOS 3, and in so doing reduced the possibility of 
a species approach being instituted for anadromous fisheries. Taken 
together with the adoption of two-hundred mile fishery zones by most
other states fishing the North Atlantic (see Figure 14.1) it
confirmed the diversion of the distant-water fleet from its
traditional grounds. In so doing, it weakened the cruciality to the 
UK of the Fisheries Coirenissions, since it promised a single 
authoritative Cormunity regime for most of the grounds fished by UK 
vessels.
The move to wider limits did not in itself dissipate the problems 
which had built up over fisheries policy, some of which were 
political, some biological, and some economic. It did nothing in 
itself, for instance, to placate the newly militant fishing industry, 
united as never before in its demand for a fifty-mile zone 
exclusively reserved for British fishermen. Failure to obtain such 
a zone might lead to further blockades and possibly to a new General 
Election, since the Labour Government of 1974-79 commanded only a
liti,
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It did not appear, in 1976-77, that the SFF and the NFFO would be 
content with an alternative formulation of a narrow exclusive zone 
coupled with a conservation regime which gave the UK quotas 
constituting a high proportion of TACs agreed within the framework of 
the Community. Such an arrangement might suit the British Fishing 
Federation (BFF) - newly formed from an amalgation of the BTF and STF 
- whose need, despite its common negotiating position with the other 
fishermen, was primarily for new grounds to replace those lost. The 
exclusions from distant waters had lost them over a third of the UK's 
total catch, equivalent in value to the losses from exclusions of all 
the other Community member states put toge+her. These exclusions, 
and capacity maintenance by flat rate daily payments, had left the UK 
with a catching capacity sufficient to take 54% of the annual yield 
of protected species in the Community pond. For the trawler 
companies high proportional quotas might suffice, but this would not 
fulfil inshore aspirations.
In this vein, extensions did nothing in themselves to solve the 
problem of how to balance the needs of small independent and share 
fishermen against trawlers, as to whether or not the former should 
have reserved grounds. Nor did they solve the problem of 
over-capacity, a problem which could only be approached on a 
Corrmunity-wide basis, since there would be no incentive sharply to 
reduce UK capacity unless the other member states did likewise. Nor 
did the extensions in themselves provide a new framework for an 
effective conservation regime.
HMG was faced with these needs, and had little room for manoeuvre
439given the militancy of the fishermen and the government's 
near-dependence on the votes of the minority parties, one of which, 
the SNP, treated inshore fishing as a major determinant of its 
actions. Also, as the Economist has pointed out ■*■, many inshore 
seats were then highly marginal, and for a government with a 
parliamentary majority so slim that its fate could be determined by 
by-elections inshore concerns could not be ignored. To add to this, 
the Minister of AFF, Silkin (Lab - Deptford), was determinedly 
opposed to UK membership of the EEC, a fact which predisposed him to 
take a strong line in negotiations within Europe. In response to 
the needs and demands of the fishing industry HMG had only one 
concession which it could make to the industry which was independent 
of success in the negotiations in the Community, and that was 
financial assistance.
A pattern was therefore set for several years in which the UK tried 
unsuccessfully to reshape the Coirmon Fisheries Policy to fulfil some 
of her needs, while placating the industry with periodic financial 
assistance. During this time UK capacity adjusted itself downwards 
even despite subsidy payments, the total GET of British vessels over 
40 feet fell by one-third between 1973 and 1979
In its struggle to revise the CFP, the UK had three major factors in 
its favour. Firstly, although the extensions had been made in 
concert with other member states of the EEC, customary international 
law, and the stalled UNCLOS Treaty, accorded the 200-mile limit to 
individual states. Therefore the British public could view the 
sector of the EEC "pond" generated by the UK as "British waters", or 
"the British contribution to EEC waters" and generally sympathized 
with HMG's taking a tough line. Secondly, the Hague agreements
afforded states the opportunity legally to apply conservation 
measures, providing that by the end of 1977 the Community
conservation regime envisaged by Article 102 of the Treaty of 
Accession had not been agreed. This implied that the UK could block 
a Community regime, and then, providing that there was consultation 
with the Commission, take unilateral conservation measures. The 
third item in the UK's favour was the "Luxembourg Compromise" of 
1966, by which an individual state was accorded an assumed veto in 
the Council of Ministers when a 'vital' national interest was at 
stake. While this had no formal Treaty status it prevented
Community measures being agreed by majority voting, and effectively 
empowered the UK to block any agreement on a revised CFP which did 
not meet the UK's requirements. It did not, unhappily, empower the 
UK to construct a CFP tailored to her needs.
It needs to be established why the UK did not simply withdraw from 
the CFP and institute its own national 200-mile limit, as indeed some 
individual fishermen advocated 3. Firstly the European Court had 
ruled in the "Kramer" case of July 1976, that the Community 
competences in fisheries exceeded those of individual states, and to 
have ignored this judgement would have resulted in embarrassing cases 
at the European Court:
"The Community has the power, so far as its internal 
constitution is concerned, to take any measures for the 
conservation of the biological resources of the sea, 
including the fixing of catch quotas and their allocation
4between the different member states"
Even within a national limit independent of Community agreements,
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historic rights of several hundred years' duration, generalised by 
the Treaty of Accession, would have been especially difficult to 
extinguish, and could have resulted in many fisheries disputes. 
Moveover, the EEC regime held out the prospect of a more effective 
conservation regime than the NEAFC had proved to be, if acceptable 
arrangements could be negotiated. There were fewer states involved, 
and the Comnunity had potentially an authoritative control over the 
fish stocks of a fixed area, a far more effective arrangement than 
the NEAFC. It was also hoped that the weakness of the scientific 
ICES in relation to the political NEAFC would not be duplicated in 
the technically-orientated Commission. The degree to which fish 
move between national sectors of the North Sea, with many spawning in 
a different national sector from the one in which they spend their 
adult lives, suggested that a unilateral UK conservation regime would 
not in itself secure stocks. Danish fishing at the Bloden spawning 
grounds or Dutch trawling of juvenile plaice could destroy the adult 
stocks in the UK zone. Moreover, the UK would not unilaterally be 
able to exclude foreign fishermen from her new 200-mile zone, and 
needed support from other Community states both in relation to the 
latter's own fishermen and to those of third parties, like the USSR, 
Poland and Spain.
An attempt to create a unilateral regime including the vast zone 
generated by Rockall, upon which so much of the British claim to make 
a large contribution to EEC waters and to EEC fish stocks depended, 
would undoubtedly have resulted in attempts by the Irish and the 
Danes to challenge the UK claim to the islet. With the support of 
other EEC member states (in retaliation against UK unilateralism) and 
the advantages afforded by UNCLOS 3 this could have been quite 




of possibly oil-rich continental shelf from the UK's grasp.
The EEC's potential for negotiating with third parties was also a 
valuable asset in the UK's attempt to maintain or re-establish access 
to waters of non-Community territories such as Iceland, Norway and 
the Faroes. The Conmunity was such a valuable market for the newly 
fish-rich states of the Arctic that it could swap access for market 
concessions in addition to direct swaps of access rights. It was 
also important to co-ordinate activities with other member states in 
order to protect the navigational aspects of the EEC package which 
the UK had worked so hard to develop. Although the UK had finally 
acted outside the Conference structure, it had only done so for 
fisheries, and had at the time no intention of preventing the 
implementation of the Convention when it was complete. The states 
comprising the Community were sufficiently influential within the 
global system to set a powerful precedent in customary law as to the 
rights and duties of a coastal state in a 200-mile zone of fishery 
jurisdiction.
There were also aspects of the CFP's marketing provisions which, if 
suitably modified could prove useful to the UK industry. The 
Producer Organisations had instituted a degree of self-regulation 
which could free government of the recurrent demands for subsidies, 
price supports and other forms of protection. Suitable reference 
and withdrawal prices, together with appropriate import tariffs, 
could alleviate some of the fishermen's economic ills. Moreover, 
there might be more FEOGA money available for the repair or 
replacement of fishing vessels, especially important in view of a 
stipulation in the Treaty of Accession forbidding operating subsidies 
after six years 5. The Comnission had already, following the
blockades of 1975 and similar actions by French inshore fishermen, 
introduced proposals in October 1975 to assist inshore fishermen in 
the interests of regional and social development , and had also 
suggested financial aid for restructuring ^.
The LJK thus needed a Common Fisheries Policy, and could not 
effectively adopt a unilateral national zone of fisheries 
jurisdiction. It had, however, to push either for a preferential 
zone or for a large share of Community quotas in order to placate the 
fishermen and anti-marketeers, and could adduce as arguments the 
facts that the UK both made the largest contribution to Community 
fish resources and had suffered the greatest loss of catch through 
exclusions from Third Country waters.
One way of improving the protection for inshore fishermen without 
breaching the CFP might have been to adopt the time-honoured coastal 
state tactic of creating new baselines. The provisions of the RSNT 
would have permitted the UK to claim archipelagic status, and thus to 
make some useful gains in internal waters between the Orkneys and the
O
Shetlands (the Hebrides were already enclosed under the 1964 Act ). 
This approach was not to the liking of the Commission, however, whose 
first proposals on a new regime of extended jurisdiction stipulated 
the application of the baselines of February 1976 9.
The co-ordination of British policy towards Europe was centred on the 
Cabinet Office, which weakened the FCO's contribution to planning. 
The extensions of jurisdiction agreed at the Hague, and the 
appointment in mid-1976 of an energetic Dane, Gunderlach, to serve as 
the relevant Commissioner, increased the priority accorded to finding 
a technical solution to the fisheries problem. Thus MAFF and the
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Scottish Office began to exercise more prominent roles. Their 
officials always accompanied FCO Ministers to the Council of 
Ministers, and MAFF maintained five senior staff permanently in 
Brussels, This higher structural priority was magnified by a 
more strenuous ministerial involvement. The Scottish Office's 
involvement was co-ordinated by Brown, Minister of State, who, 
chastened by his earlier experiences, now held regular meetings with 
all Scottish fisheries organizations From January 1977, certain 
items were transferred to the Council of Agricultural Ministers from 
the Council of Ministers, demonstrating a yet further diminution of 
FCO control
The combination of a dependence upon the Community, and of a fishing 
industry pressing the government for an exclusive zone, defined the 
approach taken by HMG. The Government signalled to its European 
colleagues that a "successful review of the common fisheries policy 
must include two major elements: a satisfactory coastal regime and a 
workable quota system" effectively this embraced both the inshore 
requirement for protection and the desire of all in fisheries for 
conservation arrangements which would not be breached. A 
negotiating position based on these two considerations was announced 
by the FCO's Minister of State, Hattersley, on 4th May 1976, between 
the Commission's initial proposals on extensions and the Hague 
agreements, and before the settlement of the Third Cod War. In that 
context it is perhaps unsuprising that the government balked at 
asking for an exclusive length defined by a uniform distance from 
baselines. Claiming that "the British fishing industry" were asking 
for an exclusive limit of 100 miles - in fact was a demand of the BFF 
alone, and one which it was to abandon the following month - 
Hattersley laid down HMG's demand as being for an exclusive belt of
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variable width from twelve to fifty miles according to "regional 
(economic and political) considerations". Historic rights within 
twelve miles would not necessarily have to cease. Hattersley 
suggested that the NEAFC had been ineffective, but that "in the 
community it could be different", and that quotas would have to be 
obeyed To strengthen HMG's hand, the policy was put to a vote 
in the House of Coitmons In the light of this negotiating 
position, Silkin refused all Commission initiatives on the CFP which 
did not accord with the UK's requirements.
Despite this, HMG was not inflexible, and twice adjusted the UK's 
demands in order to accommodate the dislike which some of her 
partners felt for exclusive zones within a Common Fisheries Policy.
In June 1977 the variable exclusive band moved to a demand for a 
twelve-mile exclusive zone, with the gradual phase-out of historic 
rights, and a 12-50 mile zone of "dominant coastal state preference".
This preference could be enforced either by the issue of licences, by 
selective effort limitations, or by state quotas. In the remainder 
of the pond each state would have a "normal" share of quotas, 
enforced by effort limitation. Such an arrangement had no 
implications of territoriality, and unlike the variable belt treated 
all coastal states equally. The UK advantage would stem from its 
more extensive coastline. The Commission and the other states, 
except for Ireland, showed themselves unwilling to concede such a 
general derogation from the principle of free access, and discussions 
began to move towards a consideration of national shares of TACs.
The government adopted a fall back position of asking for about 
900,000 tonnes of fish, plus a share of increased TACs resulting from 
effective conservation measures In December 1977 Silkin asked 
for forty-four per cent of total TACs in the pond ^ .
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If the UK gradually moved towards formulae which could avoid any 
implications of territoriality, the Commission also attempted to 
accommodate UK aspirations. It first proposed quotas based on 
average catches over ten years, weighted to emphasise 1973-6 and for 
the Hague preferences. The UK, together with the German Federal 
Republic, succeeded in persuading the Commission also to include 
"jurisdictional losses" (losses from third country extensions) in 
its calculations. This issue was important to the UK, which had 
lost thirty per cent of her traditional catch in this way, but the 
weighting in the Commission's formulations was not accepted as 
sufficient. HMG also continued to press for some allowance to be 
given for contribution to resources. She argued that since sixty 
per cent of the Community zone was generated by the UK, her fishermen 
should be entitled to a high proportion of TACs For the other 
state members of the EEC to have conceded that contribution to 
resources might be taken into account in the establishment of quotas 
might have had serious precedent effects upon other issues. The 
balancing of national contributions and receipts conflicted with 
Community principlesin general. The British claim to sole ownership 
of the fish also ignored the fact that adult fish caught in UK waters 
were often born and recruited in other national zones, and thus their 
stocks could not be conserved without the conservation efforts of 
other states and their nationals.
The Commission could however concede less-territorial formulae. In 
its 1978 proposals it offered "fishing plans", an arrangement for 
restricted access to certain areas beyond twelve miles which would 
"normally relate to" endangered stocks or stocks whose exploitation 




allowed to discriminate between fishermen of different member states, 
but they would take into account vessels with a limited range of 
operation. Fishing plans were therefore intended to advantage local 
coastal fishermen, and to operationalise the Hague preferences, and 
as such they were accepted by Ireland, which like the UK had been 
asking for larger exclusive zones. With these fishing plans to 
protect coastal fishermen, the UK could have thirty-one per cent of 
total TACs.
Silkin rebuffed fishing plans on the grounds that the quotas with 
which they were offered failed to take into account this sizeable 
contribution to resources and did not sufficiently compensate 
jurisdictional losses. In addition the fishing industry continued 
to insist upon a fifty-mile exclusive zone. There were three main 
strands to the UK's approach during the period 1977-9. The first 
was to make use of its rights under the Luxembourg Compromise to 
block any aspect of the CFP, arguing that the whole package would 
have to be settled together. The second was to introduce national 
conservation measures in the UK zone pending an EEC agreement. This 
was perfectly in order under the Hague agreements provided the UK 
notified the Commission, and measures were introduced according to 
ICES recormiendations. Early on in the struggle the dangers to the 
legal standing of the coastal state of conservation regulations which 
were de facto discriminatory, even if not so in form, were shown when 
Ireland was censured by the European Court . It nevertheless 
proved was possible for the UK, in the name of conservation, to 
transfer capacity reductions to other states, especially the Danes, 
because the UK zone constituted such a large proportion of total EEC 
waters. Britain could make arrangements for well over half the fish 





The unilateral application of conservation regulations was in part 
intended to placate inshore fishermen, to raise the cost to other EEC 
states of the failure to reach a settlement, and to curb directed 
fishing for industrial purposes. The UK had an excellent 
opportunity to pose as a scientifically responsible state, because 
from March 1975 the ICES had repeatedly asked NEAFC to impose 
substantial short-term sacrifices on member states to allow 
overfished stocks, notably North Sea herring and plaice, to recover.
The UK's growing willingness to take decisive and sometimes 
unilateral action in the application of conservation regulations was 
facilitated by an enlargement of its policing capability and by the 
divorce of the Fishery Protection and Mine Countermeasure Squadrons 
in May 1977 The six DAFS fishery cruisers and nine MAFF 360 ton 
minesweepers had been augmented, between 1973 and 1976, by four 
'Bird' patrol boats and a number of Nimrod aircraft, all under 
military control. Then between March 1976 and June 1977 five 
vessels of the new 'Island' class were launched. These were 1,250 
ton armed trawlers, with a maximum speed of only 16 knots and no 
helicopters. A number of commentators and MPs suggested that the UK 
should order a number of 'Aztec' patrol boats, developed by a 
Scottish firm for the Mexican Navy, with a much higher speed and a 
lower unit cost than the 'Island' class. Such suggestions were 
scotched by the Royal Navy, who were anxious to maintain all Fishery 
Protection Vessels as potentially operational warships. Arguments 
for a 'blue-lamp navy' (marine p»lice force) to carry out both 
oil-related and fishery protection functions, were strenuously 
opposed by both the FCO and the KN. While the vessels were slower 
than might have been desirable the introduction of aerial patrols by
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449RAF Nimrods enabled some violations to be filmed and fishing effort 
to be plotted, which much improved enforcement " .
The first major stock on which the UK imposed its own conservation 
regulations was North Sea herring. The ban on directed industrial 
fishing for herring still left half the North Sea quota allocated to 
industrial by-catches, with only six per cent of the total TAC for 
1976 allocated to British fishermen. The fisheries departments 
agreed that it was unreasonable to allocate the UK fishermen such a 
small proportion of the TAC in a 'pond* of which more than half was 
contributed by the UK. HMG was unwilling to accept the political 
and economic costs of a massive shrinkage of the herring fleet on 
such terms. Having obtained the agreement of the Fishermen's 
Federations for a complete ban on directed herring fishing if such a 
ban could be negotiated, the fisheries departments offered to impose 
a complete ban on directed fishing for North Sea herring until the 
end of 1977, as long as all other EEC governments did likewise. 
This offer, made in August 1976, was accompanied by an announcement 
that until such a ban was imposed UK fishermen would not be required 
to observe their quota, then 9,700 tonnes. By mid-September, they 
had taken 25,000 tonnes, and as no response had been forthcoming from 
other states, HMG imposed a unilateral ban on all directed fishing 
for herring in the UK 200-mile zone. The following March the ICES' 
Herring Assessment Working Group recommended a complete ban for the 
third consecutive year. A three-month ban was agreed by the Council 
of Ministers but was not renewed on expiration in June. The UK 
maintained her unilateral ban, and the EEC Agricultural Ministers 
agreed in August to make it EEC-wide. The measure proved effective, 
in that the spawning stock increasing from 267,000 tonnes in Spring 
1978 to 400,000 tonnes a year later. Fishing was not reopened until
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1981, but a longer period of restraint would have been required to 
restore the spawning stock to its level of the early 1950s, when it 
was estimated by MAFF scientists at 2.5 million tons. The herring 
question showed the EEC to be potentially an effective conservation 
body, but prone to the same political problems as the NEAFC.
Unilateral action was also taken in relation to the Mourne herring 
stock in the Irish Sea. The stock straddles the zones generated by 
the Republic of Ireland, County Down and the Isle of Man, and Ireland 
ignored the 1975 NEAFC ban on directed industrial fishing to benefit 
a newly-commissioned fishmeal plant. The UK retaliated by 
permitting herring fishing to continue within Manx waters and within 
half a mile of County Down. Entry to these fisheries was restricted 
by a licensing system off the Isle of Man and to vessels under 35 
feet in length off the Down coast so as to limit the fishery to 
the local fishermen who were enraged by the industrial fishery.
MAFF was also willing to take unilateral action in relation to the 
mackerel fishery of the South-West. By the close of the 1976-7 
winter fishery it was apparent that the catch had far exceeded the 
recommended TAC of 250,000 tonnes. In all 315,000 tonnes were 
recorded, and the potential fraud in the practice of transshipment 
implied that the true catch might have been considerably higher. In 
1977, following vigorous pressure from fishermen and MPs, MAFF 
introduced a licensing scheme , limiting the number of large 
vessels based elsewhere than in Devon and Cornwall which could 
participate. There was little controversy about this since few 
vessels from other member states exploited the fishery. The scheme 
was loosened when the ICES' Mackerel Assessment Working Group 





recommended TACs for 1978 and 1979 of 450,000 and 435,000 tonnes 
respectively.
The most contoversial conservation measure initiated by the UK was 
the creation of the 'pout box' in the North Sea. MAFF scientists 
felt that tighter controls on the by-catch of protected species in 
industrial fishing were unenforceable, and they recommended the 
banning of fishing for Norway pout (taken by Danish vessels for 
reduction to fishmeal) in a large area of the North Sea constituting 
the nursery grounds of haddock and whiting. Having obtained 
Commission sanction, the UK asked the NEAFC to ban pout fishing in 
the area 56-60 N and 4W - IE. The NEAFC accepted the validity of UK 
arguments and instituted from 1st November 1977 a slightly smaller 
'pout box' stretching Eastwards only as far as the Greenwich Meridian 
line. Assessments of the results of this measure differed widely in 
Britain and Denmark. Aitchieson, the SFF Secretary, said that it
was the most effective measure for the conservation of white fish 
. 9ftwhich the UK had yet taken . Spokesmen for Danish government and 
industry argued to the contrary, the measure had damaged white fish 
stocks as adult pout feed on inmature white fish. In July 1978 the 
UK, having failed to convince the European Commission, unilaterally 
extended the box Eastwards to the UK-Norwegian median line, and 
instituted fishery patrols to enforce the extension. The pout box 
may or may not have been am effective conservation measure, but it 
sharply reduced Danish fishing capacity, which fell by 30% in the 
year to October 1979 29. The UK also applied NEAFC-agreed mesh and 
size regulations in prawn (March 1977) and nephrops (July 1979) 
fisheries without awaiting the Commission's decisions on 
implementation.
The conservation policy froze the situation in which the UK was at 
loggerheads with other member states over access, TACs and quotas. 
Despite this, the UK, along with its Community partners, withdrew 
from individual membership of the Fisheries Commissions to make way 
for EEC representation, in December 1977 and December 1978 
respectively. Overfishing continued, and yet in 1979 the European 
Conmission advanced no new proposal on quotas, refusing to offer the 
UK above thirty-one per cent of TACs. Since the UK blocked 
agreement, no TACs were established for the year.
The third strand to the UK's approach was to give periodic aid to the 
fishing industry, but not enough to permit the purposeful 
restructuring of the fleet. In part this was the result of a desire 
to maintain capacity pending agreement, an aim in which it was not 
completely successful, but UK capacity over 40' only fell by thirteen 
per cent in the two years 1977 and 1978 ^ . This desire to prevent 
capacity reductions also led to the adoption in October 1977 of a 
system of daily quotas for herring in the Clyde and the Forth. This 
angered many small boat pelagic fishermen of the Clyde and the South 
West, who argued that the new system did nothing to safeguard stocks. 
They were faced with the choice either of dumping any fish over their 
daily landing quota, or of transshipping catches at sea to Eastern 
European factory ships (klondyking), an activity already widely 
engaged in by larger trawlers and purse seiners. This practice, the 
small fishermen held, made enforcement of catch limitations almost 
impossible Two years later MAFF offered the fishermen another 
incentive to remain in business by allowing fishing for mackerel on 
their summer grounds in the North Sea, but the fish were so widely 
dispersed that catches were very poor.
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Blocking an agreement for three years, while using as leverage the 
importance of the UK zone to the fishing industries of other member 
states, was both unavoidable, given the political pressures, and most 
effective. The capacity of the Danish fleet fell by thirty per cent 
during the year to October 1979 33, reducing future effort in the 
industrial fisheries. The hard line also encouraged the other 
member states to compromise with Silkin's more pro-Market successor, 
lest the chance of an agreement recede once more.
The General Election of 1979 brought in a Conservative government 
whose election strategy had made much of being "good Europeans" as 
compared to the Labour Party, which it characterised as obstructive 
to the European ideal. Given the fact that Conservative MPs
represented most inshore seats during the 1974-79 parliament, and 
since the party had regarded as crucial the recapture from the SNP of 
the six inshore seats which it had lost in 1974, no specific 
Conservative Party criticism had been made of Silkin's hard line. 
Indeed for most of the previous parliament the party's MPs 
representing inshore constituencies had adopted a strongly coastal 
state standpoint 33. With a parliamentary majority of around forty, 
as opposed to the one or two available to the Labour government, and 
the SNP strength reduced to two, the government now had some 
latitude. The new Minister for AFF, Walker (C - Worcester), had no 
constituency interest in fishing and was anxious to reach a 
settlement.
In addition some of the UK's weapons were removed as from 1979
onwards the European Court ruled several of her conservation measures
to be illegal. In October 1979 the Court, in the "Cap Caval" case 
34 , found that in introducing the March 1977 regulations concerning
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mesh size for prawn the UK had failed to consult the Commission as 
required by the Hague agreement. The following July the Court 
condemned the UK for the discriminatory nature of the Isle of Man and 
Northern Ireland herring regulations, and for its failure to consult 
the Commission. In addition the ~ Court ruled that the Eastward 
extension of the pout box had not been conducted according to the 
spirit of the Hague agreements and that its purpose was not 
conservation but to limit the Danish industrial catch while raising 
the catch of the British food fishery 3 .^ A further judgement in 
May 1981 attacked the manner of introduction of the nephrops and 
herring regulations, and declared that from 1st January 1979 (six 
years after accession as stipulated by Article 102 of the Accession 
Treaty) member states were "no longer entitled to exercise any power 
of their own in the matter of conservation measures in the waters 
under their jurisdiction" 36.
The new government and the industry's continuing financial losses 
made MAFF negotiators a little more flexible on what constituted a 
fair proportion of the catch. In addition, sensing that exclusive 
belts and zones were anathema to many of its partners, it dropped 
"dominant preference", and instead sought "an adequate zone of 
exclusive access and preferential arrangements beyond; satisfactory 
quotas; a comprehensive and effective Community conservation policy; 
and a control system which enables us to police our own waters" . 
Britain participated in a Working Party to determine which historic 
rights were "vital" and which were not.
This flexibility on access concentrated the discussion on TACs and 
quotas, and on 29th January 1980 an agreement establishing TACs for 




455of the EEC. The agreement was adopted by the Council of Ministers
■50
on 26th March J . Although TACs were now established, their 
division into state quotas still promised to be difficult, but in May 
a tacit agreement was made that this could be achieved provided a 
solution could be found to Britain's excessive contribution to the 
Community budget . The Council of Ministers agreed on 30th May 
that a new common policy would be put into effect at the latest on 
1st January 1981. Quotas would be established with particular 
regard to traditional catch levels, to the special needs of regions 
particularly dependent on fishing, and to jurisdictional losses, a
formulation which refused to concede the criterion of contribution to 
40resources .
Following this declaration, much work was put into reaching agreement
on quotas. In July the UK again rejected quotas amounting to around
thirty-one per cent of TACs 41, but in September a standard procedure
for boarding and inspection was established, which went some way to
make up the gap left by the collapse of the NEAFC joint enforcement
42scheme at the general extension of limits . In December the 
Council discussed a proposal which gave total compensation for 
jurisdictional losses, but no allowance for by-catches of protected 
species, and paid regard to the traditional shares of each country in 
the period 1973-78 43. Although this reference period under-valued
Britain's herring catch, the proposal offered Britain 36.1 per cent, 
by value, of the total catch of protected species, five per cent 
above any previous offer. HMG was inclined to accept, but France, 
with an election pending, did not feel able to accept the 
modifications of its historic rights as agreed by the Working Party. 
No agreement was therefore reached. At the December meeting the UK 
also revived fishing plans as a means of protecting coastal
45
fishermen, suggesting two preferential boxes for demersal fishermen, 
one covering the Irish Sea and one embracing the Orkneys and 
Shetlands. In these boxes only vessels under 79 feet in length 
would be able to fish 44.
The absence of quotas in 1980 left each state constrained only by the 
requirement that fishing by its vessels should keep within the TAC, 
and for 1981 the Council of Ministers failed to adopt any TACs at 
all. This could have resulted in massive overfishing. Instead the 
Commission declared that notwithstanding the Council of Ministers' 
failure to adopt Commission proposals, member states were required to 
force their vessels to comply with them, since the Corrmunity had 
possessed sole competence for conservation measures since January
1979. Few states accepted this assumption of power by the 
Commission, but in the Council of Ministers member states undertook 
for three months to regulate their fishing activities "taking into 
account" the TACs recommended by the Commission 4'*. This decision 
was renewed every three months until the January 1983 agreement.
The Conservative government found itself in a similar position to 
that of its Labour predecessor. Despite its claims to be a "good 
European", it could not afford to alienate the fishermen, whose 
interests and concerns were now regularly aired and analysed in the 
media, a process aided by the new unity of purpose between the BFF, 
the SFF, and the NFFO. The government urgently needed to improve 
the economic viability of the UK industry, whose capacity was 
draining away, with large vessels particularly hard hit 46. The 
government continued to make successive and short-term releases of 
cash for operating subsidies, the amount being related to the size of 
the vessel. A prime motivation for HMG was to maintain UK
457over-capacity as a bargaining counter for the negotiations about a 
revised CFP ^7. While the optimal solution was for the UK to obtain 
high quotas, the restriction of imports would also be useful. Much 
of the cod caught off Iceland and Norway by local fishermen found its 
way into the UK, Europe's principal market for white fish. 
Resentment about such imports was demonstrated by renewed blockades 
of ports by Scottish inshore fishermen in February 1981, when a high 
pound, buoyed up by oil revenues and the UK failure to join the 
European Monetary System, encouraged large quantities of imports. 
MAFF thus shifted its area of concentration from access and quotas to 
the marketing provisions of the CFP. Pressure was applied on the 
other member states by preventing the entry into force of fisheries 
agreements with third countries. The EEC had made a number of such 
agreements, but they had in no way lived up to the BFF's 
expectations. The total United Kingdom quota for Third Country 
waters for 1979 amounted to 72,000 tonnes, of which only forty per 
cent was cod (see Figure 15.1). Reserving on such an agreement was 
not entirely a new weapon, since the UK had blocked entry into force 
of the fishing agreement between the EEC and Norway for the year 
1978-79. The blocking had little effect, since both parties applied 
the agreement in autonomous regulations, and applied scant pressure 
on other member states, since the agreement provided for a UK quota 
of around 27,000 tonnes of cod and 10,000 of haddock in the Barents 
Sea and off Spitzbergen (see Figure 15.1). In 1980-2, however, the 
UK was able to block three agreements which offered her relatively 
little, two of which involved improved access to the EEC market for 
the fishery products of a third country. Thus Britain blocked 
implementation of a long-term fisheries agreement made with Canada in 
November 1980. In this agreement the Community agreed to grant 
Canada a tariff quota of 24,000 tonnes at reduced rates of duty in
»••
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exchange for catch quotas in Canadian waters. The UK was only 
awarded a quota of 1,000 tonnes, out of a total of 14,500 tonnes, 
with the bulk of the quota going to West Germany. Since Britain was 
the principal open market for white fish HMG demanded, as the price 
of acceptance, a 25 per cent increase in withdrawal and reference 
prices, subsidised sales of fish to Poland, an end to certain 
autonomous tariff suspensions and a limit to the amount of Canadian 
exports entering the British market . The Germans retaliated with 
a threat to prevent the UK's receiving budgetary rebates about which 
HMG had been pressuring the Community
This obstructionist policy was effective in some ways. In September 
1981 Britain abandoned its "reserve" on the Canadian agreement and on 
the 1981 agreements with the Faroes and Sweden in exchange for a 
promise of a new market organisation package to come into effect on 
1st January 1983 ® . The new organisation was more flexible than 
that established in 1970, and effectively made the industry 
self-governing except for conservation purposes. This was a logical 
extension of the concept of producer organisations, since already the 
White Fish Authority and the Herring Industry Board, which had 
operated for several years with shared facilities, had been formally 
united by the Sea Fish Industry Act 1980 ® . More generous grants 
were available to producers' organisations, and certain rules 
concerning trade in fish products were extended to non-members of 
such organisations. Basic withdrawal prices were increased, but the 
cost of withdrawals was to be financed by a co-responsibility levy on 
all producers. A degree of flexibility was introduced, with 
withdrawal prices sliding progressively downwards as more fish were 
withdrawn from sale. These prices were also to be adjusted 




over premium' was introduced so as to permit withdrawn fish later to 
be processed for human consumption. Finally, the reference price 
system for imports from third countries was modified so that the 
Commission could act more rapidly to prevent serious disturbances to 
the EEC market. ?
Having obtained substantial concessions on the organisation of 
marketing, HMG hoped to be able to relax its stance on access without 
alienating the fishermen. In bilateral discussions with France the 
demand for the fishing plan area for the Irish Sea was withdrawn, and 
the reserved box demanded for Orkney and Shetland was reduced in 
size. The maximum size of unlicensed vessels in this box was raised 
to accommodate more Scottish boats, and 128 licences, all but a few 
allocated to British or French vessels, were to be made available to 
vessels above 85 feet in length. In return France would lose such 
historic rights as previously agreed. As a result of these British 
and French discussions the Commission was able to make a proposal 
which effectively meant that for the period from 1st January 1983 
until 31st December 2002 a twelve-mile limit, with specified historic 
rights, would persist. The British and French compromise on the 
Orkney and Shetland box was accepted On quotas the UK was happy 
with the percentage offered in December 1980, and a fairly similar 
proposal in June 1982 received the support of all member states save 
Denmark. The latter had been the principal loser during the course 
of negotiations over quotas. When only historical catches had been 
taken into account she had been offered forty per cent of TACs, now 
she asked for a thirty per cent share In October the Commission 
offered Denmark a reduction in the size of the Orkney and Shetland 
box, and higher cod allocations in the North Sea and the Norwegian 
Sea. Denmark responded with a demand for 20,000 tonnes of West of
461Scotland mackerel. The nine other member states countered that they
would withdraw the proffered concessions arv3 implement the June 
proposals, but offered Denmark additional temporary quotas for cod 
and mackerel 55. Somehow the situation had changed to the extent
that instead of the UK being isolated it was now the Danes, whose 
fishmeal industry was being offered very little.
In November the Council discussed adopting the Commission's proposals 
by majority vote, but this was opposed by the UK, together with 
France and Greece, as a matter of principle, since it could prove a 
significant precedent for the loss of sovereignty. A number of 
further quota, trade, and structural aid inducements were offered to 
the Danes, and on 25th January 1983 the Council of Ministers finally 
approved the new CFP package
The Terms of the Agreement
Despite six years of wrangling, or perhaps because of them, the 
Coninon Fisheries Policy as agreed in January 1983 represented a 
coherent and potentially authoritative structure for the management 
of fisheries. The Commission was empowered to set TACs annually in 
the light of scientific advice assembled by a new Scientific and 
Technical Committee for Fisheries Thus the setting of TACs was
taken out of the processes of political bargaining which had 
bedevilled the NEAFC. These TACs and quotas were to be specified 
for smaller and much more precise zones than had been the case in the
CQNEAFC , and to prevent future wrangling about quotas it was
established that their agreed allocation would provide a "reference 
allocation" upon which the distribution of future quotas would be 
based. These quotas would be established with the intention of
ensuring "relative stability of fishing activities 59 462
The provisions about access to the UK twelve-mile zone fell far short 
of the industry's demands for a fifty-mile exclusive limit, and 
constituted an approximate return, -for the ten years 1983-92, to the 
position of 1964-72. At the end of 1992, historic rights between 
six and twelve miles from baselines would again be generalised. 
Walker boasted that he had eliminated or reduced historic rights in 
nearly three-quarters of the British coastline where other member 
states had fished but the catch effect of this was negligible. 
In practice the UK had, over the four years 1979-83, abandoned access 
concerns in favour of a larger share of the catch.
There was only one significant derogation about access so far as the 
UK was concerned. This was the establishment of the Orkney and 
Shetland box, which although smaller than originally proposed 
represented a large tract of Community waters beyond twelve miles 
from baselines where the principle of national non-dicrimination did 
not apply. Only the UK (62), France (52), Germany (12) and Belgium 
(2) were to receive licences for vessels over 85' in length.
Conservation measures were to be determined by the Commission in the 
first instance, according to the annual recommendations of the 
Scientific and Technical Committee for Fisheries A Management 
Committee for Fishery Resources was established, with weighted 
representation from member states under the chairmanship of the 
Conmission 62. This Committee would pass to the Council any 
objections it might have to a conservation measure adopted by the 
Commission 63. This system was not independent of the Fisheries 




463the NEAFC and the new North Atlantic Fishing Organisation (NAFO), 
which had superseded ICNAF as a body with greater executive powers 
and less dependent upon the whims of states
Enforcement of conservation arrangements was to be left to member 
states, but the regime of flag state control had given way to a 
system of control according to national zones. All Community 
vessels were to be required to keep a log in which their catches 
would be recorded. The state exercising jurisdiction over the zone 
where a stock is located would exclude vessels of another when a 
check of logs revealed that that state's quota has been exhausted. 
Any fishermen, from whichever member state, contravening Community 
regulations would be liable to prosecution in the courts of the state 
in whose zone the offence occurred This national approach may 
seem to contravene the communitaire motivation of the CFP, but the 
regulations under which a fishermen would be prosecuted would be 
those of the Community, rather than regulations formulated by the 
prosecuting state. In addition, the system would require a 
comprehensive system of surveillance, reporting and collation of 
information, and whereas member states are likely to have such 
facilities for the observation of shipping and the reporting of oil 
slicks, the cost of a new system for fisheries alone would be 
ijnmense. Zonal enforcement is also likely to be far more effective 
than flag state enforcement and somewhat more effective than 
enforcement by the Community. As Underdal has put it: "the closer 
one party is to exclusive ownership of a certain stock, the more 
responsible will be its management policies" ®6. To ensure coastal 





HMG found itself in a position from 1976 where for a variety of 
domestic political considerations it had to take an extremely strong 
line in defence of the interests "of the fishing industry, whose 
traditional division into inshore and deep sea had become 
insignificant so far as international fisheries policy was concerned. 
On the other hand it was not possible, lest other Community states 
retaliate, to adopt a unilateral 200-mile zone and to renege on the 
CFP. The solution was therefore adopted of applying national 
conservation measures in the UK zone while refusing to sanction 
agreement on any aspect of the CFP which did not take into account 
the UK's contribution to resources, jurisdictional losses, and 
populations particularly dependent on fishing. This policy was to 
the personal liking of the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries 
during the period 1974-9, Silkin, who was opposed to continued UK 
membership of the Common Market. The policy was also fairly popular 
with the fishing industry, which stuck to a common demand for an 
exclusive fifty-mile zone from 1976 onwards, a demand which although 
not adopted by HMG placed constraints upon it because of the Labour 
government's extremely small overall parliamentary majority.
This blocking of an agreement succeeded in sharply reducing the 
fishing capacity of the Danes, the bulk of whose industrial catch 
came from the UK zone. It also increased the willingness of other 
member states to deal with the Conservative government which came 
into power in May 1979, and which was less beset by domestic 
constraints than its predecessor. From 1979 the new government 
adopted a slightly more conciliatory attitude, and traded concessions 
on marketing issues and a protected area around the Orkneys and
Shetlands for lower quotas than originally demanded. It also 465
blocked agreements with third countries as a lever in the 
negotiations. Finally in January 1983 a new CFP was agreed upon, 
which gave the UK less than the fishing industry demanded, but 
promised to provide a much more ^ workable fisheries regime than had 
previously held sway. It created semi-appropriated fisheries, with 
fairly national quotas in place of territorial control. It appeared 
to usher in a new period of stability after a period of extreme 
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POLICY CHANGES 1967-83 AND THEIR DETERMINANTS
The revised Ccttmon Fisheries Policy agreed in 1983 has been treated 
in this study as a new equilibrium in UK fisheries policy» reached 
after a period of uncertainty and piecemeal change. To sane extent 
this is an oversimplification, since it was obvious that the revised 
CFP would face a number of challenges. Firstly it was not yet 
certain what effect the conservation regime would have upon stocks. 
If, as was hoped, there was a recovery of depressed stocks as a 
result of more effective conservation it might not prove possible to 
treat the quotas for 1982 as reference ones since the relative size 
of stocks might change rapidly due to predation and thrust the 
question of distribution back into the political realm. By 
mid-1984, for instance, there were signs that the heavy mackerel 
fishing off the South-West of England had created a sizeable new 
stock of sprats, upon which mackerel feed, and that these sprats in 
turn supported a new cod stock off South Wales and the West Country. 
There were no TACs for either of these stocks, and when and if they 
were established the lack of reference quotas might lead to 
inter-state rivalry over the shareout. Another problem which might 
cause a further modification of the new CFP was the future accession 
to the Ccrmunity in 1986 of Spain and Portugal, with extensive 
national zones and large fishing fleets. Spain would probably be 
allocated quotas for sane of the stocks in the existing pond, a 
requirement which even if reciprocated with quotas in Iberian waters 
for the fishermen of existing member states waould not please UK 
fishermen, since the famed conservatism of the British palate meant 
that unfamiliar species would be unlikely to find a ready market
t* *W
here. Another question which remained unanswered is to what extent 
fisheries management would move towards maximising MEY, whether the 
limited use of licensing, such as had been made as a means of 
limiting access to sensitive areas such as the Orkney and Shetland 
box would give way to a system where licences had a monetary value 
and authoritively controlled entry to the fisheries. The more 
probable alternative, given the importance which the Ccrununity1 s 
economic and social progranmes generally attached to the maintenance 
of employment, was that the Community may eventually find itself 
faced with a "post Fleck" problem of having financed excess capacity 
with grants and loans for vessel construction.
A  brief overview of policy changes
With these caveats, it was clear that the CFP agreed in January 1983 
represented a new opportunity for stability in UK fisheries policy 
when compared to the period which had preceded it. UK fisheries 
policy had altered tremendously from the position in 1967, as 
described in Part II of this study. The fisheries regime accepted 
by the UK had shifted from one of narrow limits to coastal state 
fisheries jurisdiction to one of wide limits, and from a High Seas 
regime, characterising fishing as a freedom, to a semi-appropriated 
fishery, by which quotas had become a defined national resource 
within larger Ccrmunity TACs. The CFP regime is a regional one, as 
those defined by the NEAPC and ICNAF had been, but centres around 
those states situated in the North East Atlantic region rather than 
those fishing within it. Therefore, unlike the Fisheries 
Ccrrmissions, the relevant EEC institutions possessed absolute control 
over which states, and therefore individuals, could involve 
themselves in the fisheries. The general acceptance of the 200-mile
norm had allowed EEC meniber states to exclude outsiders frcm the 
North Sea and frcm much of the North-East Atlantic, and thus new 
entrant states would not be able to take advantage of the EEC1s stock 
investment strategies.
If the nature of the regime accepted by the UK had changed, the 
attitude of HMG towards it had changed even more. Frcm the most 
steadfast opponent of coastal state jurisdiction over fisheries HMG 
had moved to an insistence that due attention within a regional 
scheme be paid to a coastal state's "contribution to resources".
The speed of this change was remarkable. In May 1976, at the same 
time as frigates were being arrployed to enforce the "right to fish" 
twelve miles off the Icelandic coast of UK fishermen a Minister of 
State for Foreign and Ccrmonwealth Affairs was arguing for a coastal 
belt of up to fifty miles effectively reserved for UK fishermen.
Coupled with shifts in the nature of the regime had been changes in 
the character of the regulatory arrangements made under that regime, 
frcm weak ones dependent for enforcement upon the goodwill of flag 
states to strong ones backed up by a joint Ccnmunity inspectorate and 
regulations enforced by coastal states. Overlapping membership 
between ICNAF and the NEAPC had given way to a single family of 
consultational forums of interest to the UK. The strength of this 
change should not be overestimated, however. The Fisheries 
Ccrtmissions had in 1967 both discussed joint enforcement schemes, and 
the UK had supported them. The difference between the Ccnmissions 
and the EEC lay mainly in the degree to which they were likely to be 
able to be effective, because of their overall pcwer in relation to 




These changes in the fisheries regime favoured and accepted by the UK 
had been accompanied by only marginal shifts in the institutional 
arrangements for the government of fisheries. MAFF and DAFS 
persisted, with the only perceptible change being the addition of two 
new fisheries divisions within MAFF. The position of fisheries 
within the overall structure of policy-making had however changed 
markedly. Fisheries policy was still sectoral only to the extent 
that it remained of a technical nature and of interest only to 
specialist sections of the population, and that it relied upon 
delegated legislation. In addition fisheries was still not 
independent of the influence of Departments concerned to harmonise 
policies with other sectors, such as the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Department of Employment. In other respects it no 
longer fitted the sectoral model delineated on pages 60-61. The 
paternalistic "sponsorship" relationship between the Fisheries 
departments and the fishing industry had given way to the regulation 
of government property rights, both in administering fishery 
activities within the UK zone and in overseeing the taking of UK 
quotas by British fishermen. Regulation by the Fisheries 
departments now implied managing the fisheries, both nationally and 
intergovernmentally, and required a willingness to limit the effort 
aimed at a UK quota in order to prevent a downturn in yield, rather 
than a search for workable ccmprcmises between conflicting interests. 
Moreover, whereas within the classic sectoral model a sectoral 
interest spanning the dcmestic and international environments would 
have to persuade the POO to take up its concerns with other Foreign 
Ministers, within the new CFP there was an autcmatic system for the 
referral to the Council of Ministers of any problem raised by the 
Management Ccrnnittee for Fishery Resources. A further major shift 
within the government of fisheries is that whereas in 1967 the
industry's views and wishes were often co-opted for strategic 
purposes by the FOO and by Her Majesty's Government in general, frcm 
1983 fisheries was being treated independently and for its own 
rationale (my earlier remarks about the entry of Spain and Portugal 
excepted). This rationale is imposed through the Community' s own 
system of assembling scientific information. This is conveyed 
directly to the European Ccnmission, rather than indirectly to 
individual governments through a weak body representative of states, 
as had been the fate of the scientific advice proferred by the ICES.
The introduction to this study lists four main international aspects 
to fisheries policy; (i) limits to coastal state jurisdiction over 
fisheries, (ii) the vesting of authority on the High Seas beyond the 
limits of coastal state jurisdiction, (iii) the type of regulations 
introduced in order to conserve fish stocks, and (iv) the approach 
adopted for the enforcement of these regulations.
(i) On the issue of fisheries limits, whereas in 1967 the UK 
accepted, for Europe at least, a regime of twelve-mile limits to 
fisheries jurisdiction, legitimate under the Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and legitimated by the European 
Fisheries Convention of 1964, by 1983 the UK recognised 200-mile 
limits to fisheries jurisdiction as customary law, legitimated by the 
Fishery Limits Act of 1976. Although this could be said to 
constitute a shift from a global to a regional approach, the UK had 
been careful in 1976 to co-ordinate its move with the provisions of 
the negotiating texts of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, and 
the general principle of 200-mile economic zones enjoyed such 
widespread support among states that this departure frcm the UK ' s 
global approach was unlikely significantly to increase uncertainty
within the international system. The UK was careful not to claim an 
EEZ so as not to prejudge the UNCLOS package, a package in which, 
ironically, after having invested so much effort, it was to appear to 
lose interest during 1983. Despite the vast increase in the UK's 
area of jurisdiction made by the-Fishery Limits Act, there had been 
in practice no corresponding extension of the exclusive area reserved 
to British fishermen. In 1983 the area between six and twelve miles 
fran UK baselines where historic rights were exercised was smaller 
than in 1967, but in practice the potential catch taken in this zone 
by foreigners was much the same. For the first time, however, 
specific effort limitations had been agreed for these historic 
rights, rather than their being applied to any fisherman fran a 
specific state.
The medium for the regulation of inter-state fisheries in the 
Atlantic remained regional arrangements, but in practice the only 
regime of importance to the UK was the EEC one. The NEAFC 
persisted, and ICNAF had been replaced by the North Atlantic 
Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), but they were of comparatively little 
relevance to the U K  once the new CFP had been settled. The UK was 
no longer independently represented on either, the European 
Caimission having replaced the individual representation of member 
states. External fisheries policy had become the concern of the 
Camission, and the UK's once large distant-water catch had been 
replaced by a concentration on EEC waters.
(ii) On the vesting of authority over what had formerly been the High 
Seas, the most significant change has been from the strident advocacy 
of open-entry fisheries tempered only by flag-state application of 
regionally-formulated rules, to the acceptance that EEC institutions
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Figure 16.1; British wet fldh landings In 1963 by region of capture 
ICES and NAFO areas appear in brackets.
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% of total 
catch by
Tonnes £000s value
Distant water Iceland (Va) — — —
(NEAFC) Barents Sea (i) 4250 2069 0.9
East ooast of Greenland (XIV) — — ---
Bear Island and Spitzbergen (lib) --- — — -
TOTALS 4250 2089 0.9
Distant water West ooast of Greenland (1B-F) 1265 684 0.3
(NAFO) Gulf of St. Lawrence (4S—V) 
Labrador (2G-J) '
— —
Gulf of thin and Georges Bank 
Grand Banks of Newfoundland
— — ——
(3lr-P)
TOTALS 1265 684 0.3
TOTAL DISTANT WA3ER 5515 2773 1.2
Middle water Faroes (Vb) 262 205 0.1
(NEAFC) West of Scotland (Via) 231707 42006 18.1
Bockall (Vlb) 702 287 0.1
Norwegian Ooast (Ila) 3361 1301 0.6
Skagerrak (ilia) — — —
TOTALS 237032 43801 19.1
Near water 
and inshore
West of Ireland and Porcupine Bank 
(VIIb-c), together with
South of Ireland and Sole Banks 1975 
(VIIg-k)
1577 0.7
Irish Sea (Vila) 22389 8783 3.8
North Sea (IV) 377714 150116 65.6
English Channel (Vlld-e) 80074 18909 8.1
Bristol Channel (Vllf) 6347 3210 1.4
TOTALS 488499 182595 79.6
TOTAL CATCH 731046 229169 100.0
ear water and inshore" are not further subdivided because
m F F  fishery statistics are not presented in a farm  Which identifies the 
size of vessel used cr Hi ntanro taken from Whore. A  direct oanpariscn with 
Figure 4.3 reveals to What extent UK effort had retreated into waters close 
to the UK ooast. 11118 crape risen slicpitly overstates the fact, however, 
since Figure 4.3 excludes shellfish. Which are mostly taken close to UK 
coasts.
should control the choice of grounds and the catch levels of British 
fishermen. The demand for free access to distant waters had been 
replaced by the principle that the European Ccrmission could 
negotiate catch quotas there on behalf of member states. The area 
of High Seas would be much reduced should the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea enter into force, since by its provisions the EEC was sui 
generis.
(iii) Methods of conservation had moved from rules on minimum mesh 
and landed fish sizes, to a system of national quotas within a 
Ccmnunity T A C ,  and a wide variety of conservation measures. To 
these mesh and landing regulations had been added closed seasons and 
closed areas, specifically the pout box. Effort limitations had 
been accepted for sensitive areas, and their extension was advocated 
by fishery scientists, although the latter favoured restrictive 
licensing rather than limits on gear type and vessel size, like that 
adapted for the Orkney and Shetland box. Industrial fishing for 
protected species had ceased, although there was still a substantial 
by-catch frcm the fisheries for trash species. There was a far 
greater understanding than in 1967 of the interlocking relationship 
between different stocks, and of the implications of the alternative 
conservation methods for the economic viability of all or part of the 
fishing industry.
(iv) The UK approach to enforcement has also shifted. An 
enforcement approach appropriate to a High Seas regime, primarily 
concerned about enforcing the right to fish, had given way to a 
system of national policing of EEC conservation rules in coastal 
zones out to 200 miles or the median line. The equipment available 
for the task of enforcement was somewhat superior to that which had
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been available in 1967, with more vessels and the use of Nimrod 
photographic patrols. While vessels and aircraft still remained, 
with the exception of the DAFS fishery cruisers, under the control of 
the RN and RAF respectively, this had became an advantage because of 
the need for coordination between fishery protection, military 
surveillance of passing vessels and aircraft, and the safeguarding of 
oil installations.
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Determinants of Policy Change
The extent and the speed of these policy changes are especially 
surprising in the light of the strength of the UK's previous 
ccmnitment to narrow limit policies. There are two main reasons for 
this. The first is that the costs to the UK of policy maintenance 
exceeded the costs of policy change. Costs were imposed solely 
within the fisheries sector by a collapse of certain fisheries and by 
the diversion of vessels from distant waters, but this is not in 
itself a sufficient explanation of the shift in policy on fishery 
limits. More telling were the costs imposed tpon high and lew 
(economic) policy by narrow limits to national jurisdiction, in 
relation both to fisheries and to other issue areas. The loss of
the effective surveillence of the UK-Greenland gap should Iceland 
leave NATO and the immense damage to the UK environment and tourist 
industry which might result from an accident involving a supertanker 
in the Dover Strait were costs imposed upon a simplistic policy of 
narrow limits to national jurisdiction comprising all competences. 
Similarly costs would have been imposed upon the UK by a series of 
unilateral extensions of coastal state jurisdiction, a prospect which 
looked very real during the majority of the life of the Seabed 
Ccnmittee, whereas to offer supporters of such extensions a
**KV
ccmprcmise seemed the only prospect of averting such general and 
indiscriminate extensions.
The second factor underlying change is that United Kingdom high 
policy interests changed very rapidly during the period. While the 
ccnmitment to NATO and the wider "Western Alliance" remained 
paramount, the period saw the UK rapidly retreat frcm a global to a 
regional military posture. The Royal Navy and the RAF lost their 
bases on many other continents, while a shrinkage of the merchant 
navy occurred at the same time as a considerable reorientation of UK 
trade frcm the Ccnmonwea 1 th to the EEC. The minimisation of coastal 
state control over navigation thus became gradually less crucial to 
UK interests. One major development which might to an extent be 
expected to have strengthened the UK1 s concern for the freedom of 
navigation was a growing dependence of UK industry, for reasons of 
cost and convenience, upon imported oil. The resultant concern 
about oil supplies was heightened from 1973-4 by a series of price 
increases imposed by OPEC, and an oil embargo inposed by QAPEC. The 
steady development of oilfields within the North Sea premised to an 
extent to remove the cruciality of Suez and the Straits of Hormuz to 
UK strategic policy. On the other hand, new rights were needed to 
protect the oilfields, and a new requirement to extend the shelf 
controlled by the UK developed.
There are interlocking elements in both these explanations, and while 
neither of them pay sole accord to fisheries, it can be seen that 
fisheries interests have played a significant part in the 
determination of policy outcomes, even in relation to the question of 
fisheries limits, traditionally reserved to high policy. This does 





were able to articulate a clear and rational scheme for the overall
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management of fisheries and to obtain goverrment sanction for it. 
For much of the period the industry was more successful in asking for 
operating subsidies than for anything else. This was because of its 
importance to regional policy and' the degree of public sympathy 
engendered by maritime pursuits, and because subsidies did not 
threaten high policy, but even here its power was limited. Even 
during the period 1974-6, for instance, at a time when the inshore 
sector enjoyed a number of political advantages, and was willing to 
indulge in blockades, it was unable to obtain an extension of 
operating subsidies to vessels under 501 . Once work at UNCLOS 3 on 
the package for the Exclusive Economic Zone had removed any 
implications of territoriality frcm fisheries extensions, the fishing 
industry was able to wield more influence. In the Third Cod War the 
trawler owners forced HMG to send in frigates by determining that 
they would no longer fish within the zone without adequate 
protection. Similarly the inshore fishermen, in alliance with the 
purse seining fleet, were able between 1976 and 1979 to force HMG to 
take a strong stance in their favour in relation to the EEC, although 
they were not able to piersuade the government to adopit their 
programme. Their success was largely a function of public sympathy, 
of the snail size of the Labour government1 s parliamentary majority, 
and of the influence of the SNP and of anti-marketeers. The 
industry's influence receded somewhat once the last three factors had 
subsided, and after the 1979 General Election it was unable 
significantly to influence the CFP negotiations.
If the power over policy of fisheries interests was limited, the 
influence of fisheries issues lay rather in the increasing 
unworkability of existing sectoral arrangements. Even without the
. «i
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military aspects of the cod wars and the perceived strategic 
implications of fishery limits, it is inconceivable that HMG could 
have refused by 1975 to seek a new conservation regime. It was 
confronted by the manifest failure of the NEAFC to stabilise stocks 
and by a massive dislocation of thé trawler fleet in the light of the 
virtual extinction of distant-water fishing. This influence was 
hcwever negative rather than positive, in that it did not prescribe a 
clear set of alternative policies so much as demonstrate the 
shortcomings of the existing ones. It is tempting to say that 
fisheries were solely responsible for the timing of the extension of 
fisheries limits, in that the end of the Third Cod War and the 
Fishery Limits Act were clearly related, but this would be to ignore 
developments at UNCLOS 3. It is difficult to predict what would 
have been the outcome had the FCO not felt confident that a move to 
200-mile fishery limits in 1976 would not have jeopardised freedom of 
transit. Systematic crises within fisheries had no doubt occurred 
before: what made that of the 1960s and 1970s so thorough were the 
sophistocation of catching technology, the number of states involved, 
and governmental approaches to fisheries which concentrated upon the 
maintenance of employment rather than upon the needs of the resource.
Influential Actors
Central to the transformation of fisheries policy during the period 
was the shift by HMG frcm firm support of narrow limits for fisheries 
jurisdiction to support of wide limits. This shift was such a rapid 
reversal of a policy of three hundred years' duration that it is 
necessary not only to point to the factors underlying policy change, 
but to analyse which actors within the policy-making net were 




the statutory bodies experienced an increasing disaffection of their 
staff frcm the concept of free entry fisheries. Although this 
disaffection began in the mid-1960s it was especially marked frcm 
1973. The speed at which opinion change took place related partly 
to the condition of fish stocks, and partly to the inability of the 
Fisheries Ccntnissions to do anything to restore them. The defection 
of the deep sea industry frcm the narrow limits position frcm 1974 
onwards, and the introduction of regular consultations between the 
Fisheries departments and inshore organisations also propelled the 
opinions of fisheries civil servants towards support for appropriated 
fisheries. The speed at which institutional opinion moved was 
partly related to the degree of crisis in the fish stocks with which 
an individual institution was concerned. Thus the Chairman of the 
Herring Industry Board lost faith in the High Seas/ Fisheries 
Caimissions regime as early as 1968, whereas MAFF1s Fisheries 
Secretary clung to it until 1976.
Given the sectoral nature of fisheries administration, however, the 
opinions of these institutions cannot be said to have been 
particularly important in influencing policy change. In that the 
FOO is the lead department in international relations, it was FCO 
reassessments which led to the central shifts in emphasis. This 
statement is an oversimplification, however. One of the principal 
activities in which the PCO engages is information gathering, and 
even though institutional opinion within the fisheries section 
wielded no power over PCO decisions, it would have been transmitted 
into PCO considerations. The PCO, however, possessed ample evidence 
of its own as to the inadequacy of its traditional High Seas views on 
fisheries for its own high policy concerns; in the damage wrought by 
the cod w e l t s  to Britain's prestige, and possibly to NATO.
Alternatively, the Caracas offer may be viewed as an internal PCO 
calculation as to on what issues concessions could be made in order 
to obtain UNCLOS sanction of other vital policy goals. Given the 
secrecy of the PCO, and the way in views emerge, it is impossible to 
ascertain whether or not the FCO decision frcm the late 1960 ' s to pay 
more attention to economic and technical training played any part in 
the move to a coastal state position.
Nor is there any evidence that other innovations to smooth policy 
co-ordination and change, such as the Cabinet Office, or the Central 
Policy Review Staff, played much part in policy change. The CPRS 
was influential in increasing government awareness of the importance 
of oil rig protection, however, which was one issue contributing to 
the redefining of the UK1 s navigational goals frcm freedom of 
navigation to unimpeded transit.
The record of political representation in contributing to the 
development of a national fisheries policy is mixed. The fragmented 
character of the fishing industry, together with the technical nature 
of many of the issues, meant that neither MPs nor political parties 
adopted stances in favour of an international fisheries policy 
appropriate to the resource. Parties generally took approaches 
designed to "defend our fishermen", a recipe for over-capacity when 
applied simultaneously by other states involved in the fishery.
Most MPs took a similar position, but concentrated upon the 
particular needs of fishermen in their constituencies. The South 
Coast MPs who presented petitions about beam trawling knew and cared 
little about the technical evidence. Similarly Scottish positions 
on the drifting of salmon related, not to the overall needs of a 




constituencies of coastal and inland populations. Even the 
willingness of sane SNP MPs to advocate a scrapping subsidy to reduce 
over-capacity probably resulted less fran a search for a workable 
conservation regime than frcm a desire to protect the herring 
industry of NE Scotland from competition frcm diverted distant-water 
vessels.
There were MPs who were influential, but they did not represent 
fishing ports. Dalyell (Lab - West Lothian) and Reed (C - Bolton E) 
made effective use of Parliamentiary questions on a wide variety of 
marine issues, even during the prosperous years of 1968-73, questions 
which required civil servants to research information and to assemble 
replies. Their attentions were not welcomed by the front benches of 
their own parties and nor was the attempt by one MP, Prescott, (Lab - 
Hull E) to conduct independent foreign policy of his cwn in 
negotiating with Iceland. The front benches seemed wedded both to a 
"national" approach to fisheries and to the traditional FCO 
interpretation of the strategic policy implications of fishery limits 
up until mid-1976, and similarly maintained a broadly cannon view 
once UK fishery limits were extended.
The fishing industry itself was influential more in its ability to 
appear to be in crisis, and to claim itself to be so, than in any 
advocacy of a rational all-embracing fisheries policy* It is not 
surprising that this should be so, given both the traditional 
divisions of the industry, and the fact that in an international 
free-for-all fishery there was no incentive for fishermen to limit 
their effort or capacity. The extension of fisheries limits, 
together with reference quotas, should help the industry to become 
more responsive to the needs of the resource. The traditional
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organisational division will vanish - the BFF was wound up in 
February 1984, leaving the NFPO and the SFF to represent all 
fishermen and also to provide the secretariats for many of the 
Producer Organisations. Unanimity of industry opinion should thus 
be easier to obtain in the future,'and fisheries policy should beccme 
less political. It should also beccme even more firmly sectoral 
than in 1967, since even international fisheries policy is 
semi-danestic, being wholly conducted within the EEC.
Lessons for an understanding of policy-making in general
It has to be asked to what extent the tortuous experience of policy 
change on fisheries throws light on the processes of policy change on 
other issues. At first sight it does not: fisheries is an 
international resource issue, and there are few resources which 
remain international and unappropriated by states. Manganese 
nodules are not a good analogy for fisheries, even though those on 
the deep seabed are to be the subject of an international regime.
Whereas fisheries issues yield seme interest frem a section of the 
population who warm to the concept of fishermen as brave 
individualists preserving Britain's maritime traditions, nodules have 
not seized the imagination of the public. Even the moral question 
as to whether it is legitimate for the developed states to take 
advantage of their technical sophistication in seizing international 
resources appears to have generated little public concern.
Moreover, whereas many in the fishing industry are semewhat vague on 
the technical issues involved, the actors involved in nodules are 
technically well-informed, and indeed have a monopoly of information 
on which even goverrments have to rely. Therefore, there do not 
seem to be any issue areas similar enough to fisheries for
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implications to be drawn from the latter. 486
There are, however, certain general conclusions which can be drawn 
about policy-making within a fragmented state system. Firstly, 
since high policy daninates the international activities of states, 
the needs of resources will suffer. Within this context, the 
majority of states prefer solutions involving firm national 
boundaries in preference to strongly international ones. Any 
resource which requires an authoritive international institution for 
its effective management will be particularly at risk - anadrcmous 
fish stocks, for instance, have become a victim of the division of 
the oceans into national zones. Secondly, there is often uneasy 
interplay between bilateral and multilateral relations, and between 
pairs of bilateral relations. Hence the incongruency during 1976 
between the UK position in relation to the European Caimunity and 
that towards Iceland. Similarly there was at the same time 
potential conflict in the process of policy formation between the PCO 
desire for a comprehensive UNCLOS Convention and the pressing 
domestic need to find more protected fishing grounds for the diverted 
trawlers. Thirdly, system managers whose power declines begin to 
move away frcm a sense of responsibility to the global order. Hence 
the UK, after three hundred years of maintaining a uniform system, 
moved to a position of self-interest, refused to sign the UNCLOS 
Treaty, and vigorously pursued maximising UK resources, whether in 
fisheries or oil. On the other hand, the UK has developed a sense 
of regional responsibilty, and has been the principal state advocate 
of a workable conservation regime for fisheries. It is to be hoped 
that, in fisheries at least, a new stability will be found.
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INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY - J. PRESCOTT AND THE THIRD COD WAR
This item has been placed in an Appendix because although its detail 
is not warranted in a work of this scale it involves an interesting 
example of an individual MP conducting foreign policy, and 
illustrates clearly the high policy nature of the FCO's concerns. 
The bulk of the material below is based primarily on an interview 
with Prescott, but he was kind enough to provide me with copies of 
the letters and telegram referred to below, so I consider it to be 
broadly accurate.
John Prescott, Labour MP for Kingston-upon-Hull E, attempted to put 
together a catch limitation agreement with the Icelandic government 
in 1976, without reference to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
Prescott's concern was overwhelmingly an employment-related one, and 
he viewed his intervention as legitimate both in view of his position 
as a constituency MP and as a member of the Trade Ifaion Parliamentary 
Committee. As a result of his visits to the Council of Europe 
Prescott was acquainted with Thordar Einarsson, a top civil servant 
in the Icelandic Foreign Ministry. Einarsson arranged for Prescott 
to visit Iceland during the period of February 13th to 16th. During 
his visit Prescott spoke to a number of trade unionists and 
politicians, including the Prime Minister. (Most of the subsequent 
information was obtained from J.Prescott, MP, Letter to Rt. Hon. 
Harold Wilson, CBE, FRS, MP, 2i4th February 1976, and J. Prescott, 
MP, Letter to Rt. Hon. Roy Hattersley, MP, 23rd March 1976). 
The Icelandic Justice Minister was especially anxious for an 
agreement. Having no concern for the legal issue v*iich obsessed the 
FCO Prescott was happy to concede the Icelandic claim to a 200-mile 
limit, and became convinced that a fairly large UK catch could be 
guaranteed in exchange. Prescott's visit angered the FCO and senior 
ministers, especially in view of the absence of diplomatic relations. 
However, Prescott presented a detailed report on his visit to both 
MAFF and the FCO. He also wrote to P.M. Wilson, unsuccessfully 
requesting a private audience and telling him that a short-term 
agreement could be made within the terms of the statement issued by 
the two governments following the previous negotiations.
On 1st March Einarsson telephoned Prescott and suggested a meeting in 
London the following Sunday, 7th March. Prescott told Einarsson 
that he had briefly spoken to Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs Callaghan and that he was convinced that the 
latter would like to reopen negotiations if Iceland would put an 
offer on the table. He suggested that the Nordic Council would be a 
suitable third party through which an offer could be conveyed. 
Direct negotiations could then recommence and the Royal Navy could 
then be withdrawn as a goodwill gesture. The two men felt that a UK 
catch of 70,000 tonnes of cod would be a suitable compromise. 
Whether Prescott knowingly led Einarsson to believe that he had any 
sanction from HMG for this meeting is uncertain, but as a result 
Einarsson was led to believe that the potential compromise sketched 
out had the tacit support of the UK government. On 16th March the 
US Ambassador for Iceland bold UK Charge d'Affaires Young that the 
Icelandic cabinet had suspended consideration of an initiative by 
Frydenlund in order to formalise the Einarsson-Prescott compromise, 
which unlike FY’ydenlund's plan had no safeguard for the FCO's legal 
position. Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Callaghan responded by
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sending a telegram to the British Embassies of all NATO states and 
Sweden emphasising that Prescott had acted in a personal capacity and 
was in no way representing HMG (FCO telegram no 1719202, 17th March
1976). Nevertheless on 16th March Prescott received a telephone 
call from Einarsson to the effect that Iceland would be offering the 
UK a medium-term guarantee of an annual catch of 70,000 tonnes of cod 
in exchange of UK acceptance of Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction out 
to 200 miles. The offer would be made via an unspecified third 
party, "a friend across the water". On 22nd March the offer
arrived, and Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
Hattersley shoved Prescott Callaghan's telegram. Prescott felt that 
he had been misrepresented and that the only effect of the telegram 
had been to prolong the dispute.
In catch terms "the Prescott deal" was more generous than the 
agreement which HMG was eventually to accept, but the FCO could not 
recognise a unilateral move by Iceland to 200 miles and strongly 
wished to discourage independent diplomacy by MPs. Although the FCO 
was perfectly happy to see the 200-mile EEZ emerge as an accepted 
part of international law in a tightly-formulated Convention, to 
accept a unilateral extension might undermine UNCLOS 3 and usher in 
an era of unmanageable change and diverse and conflicting coastal 
state regulations.
Although to the FCO and to many Ministers the dispute was
fundamentally about international law, to the UK public it was about 
the 'right' to fish, and it was therefore in terms of the suggested 
catch limits that FCO Ministers assailed Prescott in public. They 
said that 70,000 tonnes was too little, a view passionately shared by 
J.R.Moss, the Deputy Secretary in charge of Fisheries and Food. In 
a private argument Hattersley accused Prescott of indifference to the 
jobs of trawlermen, and insisted that negotiators must stand firm for 
a more generous catch. Prescott deeply resented this and retaliated 
by referring to Hattersley's acceptance of the exemption of trawler 
crews from employment protection legislation when he was
Parliamentary Secretary at the Department of Employment and 
Productivity from 1967 to 1969.
The Hull MP did in fact feel dangerously exposed in relation to Hull 
public opinion. With Johnson, and to a lesser extent McNamara, 
making public statements against severe catch limitations, Prescott's 
position would have been very precarious in Hull were it not for the 
support of TGWU National Fishing Officer Cairns. Cairns told key 
local opinion leaders that 70,000 tonnes was the best catch offer for 
which the trawlermen would hope, and that swap arrangenents would 
enable distant-water fishing to continue after a general global 
extension of coastal state fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. 
Prescott's main fear during the period of violent confrontation on 
the fishing grounds was that a British trawlerman would be killed in 
a warp-cutting or ramming incident, because jingoism would set in in 
the distant-water ports and he would be regarded as a traitor.
Although the FCO had encouraged MAFF in its strong opposition to 
catch concessions, the Ministry at large and the fisheries department 
had to learn what the BTF and the TGWU had already learned during 
March, April and May 1976, namely that the UK could not secure the 
trawlers from harassment sufficiently to provide an economic return 
to the trawler firms. MAFF's Fisheries department had to be 
persuaded that concessions must be made. Prescott played a key role 
in the formulation of the agreement, partly because of the length of
time during which he had been amassing a case for a retreat from 
Iceland, and partly because of his personal contacts with Icelandic 
politicians. Immediately following Crosiand's elevation to the post 
of Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Prescott 
wrote to him urging an early settlement (J. Prescott, MP, Letter to 
Rt. Hon. Anthony Crosland, MP, 13th April 1976.), but Crosland 
soon left for China, asking Prescott to work through Hattersley (Rt. 
Hon. A. Crosland, MP, Letter to J. Prescott, MP, 27th April 
1976.) About a month had elapsed before Prescott was able to acquaint 
Crosland with the details and to present him with a copy of the 
agreement which he and Einarsson had mapped out. By this time 
Crosland, by now under extreme diplomatic pressure from his civil 
servants, had come to the conclusion that the UK would have to back 
down; but he was concerned about prestige.
When he saw the 'Prescott deal' , which he had heard alluded to in 
disparaging terms but the details of which he had never previously 
read, Crosland was agreeably surprised at the cod catch of 70,000 
tonnes. In view of the slump in catches under harassment this now 
looked quite attractive. In the absence of diplomatic relations, 
and given his understandable reluctance to be the first to take up 
Luns's or Norway's offer of mediation lest that appear as backing 
down, Crosland found Prescott's contacts useful. Ihe two men agreed 
that Prescott would telephone Einarsson and enquire whether the deal 
was still open. This was done, and the latter undertook that 
Iceland would offer a similar deal to Crosland at the NATO meeting in 
Oslo on 20-21st May. He told Prescott that any catch limitations 
wauld have to be made by restricting access to particular vessels. 
The advantage to Iceland of such an arrangement was that policing of 
catch limitations would not be so easy if the UK was merely allocated 
a quota, because UK skippers might cheat when reporting catches. By 
reducing the number of trawlers allowed on the grounds to a number 
concomitant with the hoped-for catch, enforcement wrould be much 
simplified and would not require on-board inspection by Icelandic 
officials. Prescott urged Crosland not to accept this means of 
limitation of the catch, but to insist upon a quota. He took the 
view that Iceland's preferred solution would maximise returns to the 
trawler owners by raising the catch per vessel employed and thus 
reduce employment in the industry. Departmental opinion was however 
against him, since overcapacity was the cause of enormous losses by 
the trawler companies. The Fisheries departments were already being 
urged by the White Fish Authority that restrictive licensing would 
prove the only wjay to place fishing on a sound economic basis. Even 
more telling was the opinion of the FCO Marine and Transport 
Department, which still hoped to maintain the appearance of a High 
Seas regime in any agreement, even though it was obvious that narrow 
fisheries limits were a thing of the past. A solution wfriich did not 
require extensive Icelandic inspection at sea would be more likely to 
allow flag-state control of fishing vessels than would a solution 
based upon a quota. Crosland therefore ignored Prescott's 
complaints, and it was agreed that the interim solution should 
incorporate a limitation on the number of vessels.
Prescott also helped to calm the opposition of MAFF. Moss was angry 
at having worked so tirelessly for maximal access only to have his 
concerns thrown out for reasons largely unconnected with fisheries. 
On his advice, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Peart (Lab 
- Workington) urged Crosland not to capitulate too swriftly, arguing 
that Iceland was herself under pressure from NATO states and Norway 
to seek a solution and that with steadfastness it wrould still be
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possible for the UK to maintain the right to a considerable catch far 
into the future. A few days before Crosland vent to Oslo, a secret 
meeting took place in the Station Hotel in Hull between Peart, Moss 
and Prescott. Nobody else was invited, though Crosland was aware of 
the meeting. Prescott argued that rising fuel costs would have made 
distant-water fishing uneconomic even without the Icelandic extension 
of jurisdiction, and that with the general move to an Exclusive 
Economic Zone which then seemed inevitable, the UK would gain 
jurisdiction over fishing grounds more extensive than those she was 
losing. He also pointed out to Moss that much of the
fish-processing industry would remain in operation, because increased 
Icelandic production would have to be exported, and it would be some 
time before Iceland could expand her ovn processing facilities to 
cope with her increased catch. After a lengthy and sometimes heated 
discussion, Moss conceded that in the circumstances even an agreement 
which involved a complete phasing out of UK fishing off Iceland would 
not be a disaster, providing the UK could herself move rapidly to 
obtain exclusive access to sufficient fish stocks off her own coasts 
to supply the trawlers with grounds. Peart was somewhat bewildered 
because UK fishing on the Icelandic continental shelf had such a long 
history that he had never believed that it would be phased out 
completely; but he accepted the verdict of his fisheries department.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AMD ABBREVIATIONS AS USED IN THE TEXT
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Anadromous Fishes which, though spending much of their lives in the 
sea, ascend rivers to spawn.
Ancillary
Workers
Workers who owe their employment to the fishing industry, 
but who do not catch fish. They are engaged in the 
processing, unloading and the transport of fish or the 
administration and maintenance of the fishing fleet.
Baseline The line from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured. Landward of the baseline any sea areas have the 
status of internal waters.
Beam-trawler A trawler whose trawl-net is kept open and on the sea-floor 
by a heavy beam on the net's bottom leading edge.
BFF British Fishing Federation. An organisation of trawler 
owners formed in 1976 by the amalgamation of the British 
Trawlers Federation and the Scottish Trawlers Federation.
BTF British Trawlers Federation. An organisation representing 
the owners of most of the larger English and Welsh 
trawlers, merged in 1976 into the British Fishing 
Federation.
BUT British United Trawlers.
by-catch Catch of species other than that at which fishing is 
directed, often involving juveniles of species other than 
the target one.
C Conservative.
Capacity The fishing power of a vessel or a group of vessels. It is 
therefore an amalgamation of speed, volume and gear size. 
It is equivalent to the tonnes of fish per hour which a 
vessel could potentially extract, although in practice, 
stock abundance means that actual catches do not reach 
capacity.
CFP The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Communities.
Closing Line A line drawn across the mouth of a Bay or between islands 
to enclose the waters landward of the Closing Line.
Cohort That part of a stock hatched in a particular year.
Cohort Analysis Prediction of stock trends by an examination of the size of 
the cohorts making up each stock.
Commission Commission of the European Communities.
Committee I The Comnittee of the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea established to formulate arrangements 
for the seabed lying beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.





the Law of the Sea established to formulate arrangements 
for traditional Law of the Sea matters.
Committee III The Committee of the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea established to formulate arrangements 
for the Protection and Preservation of the Marine 
Environment.
Contiguous Zone A zone of indeterminate width contiguous to a state's 
territorial sea, defined by the Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, in which the coastal 
state may take certain actions to protect its sanitary, 
customs or fixed regulations.
Continental
Margin




That part of the continental margin which constitutes an 
accumulation of sediment at the base of the continental 
slope, tapering off and merging with the deep ocean floor.
Continental
Shelf
That part of the continental margin which is a natural 




That part of the continental margin which marks a break in 




The Council of Ministers of the EEC. The Council consists 
of one member of the government of each member state, 
normally, but not always, the Foreign Minister.
DAFS Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland.
Deep Sea vessels Trawlers above 80' in length.
Deep Seabed The seabed beyond the continental margin.
Demersal Bottom-feeding.
Directed Fishing Fishing aimed at a particular species of fish. The target
species will determine the grounds, gear and mesh size.
Distant-water
vessels Trawlers over 140' in length.
District
Inspectors




A beam trawler with two parallel beams in place of the 
more usual one. This enables a greater weight to be 
applied to the bottom edge of the trawl without increasing 
the length of the beam.
Drifter A vessel used in pelagic fisheries equipped with a large 
net which hangs vertically, extended by weights at the 
bottom and by floats at the top, and which is allowed to 
drift with the tide.
A
jtfl '
DSFIC Deep Sea Fishing Industry Committee.
DTI Department of Trade and Industry.
EEC European Economic Community.
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone.
EZ Exclusive Zone.
Effort The number of hours spent fishing multiplied by the 
capacity (q.v.) of the vessels engaged.
Enforcement Ensuring that fisheries regulations are observed.
Escapement The number of adult salmon which manage to reach their 
breedinq qrounds without beinq cauqht en route.
FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation.
FCO The Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Fish Farming The hatching and rearing of fish in a protected 
environment.
Fish Ranching The hatching of fish in a protected environment, their 
rearing in such an environment until a juvenile stage and 
subsequent release.
Fishery This is used to mean both: the business of catching fish, 
and a place for catching fish. Which meaning is intended 
is clear from the context of each time the word occurs.
Fisheries 
Closing line
A line drawn across the mouth of a Bay or between two 
islands, claiming the waters landward of the line as 
internal waters for the purposes of fisheries only.
Fisheries
departments
The Fisheries divisions of the Department of Agriculture 
and Fisheries for Scotland and the Ministry of 




A loose organisation of inshore fishermen, with mostly 
indirect membership.
Fishery Limits The outer edge of the area within which a state 
exercises jurisdiction over the fish stocks off its 
coast.
Fishery Officers Officials responsible for inspections to ensure that
Fishery
Protection
fishery regulations are observed. 
Enforcement of fishery regulations.
Flatfish Demersal fish which lie on, or swim horizontally along, 
the seabed. The principal species of commercial value are 
plaice, sole and flounder.
FPS Fishery Protection Squadron.
499
FRG Federal Republic of Germany ("West Germany").
GMWU General and Municipal Workers' Union.
GNP Gross National Product.
Growth
overfishing
An unacceptable level of mortality among undersized fish 
owing to fishing activities.
GRT Gross Registered Tonnage
Heavy Beam 
Trawler
A beam trawler whose beam or beams exceed 24' in total 
length.
HIB Herring Industry Board.
High Seas All parts of the sea that are not included in the 
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or 
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters 
of an archipelagic State.
Highly Migratory Species of which the same stock ranges through a large 
Species number of zones of state jurisdiction. A list of these
Historic Rights
considered of commercial interest appears in Annex I of 
the ICNT Rev 2. None of them are found in commercially 
exploitable concentrations on any grounds commonly fished 
by UK vessels since 1967.
The established right to fish in a certain area of sea.
HMG Her Majesty's Government.
'Hobby'
fishermen
Fishermen who sell fish coinnercially, but for whom 
fishing is not the principal source of income.
Hull Kingston-upon-Hull.
ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Sea.
ICJ International Court of Justice.
ICNAF International Commission for North-West Atlantic Fisheries
IMCO Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation.
Ind Lab Independent Labour.
Industrial
Fishing
Fishing for purposes other than human consumption, usually 
for reduction for fish meal.
Inshore vessels Vessels less than 80' in length.
Internal Waters Waters landward of baselines.
Kit A box holding approximately fourteen pounds of fish.




L ib e ra l.
Lab Labour.
Landed Price The p rice  paid fo r f is h  on f i r s t  s a le .
Landed Weight The weight o f the f is h  as caught. Gutting can reduce the 
weight o f  a catch by about o n e -th ird , and f i l l e t in g  and 
freez in g  w i l l  fu rth er reduce th is  fig u re .
Larva The e a r ly  immature form o f a f i s h ;  their habits and 
haunts often  d i f f e r  markedly from those o f the adu lt form.
Licensing The re s tr ic t io n  o f access to a fish e ry  by means o f 
licen ces .
Long Liner A boat which fish e s  by playing out over a m ile o f l in e ,  
with baited  hooks spaced at in te rv a ls .
m E ither, d istance: Nautical M ile , 6080 fee t or 1852 metres, 
o r , money: M illio n .




The le v e l o f annual catch for a p a rt ic u la r  stock which 




Annual harvest from a stock which would be fe a s ib le  
without depressing that stock. Since i t  is  mathematically 
im precise, i t  has given  way among fish e ry  b io lo g is ts  to 
Maximum Economic Y ie ld .
Median Line The lin e  every point o f which is  equ id istan t from the 
nearest points o f  the baselines from which the breadth 
o f the t e r r i t o r ia l  sea o f each S tate  is  measured.
Middle-water
vessel
A vesse l between 110' and 140' in  length.
Minimum Price  
Scheme
A scheme whereby f is h  which at po in t o f  f i r s t  sa le  f a i l  to 
to command a sp e c ifie d  minimum p r ic e , are withdrawn from 
the market.
Monofilament Constructed with a s in g le  filam ent rather than intertwined  
filam ents.
Mother Ship A vesse l to provide support se rv ic e s , lik e  food and medical 
atten tion , to a f ish in g  f le e t .
MSY Maximum Sustainable Y ie ld .
NAFO North A t lan tic  F ish e rie s  O rganisation . A F isheries  
Commission fo r the North A t la n t ic , which succeeded ICNAF 
( q . v . ) .
NATO North A tlan tic  Treaty Organisation.




Vessels between 80' and 110' in length .
NFFO National Federation o f Fisherm en's O rgan isations.
NIMA Northern Ire lan d  M in istry  o f A g r ic u ltu re .
Nursery An area o f  sea inhabited by the la rvae  o f  a p a rt ic u la r  
stock or s p e c ie s . '
OAPEC Organisation  o f Arab O il Producing and Exporting S tates .
OECD Organisation  fo r  Economic Co-operation  and Development.
OEY Optimum Economic Y ie ld .
OPEC Organisation  o f  O il Producing and Exporting S tates .
OSY Optimal Sustainable Y ie ld .
PC P la id  Cymru.
Pelagic Mid-water feed in g .
Pond The area o f  sea w ithin  the North Sea and North-Eastern  
A tla n tic  ly in g  beyond member s t a t e s ' exc lu sive  f ish e r ie s  
. l im its  but w ithin  the 200-mile F ish e r ie s  Zone o f the 
European Economic Community.
Pout Box A box covering part o f the Northern North Sea w ith in  which 
f ish in g  fo r  Norway Pout was p ro h ib ited . F ir s t  estab lished  
in January 1977, the box continued u n til time o f w rit in g , 
with varying boundaries.
PPS Parliam entary P rivate  Secretary.
Producer
Organisations
Fish marketing organ isations owned operated by fishermen, 
estab lish ed  w ith in  the Conmon F ish e r ie s  P o licy .
Protected
Species
Species monitored by the NEAFC (p re -1 9 7 7 ), or the EEC 
(p ost-1977 ), because o f  the ir v a lu e  fo r human consumption.
Purse Seiner A boat equipped with an extrem ely la rg e , bag-shaped net, 
the mouth o f  which can be drawn together with cords. Most 
purse se in e rs  are equipped with sonar to locate  shoals o f 
p e lag ic  f i s h .
Recruit A f is h  which has newly reached adulthood and has begun to 
behave in a fash ion  appropriate to  the adu lts  o f i t s  
spec ies .




A le v e l o f m orta lity  owing to f ish in g  a c t iv it ie s  such 
that the number o f newcomers to  the adu lt stock is  
depressed. I t  can be caused by the taking o f undersized 
f is h ,  or by fish in g  fo r adults on the spawning grounds, or 





SBC The Committee on the Peaceful Uses o f  the Seabed and Ocean 
F loor beyond the lim its  o f National J u risd ic tio n , together 
w ith  i t s  ad hoc predecessor.
SC A Sub-Committee o f  the SBC (q .v . ) .
Seabed Committee Used to mean both the Committee on the Peaceful Uses o f
Sector
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beynond the Limits o f 
N ational Ju risd ic tion  o f the General Assembly o f the 
United Nations, and i t s  ad hoc predecessor.
A semi-autonomous po licy  area with, under normal 
circum stances, i t s  own d is t in c t  set o f  actors, both 
governmental and non-governmental. The actors work w ithin  
le g a l  frameworks estab lished  by the d ic ta te s  o f  high 
p o lic y  ( q . v . ) .
Sectoral Perta in ing  to a sector (q .v . ) .
Sedentary
Species
Organisms which at the harvestable s ta g e , e ither are 
immobile on or under the sea-bed or a re  unable to move 
except in constant physical contact w ith  the sea-bed or 
the su b so il.
SFF Scottish  Fishermen's Federation.
SFST Sea F ish eries  S t a t is t ic a l  Tables.
S h e llfish Marine molluscs and crustaceans.
Skippers' Guild An association  representing skippers in  a p articu lar po rt . 
Most o f the la rg e r  deep sea ports had one, Fleetwood did  
not.
SL Scottish  Labour.
SN Scottish  N ation a l.
SSFST Scottish  Sea F ish eries  S ta t is t ic a l T ab les .
STF S co ttish  Traw lers Federation.
Stock A d is t in c t  population o f a p a rt icu la r  species.
Sub-Committee I A sub-committee o f  the Seabed Committee (q .v . )  estab lished  
to  deal with questions re la tin g  to the deep ocean f lo o r .
Sub-Committee I I  A sub-committee o f  the Seabed Conmittee (q .v .) estab lished




A sub-coirenittee o f the Seabed Committee (q .v .) estab lished  
to  deal with questions re la tin g  to the preservation o f the 
marine environment, s c ie n t if ic  research , and the transfer  
o f  technology.
TAC T ota l A llow able Catch (q .v . ) .
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T e r r it o r ia l  Sea A s t r ip  o f  sea contiguous to  the coast, which forms pa rt  
o f  the t e r r i t o r y  o f  the coasta l sta te .
TGWU Transport and General Workers' Union.
Tonne One thousand kilogrammes, equ ivalent to  1.016 tons.
Total A llow able  
Catch
The aggregate  catch o f  a stock o r species determined by the 
in s t itu t io n  responsible fo r  a fish ery  to  be h arvestab le  in  
in a p a r t ic u la r  year.
Transport and The UK' s la rg e s t  Trade Union representing workers in  a
General Workers1 variety of of trades, most of them being unskilled or
Union se m i-sk ille d .
Trash Species Those spec ies  not subject to  f ish e r ie s  management.
Traw ler A vesse l used mainly in  demersal f ish e r ie s , equipped with  
a bag-shaped net which is  pu lled  along the sea f lo o r ,  
e ith e r frem the side  or frem the stem .
Traw ler
Federations
The B r it is h  Traw lers Federation and the Scottish  Traw lers  
Federation.
Treaty o f  
Accession
The T reaty  by which the United Kingdom acceded to  the  
European Economic Ccrmunity.
UKOOA United Kingdcm Offshore Operators' Association .
UNCLOS 3 The Third  United Nations Conference on the Law o f  the Sea.
UU U ls te r  TJnionist.
UUUC United U ls t e r  Unionist Council.
Warp The s t e e l rope by which a traw l i s  pu lled  behind a traw le r.
WFA White F ish  Authority.
Withdrawal p rice  The minimum landed p rice  estab lish ed  a t a s p e c if ic  port  
fo r  a p a r t ic u la r  species. Fish fa i l in g  to  catmand the 
withdrawal p rice  a re  withdrawn from the market.
Y ear-C lass Cohort ( q . v . ) .
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"In te rn a tion a l Convention fo r  the regu la tion  o f  vrtialing", Washington
2nd Decentoer 1946. Entered in to  fo rc e  17th June 1947. T reaty  S e r ie s  5 (1949 ).
Command 7604. (London: HMSO, 1949).
"In te rn ation a l Convention fo r  the  North-West A t la n t ic  F is h e r ie s " ,
Washington 8th February 1949. R a t i f ie d  by UK 15th December 1949. T reaty  
S e rie s  62 (1950). Ccnmand 8071. (London: HMSO, 1950).
"Convention fo r  the Regulation o f  the Meshes o f  F ish in g  N ets  and the S ize  
Lim its o f  F ish ", London 5th A p r i l  1946. Treaty S e r ie s  8 (1 9 5 6 ). Ccmnand 
9704. (London: HMSO, 1956).
M in istry  o f  Labour, Port T ransport Industry, Report o f  a Ccmnittee 
appointed on 27th Ju ly  1955, to  enqu ire  in to  the operation  o f  the Dock 
Vforkers (R egu lation  o f  Employment) Scheme, 1947i "D ev lin  R eport". Carmand 
9813. (London: HMSO, 1956).
Command Papers—4th Series
M in istry  o f  A g ricu ltu re , F ish e r ie s  and Pood. Report o f  the Ccntnittee o f  
In qu iry  in to  the F ish inq In dustry , January 1961. Catmand 1266. (London:
HNEO, 1961J'.------  ---------  ---------------
M in istry  o f  A g ricu ltu re , F ish e r ie s  and Food. Report o f  Canrnittee on Salmon 
and Freshwater F ish e r ie s . May 1961. Ccntnand 1350. (London: HMSO, 1964).
"The A n tartic  T reaty ", Washington, 1st Decentoer 1959. Entered in to  fo rce  
23rd June 1961. Treaty S e rie s  97 (1961). Command 1535. (London: HMSO, 1965).
"Convention on the High Seas", Geneva 31st October 1958. R a t if ie d  by UK 
14th March 1960. Entered in to  fo rc e  30th September 1962. T reaty  S e r ie s  3 
(1963 ). Command 1929. (London: HMSO, 1971).
"Convention fo r  the Regulation o f  the Meshes o f  F ish in g  N ets  and the s ize  
l im it s  o f  f i s h " ,  London February 1963. Treaty S e r ie s  11 (1963 ). Command 1942. 
(London: HMSO, 1963).
Department o f  A g ricu ltu re  and F ish e r ie s  fo r  Scotland. S co ttish  Salmon and 
Trout F ish e r ie s . F i r s t  Report o f  the Ccmnittee appointed by  the Secretary  
o f  S ta te  fo r  Scotland, Ju ly  1963. Command 2096. (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1963).
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d isputes a r is in g  from the Law o f  the Sea Conventions", Geneva 29th A p r i l  
1958. Treaty S eries  60 (1963). Ccrmand 2112. (London: HMSO, 1963).
"D ec laration  o f  understanding regard in g  the In te rn a tio n a l Convention fo r  
the North West A t la n t ic  F ish e r ie s , concerning m ollusks", Washington, 24th 
A p r i l  1961. Treaty S eries  71 (1 9 6 3 ). Command 2140. (London: HMSO, 1963).
"North -East A t la n t ic  F ish e rie s  Convention", London 24th January 1959. 
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the G eneral F ish e r ie s  Council fo r  the M editerranean", Rone 24th September 
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September 1964. Entered in to  fo rce  15th March 1966. T reaty  S eries  35 
(1966 ). Ccrmand 3011. (London: HMSO, 1966).
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fo r  1968”. T reaty  S e r ie s  85 (1968 ). Conmand 3808. (London: HMSO, 1968).
"In te rn a tio n a l Convention fo r  re gu la t in g  the p o lic in g  o f  the North Sea 
F ish e r ie s " , The Hague 6th May 1882. Caim ercial S e r ie s  11 (1884.) Conmand 
3928. (London: HMSO, 1882).
Board o f  Trade, "T raw ler S a fe ty " . F ina l Report o f  the Catm ittee o f  Inqu iry  
in to  Traw ler S a fe ty . Canmand 4114. (London: HMSO, 1969).
Board o f  Trade. Report on the Conmittee o f  Inqu iry  in to  Shipping, May 1970. 
Contend 4337. (London: HMSO, 1970).
"P ro toco l to  the In te rn ation a l Convention fo r  the North West A t lan t ic  
F ish e r ie s  signed a t Washington on 8th February 1949 r e la t in g  to  measures o f  
c o n t ro l" , Washington 29th Novenber 1965. R a t ifie d  by  UK 16th August 1966. 
Entered in to  fo rce  19th December 1969. T reaty  S e r ie s  74 (1970). Coroand 
4436. (London: HMSO, 1970).
Department o f  A g r icu ltu re  and F ish e r ie s  fo r  Scotland, Regulation o f  
S co tt ish  Inshore F ish e r ie s , Decenber 1970. Ccrmand 4453^ (Edinburgh: HMSO,
1970).
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland, Salmon and Freshwater 
Fisheries in Scotland, November 1971. Corrmand 4821. (Edinburgh: HM9CL
1971).
"Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dunping from Ships 
and Aircraft", Oslo 15th February 1972. Ccmtand 4984. (London: HMSO, 1972)
"Exchange o f  notes between the Government o f  the U n ited  Kingdom o f  G reat 
B r it a in  and Northern Ire la n d  and the Government o f  Canada concerning  
f ish in g  by B r it is h  v e s se ls  o f f  the A t la n t ic  coast o f  Canada", Ottawa 27th 
March 1972. Entered in to  fo rc e  27th March 1972. T rea ty  S e r ie s  68 (1972). 
Ccmnand 5015. (London: HMSO, 1972).
"London Convention: The Durping a t  Sea A ct: the F in a l Act o f  the In te r ­
governmental Conference on the Convention o f  the Durrping o f  Wastes a t  Sea" 
London 13th November 1972. Entered in to  fo rce  27th January 1974. Ccmnand 
5169. (London: HMSO, 1972).
"T reaty  concerning the accession  o f  the Kingdom o f  Denmark, Ire lan d , the 
Kingdom o f  Norway, and the United Kingdom o f  Great B r it a in  and Northern  
Ire lan d  to  the European Economic Ccmnunity and the European Atomic Energy 
Ccmnunity", B ru sse ls  22nd January 1972. Entered in to  fo rce  1 s t  January
1972. Treaty S e rie s  1 (1973 ). Ccnmand 5179. (London: HMSO, 1973).
"Agreement between the European Economic Ccmnunity and the Republic  o f  
Ice land  with F in a l A c t", B ru sse ls  22nd Ju ly  1972. P resented to  Parliam ent 
Decerrber 1972. M iscellaneous No 50 (1972). Ccnmand 5182. (London: HM90,
1972).
"F ish e r ie s  Dispute between the UK and Ice lan d ", W hite Paper. Ccnmand 5341. 
(London: HMSO, 1973).
"Exchange o f  Notes co n stitu tin g  an Interim  Agreement in  the F ish e rie s  
Dispute between the Government o f  the United Kingdom o f  G reat B r ita in  and 
Northern Ire lan d  and the Government o f  the Republic o f  Ic e la n d ", Reykjavik  
13th November 1973. Entered in to  fo rce  13th November 1973. T reaty  S e rie s  
122 (1973). Command 5484. (London: HMSO, 1973).
"Agreement between the Government o f  the United Kingdom o f  G reat B r ita in  
and Northern Ire lan d , the Government o f  the Kingdom o f  Norway and the 
Government o f  the Union o f  S ov iet S o c ia l is t  R epublics on the Regulation o f  
the F ish ing o f  N orther-East A rc t ic  (Arcto-Norwegian) Cod", London 15th 
March 1974. Entered in to  fo rc e  15th March 1974. T rea ty  S e r ie s  35 (1974). 
Ccmnand 5615. (London: HMSO, 1974).
"Exchange o f  Notes between the Government o f  the U n ited  Kingdcm o f  Great 
B r ita in  and Northern Ire la n d  and the Government o f  th e  Kingdom o f  Norway 
concerning the c reation  o f  c e rta in  T raw le r -fre e  zones in  a reas  adjacent to  
the present Norwegian F ish ery  l im it " ,  O slo  30th January 1975. Entered in to  
fo rce  30th January 1975. T reaty  S eries  48 (1975). Ccnmand 5893. (London: 
HMSO, 1975).
"Arrangement re la t in g  to  F ish e r ie s  in  Waters surrounding the Faroe Is lan ds ' 
Copenhagen 18th December 1973. Entered in to  fo rce 1 s t  January 1974. Treaty  
S e rie s  28 (1975). Ccmnand 5930. (London: HMSO, 1975).
"Supplementary Protocol to  the Agreement between th e  European Economic 
Ccrmunity and the Republic o f  Ice lan d ", B russe ls 29th May 1975. European 
Communities No 127 (1975 ). Ccnmand 6216. (London: HMSO, 1975).
"Exchange o f  Notes between the Government o f  the U n ited  Kingdom o f  Great 
B r ita in  and Northern Ire la n d  and the Government o f  the  Republic  o f  Iceland  
concerning f ish in g  in  the Ic e lan d ic  f ish e r ie s  zone (w ith  re la te d  
documents)", O slo  1st June 1976. Entered in to  fo rce  1st June 1976. Treaty
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"Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North-West Atlantic 
Fisheries", Ottawa 31st Decentoer 1978. Entered into force 1st January 1979. 
Miscellaneous No 9 (1979). Ccrrmand 7569. (London: HMSO, 1979).
"Agreement concerning interim arrangements relating to polymetallic nodules 
of the deep seabed", Washington 2nd September 1982. Entered into force 2nd 
September 1982. Treaty Series 46 (1982). Ccnmand 8685. (London: HMSO, 1982).
"Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources", 
Canberra 31st December 1980. Entered into force 7th April 1982. Treaty 
Series 48 (1982). Ccnmand 8714. (London: HMSO, 1982).
"Agreement on Fisheries between the European Economic Coimunity and the 
Government of Canada", Brussels 30th Deceirber 1981. Entered into force 30th 
Decentoer 1981. European Communities Series 13 (1983). Command 8800.
(London: HMSO, 1983)
"Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean", 
Reykjavik 31st August 1982. Miscellaneous Series 7 (1983). Command 8830. 
(London: HMSO, 1983).
"Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters establishing Fishing 
Arrangements between the European Economic Ccrmunity and the Kingdom of 
Norway for 1982", Brussels 12th Noventoer 1982. European Ccnmunities Series 
24 (1983). Ccrmand 8855. (London: HMSO, 1983).
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There are about 200 Statutory Instruments of relevance during the period.
These listed below are those frcm vhich information was extracted for use 
in this thesis.
Salmon and Migratory Trout (Drift-Net Fishing) Licensing Order 1962, SI 
1962 No 1393.
Salmon and Migratory Trout (Drift-Net Fishing) Restrictions on Landing 
Order 1962, SI 1962 No 1394.
Petroleum (Production) (Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regulations 
1964, SI 1964 No 708.
Dock Workers (Regulation of Deployment) Amendment Order 1967, SI 1967 No 
1252.
Transfer of Functions (Wales) Order 1969, SI 1969 No 388.
Beam Trawl Regulation Order 1972, SI 1972 No 23.
Salmon and Migratory Trout (Prohibition of Fishing) Order 1973, SI 1973 No 
188.
Salmon and Migratory Trout (Prohibition of Fishing) (No.2) Order 1973, SI 
1973 No 207.
North Sea Herring (Restriction on Landing) Order 1974, SI 1974 No 74.
Herring (North Sea Fishing) Licensing Order 1974, SI 1974 No 75.
Herring (Celtic Sea) Licensing Order 1974, SI 1974 No 738.
Herring (North Yorkshire Coast) (Prohibition of Fishing) Order 1974, SI 1974 No 
1215.
Herring (North Sea Fishing) Licensing No.2 Order 1974, SI 1974 No 1766.
Fishing Vessels (Safety Provisions) Rules 1975, SI 1975 No 330.
Fishing Vessels (Safety Provisions) (Amendment) Rules 1975, SI 1975 No 471.
Foreign Sea-Fishery Officers (international Carmi ss ion for the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries Scheme) Order 1971, SI 1971 No 1103.
Periodicals
Annual Abstract of Statistics.
Central Office of Information Fact Sheets.
Eoonanic Trends.
MAFF Fisheries Laboratories Leaflets.
Fishing Prospects.
Hansard.
House of Lords Official Record.
Household Pood Consumption and Expenditure.
National Income and Expenditure.
Official Journal of the European Ccmnunities.
Overseas Trade Accounts of the United Kingdom.
Scottish Abstract of Statistics.
Scottish Economic Bulletin.
Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables.
Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables.
United Kingdom Balance of Payments.
A cts
Clean Rivers (Estuaries and Tidal Waters) Act 1960 , 8 and 9 Eliz 2 c54. 
Coast Protection Act 1949, 12 and 13 Geo 6 c74.
Continental Shelf Act 1964, 1964 c29.
Control of Pollution Act 1974, 1974 c40.
Deep Sea Mining (Tenporary Provisions) Act 1981, 1981 c53.
Dunping at Sea Act 1974, 1974 c20.
Employment Protection Act 1975, 1975 c71.
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, 1978 c44.
Fisheries Act 1981, 1981 c29.
Fishery Limits Act 1964, 1964 c72.
Fishery Limits Act 1976, 1976 c86.
Fishing Vessels Grants Act 1967, 1967 c35.
Fishing Vessels Safety Provisions Act 1970, 1970 c27.
Freshwater and Salmon Fisheries (Scotland) Act 1976, 1976 c22.
Harbours (Scotland) Act 1982, 1982 cl7.
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, 1974 c37.
Hydrocarbon oil (Customs and Excise) Act 1971, 1971 cl2.
Island of Rockall Act 1972, 1972 c2.
Local Government Act 1972. 1972 c5.
Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973. 1973 c65.
Merchant Shinoinq Act 1970, 1970 c36.
Merchant Shippinq Act 1974. 1974 c43.
Merchant Shipoinq Act 1979, 1979 c30.
Merchant Shippinq Act 1981, 1981 clO.
Mineral Exploration and Investment Grants Act 1972, 1972 c9.
Mineral Workinqs (Offshore Installations) Act 1971, 1971 c61.
Offshore Petroleum Development Act 1975, 1975 c8.
Offshore Petroleum Development (Scotland) Act 1975, 1975 c8.
Oil in Naviqable Waters Act 1922, 12 and 13 Geo 5 c39.
Oil in Naviqable Waters Act 1955, 3 and 4 Eliz 2 c25.
Oil in Naviqable Waters Act 1963, 1963 c28.
Oil in Naviqable Waters Act 1971, 1971 c21.
Petroleum and Sukmarine Pipe-lines Act 1975, 1975 c74.
Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971, 1971 c60.
Radioactive Substances Act 1960, 8 and 9 Eliz 2 c34.
Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951, 14 and 15 Geo 6 c64.
Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) (Scotland) Act 1951, 14 and 15 Geo 6 c66. 
Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1961, 9 and 10 Eliz 2 c50.
Rivers (Prevention of Pollution)(Scotland) Act 1965, 1965 cl3.
Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1923, 13 and 14 Geo 5 cl6.
Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1965, 1965 c68.
Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1972, 1972 c37.
Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1975, 1975 c51.
Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1967, 1967 c84.
Sea Fish Industry Act 1962, 10 and 11 Eliz 2 c31.
Sea Fish Industry Act 1970, 1970 ell.
Sea Fish Industry Act 1980. 1980 c35.
Sea Fisheries Act 1968, 1968 c77.
Sea Fisheries Regulation Act 1966, 1966 c38.
Sea Fisheries (Shellfish) Act 1967, 1967 c83.
Water Act 1973, 1973 c37.
Water (Scotland) Act 1967, 1967 c78.
Water Resources Act 1963, 1963 c38.
Other
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Callaghan, J., PCD Telegram 1719202, 17th March 1976, "Icelandic Fisheries 
Rumoured Intervention by John Prescott MP".
"Speech by Sir Roger Jackling, First Ccmnittee on Economic Indications", 
8th August 1974. Document issued at the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea.
"Statement by A. Archer at the Informal Session of the First Ccrrmittee on 
9th August", 9th August 1971. Document issued at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea.
"Statement by Mr. K.J. Chantoerlain, United Kingdom First Caimittee, Tuesday 
20th August", 20th August 1974. Document issued at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea.
"Statement by United Kingdom Delegation in the Second Ccmnittee on the 
Economic Zone, 5th August 1974", 5th August 1974. Document issued at the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
"Statement to Plenary Session on 4th July 1974 by the Rt. Hon. David Ennals 
MP". Document issued at the Third United Nations Conference an the Law of 
the Sea.
"UK Articles on Territorial Sea and Straits (L3)", statement in the Second 
Ccmnittee by H.A. Dudgeon. Document issued at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Department of Trade. Report of the Working Group on Disciplinary Needs for 
Seagoing Employment in the Merchant Navy. Noventoer 1975 (London: HMSO,
Department of Trade. Report of the Working Group on Discipline in the 
Fishing Industry. Noventoer 1975 (London: HMSO, 1975).
Department of Trade, Guide to the Responsibilities of Government 
Departments and Agencies (London: HMSO, 1970).
Foreign and Ccmnonwealth Office, Research in the Foreign and Ccmncnwealth 
Office. POO Information Department, Decentoer 1979.
House of Cannons. Assistance to the Fishing Industry. Sixth Report from the 
Estimates Ccmnittee. Session 1966-67. Together with part of the Minutes of 
the evidence taken before the Sub-Ccmnittee on Buildings and Natural 
Resources, Part of the Minutes of the Evidence taken before the 
Sub-Committee on Building and Natural Resources in Session 1965-66, and 
Appendices 20th Decentoer 1966. (HC 277).
House of Cannons, The Fishing Industry. Fifth Report from the
Expenditure Camuttee. Session 1977-78. Together with the Minutes of the 
Evidence taken before 13th April 1978 the Trade and Industry Sub-Ccmruttee 
in Sessions 1976-78 and Appendices. (HC 356).
House of Lords, EEC Fisheries Policy, Sixty-seventh Report fran the Select 
Carunittee on the European Camiunities. Session 1979-80. 5th August 1980. 
(London: HMSO, 1980)
“The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. Consultations with 
non-governmental organisations and individuals on British policy at the 
Conference", Church House, 15th May 1974 (London: PCD, 1974).
"The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. Consultations with 
Non-Governmental organisations and individuals on British policy at the 
Conference", Church House, 30th January 1975 (London: POO, 1975).
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Report of the Ccnmittee appointed to 
review the organisation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
(London: HMSoJ 1951).
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Report of the Ccntnittee 
appointed to review the provincial and local organisation and procedures 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, April 1956 (London: 
HMSO, 1956).
Depeurtment of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland, Lend Use in the 
Highlands and Islands. Report submitted by the Advisory Panel an the 
Highlands and Islands to the Secretary of State for Scotland an 27th 
October 1964 (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1964).
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Camiissian of the Europe am Caimunities, COM (76), 59 final, 24 th February
1976.
Ccrmission of the European Caimunities, OOM (77), 524 final, 17th October
1977.
Catmission of the European Ccmnunities, OOM (78), 39 final, 30th January
1978.
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Ccmnission of the European Comnunities, OOM (81), 435 final, 24th July
1981.
Comission of the European Ccrtmunities, Restructuring of the small-scale 
fishing industry, ISEC/B5/4/75, 19th December 1975.
Council of Ministers. Declaration, 30th May 1980. Official Journal of the 
European Ccmnunities, C158, 27th June 1980, p.20.
EEC Regulation 2141/70, "laying down a oornnon structural policy for the 
fishing industry", 20th October 1970, Official Journal of the European 
Ccmnunities, L236, 27th October 1970, pp. 1-4.
EEC Regulation 2142/70, "on the cannon organisation of the market in 
fishing products", 20th October 1970, Official Journal of the European 
Ccmnunities, L236, 27th October 1970, p.5.
EEC Regulation 753/80, "laying down detailed rules for the recording and 
transmission of information concerning catches taken by the fishing vessels 
of the menber states", 26th March 1980, Official Journal of the European 
Ccmnunities, L84 , 28th March 1980, p.30.
EEC Regulation 3796/81, "on the acmnon organisation cpf the market in 
fishery products", 29th Decenber 1981, Official Journal of the European 
Ccmnunities, L379, 31st Decenber 1981, p.
EEC Regulation 170/83, "establishing a Comunity system for the 
conservation and management of fishery resources", 25th January 1983, 
Official Journal of the European Ccmnunities, L24, 27th January 1983,
pp.1-13.
EEC Regulation 172/83, "on fishing for certain fish stocks and groups of 
fish stocks occurring in the Ccmnunity' s fishing zone..." 25th January 
1983, Official Journal of the European Comnunities, L24, 27th January 1983, 
pp.30—41.
"Officier van Justitie v (1) Cornelius Kramer, (2) Hendrick Van Den Berg", 
Arrondissements Rechtbahk (District Court) Zwolle. 24th Decenber 1975, 
Cannon Market Law Report, 1976 (No. 1), pp. 554-556.
"Officier Van Justitie v (1) Cornelius Kramer" (Case 3/76), (2) Hendrik Van 
Den Berg (Cases 4/76 and 6/76). European Court of Justice, 14th July 1976. 
Comnon Market Law Reports (1976), No. 2, pp.440- 473.
Re: Sea Fishery Restrictions: E.C. Comission v Ireland (Case 61/77). 
European Court of Justice, 22nd May 1977, 13th July 1977, 16th February
1978. Ccmnon Market Law Reports (1978), No. 2, pp.466-518.
French Republic v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
(Case 141/78). European Court of Justice, 4th October 1979. Official 
Journal of the European Cormunities, C280, 9th Noventoer 1980, p.5.
Ccrtmission of the European Comnunities v United Kingdctn of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (Case 804/79). European Court of Justice, 5th May 
1981. Cqnrnon Market Law Reports, (1982), No. 1, pp.543-576.
Treaties establishing the European Ccntnunlties (Luxentoourg: European 
Camiunities, 1973).
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General Assenfoly
General Assenbly Official Records:
22nd Session Supplement 16, A/6716.
23rd Session Supplement 18, A/7218.
24th Session Supplement 30, A/7630.
25th Session Supplement 28, A/8028.
26th Session Supplement 29, A/8429.
27th Session Supplement 30, A/8730.
28th Session Supplement 30, A/9030.
Report of the Ccrrmittee on the Peaceful uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean 
Floor beyond the limits of National Jurisdiction.
24th Session Supplement 22, A/7622.
25th Session Supplement 21, a /8021.
26th Session Supplement 21, A/8421.
27th Session Supplement 21, a /8721.
28th Session Supplement 21, A/9021.
United Nations Ccnmittee on the Peaceful uses of the Sea-bed and the Oc^an 
Floor beyond the limits of National Jurisdiction, Sub-Ccrmittee II, Sunmary 
Records:
4th to 23rd meetings, held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 22nd 
July to 26th August 1971 (New York: United Nations, 1971).
24th to 32nd meetings, held at Headquarters, New York, from 1st to 30th 
March 1972 (New York: United Nations, 1972).
33rd to 47th meetings, held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 
17th July to 17th August 1972 (New York: United Nations, 1972).
Oonferenoes
Third United Nations Conference an the Law of the Sea. 1973-1982 Official 
Records.
Other
Dag Hamnerskjold Library, The Sea: a selecrt bibliography of the the legal, 
political, economic and technological aspecrts, 1975-76 (New York: United 
Nations, 1976).
Dag Hcoimerskjold Library, The Sea: a select bibliography of the the legal, 
political, economic and technological aspecrts, 1976-78 (New York: United 
Nations, 1978).
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ICJ Report.
United Nations Information Service Press Releases, BR and SEA.
